The Nation Newspaper

Category: Dapo Fafowora

  • Jonathan’s CNN interview

    Jonathan’s CNN interview

    When he was in Davos, Switzerland, last week for the World Economic Summit, President Jonathan gave the ace CNN reporter, Christine Amanpour, a radio interview later shown on the CNN network. Of the issues raised with the President two were very interesting, but the President’s response to them was disturbing. First, Amanpour referred to advice from the US Embassy in Nigeria that US citizens should avoid going to certain parts of Northern Nigeria unless it was absolutely necessary. This advice to US citizens was given by the Embassy because of the disturbing security situation there, on account of the terror activities of Boko Haram, the extremist and violent Islamic sect in some parts of the North. Other Western Embassies including the British, French, and German have also routinely, as a precautionary measure, issued their citizens the same advice.

    Amanpour also asked President Jonathan about alleged reservations by the US Embassy of the strategy of the use of force by the Federal Government in handling terrorism in vast swathes of the North. She asked whether the use of force to put down the insurgency was being complemented by a dialogue with the insurgents. I consider the questions fair and appropriate in the prevailing disturbing security situation in Northern Nigeria. The same questions are being asked here at home.

    The other issue brought up in the interview by Amanpour with President Jonathan was about the huge oil bunkering that has been taking place in Nigeria for years without the government being able to do anything to stop it. According to Amanpour, some 400,000 barrels of crude oil are stolen daily from Nigeria and sold illegally in the foreign oil markets. This particular information is not new. It has been in the public domain for decades. I watched the interview with some dismay as I considered it very damaging to Nigeria’s foreign image. I also felt that the response of President Jonathan to the two questions by Amanpour were largely evasive and less than satisfactory. During the telecast interview he appeared tense, nervous and unsure of himself. He did not respond to the questions with any credibility or even conviction.

    On the question of the advice from the US Embassy regarding the general state of insecurity in Northern Nigeria, and the strategy of the Federal Government in tackling the danger of Boko Haram to national security, President Jonathan said he believed that the source of information of the US Embassy on the situation in Northern Nigeria was local. But he blamed the Embassy for relying on local information from the Nigerian public. Specifically, he blamed the Embassy for allowing Nigerians access to it and purportedly misleading it about the security situation in Northern Nigeria. But the security situation is not a secret and should not be treated as such.

    In this regard, President Jonathan was wholly wrong in vilifying the Nigerian public as the source of information of the US Embassy. Are the Embassies in Nigeria expected to rely on foreign sources for information about the country to which they are accredited? The primary duty of an Embassy is to gather useful information locally about its host country for the information of its own government and country. It is a traditional aspect of diplomatic practice accepted globally and taken seriously by professional diplomats as an essential part of their duties. Some of the information that the US and other Embassies have about Nigeria is from the local media which the Embassy staff monitor on a daily basis for useful information. But the press is not their only source of information on Nigeria. The US and other Embassies in Nigeria also have useful contacts in the National Assembly and in other government circles, including the Presidency itself. They interact often with senior members of the government many of whom talk freely with these foreign diplomats about the situation in Nigeria.

    In fact, the Nigerian secret service and security agencies collaborate fully and exchange information with their counterparts from other foreign countries on matters of national security. The US and other western friendly countries offer Nigeria assistance in tracking down the Boko Haram terrorists. On some occasions, they have taken part directly in military operations against the terrorists. There is nothing unusual about this, as these official contacts and security collaboration are useful to both sides and should be encouraged as a means of promoting cordial relations between the two countries.

    As a retired diplomat, I find nothing wrong with foreign embassies here openly seeking information legitimately about important political and economic developments in Nigeria. It is a basic function of an Embassy. That is why foreign diplomats are here in the first place. Their rights in this regard are fully protected by the Geneva Convention. What the foreign Embassies do here to gather useful information is not different from what Nigerian diplomatic missions are expected to do abroad to keep their government better informed about their host countries. In any case, there is far greater interaction at the official level between the officials of the Federal Government and the diplomatic staff of foreign embassies here, than with the general public. Representatives of the Federal Government have ample opportunities of correcting any wrong impressions or misinformation about Nigeria that the foreign embassies might harbour as a result of their interaction with the Nigerian public and press. In this particular case, in advising American citizens to stay away from the areas of the North affected by the current insurgency there, the US Embassy cannot legitimately be blamed for seeking to protect its citizens in Nigeria. Even Nigerians avoid going to the North now unless it is absolutely necessary for them to go there. It is counterproductive for the Nigerian authorities, particularly the President, to seek to deceive the public and foreigners on the security situation here.

    President Jonathan’s acerbic response on this matter reminds me of the manner the former American Ambassador here, Walter Carrington, was hounded by the authoritarian Abacha military regime for supporting and encouraging resistance to the regime. Very few people will now argue that Ambassador Carrington was wrong in his opposition to military rule in Nigeria and support for democracy in Nigeria. As the representative of a democratic government, he could not have been expected to support an unpopular and vicious military regime. The fault is not with the Embassies but with us, particularly our leaders who are intolerant of any form of criticism, even if such criticisms are legitimate and in the interest of the country.

    The second issue brought up in the interview by Amanpour was about the vast amount of oil being stolen daily from Nigeria through bunkering. Specifically, Amanpour claimed that some 400,000 barrels of crude oil were involved in this illegal export and sale of Nigerian crude oil. It is difficult to believe this figure as it represents about 20 % of total Nigerian oil production of about 2.5 million barrels per day. Considering the fact that oil exports remain the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the government should be concerned about this vast oil theft and take the necessary measures in eliminating it. President Jonathan’s response on this crucial matter was very disappointing. Instead of outlining measures to tackle the problem, he blamed foreign oil companies for it, arguing that they were, in effect, the receivers of stolen goods. But oil is such an important and scarce resource that it will always find a market abroad. Whether they suspect it to be stolen, or not, there will always be buyers abroad for crude oil, some of which is sold in the open oil market. The fact is that the government is aware of the vast amount of crude oil being stolen from Nigeria. But it has done little to curb it because of vested interests in oil bunkering in the corridors of power in Nigeria. Very few culprits of oil theft have been caught and punished for the crime. When caught, as they are occasionally, they are let off the hook by the powers that be. Recently, this situation prompted the retiring Naval Commander in the area to complain that the Nigerian Navy has not succeeded in curbing oil theft in the area because of the connivance of people in high places and the rampart corruption in the Judiciary.

    These are local problems that require local solutions. President Jonathan should face them squarely. It does not do his government or Nigeria’s foreign image any good to look for scapegoats abroad for our internal problems created by our leaders. Foreign observers know quite a bit about Nigeria. With the vast improvement in global communications and reach there is no longer any hiding place for corrupt or incompetent governments any where in the world. It is a reality that the government should accept instead of blaming foreigners for our self inflicted problems.

  • Jonathan in the hot seat

    Jonathan in the hot seat

    Life is being made increasingly difficult for President Jonathan and his administration by his critics, including some leading members of his own party. Some of them are in open rebellion against him. There is also growing public impatience, discontent, and disillusionment with his PDP government. Last week, “The Patriots”, an old and normally sedate pressure group of some prominent public figures, drawn from all sections of the country, joined others in criticising the government. It issued a press statement attacking President Jonathan for what it claimed was the drift and lack of direction in the nation. The group, which includes Professor Ben Nwabueze, Chief Philip Asiodu, General Alani Akinrinade, and Chief Ayo Adebanjo, the veteran Afenifere leader, among others, made the following specific demands on the Jonathan PDP government;

    •the convocation of a National Conference to review the Constitution

    •the reconstruction of the government and the appointment into the federal cabinet of a selfless, patriotic, and energetic team

    •an end to the huge and outrageous remuneration of holders of public offices

    •the reduction of government agencies and cost of governance

    •a more vigorous fight against public corruption through the punishment of those found guilty of it, and

    •improved public safety and security

    These demands by “The Patriots” are not new. They reflect the massive discontent in the nation over the perceived failure, or inability, of the Jonathan PDP Federal Government to tackle these long standing national problems.

    To be fair, President Jonathan actually inherited some of these problems from his predecessors. Some of his critics did not do any better when they were in office. But he has failed to tackle them effectively. There is a palpable sense of fear and resignation that the nation is heading to the precipice unless the government acts swiftly and with greater determination to tackle the myriad of problems facing the country. Despite his best efforts, President Jonathan appears overwhelmed by these national problems which have lingered for far too long. Of these, the present threat to public order and safety by Boko Haram and the mass unemployment remain the major sources of public concern in the nation. Fuelled by rising oil revenue, the economy has recorded an impressive average annual growth rate of 7% since last year. But the vast majority of the people remain poor. Some will say they are even poorer today than ever before. The impressive economic growth has not translated into a better life for the people. That is the primary purpose of an elected democratic government. The bulk of the nation’s wealth remains in private hands, while the majority of the people wallow in abject poverty. In the circumstances, criticism of the PDP government for its failure to govern effectively is right and legitimate.

    The timing of the criticism by “The Patriots” is not without some significance. Right now, the PDP Jonathan government, through its seeming inaction, is highly vulnerable to political barbs. The party leaders are badly divided. Instead of facing the nation’s problems squarely, they have continued with their unrestrained political bickering. The party now has very little electoral appeal. The political situation in the nation remains tense and disturbing. The nation is in ferment as the politicians begin to jockey for positions in anticipation of the Presidential elections in 2015. Though the elections are three years away, the politicians are already on the hustings and have abandoned all pretence of governing. Most of the nation’s problems are increasingly being swept under the carpet, left by the government unattended to. The deepening crisis in the PDP, the ruling party, has made the situation worse. It is as if no one is in charge of the nation now, as the President is deeply involved in the political horse trading now taking place in the PDP.

    President Jonathan will, undoubtedly, seek his party’s nomination for the 2015 presidential elections. It is this quest by him that is directly responsible for the crisis in the party. But it is by no means certain that he will get it. There is a lot of opposition from Northern political leaders who want power to revert to the North. Political alignments and alliances change very swiftly in Nigeria. Tribal politics has again taken the centre stage in Nigeria’s politics. President Jonathan cannot even count on the support of his political mentor, former President Obasanjo, with whom he has fallen out politically. President Obasanjo has recently been one of his worst critics. Under the control of the ACN, the Southwest is playing its cards very close to its chest. It wants to be part of a grand political alliance that can stop the PDP and President Jonathan from winning the 2015 elections. But this remains a major challenge. The party has leant from its previous experience that some of its possible political allies cannot be trusted and lack credibility. For the party, the options are really limited. At best, it can only play a second fiddle if it enters into an alliance with the other opposition parties which, on their own, cannot win any federal elections. The party is on the horns of a dilemma.

    In many respects, ‘The Patriots” have hit the nail right on the head with their stinging criticism of the Jonathan PDP Federal Government. But to be blunt, some of them have, in the past, been in government before, and have been a source of some of the problems now confronting the nation. One of them helped the Abacha military dictatorship to draft and impose the draconian military decrees under which the nation was ill governed for long. When in office, many of them contributed to the public corruption they now decry. But this should not detract from the quality of their demands, nor be held against them in present circumstances as they articulate the voice of the people.

    However, the call of “The Patriots” for a national conference to review the Constitution is questionable and possibly impractical. Neither the Executive nor the National Assembly is favourably disposed to the idea. Their support for such a Conference is vital if it is to succeed. There is a parallel exercise now going on in the National Assembly. But there is no consensus there on what amendments are deemed desirable, or necessary. There is squabbling in the Legislature over the creation of more states and state police. And re-writing the Constitution, a mere legal framework, will not necessarily solve our problems.

    Since the 1959 Independence Constitution, we have had several major reviews of the Constitution. We have moved from the Westminster model to the White House model without being able to solve our national problems. As Governor Babatunde Fashola of Lagos rightly observed in his recent interview in The Nation, it is not a new Constitution that will solve our national problems of insecurity, increasing poverty, public corruption, poor infrastructure and ineffective governments at all levels in Nigeria. In 2005, President Obasanjo called a National Political Reform Conference, in which I participated, to work out a new Constitution for the nation. Some of the recommendations of the Conference were quite useful, but they were never seriously considered by the National Assembly. That Conference cost the nation billions of naira. But President Obasanjo called it off when he did not get his way on the third term issue. In any case, the Conference hit a brick wall on the issue of a review of the formula for the sharing of the national revenue from oil. Another conference will almost certainly fail over this contentious issue.

    If we must have a national conference, then it should be sponsored and financed by those calling for it, and not by the government. It will be another political jamboree. We should not continue to waste our meagre national financial resources on Conferences that are unlikely to solve our problem What the nation needs is good and effective government under a disciplined and committed leadership, not endless political conferences that will not get us anywhere.

  • Rev Joseph Abiodun Adetiloye (1929-2012)

    Rev Joseph Abiodun Adetiloye (1929-2012)

    The People’s Prelate

    The year 2012, a leap year, ended with the sad death of many Nigerian public figures from all walks of life. Of these, I should mention two; the death of the Hon. Justice Kayode Esho, a brilliant and distinguished former Judge of the Nigerian Supreme Court, and that of the Most Revd. Joseph Abiodun Adetiloye, a former Archbishop of the Ecclesiastical Province of Lagos, and Primate and Metropolitan, of the Anglican Church in Nigeria. He died on December 14, barely 11 days from what would have been his 83rd birthday. Justice Esho, at 87, was four years older. His death was the occasion for the outpouring of grief and sadness in the country. On account of his judicial integrity and erudition, many regard him as the best Chief Justice Nigeria should have had but chose not to have. For me, both deaths were very sad and painful as I knew both of them very well.

    Archbishop Abiodun Adetiloye, the subject of this tribute, succeeded the Rt. Revd. Festus Segun as the Bishop of Lagos in 1985. In 1988, three years later, he succeeded the Most Revd. Timothy Olufosoye, the Bishop of Ibadan, as the Primate Metropolitan of the Anglican Communion in Nigeria. Altogether, he had quite a remarkable career in the Church where his rise in the Church was both unconventional and meteoric. He was born to a humble family in Odo-Owa, in Ekiti, on Christmas day, December 25, 1929, in the most inauspicious of circumstances. He was only three years old when his father, a peasant farmer, died leaving him in the care of his poor mother at Ijero-Ekiti. After his primary school education at Ijero, he could not proceed to a secondary grammar school due to lack of financial means. But he was lucky and clever enough to enter Melville Hall, a theological college of the Anglican Communion in Ibadan, where he did not have to pay any fees. It was at Melville Hall that he received his preliminary training for entry into the priesthood, and showed the academic brilliance and mettle that was to open the doors for him to his subsequent glittering career as an Anglican clergy. He was made a deacon and ordained a priest in 1954, the year he left Melville Hall. In 1958, four years later, he entered the King’s College, University of London, on the sponsorship of the Anglican Communion in Nigeria to study Theology. In 1961, after three years, he graduated with an honours bachelor’s degree in Divinity (B.D.). At King’s College, he was the contemporary of Bishop Olajide and the classmate and close friend of the Very Revd. Sope Johnson, the former Provost of the Cathedral Church of Christ, Marina, Lagos, another brilliant cleric.

    In 1962, the year after he graduated from London, he arrived as a lecturer at the Immanuel College of Theology, Ibadan, famous for the training of Anglican priests. There he made his mark as a diligent, brilliant, and highly respected theologian. In 1966, after four years at Immanuel College, Adetiloye was inducted as the Vicar and Provost of the Cathedral Church of St. James, Ogunpa, Ibadan. The appointment was a rare feat as, before then, he had not been a Vicar in any parish church. It was there that he began to make his mark as an affable cleric. In 1970, after only four years at St. James’s Cathedral, he was consecrated as the first Bishop of the new Diocese of Ekiti. He had declined an offer of appointment as the Provost of the Cathedral Church of Lagos in succession to Bishop Festus Segun, preferring a bishopric in Ekiti. It was from the Ekiti bishopric that, in 1985, he was consecrated a bishop at the Cathedral Church of Christ, Marina, Lagos, in succession to Bishop Festus Segun.

    Initially, there was some objection from a few parishioners of the Cathedral to his appointment as Bishop of Lagos. Virtually, all his predecessors as Bishop of Lagos had been appointed from the diocese, or had worked there before. These critics wanted somebody from the Diocese of Lagos to be appointed Bishop. Bishop Festus Segun had been the Provost at the Cathedral Church of Christ, Lagos, before his translation as the Bishop of Kaduna, from where he was transferred to Lagos as bishop. In fact, the matter was taken to court but later settled amicably. Adetiloye had not worked in Lagos before and was virtually unknown in the diocese. His appointment as Bishop of Lagos from the Ekiti diocese was controversial and marked a water shed, as it ended the domination of the Anglican diocese in Lagos by such ‘princes’ of the Church, as the two Bishops Howells, father and son, and the Phillips, all from distinguished ecclesiastical families in Lagos. Since the appointment of Irunsewe Kale as Bishop of Lagos, it was the first time a Bishop had been appointed for Lagos from outside the diocese. Before his arrival in Lagos, there had been a dispute over liturgy in the Cathedral. Bishop Adetiloye was able to restore amity and peace in the Cathedral. He remained the Bishop of Lagos until 1988 when he was translated as the Archbishop of Province 1 (Lagos) and Primate, Metropolitan of the Anglican Communion in Nigeria. He retired from this position in 1999 on attaining the age of 70, but remained in Lagos for a while until his health began to fail.

    As Bishop and Archbishop he made his mark in Lagos and in the Anglican Communion in several ways. First, he made the training of Anglican priests his top priority. In 1987, he established the Lagos Anglican Diocesan Seminary for the training of the clergy, opening its doors to other non-Anglican Churches. Second, he continued with the Kale policy of admitting professionals, such as engineers, medical doctors, architects etc, into the priesthood after training at the Seminary. Third, as Archbishop and Primate, he initiated an unprecedented programme of evangelism in the Anglican Communion in Nigeria. Between 1987 and 1997, he created 15 new dioceses in Northern Nigeria, another 15 in Eastern Nigeria and 13 in Western Nigeria. It was during his incumbency that the Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) was divided into three ecclesiastical provinces. When he arrived in Lagos as Bishop in 1985, there were only 66 priests. When he retired in 1999, there were a total of 281 priests. In 1985, there were only 26 dioceses in Nigeria. Under his episcopacy, this figure rose to 76. The four archdeaconries increased from only 4 to 15. Fourth, he initiated the system of directorates in the diocese as a means of promoting evangelism more vigorously in the diocese. These directorates, which included the Prison Chaplaincy, Evangelism, the Elderly Helpline, and Health and Welfare, brought the Church closer to the congregation as never before. He also started at the Seminary site, a secondary grammar school, the Thomas Babington Macaulay Junior Seminary, named after the Revd. Thomas Babington Macaulay, the founder and first Principal of the famous CMS Grammar School, Lagos, the first secondary grammar school in Nigeria. The Revd. Macaulay was the father of Herbert Macaulay, the great leader of the Nigerian nationalist movement in the 1940s.

    Archbishop Abiodun Adetiloye was a charismatic and vastly learned man, steeped in Theology. As bishop, he was humble and not given to any form of ostentation. He was a man of great spiritual strength, moral courage, and evangelical fervour. He was admired as a most inspiring preacher, often delivering his sermons without any notes at all. His sermons in the Cathedral were quite memorable and immensely enjoyable. In political matters, towards which all successful prelates must cock a sensitive ear, he was alert, well informed and, when occasion demanded, very responsive. He was a fearless cleric and spoke out strongly against social injustice under military rule in Nigeria. So strong was his persistent criticism of the repressive Abacha military regime that many people feared for his personal safety. The security agencies kept him under their close watch together with Bishop Gbonigi of Ekiti, another courageous cleric, he was tagged a “NADECO Bishop”. In those days, I met him often and had conversations with him concerning the disturbing political situation in our country. I admired his great courage despite some well known health challenges in his own family. A totally unpretentious, easily accessible, and humble bishop, he attracted to himself the admiration and affection of the diocese, including a few parishioners who had initially objected to his appointment as the Lord Bishop of Lagos Diocese. He was, indeed, a steadfast bishop in the mould of Bishop Leslie Gordon Vining, the last expatriate Bishop and Archbishop of Lagos (Anglican Communion). I join all his admirers in offering his family my condolences. May his gentle soul rest in perfect peace.

  • Nigeria to borrow more

    Nigeria to borrow more

    Nigeria’s foreign debt stock is beginning to rise again. Currently, the total debt stock is about $15 billion. But the Minister of Finance, Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, announced recently that Nigeria is seeking about $7 billion new loans, of which nearly half are loans requested by some of the states governments. Mrs. Okonjo-Iweala said the foreign loans were required to finance much- needed investment in physical infrastructure, particularly in the woeful power sector that has become a national nightmare and embarrassment.

    The objective domestic economic and financial environment for the proposed loan is quite propitious. Over time, Nigeria has achieved relative macroeconomic stability. Though still rising, inflation is relatively modest. The naira exchange rate is more stable. The foreign reserves are quite healthy to the extent that Nigeria has, under the Sovereign Wealth Fund, placed $1 billion in the international finance market for lending to other international borrowers. At an estimated annual average of 7 per cent, the economic growth rate is quite impressive. It is one of the highest in Africa. But it is fuelled largely by the record increase in oil prices and incomes. Not by non-oil exports. With the rise in oil prices and healthy foreign reserves, Nigeria’s balance of payments is in order. Nigeria can meet its import bill without much strain. International confidence in the Nigerian economy has been restored. Lenders, both bilateral and multilateral, are more willing to lend to Nigeria now, in the belief that, unlike in the early 1980s when Nigeria ran into balance of payments disequilibrium, it is now in a better position to repay its foreign loan without too much hassle. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria is currently one of the highest in Africa, surpassing that of South Africa, still Africa’s largest economy. So, based on the existing health of the domestic economy, it is possible to argue as the Minister of Finance has done with some conviction that now is the time for Nigeria to borrow externally to meet its investment gap of nearly $10 billion annually.

    However, despite these seemingly positive factors, some legitimate questions should be asked by the public about these planned foreign loans. First, have both the federal and states governments really identified the infrastructure projects to be financed by these foreign loans? Second, are the loans project-specific, and will they be used for the purpose intended? Third, do we really have the managerial and technical capacity to manage such huge foreign loans? Fourth, are these new loans sustainable in the long run? Can they be repaid without too much stress on the domestic economic and economic growth?

    If Nigeria’s past record in managing foreign loans is any guide at all, we are likely to come to the sad conclusion that we have failed to use foreign loans wisely. By the time the Shagari government was overthrown in 1983 by the military, Nigeria’s foreign debt stood at over $40 billion. It could no longer service the loan. Technically, it was in default on its debt servicing which was several times above its average annual GNP. But there was really very little to show for the massive borrowing. The infrastructure, for which the loans were obtained, continued to deteriorate. But like the captain of a sinking ship the Shagari government continued to assure the public that all was well with the economy. It borrowed more and more.

    But the overwhelming evidence is that the foreign loans were simply frittered away and diverted into private pockets. The nation hardly benefited from them. The loans, or at least some of it, had to be repaid. Some financial relief was granted with the writing down of some $18 billion of the repayable loan. It was Mrs. Okonjo-Iweala who, during the Obasanjo administration, arranged the bail out. Now, she is the one seeking new loans for the Jonathan government. But even then, the burden of the financial mess into which the country got itself, fell on the poor, who had to suffer the inevitable cuts in social spending involved in the ensuing economic reform programme. Even today, nearly thirty years later, we have not yet fully recovered from the economic and financial consequences of the structural adjustment programme. Jobs lost have not been recovered. Investments in the social sector have declined sharply, lower than the levels in the 1970s. Investments in education and health have continued to fall.

    If past experience is any guide, then we have to contend with the real possibility that some of the loans will again end up in private pockets. Given the widespread corruption in the public sector, some of the loans will, as usual, be frittered away by the bureaucrats and ministers. Even the Finance Minister is in no position to monitor the use of the loan once it is released to the executing agencies. Foreign lenders do not have the ability, or even obligation, of ensuring that borrowing countries will use the loans granted them honestly and prudently. No matter what happens they will get their loans back, with the due interest. In fact, it is often the case that foreign lenders connive with borrowers from the poor countries in diverting the loans to private pockets. So, there is little or no pressure from the foreign borrowers to ensure fiscal discipline in spending by the borrowers.

    We currently run a budget deficit at all levels of government in the country. The federal deficit is about a third of the entire budget. The domestic debt stock has increased hugely, putting pressure on lending to the business sector. Even then, the rate of implementation of the vast federal budget is barely 60 per cent. It is probably even less. The situation in the states is not much better. Very few of them are financially viable. There is very little to suggest that the proposed loans will fare any better in terms of the implementation of the projects for which we are borrowing. Some of these new loans will go towards funding the overblown public administration. Estimates of this vary from 50 per cent to over 70 per cent of the total budget. The jobs expected from new investment in the economy have not materialised. It is by no means certain that these new loans will generate more jobs in the economy.

    All governments like to spend and borrow money. But as we have seen even in some of the rich countries, such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, or even the United States, the biggest foreign debtor, most of this lending goes towards public consumption, rather than productive investment in the economy. The fiscal responsibility act should include a ceiling on foreign borrowing. We must also contend with the vagaries in the oil sector. The medium to long term forecast is that oil prices will fall, particularly when the United States, the largest importer of Nigerian crude oil, achieves self sufficiency in domestic oil production and consumption. By 2020, it could be a net exporter of oil. This huge oil market will be lost to Nigeria.

    In the circumstances, the federal and states governments government should borrow less, and generate more revenue internally. Due to poor and ineffective tax administration in the country, the rich hardly pay any tax at all. When they pay, it is far less than they should pay. Public corruption must be curbed. The scam over the so-called oil subsidy must be brought to an end. If there is any subsidy at all, this should be fully established. The proposed expenditure of N2 billion on a new banquet hall in the Presidency, and another N7 billion for a new residence for the vice president, are wasteful. It should be reviewed urgently. When obtained, the foreign loans should be utilised more judiciously in the productive sectors of the economy, so as to avoid the situation in which the country found itself in the 1980s when its huge foreign debt became unsustainable. We must not fall into another foreign debt trap.

  • The growing discontent with public corruption

    The growing discontent with public corruption

    One of the major sources of discontent and outrage in Nigeria today is the widespread and growing public corruption in the country. Many high profile public figures, including about a dozen federal ministers, and several former governors, are under investigation by the EFFC, the anti-graft federal agency, for alleged financial crimes. The former Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Dimeji Bankole, and his deputy, Mr. Usman Nafada, have been arraigned in an Abuja High Court on multiple charges of financial impropriety, ranging from the award of inflated contracts, in breach of the Procurement Act, to borrowing money illegally from a commercial bank to fund unauthorised and outrageous increases in the allowances of the members of the House. The total sum involved in the charges is about N42 billion. This was done despite the public complaint of the Governor of the CBN that payments to members of the National Assembly constituted over 25 per cent of the recurrent budget of the Federal Government. Bankole and his deputy are now on bail and have both denied any wrongdoing in the matter. We must presume they are innocent until the court determines otherwise.

    The case has fuelled widespread discontent and cynicism about financial probity in public expenditure in Nigeria. Last week, it was reported in some local newspapers that former President Obasanjo had declared flatly at a meeting of the ILO in Geneva that, since he left office, public corruption had grown worse and that he did not think President Jonathan, his former protégé, was capable of dealing with the monster. It would have been better if that damaging criticism, from a former president, had been made at home, rather than abroad where it received wide publicity. It was President Obasanjo who had set up the EFFC and the ICPC to fight public corruption. It had appeared that some progress was being made initially in the fight against corruption. Two presidents of the Senate and a Speaker of the House of Representatives had been removed for fraud. But he was himself so overwhelmed by the large scale fraud in the public sector, involving some of his aides and close political associates that he virtually gave up on his fight against public corruption. His unconstitutional and unsuccessful bid for a third term, in which bribes were openly and freely used, also undermined his credibility and commitment to the fight against corruption. His own daughter, former Senator Iyabo Obasanjo Bello, now being considered for appointment as a federal minister, is believed to have been implicated in some financial scam in the Federal Ministry of Health where funds intended for official use were simply diverted into private pockets. The scandal was swept quickly under the carpet. It was never brought to a conclusion by the EFFC. Many of Obasanjo’s critics thought him to be rather selective in determining those who were to be probed.

    It is a matter for deep regret that many senior officials and public servants get away with their loot without the government being able to do much about it. In some cases, such as the Siemens affair, or the Tarfa Balogun affair, the government accepted plea bargaining to let the culprits off the hook. Some Nigerian lawyers have expressed serious doubts that plea bargaining has any place in Nigeria’s legal system. But this despicable tactic has become the trend now among major public figures being charged for fraud to avoid their prosecution in the courts. Far too many culprits are being treated with kid gloves instead of being made to bite the bullet if found guilty of financial impropriety. And once the dam broke it was inevitable that financial scams would continue to flourish in the country. It is significant that in the campaign before the 2011 elections corruption did not feature as a major issue. The candidates were too afraid to speak openly about it. Most of them had soiled their hands.

    The grave concern about public corruption is not confined to the country. Our major trading partners and potential foreign investors are just as concerned. Nigeria’s financing gap, currently estimated at over $40billion annually, is large and still increasing. We will need to continue borrowing abroad for the foreseeable future. But we are accumulating foreign debt all of which might not have been necessary if we had managed our economy and finances with greater probity. When President Obama met recently with President Jonathan in Washington he expressed grave concern about corruption in Nigeria. Most foreign observers doubt whether our leaders are really committed to fighting corruption vigorously and courageously. In fact, the perception of foreigners who wish to invest or do business in Nigeria is that it is impossible to do good business in the country without getting involved in the prevailing public corruption. Foreign reporting about Nigeria has been generally negative and has centred largely on the mass public corruption in the country with many of these reports placing Nigeria in the bottom league of corrupt countries.

    I recall how in 1981, thirty years ago, at a meeting in Harvard of American and Nigerian businessmen, which included Chief Ernest Shonekan, then Chairman of UAC, the late Chief Jerome Udoji, then Chairman of the Nigerian Tobacco Company, and the late Chief Adeyemi Lawson, their American counterparts complained bitterly and angrily about corruption in Nigeria. As the guest speaker on the occasion, I was obliged to assure the Americans that the Nigerian government was doing something about the problem. I was wrong as the problem has become worse since then.

    In a recent article on Nigeria at page 18 of its edition of May 28- June 3, the influential and respected British weekly, The Economist, observed that ‘Nigerian leaders are so greedy that they have subverted the entire machinery of the state to serve their needs. Every policy is a scam, every regulation a source of rent”. The article went on to say that “Freed from kleptocrats, Nigeria could be an African giant”. This is a devastating and vivid description of the scale of public corruption in Nigeria which we may not like. But very few people here will disagree with the disturbing report of the paper. In most cases, these damaging reports are based on reports in the Nigerian media, particularly the newspapers, the only watch dog on public corruption.

    To further complicate matters, there was some press speculation in the local media last week that the former Speaker of the House, Dimeji Bankole, and his deputy, may not face prosecution in the court at all over the alleged N42 billion scam, and that the government may decide to withdraw the charges against them; not for lack of evidence, but as a sort of political deal. I was with some friends recently and many of them had expressed the view that a deal would be made by the government on this matter, and that the whole thing would be swept, as usual, under the carpet. I had said I considered the idea absurd and improbable, and that I believed the case would be fully prosecuted. As may well be imagined I was truly horrified by press reports that the authorities might be contemplating such an absurd idea. If Bankole and his deputy are innocent of the charges against them, then let them prove this in court. It is not for the authorities to withdraw the charges against them.

    When this sort of thing occurs, the public is left with the conclusion that financial crime pays and that the culprit, if well connected, will be let off the hook. Some years back the former speaker of the House of Representatives, Mrs. Patricia Ette, was accused by her colleagues of fraud and was forced to step down from office. To clear the way for her possible appointment as a minister the same House that had adjudged her guilty has now reversed itself on the matter and declared her innocent. How does this encourage or promote financial probity in government? How can we convince potential foreign investors that we are committed as a nation to fighting public corruption in our country? A deal over this matter will be reprehensible and morally indefensible. What kind of legacy are we leaving our children with?

    With the exception of Lagos State, many of the state governments have said they are not in a position to pay the new minimum wage of N18, 000 per month. How can these state governments convince the workers that they are truly unable to pay when the workers read reports in the media about the hefty salaries and wages of public officials, particularly the members of the National Assembly, as well as the huge financial scams in which they are involved? As I write this, thousands of pensioners have not been paid their pension for up to a year, or even longer, on account of the large scale scam in the Pensions Office, where funds meant for pensioners were simply diverted into the pockets of senior officials of the Pensions Office. A former Director of Pensions has been arrested by the EFFC and is now under investigation for salting away some N12 billion. In fact, before his arrest he was rewarded for his alleged misappropriation of such huge public funds by being made a Director in the Petroleum Ministry.

    Regrettably, public corruption is not confined to the public sector. It has spread its tentacles to the private sector, including the banks, many of which are on the brink of collapse, the Stock Exchange and stock brokers, the oil sector, the Universities, and the judiciary. In fact, virtually every facet of life in Nigeria has been badly infested with corruption, the economic consequences of which are very clear. Nigeria’s target of becoming one of the top 20 industrial economies in the world by the year 2020 will not be realised unless we manage our resources better by tackling the problem of public corruption. The wanton disregard for the rule of law and the inability of the government to come down heavily on public corruption is directly responsible for the violence and tension in our country.

    In a poor country such as Nigeria, corruption breeds mass poverty and this, in turn, creates widespread social discontent that spills over into social crimes such as armed robberies, kidnappings, and terror bombing in the country. The dire security situation in the country will not be resolved by creating additional units of law enforcing agencies, many of which have been badly compromised by corruption. Instead of that, we should take practical measures to create more jobs by spending more on health, education, and infrastructure. We need to assure our youths of a better future, a better society that will reward hard work and punish fraud and other social crimes.

  • Kagame in Nigeria

    Kagame in Nigeria

    Rwandan President Paul Kagame was in Nigeria two weeks ago on a private visit at the invitation of a local Foundation. It was his first visit to Nigeria. The highlight of his short visit was the Spring Lecture on Public leadership of the Oxford and Cambridge Club of Nigeria, which he delivered at the Eko Hotel in Lagos.

    The Spring Lecture, an annual event, is a tradition shared by the two great British Universities. I was delighted to attend the lecture which was well attended by other Oxbridge graduates and their guests. I have visited the country before and I was eager to hear directly from President Kagame a personal account of recent developments in Rwanda, and how it emerged successfully from the tragic event of the genocide there a decade ago.

    President Kagame spoke enthusiastically and with justifiable pride and passion about the phenomenal economic and political progress achieved since he took over power in Rwanda, after the horrifying genocide that virtually destroyed the country. Rwanda is no longer a pariah state. Under his watch, the country is ostensibly more stable now. There is a general sense of normalcy there, though tribal violence and conflict remain a potent threat to its future stability. Rwanda appears to have put its ugly and dark past behind it. Some of the major economic transformation in Rwanda in recent years is being highlighted in the global media as a good example of sound economic management. Its growth rate in recent years has averaged eight per cent. This is striking as President Kagame came to power in the most inauspicious circumstances, after nearly a decade of civil war and genocide in Rwanda, in which nearly one million Tutsis, the minority tribe, were slaughtered by the Hutus, the majority tribe. The violence was a revenge for the 1972 slaughter by the Tutsi of some 200,000 Hutus, an event that attracted little global attention at the time. This time, the Tutsi genocide stirred the conscience of the world. Its primitive and horrifying savagery was incredible, even by African standards. It was worse than the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It was the worst in Africa’s long history of bloody civil conflicts. But, like the recovery of Nigeria after its bloody civil war, Rwanda’s recovery from the tragic event and the deep seated tribal hatred that caused the genocide has been hailed and admired widely all over the world. Africans tend to forgive and forget more readily than other races.

    In general, poor people tend to forgive and forget more easily, since their means of vengeance is limited. But as Chinua Achebe’s recent controversial book, ‘There was once a Country, and the response to it have shown, the victims of violence do not forgive and forget completely. They simply wait for the right moment for vengeance.

    Rwanda has had a chequered political history of serial and tribal violence. With its undulating features and terraced farming, it is a beautiful, small, but landlocked country in Central Africa. Until its independence in 1962, it was one of the three Belgian colonies in Africa, the others being Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwanda and the neighbouring Burundi were so small that Belgium governed them as one territory, Rwanda-Burundi, to reduce the cost of colonial administration. Neither was considered by the Belgians as really viable economically on its own. Because of its poor resources, the Belgians did not care much for the colony. Unlike the Congo, described as a geological scandal, Rwanda and Burundi were very poor countries, the poorest in Africa actually. At independence, the two countries had the lowest per capita income and GDP in Africa. They had little or no natural resources and were almost totally inaccessible to outsiders.

    Even now very little is known about Rwanda. It remains one of the most obscure countries in Africa. There are no foreign correspondents in Kigali. The few in South Africa hardly ever go there. It was brought into global attention by the tragic events that occurred during the genocide.

    In 1973, I had the privilege of visiting Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda and found its natural beauty breath taking. I was serving then as Nigeria’s acting High Commissioner in Uganda, from where we were concurrently accredited to Rwanda. I actually drove there myself with my wife and our two young children, through Uganda, which shares its borders with both the Congo and Rwanda. It was a hazardous journey, but it was the easiest way to get to Kigali from Kampala. The alternative route would have been to fly to Kigali through Nairobi, Kinshasa, and from there to Kigali. There were no regular commercial flights. Most people going to Kigali from Kampala went by road. Our journey took us through frightening hair spin roads, up on the beautiful hills of Rwanda. It took us some six hours to get to Kigali from the Ugandan border where we had spent the night before very comfortably.

    At the time, Kigali was a small, sleepy, and unpretentious town, with only a few tarred roads and one major tourist hotel. Even though Rwanda is recorded as one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, but with a total population of only five million, Kigali itself was probably not more than two million in population then. The future of the country looked really bleak, so bleak that nearly half of its population had emigrated to the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Kenya, and the Congo, in search of employment and better economic opportunities. It was the only way to escape the crushing poverty in Rwanda.

    At its independence, the Belgians left a terrible colonial legacy in Rwanda which eventually led to its long civil war and genocide. In both Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians yoked together, under one colonial administration, two different and mutually hostile ethnic groups. The Hutus, a Bantu ethnic group, are the majority tribe, with 85 per cent of the population, while the Tutsis, of Nilotic racial stock, are the minority. But in both countries the Belgians contrived to hand over power to the Tutsi minority, which formed the back bone of the Army before and after independence. The Tutsis ran the country as badly as the Belgians. Under their rule, tribal colonialism replaced foreign colonialism. In Burundi where the Belgians handed over power to the Tutsi monarchy, it was overthrown by the Tutsi dominated Army, which embarked on ethnic cleansing against the Hutu majority. In 1993, a Hutu, Melchoir Ndabaye, won the general election, but was assassinated in 1994 by the Tutsi minority which assumed power again. In Rwanda, a Hutu-dominated government was overthrown by a Tutsi militia which installed a Tutsi government. In retaliation, the Hutus struck back by embarking on genocide against the Tutsi minority. That is the origin of the genocide in the country about which there was despair globally.

    Now, President Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, has had some success in ending the despair in Rwanda. He has brought back some hope to the country. Under his rule, the country has recovered from the ravages of its long civil war, and has, by all accounts, made astonishing economic progress. Economic liberalisation has brought in substantial foreign investment in the tourism and service industries. Its FDI per capita is one of the highest in Africa. Kigali, its capital, once a sleepy town, is beginning to look like a modern city, with relatively good infrastructure. Rwanda’s per capita income has increased significantly. President Kagame could boast in his lecture that Rwanda is now 94 per cent literate, and that 90 percent of its population is covered by health insurance. He has tackled public corruption in Rwanda vigorously. The scope and range of Kagame’s reforms and the economic transformation of Rwanda are confirmed by nearly all the reporting multilateral financial and economic institutions, including the WB and the IMF. But unemployment is still rife in the country. For all this, President Kagame deserves credit and commendation.

    But there are still some leadership challenges in Rwanda that President Kagame has to face squarely. He is being denounced increasingly at home and abroad as a despot. These critics argue that he does not tolerate any domestic dissent and that the two elections he won over the years by over 95 per cent in a country with a tribal structure such as Rwanda’s were a sham. Many of his domestic critics have fled abroad to European capitals for their own safety. Some of these media criticism may be exaggerated as claimed by President Kagame, who dismissed them at the lecture as biased. But when I brought this issue up with him after his lecture, he appeared rattled and uncomfortable. He defended his regime angrily. He did not appear keen or willing to discuss the issue, or to introduce the necessary political reforms in Rwanda to complement his impressive economic reforms.

    Like in most African states, tribal colonialism has replaced foreign colonialism in Rwanda, with the Tutsi minority holding the reins of power and subjugating the Hutu majority. There is no easy answer to this complex African political problem. But the tensions generated by tribal politics in Africa can be substantially reduced by allowing all the ethnic groups greater participation in the political process. The democratic process must be free and fair. A greater accountability at all levels of government will also help. Regrettably, this does not appear to be the case in Rwanda now. It is unlikely that its economic transformation under President Kagame can be sustained without the Hutus, the majority tribe, being given a fair share of the political power in Rwanda, now held predominantly by the Tutsi minority. This is the great test that President Kagame now faces. Failure to address this problem will undermine his impressive economic record. Worse still, it may lead again to the horrendous cycle of violent tribal conflict that almost destroyed the country a decade ago.

  • Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III) (part 2)

    Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III) (part 2)

    Some of the leaders of the insurgency have University education which accounts for their vastly improved organization. They are familiar with the terrain in which they operate and have wide social connections in the region. In addition, there is some evidence of both local and external support in terms of funding and training for the insurgents. Some senior government leaders and politicians in the North are under investigation for giving the insurgents financial and logistical support in their operations. The full extent of such collaboration by a few of the leaders in the North is not known. But there is little doubt that some Northern leaders secretly support the insurgents for political reasons. These leaders want political power at the centre to return to the North.

    The skills of the insurgents in producing lethal home based bombs, and other weapons of mass destruction used in the massive suicide bombings of their targets indicate some external support as well for the sect. One of the fallouts of the Libyan war is the proliferation of arms in the Sahel, some of which have found their way into Nigeria and other states in West Africa. The recent attacks on Mali were facilitated by the easy access of the insurgents to some of the weapons from the Libyan war. The insurgents do not seriously appear to lack access to arms and ammunitions or to considerable financial and logistical support. The open terrain in the North and the wide dispersal of the local communities are conducive to the type of insurgency being waged by Boko Haram in the region. There is some evidence that the insurgents enjoy the support of some law enforcement and security agents. This accounts for their good intelligence which keeps them a step ahead of the security forces. The Churches, main targets of their attacks, are clearly visible and, in view of their large number, cannot be fully protected by the security forces, already overstretched by the security challenges they now face.

    Some of the leaders of the insurgents are believed to have received their military training in the use of arms in Pakistan and the Yemen. Certainly, the insurgents have received considerable financial and logistical support from Al Qaeda, the formidable terrorist group based in Pakistan and the Yemen. Mutallab, the University educated, well bred young man, involved in the attempted bombing of a US bound plane is a good example of young educated Northerners who have turned their back on the Northern establishment into which they were born, but from which they have become totally alienated as a result of the social and economic inequalities in the region, far exceeding those in the South where education provides the basis for social and economic advancement, including access to job opportunities. These young educated Northerners despise their Northern leaders for the widespread corruption in the country, including the North. They have a vision of a society based on the Sharia, the Islamic legal doctrines. Boko Haram is also able to recruit easily from the ranks of the poor, the talakawa, who abound in the North. The talakawa have nothing to lose by joining the insurgency which promises them a better life and equal economic opportunities. It is from this group of the poor that Boko Haram has continued to receive its local support. The insurgents seek the overthrow of the established authorities for political reasons. In most cases, this type of insurgency is tribally or ethnically based. It is a product of a colonial legacy in which different tribes and ethnic groups were brought together under colonial rule.

    At the moment Boko Haram is not known to be operating outside Nigeria. It is local in origin and outlook, with a single specific objective; the destruction of the old established order and its replacement by a new order based on Islamic laws and strict Islamic doctrines. It is limited to the Northern part of Nigeria. Al Qaeda, the fundamentalist Islamic movement, based in Pakistan, but with tentacles all over the Arab world is an example of an insurgency whose operations and activities cut across the entire Moslem world. Nigeria is a multi-religious country. The country’s constitution guarantees to all its citizens the freedom of association and freedom to practice their religion. Boko Haram is opposed to this. Where the North is concerned it wants the creation of Islamic states. This is why Churches and the Christians are the main focus of its attacks. The insurgents resent the spread of Christianity in the North. They want the Hausa- Fulani North to be wholly Moslem, to be governed strictly according to Islamic laws. The problem is that it is not only the immigrants from the South that are Christians. There are large numbers of the Hausa-Fulani who, over the years, have converted to Christianity. The new generation evangelical Churches in the North have achieved remarkable success in extending Christianity to the largely Moslem North. The fundamentalist Moslems in the North feel beleaguered by this development which they fear threatens their way of life.

    So far, the Nigerian security forces have failed to effectively tackle the Boko Haram terrorists. They have stepped up their activities and operations in the North. The authorities have attempted without much success to counter Boko Haram by the application of military force. Dialogue may offer a way out of the insurgency but Boko Haram has not yet committed itself to this. At the moment, there is very little room for maneuver on either side of the dispute. The issues involved in the insurgency are so fundamental that any negotiations at this point in time are unlikely to succeed. There is a distinct lack of trust on either side. The group has persistently ignored the pleas of the Northern leaders to abandon their terrorist acts and operations. Instead, Boko Haram has intensified and widened its insurgency. There is a complete deadlock between the two sides. What is likely to happen is that the insurgency will gradually run out of steam and external support. This will make it easier for the Nigerian state to manage and contain the conflict. The federal authorities need to be more proactive in tackling Boko Haram. A sustained programme of public enlightenment on the danger to the state of Boko Haram should be started. This should be complemented by a more sustained and determined effort by the federal government as well as the Northern governments to invest more in providing easy access to education and jobs in the North.

    The security forces will need to do much better in intelligence gathering to pre-empt terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. A greater infiltration of the sect by the security forces for intelligence gathering is also called for. In this regard the federal authorities are looking for international support and assistance in intelligence gathering and equipment. The US government has been reported as being willing to offer some assistance on this. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was reported as making this offer during her recent official visit to Nigeria. Britain and other western countries will also be disposed to offer similar assistance.

    It is doubtful whether the Nigerian state has the capacity to neutralize the insurgent groups. Ethnic and religious divisions compound the security problems of the Nigerian state. Poor police and army intelligence makes it far too easy for Boko Haram agents to operate in the North. But it has to be admitted that there is also some support in the North for the principal aim of the sect, which is to make most of the North theocratic, instead of being secular.

    It will also be necessary to take practical and effective measures to cut off the local and foreign financial and logistical support for the insurgency. The CBN and the local banks have a huge responsibility in this regard. Without funding and logistical support Boko Haram will lose local support and become less effective.

  • Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III)

    Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III)

    The 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria was a sham. It was certainly unpopular in both Northern and Southern Nigeria at the time. In the North, the powerful Moslem Emirates were opposed to it, as it was feared that a centralized administrative system would weaken their authority, while in the South the fear of the Lagos based educated elite was that it would lead to the extension to the South of the obnoxious practice associated with indirect rule, and the curtailment of the few political rights that they enjoyed under the legislative council system. Lord Lugard and most of his successors as governors were committed to the maintenance of the existing aristocratic Emirates and social order in the North. They admired the Islamic way of life in the North. Northern Nigeria seemed more orderly and stable. Why disrupt this order by bringing in foreign cultural influences, including western education? While allowing the Christian missionaries to start schools in Southern Nigeria, the British colonial authorities did little to encourage education in the North. Churches were virtually barred by the British colonial government from starting schools in the North. The practical effect of this basic commitment by the British colonial authorities to maintain and protect the Islamic way of life in the North was that a yawning gap between the North and the South in western education began to develop rapidly. This gap in education between the North and the South is one of the major sources of conflicts and instability in the country, even today. It is directly responsible for the emergence of religious sectarian groups in the North such as Boko Haram. The pre-independence political process in Nigeria has also contributed to sectarian violence in Nigeria. On the surface, the constitutional framework at independence appeared flexible enough to permit compromise, adjustment, and change. It seemed loose enough to satisfy regional aspirations and at the same time to accommodate conflicting national interests. What it did in reality, however, was to conceal the essence of the Nigerian political process which, in practice, showed that there was a basic incompatibility between the formal side of the system and the political needs of the country. As one observer of the post independence situation in Nigeria rightly remarked, “the organization of power in Nigeria for the creation of political stability, whether for democratic or non-democratic purposes, is extremely weak’.

    Economic and social factors account for some of the friction between the largely Moslem North and the largely Christian South. The lack of a consensus over societal values, including a division over religion, is also a major source of the frequent religious conflicts in Nigeria as exemplified in the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria which, despite years of political domination of the country, continues to lag far behind the South in terms of economic and social development. The North is far poorer than the South. Per capita income in the North is less than half of that of the South where, until recently, economic progress had created a small but rapidly mobile middle class. Some of the educated Southerners have migrated to the North for jobs and commercial enterprise. Most of these Christian emigrants in the North have been largely successful financially as their education has given them an advantage over their Northern Moslem brothers. There are vast economic opportunities in the North. But the Northerners are ill equipped to take advantage of these opportunities because they lack access to education. They are simply unable to compete with the better educated Southerners who dominate commerce in the region. The Northern Moslems resent this development for which they blame, not only their own selfish leaders, but Christians who have lived with them for generations as well. Even without religious differences, this situation of economic inequality was bound to generate some hostility against Southerners living in the North. The grievances of the Boko Haram insurgents range from religious and cultural differences with the South to their inability to take advantage of the economic opportunities available in the North. Over time, they have seen how their hopes for a better society and living conditions have failed to materialise.

    The progressive breakdown of the old and powerful Emirates has also created an opportunity for these insurgents to challenge the old traditional authority in the North. The old and powerful emirates no longer have any power of coercion and rely on state security forces for the maintenance of law and order in their domain. Over time, they have also lost the moral authority that they enjoyed in pre-colonial times. Even though the process of modernization has been slower in the North, the hold of the Emirates on political and economic power has declined significantly. They have lost their political stranglehold on the people. Recently, there have been physical attacks by the sect on some of the Emirs. The insurgents want a return to the old values of a society governed under Islamic laws. They want to establish an Islamic theocracy in the North as they believe that this would provide them with equal opportunities for social and economic development. They believe it will end the corruption of their own Northern leaders and make the Northern ruling class more accountable to the talakawa, the poor. Their vision is that of a strict Islamic society in which their basic needs would be met by the state. This is the religious nexus binding the insurgents to one another. The widespread poverty in the North has provided the Boko Haram insurgents with a formidable instrument for seeking the overthrow of the existing order in the North. This order has not served the people well.

    When the Boko haram insurgency first came to light in 2009, it was a weak, poorly organized, and inchoate movement. Since then, it has been transformed into a powerful organization posing a serious threat to national security with an impressive strategic strike capability. This transformation has been made possible by a more determined, better educated, and committed leadership.

    •To be continued

  • The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (II)

    The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (II)

    This religious and sectarian insurgency emanating from the Arab world has now spread to Nigeria where, since 2009, the government has had to face the growing security challenge posed by Boko Haram (Western education is evil) to its authority. Before then, very little was known of the existence of this sect and its objectives. It was preceded by the activities and operations of the militants of the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that posed a grave security threat to Nigeria’s oil installations. Here, the grievances were mainly local and economic. Through dialogue, the federal authorities have been able to reach an agreement with the militants involving training abroad for them and some generous financial compensation. But even this can only be a partial solution to a problem that is deeply rooted in the political and economic history of the Delta region.

    The nature of the colonial legacy is responsible to a large extent for the emergence of political instability and the consequent emergence of insurgency in Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect is the product of a political and social process that failed to ensure an even development in the country, with the North lagging far behind the South in economic and social development. The insurgency in the North is a symptom of a deep seated malaise going back to the colonial area during which colonial policies adopted led to the North, the largest and most populous part of the country, falling behind the rest of the country in virtually all respects. Boko Haram is the direct consequence of the failure of northern leaders to invest in the education of their people. It is this failure, and not mere religious differences, that accounts for the deep seated grievances of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. The process and pace of modernisation in the North have been much slower than in the South. This situation creates frustration among the northern youths who find themselves unable to compete with their southern counterparts in all respects, even in the North.

    Northern Nigeria had been politically restive for some time. Before 2009 when Boko Haram first emerged there was the Maitasine rebellion which the Obasanjo government succeeded in putting down, largely through the application of force. But the underlying problem that produced Maitasine in the North was not really addressed. Boko Haram is the direct successor of Maitasine. Most of the northern states have since come under the savage attacks of the Boko Haram insurgents. There is now a serious danger that the insurgency may extend to other non-Fulani parts of northern Nigeria. Plateau State is the new target of attacks, though the competition for land between Fulani herdsmen and the indigenes in the region is also a major factor in the ethnic clashes there. Plateau State, part of the old Middle Belt, has a large Christian population as well. Its people have always historically been at logger – heads with the Hausa-Fulani who want to dominate the area. So, here the battle is for the control of this mineral rich part of Nigeria. It is both economic and political.

    A recent country report on global terrorism by the State Department of the United States showed that in 2011, 136 attacks were carried out in northern Nigeria by Boko Haram resulting in the death of 590 people. In terms of the global number of casualties in the Boko Haram attacks, Nigeria was placed fifth, after Afghanistan (3,353), Iraq (3, 063), Pakistan (2,033), and Somalia (1,103). It was reported that in 2011 there were some 978 terrorist attacks in Africa with Nigeria alone accounting for over 20 per cent of those attacks. The report stated that the sect was more deadly and vicious in its attacks in 2011 than in 2010. In 2010 only 31 attacks by Boko Haram were reported by the media. This figure increased in 2011 to 136. This year the number and frequency of Boko Haram attacks are likely to be even higher as the sect has increased its tempo during the current year. Already, it is estimated that Boko Haram attacks have resulted in the death of over 1,000 people in northern Nigeria since 2009.

    A former head of the Nigerian Army, Gen. Danjuma, has publicly expressed concerns that Nigeria may become a failed state like Somalia which has integrated on account of a long drawn out insurgency. Many northern leaders have also condemned the sect and blamed it for the situation of economic paralysis in the North There is increasing public concern that the sect seems to execute its vicious and bloody attacks so easily and with almost complete impunity. Despite its best and brave efforts the Joint Task Force, comprising the Army and the Police, has not yet been able to evolve a strategy to effectively tackle and contain attacks by the sect. Vast swathes of northern Nigeria have been rendered ungovernable and ‘no go’ areas. In the states that have been hit by Boko Haram, economic activities have been totally paralysed. The Plateau State has been one of the main targets of these attacks. It has suffered more casualties from the Boko Haram attacks than other states in northern Nigeria. The attacks appear religious in nature as most of them have been targeted at churches and Christians in northern Nigeria. Christian leaders have been restrained in their response to these attacks, but have warned that they may be obliged to urge their people to retaliate as the government has been unable to offer the victims of these random attacks any protection. A few mosques have also been attacked. But these attacks are directed against Muslims who are thought to have fallen behind in the strict practice of the Islamic doctrine and have fallen for the trappings of Western civilisation and way of life that the sect considers evil and unacceptable to strict Islamic doctrines.

    The Boko Haram phenomenon and the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria have to be considered as one of the unsavoury consequences and legacies of colonial rule in Nigeria. British colonial rule in Nigeria sought to create a new state by bringing together under a single colonial administration a country of such wide cultural and ethnic diversity. The central historical fact of Nigeria is that, like most of the other African states, it owes its existence as a nation state to European imperial ambitions in Africa. Lord Lugard, the first colonial governor of Nigeria, and the man who carried out the amalgamation of Nigeria, admitted at the time that Nigeria was ‘a mere geographical expression’ of this new British dependency. The territorial boundaries, the political institutions, and the images of these African states, are the result of European ambitions and rivalries in Africa. But colonialism was both a factor of cohesion and a source of friction. While it brought under one rule people with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, it did very little to integrate them into one nation.

    The roots of the current insurgency by Boko Haram also lie in the fragility of the political institutions that Nigeria inherited at its Independence in 1960. Post-colonial Nigeria has remained a weak state. The post-colonial political and economic systems were far too weak to contain the centrifugal tendencies in the country. The federal system of government agreed upon at Independence was unbalanced. It failed to provide an equitable distribution of power at the centre. It is this quest for a more balanced political system that has been at the centre of Nigeria’s post-colonial political history. The post-colonial framework was itself the product of the nature and style of the British colonial administration in Nigeria. It created huge divergences in administration in northern and southern parts of the colony.

     

    •To be continued

     

  • The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (I)

    The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (I)

    In recent years, there has been a global surge in both the intensity and range of insurgencies and terrorism. Nigeria is one of the latest to be added to the growing list of states affected by sectarian insurgencies. The US Department of State reported recently that of some 15 countries surveyed in 2011 for terrorism Nigeria ranked fifth. It also ranked 15th in kidnappings with 17 kidnappings reported. The figure for kidnappings is certainly underestimated. It is much higher. Since then, the tempo of terrorist attacks and kidnappings in Nigeria has certainly increased. In northern Nigeria, Boko Haram, the violent and extremist Islamic sect, has accepted responsibility for virtually all the terrorist attacks inflicted on the country. These increasing global insurgencies and terrorist acts are deeply rooted in the history of the various states affected. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria which first came to light in 2009 is a product of Nigeria’s colonial and violent post-colonial history. It presents Nigeria with its gravest domestic security challenge ever. There are fears that the insurgency could lead to the collapse and ultimate disintegration of the state. It has polarised the northern and southern parts of Nigeria as most of the victims of the Boko Haram insurgency are from the South.

    Insurgencies are not new in the history of states. They go back to times of antiquity, as far back as the old civilisations of the Greek city states and the Roman Empire when the rulers of these ancient civilizations often had to face the challenge of insurgencies, insurrections, and revolts. The main aim of insurgencies has always been the overthrow of the established order and its replacement by a new social and political order. Insurgents seek power through violence. Ultimately, both the Greek and Roman Empires fell as a result of these internal rebellions and insurgencies. The objectives of modern insurgencies remain the same; the overthrow of the existing order and its replacement by a new order or government. In modern history, examples of insurgencies and terrorism go back to at least four centuries, spanning many continents and states. These include the 1776 American war of independence from British colonial rule and the French revolution of 1789. In the Balkans, the old Hapsburg Empire was overthrown by a series of insurgencies, including the murder at Sarajevo of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist. This incident led to World War 1 and the break up of the Hapsburg Empire and Monarchy. In Russia, the Romanov Monarchy was brought down in the 1917 revolution against Imperial Russia. This bloody conflict, in which the entire family of the Tsar was wiped out, gave rise to the new Communist Empire of the Soviet Union. More recently, internal dissent and grievances led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ethnic war and cleansing in Yugoslavia led to its collapse and the rise of several successor states in its place. Most of the conflicts in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries involved the struggle for national independence from foreign rule, territorial expansion and grandeur. But some, such as the religious crusades between Islam and Christianity, were religious in character. Either side fought to expand its frontiers and its religion. In 1945, a Jewish terrorist group bombed a hotel in Jerusalem to drive out the British from Palestine and establish a Jewish state there.

    In addition to inter-state conflicts, we now have internal insurgencies and insurrections directed at the overthrow of the established social and political order in the affected states. The sources of this new kind of insurgencies range from political and economic factors to religious causes. Examples of these include the current sectarian conflict in Afghanistan between the insurgents, the Taliban, an extremist Islamic sect, and the Afghan government. In Pakistan and India terrorist groups, mainly extremist Islamic sects have continued to pose serious security problems to those countries. In the Middle East, the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians remains unresolved, with bands of insurgents and terrorists moving freely from one country to the other. In our own region of West Africa, the virtual dismemberment of Mali by Islamic warriors which have seized the northern part of the country constitutes a warning that insurgencies are spreading rapidly in the Savannah region of West Africa and the Sahel. Nigeria is just one of the possible targets of international terrorism in West Africa.

    There is no agreement on what constitutes an insurgency or terrorism. This reflects the divergence of views among those viewing the phenomenon. Normally, insurgencies are directed against the government and public institutions. It is more selective. On the other hand, terrorists want to destroy the entire social order in the country, not just the government. That appears to be the aim of Boko Haram. Sometimes, the phenomenon is described as militancy to secure a limited local objective. For instance, the various colonial struggle and conflicts, particularly in Asia and Africa were, in general, portrayed by the ruling colonial authorities as insurgencies or terrorism. In Africa, the ruling colonial authorities dismissed those fighting for the independence of their countries as insurgents or, worse still, as terrorists. The classic examples are those of the epic struggle by the ANC against apartheid South Africa and the bloody war waged by the Mau Mau against colonial rule in Kenya. Nelson Mandela of the ANC and Jomo Kenyatta of the Kenya African Union were accused of terrorism and sent to life imprisonment for leading the nationalist struggles in their respective countries. But the African nationalists claimed that their movements were nationalist in character and aimed at ending apartheid rule in South Africa and British colonial rule in Kenya. From the perspectives of the colonists, the Africans challenging foreign rule in their countries were insurgents or terrorists, a charge rejected by the African leaders. They considered their struggle as just and rejected the claim of the colonial powers that they were terrorists. The colonial powers also resorted to brutal terrorist means to end the various rebellions. French brutality in the Algerian war of independence is well documented.

    Boko Haram is not a nationalist movement. In post-colonial Africa, the current insurgencies are not overtly directed against foreign rule. Instead, they are local in nature and directed against hated local authorities and foreign influences. But then those who take up arms locally against established authority still do not think of themselves as terrorists, or even insurgents, but as nationalists fighting for a just cause. It could be for religious reasons. It could also be due to local grievances. They resort to insurgencies or terrorism to over throw a regime they consider lacking in political or moral legitimacy. Examples of this, in which insurgents and government forces contend for power, abound in different parts of the world. Recently, the so -called ‘Arab Spring’ has led to the sudden eruption of political violence and the overthrow of some despotic regimes in the Arab world, including Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in North Africa. Change was needed in the Arab world where despotic regimes had firmly established themselves. The Syrian regime of President Assad is the latest Arab government facing a serious insurrection and revolt of a religious character. The conflict is principally one between the Sunni and the Shiites for control of Syria. The Arab Spring is, in some cases, the result of sectarian conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites. In other cases it is a revolt against despotic governments and bad leadership in the states affected by the insurgencies and mass revolt.