Constitutional arrangements such as federalism or unitary states or forms of government such as parliamentary or presidential systems or hybrid governmental systems are made for man and not vice versa. Thus, parliamentarian, presidential, unitary or federalist principles of governance are not abstract ideals that all nations must strictly abide by but rather evolve in most societies as outcomes of their peculiar evolutionary experiences. Nigerian federalism and by extension her local government structure bear inevitably the imprint of her experience under military rule.
It could be true that the ruling military elite in the nearly three decades since they were at the helm of affairs in Nigeria were inclined towards emphasizing centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism as a result of the military organization’s centralist hierarchical ethos. But it is no less true that other critical stakeholders like elements of the political class, some intellectuals who were involved in governance in military dictatorships, and the top hierarchy of the civil service all supported the weakening of the rigid regional system of the first republic, increased states creation as well as the shift to the presidential form of government because of the perceived role of the political structures of the first republic in orienting the country towards disintegrating centrifugal tendencies inimical to national unity and cohesion.
It is all too common to blame the military for the shift in the dominant political thought that shaped the political institutions of the first republic. But this perception of the country’s problems and how to resolve them through the constitutional provisions of the 1979 Constitution, a document drawn up by 49 ‘wise men’ comprising some of the country’s best and brightest judicial minds, exemplary intellectuals, and statesmen and which forms the core of the extant 1999 Constitution (as amended) were considered by the conventional wisdom of the period to be the right way to go in correcting the ills that brought an end to the first republic and drove the nation inexorably into civil war.
Indeed, although he refused to serve as a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) headed by Chief Rotimi Williams (SAN), that avatar of Nigerian federalism, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, publicly admitted that most of the proposals of the CDC reflected his views and suggestions in his book ‘Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution’.
Thus, even though it may depart from the experience of other federal systems with particular reference to the local government as the third tier of government which is designed by the architects of the constitution to exercise a reasonable degree of autonomy to perform with minimal encumbrances from other levels of government, this is in no way an intrinsic inhibition against the local councils being able to perform optimally and achieving concrete developmental goals at the grassroots. As we noted last week, for instance, Brazil is one federal system that has the local government councils as their third tier of government apparently with beneficial impacts on governance.
The federal purists contend that seeking to make the local governments an autonomous third tier as the 1999 Constitution (as amended) does, amounts to an absurdity. But they proffer no argument as to why it is logically necessary for states, which are part and parcel of the federation territorially, to enjoy a reasonable degree of administrative and constitutional autonomy while the local governments which are inextricable parts of the states where they are located cannot. It is not enough to assert that local government councils must mandatorily be subordinated to states as an inevitable logic of the federalist ethos perhaps as handed over to us by some constitutional deity whose word is law and must be obeyed. The same argument that makes this case for states’ autonomy can also be made for local governments and may even be considered to be a deepening of the federalist logic.
In any case, critics of the constitution as regards its provisions for the establishment, management, and funding of this tier of government are utterly unfair in my view. In Section 7 (1) the Constitution provides in unequivocal terms that “the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is guaranteed under this Constitution”. It further states that “Accordingly, the Government of every State shall…ensure their existence under a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils”.
Some scholars such as the late Professor Adeoye AKinsanya, see a contradiction in this position of the Constitution as regards the existence and functioning of local government councils. In his words, “To be sure, the system of local government by democratically elected LGCs guaranteed by the framers of the Constitution is negated by the same provision of empowering a State Government, using its legislative arm, to enact a Law providing for the “establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such council”, meaning that a state had the power of life and death over every local government council”.
It is difficult to agree with the submission of the Professor. The only constitutionally recognized local government councils are those democratically elected as clearly stipulated by the Constitution. Once a free, fair, and credible poll has been held and the council’s officers have been elected, their powers and existence flow from the votes of the people and these entities can no longer be legitimately dissolved by governors as currently happens arbitrarily and replaced by caretaker committees.
The Constitution provides for no lacuna to give governors any leeway to such recourses as the dissolution of elected local government councils, an action that is tantamount to annulling the will of the people and to derogate from the inalienable right of voters in this regard. But the pending decision of the Supreme Court which is being awaited in the case between the federal and state governments should put this matter to rest.
In also giving the state powers, through the legislature to enact laws for the establishment, structure, composition, funding, and functions of the local councils, the framers of the Constitution pay obeisance to the perceived federalist fetishism. But this provision stands on the leg that the councils must be democratically elected. Some have advocated that amounts of money due to the local councils should simply be paid to state government accounts with the governors determining not only the number of local councils but also how much to allocate to the councils.
This essentially is what obtains at the moment. The funds paid from the State, Local Government Joint Account as stipulated by the Constitution are managed and distributed according to the whims of the governors. Thus, most local governments lack sufficient funds to effectively undertake their functions even minimally. Again, since the governors reportedly appropriate much of the funds due to the local government councils, the latter officials simply have no compunction, in turn, to divert much of whatever is released to them for private acquisitive purposes rather than to address local developmental challenges.
Another problem is that of ensuring the integrity of local government elections which is a responsibility conferred on State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs). The latter have been a disaster with every party in power in the states winning 100 percent of Chairmanship and Councilorship positions competed for. Invariably, with their elections guaranteed by partisan SIECs, the local government officials have no sense of responsibility and accountability to the people with negative consequences for grassroots transformation. It is either the SIECs are strengthened constitutionally and administratively to guarantee their independence and autonomy from the autocratic suzerainty of state governors, or their functions transferred to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
It is difficult to understand why anyone should be scared of having credible polls that truly reflect the will of the people at the grassroots all in the name of adherence to some received theoretical doctrine of federalism. If we are striving ceaselessly to improve democratic structures and processes at the centre and in the states, why should the local governments be immune from imbibing the emergent democratic ethos?
It is no exaggeration that state governors are the greatest albatrosses on the country’s evolution in the direction of an ever-increasingly perfect democratic union, which is an ongoing process even in the most advanced democracies. State governors are widely known to have the state legislatures under their thumbs, and maintain a stranglehold on state judiciaries in addition to their lordship over the state public services. Indeed, so ruthlessly have some governors exercised the powers of their offices that many are beginning to be scared of the impending moves toward the establishment of state police outfits.
True, it is inevitable that states must necessarily have some degree of control over local government councils as they have the responsibility of planning for the socio-economic development of all local governments that constitute their geographical territorial demarcation. But this is just the same way that states have their budgets and economic planning efforts carried on within the framework of macroeconomic and monetary policies articulated and adumbrated by the national government.
Of course, no one should be under the illusion that paying funds of local governments directly to them from the Federation Account will automatically translate into manifestations of robust development at the grassroots. There is also the question of the availability of administrative and managerial capacity at that level of governance. It is certainly not out of place to encourage retired citizens with years of experience and accomplishments in both the public and private sectors to seek election as local government chairmen and councilors. Contrary to popular perception, local governments require the highest levels of experienced, capable, and experienced hands because achieving most of our national developmental goals will be a function of the vibrancy and vitality of those elected to run the councils.
Apart from taking deliberate steps to improve the quality of those elected to run local governments, no effort should be spared by ministries of local government in the states to intensify training and retraining of the officials of the local government bureaucracies to enhance their capacity and effectiveness on the job.
Perhaps one initiative that could be useful in our quest for a more viable local government system is to experiment with holding local government elections on no party basis or at least inoculating the local government system from the vitriol and prejudices of national or state-level electioneering and elections. Professor Alex Gboyega notes in this respect that “In fact, one could go as far as to say that only local parties show interest in local elections. For example, according to Bowman “Australian local councils are generally proud to describe themselves as non-political, that is, they do not divide on party lines, and most councilors are not endorsed by a political party. Formally, at least, most local authorities are set apart from the partisan politics of state and federal government “.
Gboyega continues, “In Canada, the principal characteristic of the local political scene…is that the established political parties existing at the federal and provincial levels do not play a direct role in municipal politics. Municipal council members are elected either on a nonpartisan basis or as representatives of purely municipal or civic parties. In the USA too, the party system is so fragmented that national or statewide political parties play no role in local government “. Perhaps this is one area we can look at in reshaping and reorganizing our local government system in Nigeria.
