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Category: Ropo Sekoni

  • Nigeria and its neighbours (2)

    By Ropo Sekoni

    It is time to encourage countries in the region to reduce regional economic communities from the existing five to just ECOWAS

    The deepening of market integration in West Africa remains critical for harnessing the benefits of a large and growing regional market and for enhancing the role of trade as engine of sustainable and inclusive growth in the Member States. ECOWAS being a designated major building block of Pan-African economic integration, the enhancement of its market integration is also important for the success of key continental initiatives such as the AfCFTA, AEC, and Agenda 2063, whose primary objectives are to assist Africa to meet the challenges of development in a rapidly changing global economy — Olufemi Fajana in “Accelerating the Implementation of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme.”

    In the first part of this piece, I raised the probability of persistent smuggling of goods from Nigeria’s neighbours, regardless of what may be the effect of the current border closure and until all factors motivating smuggling are addressed. I based (and still do) my assumption on contiguity and cultural overlaps across borders in Nigeria, Benin, and Niger that are too strong and widespread for any country to monitor and control successfully. The focus of this final piece is the importance of making ECOWAS, especially the organisation’s Trade Liberalisation Scheme and economic integration effective, the way similar projects had worked in other parts of the world. European Union is a graphic example of such success.

    Since the first generation of post-independence African leaders endorsed the sanctity of the boundaries established by colonial masters, the concept and practice of the Westphalian State system became the norm across the continent, thus allowing for many countries that share cultural and economic values to assert their sovereignty in relation to their neighbours. Even though Niger and Benin are members of West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the economies of the two countries are tied to Nigeria’s so much that the two countries have earned the nicknames of Nigeria’s 37th and 38th states. There is no better illustration for this characterisation than the decision to extend Nigeria’s railway to Maradi in Niger.

    Read Also: Nigeria and its neighbours (1)

    Shortly after the adoption by Organisation of African Unity and later the African Union of the sacredness of the Westphalian theory of states in post-colonial Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975, perhaps in imitation of the European Economic Community that later became European Union. ECOWAS has as its primary purpose promotion of economic trade, national cooperation, monetary union, and growth and development throughout West Africa. The organisation later established Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) to accelerate economic integration of West Africa through intra-regional trade. Further, ECOWAS created and sustained a parliament, commission, secretariat, common passport, regional judicial system, such as the European Union had done to make its own economic integration consequential.

    The purpose of the historical summary is to raise the question why Niger and Benin still serve as sources of smuggled goods to Nigeria, several years after ECOWAS had achieved all the institutions needed to make smuggling of goods from one country to another, especially of goods from a third country, such as the illegal importation of rice that had made Nigeria to close its borders, unnecessary?

    It is African leaders—civilian and military—since independence till today that deserve to be blamed for a situation in which borders are closed because of smuggling of simple products like rice to Nigeria or any other country within ECOWAS. Given the frequency with which African leaders travel to other regions of the world, it is surprising that it has been hard for them to go beyond creating all the paraphernalia of an integrated region, with no outcome on the primary goal of a regional body established since 1975 to achieve economic integration.

    Of course, African leaders seem to have reasons for sticking to the national countries bequeathed to them by Britain and France. The power to invoke sovereignty of countries the leaders control; the opportunity of such leaders to enjoy and flaunt the power thrown up by becoming leaders through coup d’etat or election; and the chance for leaders of individual nations to use such power for personal or ethnic advantage within the framework of each sovereign country have made re-examining the Westphalian system unattractive to African leaders.

    In respect to ECOWAS, it is curious that this regional body has the smallest percentage of inter-country trade in relation to other regional economic communities on the continent, about 11% in relation to other regions that range from 15% to 25%. This situation also suggests that leaders in the region are wary of promoting regional economic integration for fear of losing privileges provided by individual countries. What is generally referred to in the literature on regional bodies as lack of political will looks more like the absence of will on the part of leaders to share the sovereignty of their country—believed to be embodied in them—with leaders of other countries in the region.

    Coincidentally, Nigeria currently has enormous advantages to move ECOWAS in the right direction. It houses the secretariat of the 50-year-old body, has its president as the current chairman of the body, has the largest population in the region, has more trained manpower than any other country in the region, and has a government that has sworn to moving the country in the direction of productive economy, as distinct from decades of rent collection from petroleum. In other words, Nigeria has what it takes to call on other countries in the region to commit beyond rhetoric and symbols to meaningful economic integration.

    Relatedly, reliable electricity must be provided so that produce coming from Nigeria’s farms can be given the right polish that rice from other countries presents. This will make imported rice unattractive to Nigerians and even people in Niger, Benin, and other countries. There is no reason why good parboiled rice from Nigeria should cost more than what comes from India, China, or Thailand. Cost of labour is lower here than in most countries. Further, should Nigeria choose not to imitate countries that polish and parboil their rice, it should be ready to market the advantages of its rice, particularly the enormous health benefits of consuming rice with the  bran on the rice grain, which over processing of imported rice lacks.

    So far, closure of two major land borders ought to have sent the right signals to Nigeria’s neighbours. Nigeria’s federal government has demonstrated its resolve to reduce the business-as-usual syndrome that has hobbled the West African region economically. Nigeria should also talk to its foreign development partners, especially former colonial masters who would prefer to push their own farm produce and factory goods or of members of their own regional economic communities to Africa’s largest market.

    In addition, Nigeria ought to provide leadership for a regional summit on how to give ECOWAS the economic system that is needed for improving chances of people in the region to survive and thrive, better than can happen with the current 15 discrete economic system held together by name and symbols. It is time to encourage countries in the region to reduce regional economic communities from the existing five to just ECOWAS. Such development is likely to provide ECOWAS with the concentration to make the community add value to the lives of the region’s 400 citizens.

    Given what happens in other regions of the world, the future of economic organisation and prosperity in the ECOWAS is bound to be different from the past of all the countries that constitute the regional body. Economic integration and common currency are more likely to discourage smuggling of products of other countries in a region-wide economic system where economic and fiscal policies are similar. In the meantime, Nigerian Customs should be strengthened technologically and morally to perform its regulatory functions efficiently and effectively, by giving no excuse for illegal goods to enter the country and without needing to close the borders.

    • Concluded

  • Nigeria and its neighbours (1)

    By Ropo Sekoni

    Equally, many people may be wondering why we just close two out of four borders with the country.

    Perhaps, many people are just knowing that Nigeria has many neighbours with which it is contiguous. These are Republic of Benin to the west; Niger Republic to the north; Chad to the northeast; and Cameroon to the east. And the novelty of the knowledge about Nigeria’s neighbours must have come from the ongoing closure of the borders between Nigeria and its western and northern neighbours: Benin and Niger republics.

    Equally, many people may be wondering why we just close two out of four borders with the country. Certainly, it is not because there is no smuggling into Nigeria from the other two neighbours; Chad and Cameroon.  As far back as the 1980s when I used to visit the University of Yaounde for academic conference from the University of Ife, smuggling of Peugeot cars and parts from Cameroon to Nigeria, even when there was a Peugeot assembly plant in Kaduna, was common knowledge. It is because of the intensity of the smuggling from Niger and Benin has become unmistakable and worrisome to those who see it as a problem that must be solved. It may not be surprising that while the northern and western borders are closed, smuggling could have increased in the remaining two, i.e. Chad and Cameroon. There is no guarantee that the border closure would not come to the turn of Chad and Cameroon as time goes on.

    The recent observation by Nigeria’s Minister of Information: “What has happened is that there is an agreement among the ECOWAS member states that goods coming into Nigeria must be containerised and taken through the border where they can be assessed and attested that they are not smuggled items….However, this agreement has not been adhered to by our neighbours….We know that the closure is inflicting some collateral damages to many people but in the overall interest of Nigerians, we need to persevere and bear with the government so that our neighbours would be responsible and responsive” says a lot about the trade problem between Nigeria and two of its neighbours currently receiving federal government’s attention. And the minister’s observation calls (rightly) for a long-term solution to the time-honoured problem. What must not be missed when the time for long-term solution to the long-standing problem, currently receiving a temporary and drastic solution, comes is the need for a holistic approach.

    First, a little history that can sketch out contours of a holistic approach to this problem. The political history of Nigeria (as it is today) is akin to the history of its four neighbours. They are all products of the imagination and desire of their colonial masters; Britain, France, and Germany for some time. People who smuggle today to Nigeria are largely descendants of the same ancestors, Fulani in northern tip of Nigeria and southern Niger and Yoruba for western Nigeria and eastern Benin.

    The fact that these two sections have relations across borders is not unique for West Africa. There are Ewes in Togo next door to their cousins in Ghana; there are Ashanti in Ghana and Baoule in Cote d’Ivoire; and there are Yoruba in Benin and in Togo, etc. Such cross-border nationalities across the globe experience legal and illegal cross-border movement of goods and persons, where the governments on both sides look away. With respect to Nigeria, while products from Europe or Asia, such as rice, sugar, exotic spices may come from the former French colonies of Benin and Niger, so do products like Star, Guilder, Trophy beer and crude and refined petroleum go from Nigeria to Benin and Niger. For example, the contiguity between Maradi and Katsina (such that Nigeria has decided to extend its railway to Maradi and the proximity of Idi-Iroko to Porto Novo or Badagry to Seme makes smuggling as easy as it can get.

    Readers of WikiLeaks revelations on Nigeria would recall that during the administration of Obasanjo, a man with a Yoruba name was the most notorious smuggler of stolen cars from Nigeria to Cotonou while another Nigerian from Katsina was the most notorious smuggler of luxury goods from Niamey to Nigeria. Smugglers can do their business without English and French, as those close to Niger can make do with Fulfulde or Hausa while those around Cotonou or Porto Novo can plan and execute crude and sophisticated smugglings in Yoruba. The existence of several villages that connect Nigeria and Niger and Benin also suggests that the smuggling going across these countries may be more than meets the eye or that the authorities in the three countries can easily manage with their anti-smuggling personnel.

    It is, therefore, short-sighted to see smuggling into Nigeria from Niger and Benin Republics as only an economic problem. It is a problem that is sociological, cultural, emotional, and even psychological. It is a replaying of an ancient trade relations that they cannot believe to be inimical to colonial and postcolonial boundaries. What the current closure by itself can achieve is only a temporary solution to smuggling. This makes the need for a holistic approach mandatory on both sides of the borders. Earlier in the year, the federal government directed that citizens from Nigeria’s neighbours (that include Benin and Niger) be registered online to enable them to remain in Nigeria as duly documented immigrants, regardless of how they got into the country. The reasons for such easy movement of persons into Nigeria also apply to movement of goods.

    Although movement of persons may be easier than movement of goods, unplanned immigration may be seen as increasing the country’s ‘raw labour supply’ but it may also aggravate Nigeria’s unemployment rate, particularly at a time that Nigeria is already being cited as about ready to become the fourth largest country on the globe. Illegal movement of goods, especially goods from a third country, like rice, sugar, wine, and hard liquor into Nigeria can degrade or damage Nigeria’s economy, especially now that the country is working on espousing a productive economic model to complement its rentier one. Closing the borders indefinitely, if this were possible, may not bring smuggling among Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon to an end.

    One thing that is good about the closure of land borders, apart from the announcement that the price of domestic rice has been spiking since the closure, is that the government is also assuring citizens that the closure is not the best permanent arrangement for countries tied together not just by geography but also by centuries of consanguinity and way of life. Just as Olusola Igue, a Beninois scholar of cross-border trade in Africa, had observed, smuggling has persisted in the region because it reflects ancient trade patterns starkly in collusion with modern boundaries. It may be over optimistic or foolhardy for any government in the ECOWAS region—from Senegal to Nigeria—to expect that border closure will solve the problem of smuggling within the region. Even after several days of closure, the Nigerian Customs has announced that over 3,000 bags of imported rice had entered Nigeria through bush paths on bicycles or motorised cycles through villages in Niger and Benin republics.

    Similarly, the conclusion of Alan Deardorff and Wolfgang Stopler in  “Effects of Smuggling under African Conditions: A Factual, Institutional and Analytic Discussion,” that for as long as Africa’s geography conflicts with its politics, “free trade would solve most of existing boundaries currently engaged in inward-looking policies necessitated by ‘nation-building’ on the basis of existing boundaries,” is worth the attention of political leaders and policy wonks of all the countries in West Africa.

    Nigeria has many comparative advantages. And it has shown some of it by unilaterally closing borders between it and its smaller neighbours and seems to have sent some significant signal through this measure. But it will be wrong to assume that the problem of smuggling from Nigeria’s brothers and sisters across the borders will go away because of border closure. Nigeria has more comparative advantages that it can deploy to deal with an ancient problem that it and other members of ECOWAS has inherited and aggravated.

    The conclusion to the paper by Alan Deardorff and Wolfgang Stopler in the article referenced above is worth restating for the benefit of post-closure policies: “Smuggling in African circumstances is an unequivocal blessing for the economies, the people, and ultimately perhaps even the governments. It is a healthy reaction to bad situations caused by bad policies. It is healthy in the sense in which a high fever is healthy for a person with an infection. Of course, a healthy body and no fever would be even better.”

    To be continued

  • Rule of Law and security shouldn’t be mutually exclusive

    The nexus between the rule of law and national security/public interest is one of the most complex aspects of democratic governance.

    When it comes to security, all laws take a back seat….  We want to make sure that our people are protected. You must be alive and well for you to begin to ask for your rights. Your rights come when you are well and alive. …Go and [ask] the people in Maiduguri when Boko Haram was harassing their lives, the only question was survival, there is no question of right. This time Nigeria must survive first then before we begin to ask for our right—Hameed Ali, Comptroller-General of the Nigeria Customs.

    Rule of Law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires as well measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.—Kofi Annan in 2004.

    The first quotation overleaf represents the latest thinking in government about the nature of the social contract between citizens and the federal government. But earlier, President Buhari had been reported to have said to the nation’s Bar Association that “where national security and (the) public interest are threatened or there is a likelihood of their being threatened, the individual rights must take second place, in favour of the greater good of society.”

    Similarly, the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice has been quoted as saying, in a response to a question about continued detention of retired Sambo Dasuki and Ibrahim Zakzaky, “I concede as argued by the Senate Minority Leader, Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe (Abia South ), that a Minister of Justice and Attorney General as stipulated by sections 36, 37 and 39 of the constitution, is supposed to protect the rights of any citizen from being violated even by the state, but where such rights conflict with public interest , the latter overrides the former. Office of the AGF has exclusive responsibility of upholding the public interest above personal interest of anybody.”  If truly the three statements had been made by three members of the executive branch of government, then the country’s democracy  may be entering a phase in which Ori bibe di oogun fun ori fifo (decapitation becomes a regular cure for headache).

    In case many of the members of our executive branch of government prefer to forget the history of democracy in our country, this country came into existence as an independent one because of the desire of many patriots to become part of a global democratic world. From various parts of the country, political leaders struggled against the British colonial government on the premise that colonisation of another group was wrong because such act denied colonised citizens opportunities to enjoy benefits of the rule of law. In more recent times, citizens from across the country have also struggled against military dictatorship in order to re-enthrone the culture of democracy and the rule of law in the country, the kind of struggle that made it possible for many people with no military background to be in power today. How many of the nationalities in Nigeria today would have agreed to go into independence as a country that accepts that the rule of law is inferior to public interest and that public interest overtakes human rights?

    In addition, the 1999 Constitution that came as part of the outcome of the struggle for democracy in the wake of the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections created a system of separation of powers defined by existence of three arms of government: executive, legislative, and judiciary. The executive is given the power to, among other things, provide citizens with security of citizens and the country; the legislature to create laws to ensure that citizens are well protected and properly governed, and the judiciary to be the final arm that interprets the laws of the land independent of the other two branches of government. It is, therefore, improper for the executive to act as if it is the only arm of government to determine what the national interest is and whether responsibility to sustain the national interest and protection of citizens’ human rights through insistence on the rule of law are mutually exclusive.

    That the president sees ensuring the unity of the country as one of his principal objectives illustrates that he recognises that the country is not united enough. Unless he believes that making national unity sustainable in a country currently held together by democracy can be best achieved without fidelity to the primacy of the rule of law, the statements emanating from the executive side of the government in respect of the importance of rule of law are not needed now and at any other time in the country as a democracy.

    Such statements amount to trying to re-invent the wheel of democratic governance in the country. The current constitution does not establish any polarity between the rule of law and management of the country’s security—territorial and human. For example, in case of an attack from a foreign country, the constitution empowers the executive to recommend declaration of emergency regulations to the legislature. There is no evidence that the country has been under any external attack since the country’s transition from the president’s first tenure to his second after the 2019 elections. It is, therefore, troubling that within sixty days, the rhetoric in respect of separation of powers is raising the political temperature of the country and giving citizens the impression of fearmongering.

    Where the threat to the country is from within—terrorism from Boko Haram for instance, banditry, kidnapping, violent conflict between herdsmen and farmers, etc., the constitution gives the executive the power to make adequate provision for enforcing the laws of the land to fight internal security problems, without declaring any emergency rule that can tamper with the rule of law. In fact, the constitution assumes that the rule of law is part of the arsenal with which the government can or should fight any form of internal threat. Such emergency regulations had been imposed before in respect of Boko Haram, without generating a conflict between the rule of law and maintenance of internal security in the country. And where there are confusions between the views of the executive and legislative branches in respect of the sanctity of rule of law and human rights in a democracy, it is the judiciary that is constitutionally empowered to make the final review and decision on how to resolve such confusion or conflict.

    The average citizen may not know what government officials know about security threats in the country. It will help matters if government leaders share knowledge of threats that justify suspension of the rule of law and human rights with citizens. For example, the juxtaposition of rule of law/citizens’ rights and security by the Comptroller-General of Customs in the statement “when it comes to security, all laws take a back seat….  We want to make sure that our people are protected. You must be alive and well for you to begin to ask for your rights. Your rights come when you are well and alive” appears simplistic and yet confusing. Is government’s respect for citizens’ rights not connected to being “alive and well” in a democracy? The nexus between the rule of law and national security/public interest is one of the most complex aspects of democratic governance. Its discussion by public officials usually requires more sensitivity and sophistication under a democratic government than citizens have seen in the last few weeks.

    The quotation above from Kofi Annan illustrates the sensitivity and sophistication required in the discussion of the right relationship between the rule of law and public interest in a democracy.

  • Rightsizing governance

    By Ropo Sekoni

    Nigeria does not seem productive enough to justify having two full-time legislative houses.

    President Muhammadu Buhari has started on a ‘trailblazing’ of some sort: He wants to reduce the cost of governance. Even some of his governors and senators are already jumping on the bandwagon that the president’s new pet project seems to have established. Even critical observers of the country’s governance may find the move to reduce money spent on governing a country that leaves very little for the masses a little belated but all the same necessary. Profligacy in government has been rising 1966 but efforts to stop it should not just focus on errant individuals but also causes of wastage in the system.

    The president should not just “weed out possible corruption that exists anywhere,” he should examine agencies that function more like sites of jobs for the boys at all levels of government. One area of cutting the cost of governance that has received a lot of publicity in the last few days is about the justification for a bicameral legislature in a country with inadequate infrastructure. Of course,  nobody expects a senator or his/her family members to see any sense in the suggestion that there is no urgent need, if any at all, for a bicameral legislature in a country that is spending 25% of its budget on debt servicing. But it is a good thing that government policies and institutions are not created for the benefit of just a few folks with the money or connection to get elected into the senate or house of representatives. One legislature, whatever name it may be given, is enough until such a time that the country can afford the luxury of a senate.

    Democracy can function in a unicameral legislature. What matters most is the degree of affiliation of citizens to the constitution and the degree of lawmakers’ patriotism to the country.  For example, lawmaking over 50 years ago in Nigeria was part-time and it was such a hallowed chamber to which the best minds in the society craved to belong. Each lawmaker had a regular full-time job and just came to Lagos or Ibadan to debate and deliberate with the best from the other communities to make laws.

    For those who had lived through that time, it is not clear which improvement in the governance of the country has necessitated having two houses of legislature at the center and almost two assemblies—one for lawmakers and another for chiefs—in the subnational sector. Even when lawmaking was part-time in Western Nigeria, all chairs were occupied when the house was in session, unlike now when full-time lawmakers stay away most of the time and many of those who are present at work sleep through most of the deliberations. Nigeria does not seem productive enough to justify having two full-time legislative houses.

    Indeed, what is needed may be just one house of equal number of representatives from each of the states. Such a legislature will capture the sense of balance and equal representation from the states that the current senate. With one legislative house, the country would save at least N60 billion annually that is currently reserved for servicing one of two legislatures. Similarly, in the states, one house without a House or Council of Chiefs should be adequate. Attempting to find relevance for pre-colonial rulers: chiefs, emirs, obis, obongs looks like rewarding obsolescence and promoting avoidable contradictions by having a republic in which unelected individuals participate in governance, on the basis of ascription or inheritance. To the average citizen, there is no outcome from governance at the federal level to justify having two legislatures of about 500 lawmakers who receive more public funds as salary and allowance than any other lawmaker on the globe.

    But attention needs to be given to many other sectors that serve as sources of pork for politicians or their cronies. With a civil service that consumes almost 40% of the annual national budget, there should be no need for several aides for the president or the governors in the name of special advisers, special assistants, senior special assistants, etc. What are the people in the professional civil service expected to do? With a professional civil service that is expected to be loyal to whatever party in power, why should our presidential system need another layer of aides? Many citizens are unaware of the significance of civil servants, let alone a new horde of advisers and assistants for president, governor, ministers, and commissioners.

    By way of digression, in 2006, I went to Akure with a boy of ten. We happened to be around the secretariat during closing time. On seeing so many people ooze out of the many buildings of the secretariat, the young boy screamed, “Daddy, who are these people?” I responded, “they are civil servants.”  He added, “What do they do?” I said that “they provide services for citizens.” Feeling surprised, he said, “what service—no electricity, no good road, no water, etc.” I told him our country is a developing one. What the young boy saw in Akure is typical of other states even till today. The resources being spent on the civil service in the states do not justify employing another layer of public servants to man the governor’s service. And the sitting allowances paid to traditional rulers whose salaries come from the public source is part of the pork that should be dispensed with.

    Before President Buhari announced his commitment to reducing the cost of governance, he had called for resuscitation of the Oronsaye Report that had advised the federal government before Buhari’s first term in office to reduce its bureaucracy, especially by cutting down on the huge number of government agencies that compete to do more or less the same thing, and without showing convincing outcomes to justify investment on them.

    Too many agencies are doing more or less the same thing: ICPC/EFCC; Broadcasting Corporation of Nigeria/Federal Radio/Television Corporation of Nigeria/Nigeria Broadcasting Commission; National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons/the Immigration Service; National Council on Privatization/Bureau of Public Enterprises; National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion/Ministry of Science or Technology; National Environmental Standard and Regulation Enforcement Agency/National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency; Niger Delta Development Commission/Ministry of the Niger Delta; Nigerian Export Promotion Council/Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority; etc.

    Most importantly, there was a time the president very early in his first term had to bail out states for failure to pay salaries of their workers. A country of Nigeria’s size with 36 states is one that can be called an over administered state. It has been said many times that just two or three states; Lagos, Akwa Ibom and Rivers (because of allowance for oil) are sustainable. It is a no brainer that the current political structure came into being because of petroleum and later gas. From what happened in 2015 when the price oil slumped in the international market, it is also clear that the current structure is unsustainable without oil, until the new policy on diversification changes the country from a rentier state to one that can live on the brain and brawn of its citizens, like other countries that are largely self-sustaining without petroleum.  Even though we may be close to finding petroleum in the Chad and Benue Basins, the profitability of oil no longer rests with oil-producing countries alone, it is dependent on the taste and needs of developed countries that are also now capable of creating technology that can make oil obsolete and of little or no value in the near future. This may be an opportune time for the president to send a special bill to the house on creating a new structure for governing the country.

    There was a time when Nigeria could boast that money was not its problem but how to spend it. Such claim is no longer possible when the country spends about 25% of its annual budget on servicing debts owed to external and internal creditors. Reducing the cost of governance at the level of the central government and encouraging governors to see the reason for a new vision beyond receiving allocations to pay salaries for work by public servants who embarrassingly have little to show for their presence is one legacy that many Nigerians may never forget.

  • Nigeria’s governance: the presidency or the constitution? 2

    Last week, we emphasised the role of military rule on the 1999 Constitution that shapes the country’s political and economic life, even 20 years beyond military rule. We also asked readers to look beyond the surface of what happens on the country’s political and governance landscape to avoid heaping all the problems of governance on who becomes president while urging readers to pay more attention to the constitution that distributes power across the governance spectrum.

    My focus today is on the politics of constitution making in Nigeria and the effects of political visions of various groups of rulers on the type of constitution that is produced to determine governance goals and style.   Since 1999, the narrative about presidents remained the same: that none of the presidents has been able to solve the problems facing the polity and the economy. Could all the four presidents be below average? Of course, there is no attempt to say that character of individuals would not affect the way they respond to power. But the magnitude of power made available to presidents often matter; otherwise, the country should not be making the same complaints they made during the regime of Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, Jonathan, and now Buhari, namely inability or unwillingness to solve the country’s problems.

    Beyond the 1960/63 constitutions, the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, as we observed last week, are products of military imagination or mindset. The introduction of presidential system in 1979 is believed to have derived from military authoritarian model of governance. Some observers have also suggested that the adoption of presidential system in 1979 by the Obasanjo regime was influenced by the Emirate system and that ascribing the influence to American presidential system was to make the presidential system look more glamorous to citizens.

    What has the presidential system engendered in contrast to the parliamentary system bequeathed to the country by British colonialism? The transition from a democracy up till 1965 driven by debate to one bolstered by executive orders, vetoing of legislative bills, and issuance of executive orders remove presidents from the thinking of his or her colleagues in the parliament and casts him or her as sole player. Even though a president appoints ministers and advisers to assist him or her, such officers are responsible solely to the president in practice, despite the power of lawmakers to invite ministers occasionally for clarification on matters of interest to the legislators.

    In addition, replacing the parliamentary system with the presidential model makes it easy for the president to make so many appointments that are not subjected to any debate, thus explaining why a president can defend filling all top security posts without worrying about being accused of sectionalism. For example, section 151. (1) of the Constitution allows the president to appoint any person as a Special Adviser to assist him in the performance of his functions and 154. (2) says the president can appoint a person as Chairman or member of the Council of State or the National Defence Council or the National Security Council, without obtaining confirmation of the Senate.

    These provisions give the president full control of bodies that constitute the soul of the nation. Further, the State Security Service (SSS or DSS) is under the sole control of the executive and the agency has the power to disregard court judgement in respect of bail in the name of national security. No prime minister had such powers under a parliamentary system discarded by military rulers and designers of post-military polity. But the military authors of the 1999 Constitution thrived on such powers. Any surprise if any president acts in a way that smacks of authoritarianism?

    Recent developments in the United Kingdom and the United States raise issues of importance about the effect of constitutional principles on the disposition of political executives to power. In the UK, an attempt by the prime minister to overextend the power allowed him led to a judgment that resisted any attempt to distort the fundamentals of British democracy. In the United States, efforts are in what promises to be a tortuous process by the Congress to test the limit of presidential power.

    The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to remind the average citizen about the danger of ignoring the root of problems of national and subnational governance in the country. The challenge is for committed reformers to accept is the need for the country to base its democratic governance on a constitution derived from participation of free citizens. Holding on to a constitution constructed without reference to the authority or approval of citizens, directly in a referendum or indirectly through deliberations by elected representatives while expecting operators of the constitution to perform miracles is foolhardy.

    For those interested in fundamental political reform of the country, it is rather defeatist to hold on to the idea of the 1999 Constitution as fait accompli or done deal. There is no fait accompli in democratic politics, especially with respect to searching for a constitution that bring a country together to solve problems common to its citizens. This explains why many countries across the globe have had many constitutions. Some of such countries in Africa are Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana, France, Angola, Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, Greece, Brazil, Finland, and Hungary are examples from outside of Africa.

    Nigeria itself has had four and still needs another one, if the country is to have a constitution that reflects the kind of consensus that can generate a genuine sense of belonging that gives every part of a diverse country a greater sense of belonging. Isn’t it worrisome that since 1966, national unity has been the most important goal identified by presidents—military and civilian? Is this an indication that the country is not doing the right thing in respect of how to mobilise its citizens with a Union Charter that they find rational and capable of making Nigeria worth dying for?

    Knowing that it is not easy to undo history, reform-minded Nigerians can imagine many aspects of the 1999 Constitution that might have been avoided, had citizens been given opportunities by the departing military rulers in 1999 to deliberate and negotiate principles of governance agreeable to the communities that constitute the country. For example, the presidential system could have been replaced by a parliamentary system that seems to have more opportunities for citizens to realise that sovereignty remains theirs in a democratic governance beyond electoral democracy. Apart from international sports (the success of which cannot be attributed to Nigeria), election is the only one that gives Nigerians a feeling of political importance, especially citizens who succeed in obtaining permanent voter cards on time. Is it surprising that 2023 election is already being hyped a few months after the 2019 elections?

    It would have been hard for the section on secularity of the polity in the 1979 Constitution to be omitted in the 1999 Constitution. It is also conceivable that many communities would have preferred that approvals for all appointments made to assist the president to do the job of governing the country are constitutionalised. In addition, the powers concentrated at the centre, which by implication boost the powers of the president across the country might have been considered by many communities as inimical to sustainable federal democracy and national unity.

    It may be better for citizens to pay more attention to how to improve the structure and institutions of governance than to expect angelic actions from presidents or governors. Citizens do not have powers over the personality of their political leaders, but citizens in a democracy have the right to insist on creation of principles, procedures, and processes that can make it mandatory for presidents and governors to serve the interests of the nation, state, and citizens, regardless of personal idiosyncrasies.

  • Nigeria’s governance: the presidency or the constitution? 1

    In 1999, citizens were not given an opportunity to show their views or assessments of the 1979 Constitution in relation to citizens’ sovereignty beyond the right to vote.

    Before I lose my readers, I would like to say that by presidency, I do not mean the unelected group that is generally referred to in the media as the presidency. I mean the two elected leaders—Buhari and Osinbajo—and their subnational counterparts—the so-called ‘executive governor’ and his deputy in the states. If you prefer, take my usage to mean the presidential system at the centre of the 1999 Constitution at the national and subnational levels.

    There is a Yoruba proverb: Amukun eru ori re wo, hmn oke lo n wo, oo wo isale, in English, an observer asks a semi-crippled person why the load on his head is not balanced and gets the reply of looking at the symptom, rather than the cause of a problem. This proverb seems to have a lot of relevance to the study of problems of governance in Nigeria. After four presidents since the end of military dictatorship in 1999, a journey through the country’s newspaper archives would reveal that each president including Umaru Yar’Adua who ruled (or reigned?) just for two years has been characterized by citizens and pundits to be incapable of solving the growing problems of the country. Is it conceivable that not all the presidents may be bad rulers but well-meaning individuals that choose to rule in an atmosphere toxic to the growth of democracy and development?

    After sixteen years of post-military rule, complaints about bad governance from citizens and pundits peaked to the point that Change became All Progressives Congress (APC) that brought Buhari to presidential power in 2015. And since he became president, complaints have not reduced about how little he, like those before him, has achieved, despite the sophistication with which the programmes he introduced have been reported and defended by his media men and other self-appointed praise singers of the president from the legislature, not only from his party but from opposition parties. For example, shortly after the election of the 9th Senate President, he pledged that he and the senate would not disappoint President Buhari, instead of worrying about disappointing Nigerians. What can be the explanation for having four presidents in a row that citizens in general are at ease to complain about and more or less for the same reason—lack of good governance and democracy?

    During the tenure of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the first president after the end of military dictatorship, a recurrent motif in the criticism of his rule was about a constitution that was not conducive to post-military rule. This was quickly replaced by a school of thought that propagated the belief that it was Obasanjo as an individual that was bad—unduly beholden to his military past and lacking the finesse of governing a truly free country. After him came Yar’Adua, whose failure was blamed on his poor health, at a time that most of the nation knew nothing about his approval of a contract with P&ID, a move that now threatens the economic health of the country. Criticism of Yar’Adua’s government later shifted to an invisible cabal blamed for ruling in Yar’Adua’s name, until the elevation of Goodluck Jonathan from vice president to president.

    Jonathan too was castigated for being too much of a-happy-go-lucky-fellow to have been wired to govern properly. And now, Buhari, a man believed to be coming to govern with the image of a messiah or angel, is believed by many not to be better than the people before him. Many of those who convinced voters about Buhari’s messianism are now complaining that they would rather not be ruled by a messiah-figure but by a regular mortal likely to feel the pains of suffering citizens. If after the nation-wide excitement of 2015, critics of governance at the centre and in the states cannot see their economic and political salvation in the style of Buhari, shouldn’t such critics, like the critic in the Yoruba proverb referenced at he beginning of this piece, wonder and worry why for 20 years after the departure of military dictators, Nigeria is still groping with the lock and searching for answers to its democracy and development?

    For a country to believe that 100% of its presidents and governors generally underperform, the reason may not be because all such persons are below average individuals, it may very well be that the tools with which they are asked to perform the herculean task placed before them by decades of military dictatorship are inadequate for the job. But I must confess to the fact that I am not a believer in the leadership-is-the-problem-of-Nigeria school of thought. Believing that leaders are not born but made by the environment or context in which they function, I am of the school that connectedness of goals and process or method can make an average person do well in government.

    Consequently, I believe that all the four presidents we have had since 1999 have been saddled with a governance structure that is inferior to the job at hand. Consequently, I believe that the 1999 Constitution is an albatross that needs to be removed in order to improve the qualities and standards of the field of governance in our multicultural federal democracy. Looking away from this important foundation while expecting angels in the most unlikely place—the seat of near-absolute national or subnational power—seems unrealistic or denialist.

    The history of the making of constitutions in the country shows a decline in the role of citizens in the making of the basic laws that determine their relevance in the polity. The constitutions that culminated in the Independence Constitution were made with direct and indirect participation by citizens. Each of the pre-1960 constitution heard from citizens through representatives that they sent to conferences at which choices were made about the type of constitution they would prefer. Of course, at each level, the colonial master also had a role to play in what type of constitution Nigeria got between 1946 and 1960.

    But the short-lived 1963 Constitution was negotiated by representatives of citizens under the government of Tafawa Balewa,  before it was suspended between 1966 and 1979 by the military dictators that came on the political landscape—from Gowon to Murtala and finally to Obasanjo, the most important author of the 1979 Constitution. It is necessary to remind ourselves that the committee that produced the first draft of the 1979 Constitution under the chairmanship of Rotimi Williams did not recommend a presidential system of government. It was the Supreme Military Council under Obasanjo that changed the focus of the draft from parliamentary to presidential system. Even though the 1979 document was suspended from 1984 to 1999 by successions of military rulers from Buhari to Babangida and Abacha, it re-surfaced in the 1999 Constitution that was produced in camera and unearthed after the election of the first post-military civil government in 1999.

    The little input from citizens directly or indirectly in the 1979 Constitution was given no chance by the authors of the 1999 Constitution. In 1999, citizens were not given an opportunity to show their views or assessments of the 1979 Constitution in relation to citizens’ sovereignty beyond the right to vote. Authors of the 1999 Constitution ignored the history of the struggle for de-militarization of the Nigerian polity by creating a constitution that ignores all of the issues that led to the struggle—the call for a constitution negotiated by free citizens and that is capable to respond to the country’s cultural diversity, especially a Basic Law document that can respond to the special needs of a multiethnic and multicultural democracy.

    To be continued.

  • Politics of police and policing

    The matter of state police is, in every sense, political and should not be joined by the IG.

    Words that have been in circulation almost daily in the last one year include security, police as a system, and policing as methods of sustaining law enforcement and public order round the clock. For example, since June, state police and community policing have formed substantial part of public discourse. In June the governors went back and forth on the importance of state police and even met with President Buhari on this matter. At this meeting the governors demonstrated that not all the 36 governors have agreed on establishment of state police.

    Further, President Buhari himself set up a special Panel to investigate allegations of human rights abuse by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad. The committee recommended among other things establishment of state and local government police to address security challenges in the country. Later, the federal government set up another committee on Strengthening of Internal Security and Community Policing in Nigeria. This committee submitted its report a few days ago, at a ceremony that included the Inspector General of Police (IGP), also a member of the committee.

    At the ceremony, the IGP doubled as police professional and policymaker when he stated: “Because the advantages of community policing outweigh the idea of state policing, the disadvantages of state policing are more than the perceived advantages. So, the way to go is by community policing, which will take care of all the demands and agitation for state police.”  This statement brings to a head several side comments by the IGP since his appointment to show opposition to multilevel policing or establishment of state police. Such statements by the IGP are likely seen to be needless meddling in political issues.

    Given that the country has had 20 years of post-military rule, it is not too soon for citizens to become sensitive to increasing to propensity of public servants to act as politicians or policymakers. In the last one year, the IG has done so much of that, and more so when he made the statement that community policing is better than state police or that the recommendation by the Committee on Strengthening of Internal Security and Community Policing to adopt community policing system in response to rising insecurity is an indication that such recommendation has put paid to the matter of state police.

    The tendency by public servants to appropriate the authority of elected politicians should be diminishing rather than growing in a post-military democratic dispensation. Inspector-General’s statement that commencing community policing automatically renders calls for state or local government police superfluous is an illustration of a public servant acting in the capacity of politician or source of public policies.

    In a democracy, politics, in respect of police systems or organisation of police, is concerned with functions and activities of elected officials involved determining best options for police systems for the country and its constituent groups. In The Politics of Policing: Between Force and Legitimacy, Mathieu Deflem argues in the introduction to the book, “The Perpetual Politics of Policing,” that political influence on police is a moving target and will always involve questions regarding the authority of police to rely on force and its legitimacy in terms of the support police enjoy from the citizenry. He further argues that police legitimacy can be enhanced by greater alignment of the police with citizens.

    With respect to the controversy over the need for multilevel policing and for state and local government police, it is premature for anybody to claim that community policing as currently conceived by the National Police is more efficient and effective than state police, as the IG has done recently. First, a nascent community police system could not have experienced the level of latitudinal and longitudinal research needed to make such claims. Second, what constitutes legitimacy in the organisation of a police system lies more with citizens than a single person or a group of persons engaged in policing or other paramilitary engagements. Logically, organisation of police system precedes policing, its operations, and personnel appointed by political figures to drive such operations.

    We may be at the risk of miseducating younger generations about the culture of democracy and good governance if our political leaders fail to refrain technocrats, at whatever level and in whatever agency, from appropriating the power of elected officials on matters that are constitutionally best determined by democratic debate. Nothing is impossible in democracy except things that citizens declare to be impossible. It is thus wrong of the IG to use recommendations from a committee of which he was a member to dismiss the importance of calls for state police by stating that a committee’s recommendations are enough to make demands for state police futile. Though the IG is free as a citizen to express his view on any public issue, modern statecraft and ethics demand that he be neutral on debates by citizens for new additional levels of policing. The boss of a police system created by political figures ought to refrain from comments that are likely to present him as partisan in a nation-wide search for the best form of policing.

    Operationally, the IG may have total control over the way the police act but as a professional he has no power to dictate on ideological matters, which the choice of police systems in a multicultural polity is. The basis of legitimacy for any form of policing does not and should not end with what the IG thinks about any debate about what types of police exist in a country; it is the degree of agreement among citizens or communities about the relevance of existing organisation of the police to citizens’ values. This is more important in a multicultural society where policing is also a part of the culture of those being policed.

    There is need for a clear dividing line between playing operational and political roles. Leaders of agencies deserve to be given all the autonomy they need to play the role of law enforcers and public order sustainers. But they should not be made to feel that they can make political statements about what concerns citizens, more so when such concerns address lack of capacity of the central police to protect citizens and their property.

    The IG ought to limit himself to operational matters where he is the boss, without meddling in political matters. A presidential committee on any aspect of public life in a democracy is political even though it may concern the matter of law enforcement. Joining in the debate about state or local government police is a political matter reserved for the presidency, Minister of Police, and the legislature and the citizenry. The matter of state police is, in every sense, political and should not be joined by the IG. The IG’s statement: “The disadvantages of the state police are more than the perceived advantages so the way to go is by community policing, which will take care of all the demands and the agitations of state police” is rather partisan in a country where even governors are calling for state police.

  • A quiet revolution to watch in Kano

    The greatest use that can be made of wealth is to invest it in creating generations of educated and trained people—Sheikh Zayed Bin, Founder of UAE

    Education reform in the UAE focused on better preparation, greater accountability, higher standards, infusion of technology and improved professionalism to achieve the desired quality. Schools are moving away from papers, books and pencils to electronic-books, files and materials from different authors in one location, thereby simplifying the learning process. Investing in Technology can play a significant role in making it easier for students to get content and apply it in practice—Representative of United Arab Emirate at a recent conference on free education in Kano State

    Free and compulsory education also helps bind people and communities together, it helps create a nation of citizens, and this is more important than ever indeed in this day and time. Finally, free and compulsory education for all is what brought freedom to many different nations and people throughout the world-freedom to think, freedom to act, freedom to prosper. And, as you know, all successful countries and economies have invested very heavily in education—Lella Mathieu, Representative of French Embassy at a recent conference on free education in Kano State

    There is a Yoruba proverb that says anyone who is being pursued by a masquerade should not lose hope and remember that just as earthly beings get tired so do the ones from the other world. Put less metaphorically, this proverb warns that people faced by seemingly inflexible forces should continue to hold on to the ideology of change. Abdullahi Ganduje’s recent announcement of a policy of free and compulsory primary and secondary education in Kano State promises a quiet revolution that Nigerians should not ignore, because the policy promises to create a new northern Nigeria and Nigeria, if the policy is nurtured properly. It may bring the wind of change that the country has been looking for since 1960.

    Kano is Nigeria’s largest industrial and commercial centre. It has historically been a major centre of culture in northern Nigeria.  It was a major centre of Qur’anic education even in pre-colonial/colonial/postcolonial times. It is, therefore, not surprising that it is a state with over three million out-of-school children today and now the first State in northern Nigeria to integrate Almajiri and universal education systems in public education. In addition, Kano has been a leader in progressive political thinking, having been the birthplace of Aminu Kano’s Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and later Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). In many ways, therefore, Kano has been a trailblazer.

    That a city which has been a bastion for Almajiri education for decades has accepted a new template on public education is significant. The latest policy of free and compulsory primary and secondary education has the potential to change the face and fate of public education in the country. At a time that the federal government seems content with free but not compulsory 9 years of education, Kano has opted for free and compulsory 12 years of primary/secondary education, with the possibility of subsidy for tertiary education and special facilities to support the displaced seeking education in Kano State. A policy decision to integrate about 2.5 million almajiris in 13, 619 Qur’anic schools with 1.180 conventional (secular, Western?) schools with a population of about 1 million, the state appears ready to pay attention to public education that seems to be disappearing fast in many parts of the country in the era of primacy of the market.

    It may not be the introduction of free primary and secondary education in Kano that is revolutionary. Western Nigeria (now Edo, Delta, Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo) had introduced free primary education in 1955 and later free secondary education in 1979. What is revolutionary is that a state that had for years been a subscriber to the primacy of Koranic education has resolved to provide what may be Nigeria’s largest public education system that is not likely to be upstaged by private school system that has become the norm in many states of the federation.

    Creation of a huge public education system in northern Nigeria is bound to create a lot of impact on other states. Already four states in the north have been reported to have committed to adopting Kano’s model. The plan to add three million children, hitherto out of schools, especially over 1 million girls into the number of literate people in Kano cannot but be a major job creator and consciousness changer. Adding 3,000 professional teachers for a start is bound to increase the number of literate middle class that can expand the number of beneficiaries of a  philosophy of enlightenment that conventional, universal, or Western education provides.

    With exposure of additional three million young children to a pedagogy that promotes enlightenment and critical thinking about many aspects of life, the likelihood that the number of young people available for radicalization by Boko Haram and similar terrorist sensibilities is high. And with another four or more northern states joining the Kano experiment, the number of potential candidates for religious radicalization may go down considerably in a country that has been hobbled by religious extemism.

    What Kano’s commitment to free and compulsory pre-tertiary education may provide is a superior education system to what the federal government has been able to afford. The good side of this is that Kano can push the federal government in the direction of provision of free and equal access to 12 years of education, the type that has made it possible for many countries to experience more development than Nigeria. One such example is the United Arab Emirate’s public school model’s emphasis on emphasis on a modern curriculum and methodology as necessary ingredients for creating a modern education system.

    Further, the belief expressed so forcefully by Chief Obafemi Awolowo about the power of free public education to stimulate a more united and progressive Nigeria, may be gaining ground in northern Nigeria to suggest possibility of new visions about Nigeria in northern and southern Nigeria. The view of the representative of French embassy at the Kano conference: “Free and compulsory education also helps bind people and communities together, it helps create a nation of citizens” is a lesson worth learning by the federal government and all the 36 states, as the country prepares to join the competition of the global market.

    The possibility that the Kano public education model may change the way of life not only in the northern regions but in the country at large is high, particularly if the Kano’s experiment is done well, a matter that the reference to contribution of the UAE representative at the conference subtly referred to in the second quotation in italics.

    Since the devil is always believed to be in the detail, Kano education planners will need to pay special attention to the integration of Religion-based and Reason-based education, such as exists in Dubai’s public education system. To respond to the diversity in Kano, a public education system that is balanced between religion and reason is important, if non-Muslims and non-indigenes of Kano are not to be restricted to privatized education, for fear of not losing their identity because of overdose of religiosity in the curriculum of the public school. As it is, Kano seems poised to give a new direction to principles of access and equity in public education, and if it pays attention to the UAE experiment, it is also in a good position to add quality to its nascent public education model.

    If the Kano vision of 2019 suggests a convergence with the Ibadan vision of postcolonial Nigeria in 1955/79, it may also lead in years beyond 2023 to new ideas that can respond effectively to other problems that Nigeria faces—search for rational ways to modernize cattle farming;  manage water resources; manage diversity; enhance Nigeria’s  capacity for innovation and competitiveness in a global economy. Creating a school system that balances the spiritual and rational sides of human beings may be the best way to marry the old and the new in postcolonial Nigeria. It is such balance that can lead to sustainability of modern ieas and techniques  needed for nurturing a multicultural polity and society.

  • South Africa/Nigeria: Globalisation going sour?

     

    In most basic terms, the globalization of the world economy is the integration of economies throughout the world through trade, financial flows, the exchange of technology and information, and the movement of people…. Finally, African governments will need to actively encourage the participation of civil society in the debate on economic policy, and to seek the broad support of the population for the adjustment efforts—Alassane D. Ouattara in “The Challenges of Globalisation for Africa.”

    The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has since its establishment promoted a good measure of peace and prosperity among African nations. It has also facilitated movement or migration across national borders to seek livelihood and for national companies to seek profit across national borders. The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa since the end of Apartheid has benefited from the principles of the Banjul Charter, hence the possibility of MTN and Shoprite coming to add value to life in Nigeria and for thousands of Nigerian citizens migrating to South Africa to make a living. The recent killing of Nigerians and destruction of their property in South Africa and the looting and destruction of property belonging to MTN and Shoprite in Nigeria have indicated major problems between the two largest economies on the African continent. Apparently, the two countries have neglected one crucial aspect of inter-country economic relations: investment in inter-cultural relations required to sustain such interactions.

    What could have been the source of this crisis? Certainly, it is not the absence of formal protocols between the two countries. The Banjul Charter, patterned after European Convention of Human Rights and Americas Convention of Human Rights, is as rich and generous as any charter could be. It contains all the rights that, if fully respected, could save Nigerian businesses in South Africa and South Africa’s businesses in Nigeria from the destruction, such as had taken place in the last few days. The rights in the charter include freedom from discrimination (Article 2, 18, Equality (Article 3, Life and Personal Integrity (Article 4), Dignity (Article 5), Freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5) Right to fair trial (Article 7), Freedom of movement  (Article 12), Right to property (Article 14), to name a few.

    Consequently, the tension between South Africa and Nigeria in the last ten or so days need serious probing on both sides. It may not be enough to see the individuals that burnt shops belonging to Nigerians in South Africa as ungrateful people who are incapable of remembering the favours Nigeria did for South Africa during the struggle against white oppression. How many of the children seen on television burning and looting shops of Nigerians are likely to know anything about the good that Nigeria did to South Africa about thirty years ago? With stoppage of teaching history in schools in Nigeria, how many Nigerians of the age range in South Africa know this history of Nigeria’s assistance to South Africa? Equally, it may not be rational for South African youths to characterise Nigerians in their country just as drug dealers, 419ners, and illegal aliens. South Africa must also have its own share of global drug pushers and bandits.

    So far, Nigeria’s government has done the right thing: defend the interest of its citizens by saving them from harassment and intimidation, largely on the assumption that Nigerians ought to be viewed as innocent until proven guilty of any crime by their host country. Equally, the President of South Africa has said the right thing by condemning the behaviour of South Africans towards foreigners. Undoubtedly, professional diplomats would not see the current crisis as insoluble. Nigeria’s demand for compensation for lost property and lives is in order and would have been the most unassailable stance from any government had Nigerians not rushed to destroying the property of South Africans in anger. But diplomats should eventually have a way to bring smiles to faces of the two countries before long. It is not in the interest of the two countries for property to be going up in flames on both sides.

    What needs to form part of the investigation in South Africa is search for remote causes of what seems to be hatred of Nigerians and other foreigners in South Africa. Apparently, Nigerians in South Africa do not seem to harbour any hate towards South Africans, but it seems that South Africans have deep problems with the Nigerians in their country. It is the source of this negative emotion that needs to be clinically verified and both countries need to be forthcoming on this search for hidden fears, so that similar problems do not surface again between Africa’s two largest economies. Peace between the two nations is imperative to prevent frittering opportunities for them to benefit from each country’s comparative advantage in a fast-globalising ethos that can enrich the economy of each of the two countries and by extension of neighbouring countries.

    One good thing is that none of the two presidents; Buhari and Ramaphosa, in a way to suggest intolerance of otherness. If bad feelings reside at the lower socio-economic level of the two societies, the problem can be solved by re-orientation of such citizens through civic education and what Ouattara in another context in the discussion of globalisation as the need for “African governments to actively encourage the participation of civil society in the debate on economic policy, and to seek the broad support of the population for the adjustment efforts.”

    In other words, it is vital that citizens in Nigeria and South Africa are sufficiently prepared psychologically, cognitively, and emotionally for globalisation? It is not right for both countries to assume that because people in the two countries speak some measure of English, they are ready to live effectively and profitably in whichever country they have obtained visa to enter. Even evidence of cultural maladjustment is surfacing in many more advanced democracies, such as the United States and Italy where intolerance of otherness is causing problems for immigrants.

    It is wrong for national leaders to expect that citizens at the grassroots of both countries share the same level of understanding the leaders have about globalisation, especially when there are economic problems within both countries.  Since the end of apartheid, the average Nigerian has believed (and they still do) that South Africa’s economy is good and can be boosted with the turbo energy of the average Nigerian, for personal profit much more than they can do within their own country, Nigeria. This is not strange, given the human propensity to see the lawn being greener on the other side. But the reality of Black South Africa is that MTN, DSTV, Shoprite, South African Airways have not translated into a better economy for the average South African, just NNPC in Nigeria has not translated into economic opportunities for the average Nigerian. Indeed, South Africans assume that Nigerians should have enough to do at home without having any reason to share the little benefits available to poor South Africans with little access to land, education, and financial credit. There ought to be ways for both countries to give proper economic education to their citizens as they negotiate with other.

    For example, it is not helpful for South Africa to complain that Nigerians are drug pushers and 419ners. Did South African Consuls just admit Nigerians to their countries on the strength of the visa money they could pay without due diligence or proper interview and are Nigerians at fault for such consular lapse? On the other hand, do Nigerian Immigration officers issue passports to Nigerians largely on their capacity to become sources of home remittances every year?  What re-education of the masses about the new economy that accepts people with capital from other countries has South African government done since the first xenophobic attacks of 2008? How much soft diplomacy has Nigeria done directly or through its High Commission since 2008? Why are cultural exchange programmes just being planned by the Acting High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria? Why has such soft diplomatic tactics not been a regular menu of two countries with important economic ties?

    These and many other questions regarding preparedness of migrants from Nigeria to South Africa need to be settled between the two countries that cannot afford to reduce economic interactions, not only for their sake but for the benefits of other Africans in the century of global trade. Just as Ouattara had said in 1997 about the global century: “African governments will need to pursue a more active information policy, explaining the objectives of policies and soliciting the input of those whom the policies are intended to benefit.” Such advice applies to both Nigeria and South Africa.

     

     

     

     

  • The Irony and promise of democracy in a federation: lessons from recent security issues

    The cases of Arab Spring and the ongoing Asian Spring in Hong Kong indicate why the masses must not be over rattled.

    The challenge for us is to continue to defuse the potential perils of diversity by continuing to pursue measures that promote social inclusion and national cohesion. One of the most important ramparts of national cohesion are the guarantees of fundamental freedoms: the right to life, which comes with it the duty of governments to ensure peace and security, freedom of movement, freedom of worship, and the rule of law. Everyone must be reasonably assured that their lives and livelihoods will be protected by the government, that their disputes will be fairly and justly resolved, regardless of their ethnicity and faith.- Prof Yemi Osinbajo’s lecture at the Lagos Country Club, “How to Keep Nigeria One”

    If someone who first visited Nigeria 20 years ago returned to the country in the last four months, he/she would think the house has fallen or is falling. The reason for the negative change would have been attributed to lack of security and conflicts among some of the country’s ethnic nationalities. If the visitor has been familiar with the character of Nigeria as a combination of territorial and ethnic federalism, he/she would have been surprised at the level of suspicion and antagonism between the Fulani and the Yoruba. Such visitors would have been surprised to hear, in a region not known for complaining of marginalisation, calls from Yoruba civil society groups on the federal government to do its constitutional duty about rising insecurity in the Southwest and other regions. Further, such visitor would have been amazed at the speed of response to urgent calls in an era of democracy.

    But democracy watchers may not be as perturbed as the visitor, feeling less worried because of his/her interest to understand why Nigeria’s governing elites work as they do. Believers in the concept that democracy is largely the function of elites and those who believe that democracy is a game for many groups in the society-from professional middle class to the working class-to play together in pursuance of the common good are also likely to be worried that things have had to wait for months before proper consultations take place on how to stem violent crimes in the society. Knowing that it is the group generally left out of consideration by both governing elites and professional middle-class men and women-the masses that had worked hardest and in silence since the outbreak of physical insecurity.

    Generally, it is the masses that remain the last to react to insecurity because they live continually with insecurity in other forms-material and social poverty. But the masses are the most potent when they choose to react positively or negatively. The cases of Arab Spring and the ongoing Asian Spring in Hong Kong indicate why the masses must not be over rattled. And when the masses choose to explore peaceful methods before acting, they often do well. Fortunately, in the Southwest in the last few months, the masses opted to act like informal advisers to the governing elites and other influencing groups that function as agents of pluralist governance-traditional rulers, civil society organisations, the media, etc. Instead of focusing on the tinder box inherent in kidnapping murder on highways and in deep forests, the region’s masses started informal consultations across the spectrum of rulers in the region.

    Picking on the role of the masses in a democracy in another context, Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, argue particularly in the section on “How Democracy Survives,” that “democracy does not depend on mass support for democratic ideals. It is apparently not necessary that most people commit themselves to a democracy; all that is necessary is that they fail to commit to antidemocratic movements… Those (the masses) with the attitudes most dangerous for democracy are the least involved in politics.” The authors argue further that mass anxiety may become volatile when, for example, the masses experience poor level of personal safety-crime, street violence, and terrorism, etc.

    Although anxiety-inducing criminality had existed in the Southwest in the last few months, the region’s masses had not acted in a way to complicate the search for resolution.  Although masses have woken up in the morning to vacillate between going to the farm and staying in the town or village, for fear of being kidnapped or killed. Some have taken their children to school and stay around till the end of school hours to take them back home while many market women have stayed on their farms, waiting to no avail for their wholesale buyers of fruits and vegetables to come and collect their produce. Yet those whose livelihood depends on moving from one town or village to the other have done so less frequently and those with the courage to do so have travelled with their hearts in their mouths.

    Yet the masses have not caused any civil disturbance. On the contrary, they have opted to use the structures of pluralist governance available to them to sublimate their anxiety into seeking consultations with their community leaders on the way to restore order. In other words, the masses have chosen to give democracy in a federation of many cultures the chance it requires-consultations with others on finding solutions to immediate problems. For example, the masses in the region have refrained from making inflammatory or hateful statements, from protesting on the streets, and issuing threatening ultimatums. Most of what the masses have done is to consult with their immediate leaders who they perceive as their elected representatives and traditional rulers who they see generally as their cultural leaders in a semi-federal system.

    If the recent promises of President Buhari to the region’s traditional rulers to restore security in the region and other parts of the country yield desired results, the masses of the region would deserve appreciation for not losing interest in consultation as an important democratic option at a time of major crisis and for refraining from making statements that can add petrol to the fire ignited by kidnappers in different parts of the region. It is gratifying that the masses, believed to be the least concerned about democratic rituals, rhetoric, and theatrics that abound in the country’s political culture, have acted to showcase the importance of tolerance and restraint to the nurturing of democracy, particularly in a federation of competing aspirations and expectations.

    Given that presidential pledge on restoration of security is just a few hours old, it is premature to start sharing compliments, but one lesson has emerged from the handling of the security crisis in the Southwest so far. The lesson is that the notion of plurality as a means of nurturing democracy, especially in a culturally plural polity, is worth giving more attention than it has received in our public discourse.

    The quote from the vice president’s lecture two days ago at the Lagos Country Club in respect of how to keep the country united to benefit from its diversity like other diverse polities is, coming at a time that conferences and workshops are holding in different parts of the country on the imperative of sustaining the country’s unity, timely and apt. More of such talks are needed to assure citizens that our governing elites are concerned about threats to security and its resultant threats to national cohesion.

    While congratulating conveners of public discussions on our federation, watchers of our federal democracy need to sponsor more conferences and workshops on peace, harmony, and stability, especially at a time when there are no crises. Nurturing democracy in a post-military era is like nurturing a child; it is a daily investment of time and resources. Working toward peace is a task that can benefit from continual education of governing elites and the masses. Both groups can benefit not only from seminars on how to build inter-ethnic harmony, they can also benefit from how not to kill peace.

    In conclusion, a quote from How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in relation to American democracy is relevant, not only to Nigerian democracy but also to Nigeria’s federalism: “Think of democracy as a game that we want to keep playing indefinitely. To ensure future rounds of the game, players must refrain from either incapacitating the other team or antagonising them to such a degree, that they refuse to play again tomorrow. If one’s rivals quit, there can be no future games. This means that although individuals play to win, they must do so with a degree of restraint.”  This observation applies to Nigeria’s federation in toto. And our governing elites should pay attention to any threats to peace and security, before such threats fester.

    This columnist will be on vacation for the next two weeks and will resume on August 25.