Category: Law

The National Assembly’s Joint Constitution Review Committee has proposed 67 bills containing several items for amendment. Twelve of them are on judicial reforms. ROBERT EGBE looks at the proposals and their implication for constitutional development.

The National Assembly will today begin another attempt to review the 1999 Constitution by voting on 67 bills.

Last Thursday, the “Report of the Senate Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution (Fifth Alteration) Bills 2022” was laid by Deputy Senate President, Senator Ovie Omo-Agege.

Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ahmed Wase, did the same at the Green Chambers.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives will vote to adopt or reject the bills.

For a proposal to scale through, it must be supported by two-thirds of members.

12 bills

According to the joint constitution review committee, there are 12 bills on judicial reforms.

They include bills on financial autonomy for state legislatures and state judiciary, establishment of the Federal Revenue Court and the revenue court of a state, timelines for determination of civil and criminal causes and fundamental human rights and national security.

Others are the uniform retirement age of judicial officers and pension rights, judiciary (visual/remote court hearings) and the inclusion of judges of the National Industrial Court in the composition of the election tribunals.

Federal Revenue Court

Stakeholders have long sought a special court to resolve revenue matters, but it was not until last August that the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) initiated moves for the establishment of a federal revenue court (FRC), via a document to the House of Representatives.

The bill also sought the removal of powers to adjudicate on tax matters from the Federal High Court.

The move followed an order by the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt restraining the FIRS from collecting value-added tax (VAT) in Rivers State.

“The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) hereby proposes the insertion of Section 254G to 254L in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) to provide for the establishment of Federal Revenue Court (FRC), the appointment of chief judge (FRC), power to make rules for the proceedings of the (FRC) and the Appointment of judges of the (FRC), Exclusive Jurisdiction of (FRC) on Federal Tax Matters,” the proposed bill reads.

“The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) further proposes for the amendment of Section 251(1) (b) of the Constitution of FIN 1999 (Amended) by removing the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal High court only on anything connected or related to Federal tax matters since same would be vested on the proposed Federal Revenue Court.

“The FIRS, therefore, wishes to further request that the House of Representatives consider the request for the establishment of Federal Revenue Court for the reason stated above.”

Why FRC?

The FIRS argued that such a court would increase revenue generation for the government.

FIRS stated that the revenue court can replicate the success story of the tax appeal tribunal (TAT), which handled over 500 tax related cases between its inception in 2019 and last August, with values such as N75.8 billion between 2010—2016 and N381,013,087,914,25, $14,779,158.07, EUR – 585,511.00 GBP – 11,145.00, and ZAR 644,857.00 between 2018 and 2020.

If the lawmakers tow the FIRS’ line, the FRC would be modelled along the Federal Revenue Court Decree No, 13, 1973 established during the military regime of Yakubu Gowon.

“Historically, the Federal Revenue Court was established by the promulgation of the Federal Revenue Court Decree No, 13, 1973. However, the enactment of Section 228(1) and 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution renamed the Revenue Court to Federal High Court, this was further replicated in the Federal High Court Decree (Amendment) 1991 Cap (60) LFN now referred to as Federal High Court (amended)- Act 2000 Cap F12 LFN revised edition 2010.

“This amended Section 7 of the Federal High Court Act, (1991); and conferred Exclusive Jurisdiction on the Federal-High Court in relation to tax matters amongst others.

Section 228(1) and 230(1) was further re-enacted as Section 251. (1) (a) to (s) of the Constitution of FRN 1999.”

Bill seeking timeline for civil, criminal cases

There is also a bill seeking timeline for civil, criminal cases. The bill has also been a long time coming and it seeks to set down laws to cure the slow pace of justice delivery

Last December 10, the House of Representatives passed it for second reading.

The bill seeks to set a timeline within which to start and conclude civil and criminal cases in high courts and appeal courts to eliminate unnecessary delay in justice delivery and administration and boost people’s confidence in the judiciary.

The legislation, sponsored by Hon. Onofiok Luke, is entitled: “Bill for An Act to alter the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Cap. C23, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 to set time within which civil and criminal cases and matters are heard and determined at trial and appellate courts in order to eliminate unnecessary delay in justice administration and delivery; and for related matters.”

The bill seeks to amend Chapter VII, Part IV of the Principal Act (the 1999 Constitution), by inserting after the existing section 287, a new section ‘287A’, that will comprise of 10 clauses.

 

Inside the bill

According to the clauses in the bill’s draft, clause 1 mandates every trial superior court of record to deliver judgment on a matter before it within 270 days (a period of about nine months) from the date of the filing of the civil or criminal matter. Electoral matters are, however, exempted by this clause since such matters are specially regulated by other constitutional provisions.

Clause 2 also mandates trial inferior court of record or tribunal to deliver judgement on any matter before it within 210 days (a period of about seven months) from the date of the filing of the civil or criminal matter.

Clause 3 (a), however, gives latitude to a trial superior court of record to deliver its judgment within 330 days (a period of 11 months) where the circumstances of a particular matter warrants. Such circumstances could be the complexity of the matter, number of parties and witnesses, number of documents or other exceptional circumstances.

Clause 4 mandates all appellate courts to hear and determine appeals within 180 days (a period of about six months) from the date of the filing of the appeal or such number of days not exceeding 270 days (a period of about nine months) if the circumstances of the appeal so warrants.

Leading the debate on the general principle of the bill, the sponsor, Luke said when passed, it will enhance speedy delivery of justice.

He said: “This bill when passed will entirely change the face of justice in Nigeria for the good of all. It is more pleasing that this proposal is made in this particular legislative house which is known to be pro-people. The pace of justice delivery in Nigeria is alarmingly slow. In average, cases stay a minimum of five to 15 years before determination and judgment. The snail-like pace of justice delivery has caused great discomfort, inconveniences and hopelessness to litigants, investors and businesses.

“People only know the date they approach the court but they do not know when their matters will get determined. The inability of our judicial system to deliver justice to the people within reasonable time has occasioned great frustration on the part of the people, and has caused them to resort to self-help. Slow justice delivery serves as a stumbling block to Nigeria’s industrialisation drive and foreign investment. We have heard about so many of our people in criminal cases wasting away and leading to the congestion of our correctional centres and case lists in our court rooms.”

Existing related provision in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) and Administration of Criminal Justice Law (ACJL) of states also makes provision for speedy court proceedings.

But Chief Whip of the House, Mohammed Monguno explained that this new bill is different.

Monguno said: “Administration of Criminal Justice Act only prescribes that criminal matters must be heard on a day- to- day basis and there should not be the chequered history of adjournments. There is no time limit within which criminal cases should be dispensed with.

“Once a time limit is constitutionally stipulated for the disposal of criminal cases, then the courts will make sure that these cases are not stagnant; they will make sure that they are disposed of by the time stipulated by the Constitution”.

Another lawmaker, Nkem Abonta, also weighed in, adding that the ACJA needs total overhaul.

 

Virtual hearings of cases

The case for virtual hearing already has judicial stamp of approval, following the Supreme Court’s July 14, 2020 ruling which upheld the decision of Lagos and Ekiti State to hear cases virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A seven-man panel of the apex court led by Justice Olabode Rhodes-Vivour held that virtual court sittings are presumed to be valid and had not been declared unconstitutional by the apex court.

Justice Rhodes-Vivour gave the ruling while hearing separate suits filed by the Attorneys-General of Lagos Moyosore Onigbanjo (SAN) and Ekiti states’ Olawale Fapohunda on the adoption of remote hearings by judges in their states.

Lagos State had filed a suit challenging the power of the National Assembly to amend section 274 of the Constitution which seeks to include virtual proceedings in the constitution.

Ekiti State, on the other hand, had prayed the court to make an affirmative decision to remove the speculations and uncertainties being entertained about the virtual hearing by judges.

The Rhodes-Vivour panel described the suits of both the Lagos and Ekiti states’ attorney-generals as speculative as the suits did not disclose how virtual proceedings had injured the interest or right of anyone.

Onigbanjo and Fapohunda then withdrew the suits after members of the apex court panel described the suits and academic and speculative.

The judge maintained that the chief judges of the states that had issued practice direction to provide for virtual sitting should enforce the directive.

But several problems are anticipated and the lawmakers are expected to provide a solution via a constitutional amendment.

Ugonna Ogbuagu and Kehinde Takuro of ÆLEX, Nigeria, noted some of the challenges, particularly with regard to implementation, in their article, “Innovations for the development of remote justice in Nigeria”.

They said: “The most significant challenge for the development of a remote justice system in Nigeria is the sub-optimal state (or in some cases, absence) of the infrastructure required for its implementation. In many areas, the power supply is irregular, internet speed is slow, and there is a dearth of computers and other technology required by the judges and registrars to facilitate virtual hearings.

“The fact that not all parties may be able to participate in virtual hearings effectively may be the reason why some courts require both parties to agree to a virtual hearing before such hearing can be scheduled. For instance, the FHC’s Practice Directions specifically provides that, where parties and lawyers in a case agree to virtual proceedings, they shall liaise with the registrar to schedule the hearings.”

 

Uniform retirement age of judicial officers

At the moment Justices of the Supreme Court retire at age 70, the Justices of the Court of Appeal, 70 and judges of the Federal High Courts retire at 65, while state High Court judges also retire at age 65.

The bills if adopted may see Supreme Court Justices retiring at age 75, while Justices of the Appeal Court and judges of the Federal High Courts may both retire at age 70.

This will please proponents of a longer tenure for Supreme Court justices.

For instance, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Chief Afe Babalola, believes Supreme Court Justices should remain on the Bench for life or at the very least, for far longer than the current 70 years retirement age.

Speaking last year at the virtual launch of books in honour of Justice Bode Rhodes-Vivour, who retired from the apex court on March 22, 2021, Babalola outlined his proposal.

The founder of Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti (ABUAD) observed that justices become more experienced and wiser as they get older, hence, should be allowed to remain on the Bench for life.

“There is an urgent need for reform of our judicial system. This is with particular regards to age of judges, most especially those at the Supreme Court,” he said in a statement signed by ABUAD Director, Corporate Information, Mr. Tunde Olofintila.

Babalola frowned at the present situation where strong and mentally alert judicial officers are eased off the Bench on account of a constitutional retirement age of 70 when their services and experience are still most needed.

His said: “I want to seize this opportunity to plead that we should review our justice system, particularly the age of retirement of Supreme Court Judges. Experience has shown that a person becomes wiser and more experienced as he advances in age.

“Under our judicial system. today, Justice Olabode Rhodes-Vivour JSC (Rtd) is retiring at the young age of 70 when he has not shown any sign of physical weakness and when Nigeria would have benefitted more from his wealth of wisdom, insight and experience.

“A brief look at other countries shows that appointment to the Supreme Court is a lifetime appointment. There is no age limit for a justice of the Supreme Court to retire. Often times, they stay as long as they probably can. In fact, many die while in office.

“But those who opt for retirement, the average age is 78.7 years. The average retirement age has grown a whopping 103 years.”

Both the Senate and House of Representatives are expected to harmonise their two bills on the issue.

Other benefits of longer tenures for justices

According to Onofiok, there is the belief that a longer tenure for justices might discourage the idea of age falsification by some judges in an attempt to extend their stay in office, a ground for which several judicial officers, particularly at the high court level, have been recommended for retirement by the National Judicial Council (NJC) in recent times.

For instance, in 2016, two judges of the Niger State High Court were sanctioned for allegedly falsifying their dates of birth; while another judge was recommended for compulsory retirement. In April 2020, the NJC recommended the compulsory retirement of yet another judge, an Acting President of a state Customary Court of Appeal, alleged to have falsified his date of birth and avoided his retirement which was due five years earlier.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

IN ASABA JUDICIAL DIVISION

ON FRIDAY 12TH MARCH 2021

 

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

MOHAMMED A. DANJUMA, JCA

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA

ABIMBOLA O. OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, JCA

 

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNOR OF DELTA STATE OF NIGERIA & 2 Ors

And 

OLUKUNLE OGHENEOVO EDUN, ESQ

  (Lead Judgment delivered by Honourable Justice Joseph Eyo Ekanem, JCA)

 

Facts of the case:

The Respondent, a Legal Practitioner based in Warri, while driving his vehicle along Afisere Road, Ughelli, Delta State, was intercepted by Officers of the 3rd Appellant, through a road block; and was asked to produce his Certificate of Road Worthiness.

The Respondent maintained that he had none and that, as a private car owner, whose vehicle was not used for mercantile or commercial purpose, he was not required to apply for roadworthiness.

This led to serious traffic which prompted the 2nd Appellant to release the Respondent. Upon inspection of his documents, the Respondent discovered that he was actually issued a Certificate of Road Worthiness by Officers of the Appellant.

He therefore initiated an action by way of Originating Summons at the High Court of Delta State, seeking the interpretation of whether a Certificate of Road Worthiness was needed for private owned vehicles.

The trial court found in favour of the Respondent.

The Appellant, aggrieved, lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

 

Issues for determination:

1.Whether the suit of the Respondent filed against the Appellants on 21 November 2014 is not statute-barred, in view of the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. P.23, Vol. IV, Laws of Delta State of Nigeria, 2006.

2.Whether the 3rd Appellant “Senior Vehicle Inspection Officer (Ughelli North Local Government Area of Delta State), is a juristic person that can be sued.

3.Whether by virtue of the provisions of all relevant laws relating to Road Traffic, the Certificate of Road Worthiness has no application to private motor vehicles.

 

Counsel’s Argument

On issue 1 Appellants’ counsel submitted that the suit of the Appellant is statute-barred.

He referred to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Laws of the Delta State and submitted that the Appellants are Public officers within the intendment of the provision.

He contended that the cause of action arose on 5 August 2014, while the suit was filed on 21 November 2014, which is over the 3 month period prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Law.

He placed reliance on Ibrahim v. Judicial Service Commission, Kaduna State (1998) 64 LRCN 5044, among other cases.

Respondent submitted that the Public Officers Protection Law is not an all-embracing bar against actions brought against public officers, but admits exceptions, which he set out in his Brief of Argument.

He further submitted that the act of the Appellants was ultra vires, and had no semblance or colour of authority, and so cannot be protected under the law.

He referred to Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 21 NSCC (pt. 1) 306, among other cases.

The Respondent argued further that the illegal retention of the fee for the Road Worthiness Certificate means that there is a continuous wrong or injury to the Respondent.

This, he said, takes the case outside the application of the law.

 

Judgment of the court and the reason

Their Lordships held that the purpose of the Public Officers Protection Law, is to protect public officers from civil liability for any wrongdoing that occasions damages to any citizen if the action is not instituted within 3 months after the act, default or neglect complained of.

The law is designed to protect only the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and without semblance of legal justification.

Their lordships held that there is however one well-established exception to the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Law, namely that it does not apply to acts of a public officer which are outside the scope of the authority or which is in abuse of his office or without semblance of legal justification.

Their Lordships relied on Nwankere v. Adewunmi(1966) 1 All NLR 129.

On whether the 3rd Appellant “Senior Vehicle Inspection Officer (Ughelli North Local Government Area of Delta State), is a juristic person that can be sued.

Their Lordships held that the 3rd Appellant, “Senior Vehicle Inspection Officer (Ughelli North Local Government Area of Delta State)”, is not a natural person.

Their Lordships held that there is no express provision of the Road Traffic Law of Delta State or any other law which confers on him the right to sue or be sued eo nominee.

The Senior Vehicle Inspection Officer is only an administrative head of his zone and not the overall body, to wit: the Vehicle Inspection Unit.

The right to sue or be sued does not arise from the mere fact that a statute recognizes the existence of a body or office for the performance of a function.

The right must be donated by statute expressly or impliedly.

Their Lordships placed reliance on Erokoro v. Government of Cross River State (1991) 4 NWLR (pt. 185) 322.

His Lordship Joseph Eyo Ekanem, JCA held that, ‘‘The position of a Senior Vehicle Inspection Officer is akin to the position of a Divisional Police Officer who is the administrative head of a Police Division.

In the case of African Ivory Insurance v. Commissioner for Insurance (1998) 1 NWLR (pt. 532) 50, at 57, it was held that while the Commissioner of Police could be sued eo nomine as it is known to the Constitution, the Division Police Officer being an office set up merely for administrative convenience, cannot be sued.

It is, therefore, my opinion that the 3rd Appellant is not a person that can sue or be sued eo nomine’’.

Whether by virtue of the provisions of all relevant laws relating to Road Traffic, the Certificate of Road Worthiness has no application to private motor vehicles.

The Appellants’ counsel argued that Certificate of Road Worthiness has application to private vehicles.

He referred to the learned trial Judge’s interpretation of Section 48(1), (4) and (5) of the Law and submitted that it cannot be the correct intendment of the lawmakers.

This he said is because the law defines “Motor Vehicle” to mean mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads. He also referred to Section 3(2) of the Road Traffic Law.

He contended that if the intention of the lawmakers was that private vehicles be exempted from carrying the Certificate of Road Worthiness, it would have been expressly so stated.

He stated that this is on account of the fact that Section 48(1) and (2) of the Law, which empowers persons authorized to impound vehicles plying the road without certain particulars includes Road Worthiness Certificate as one of the particulars meant to be carried by vehicles plying the road.

The Respondent submitted that a perusal of the Law and its Regulations shows that there is no provision therein that empowers the Appellants to issue Certificate of Road Worthiness in respect of vehicles used for non-commercial purposes.

Rather, the only section that authorizes the Appellants to examine vehicles is Regulation 58 of the Regulations, which relates only to examination of commercial vehicles and the issuance of certificate therefor after such examination.

He referred to Section 2 of the Law (the interpretation Section) and submitted that his vehicle does not fall within the definition of a commercial vehicle.

He also referred to Regulation 2 of the Regulation and Section 43 of the Law, which empowers the State Execution Council to make regulations on various matters relating to road traffic and Regulation 5 of the Regulation made pursuant thereto, which he said relates to the examination of commercial vehicles only.

He argued that there is no similar provision in respect of vehicles used for private purposes.

Their Lordships held that Paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Regulation 5 of the Road Traffic Regulations (RTR) made detailed and comprehensive provisions for the factors or matters that must be present for the registration of categories of vehicles as follows:

(1)Paragraph (2) is for registration of commercial and passenger carrying vehicles, to wit: categories (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) of the paragraph (1).

(2)Paragraph 3 is for registration of trailers (that is to say category (iii) of paragraph (1).

(3)Paragraph 4 is for registration of agricultural machine, that is to say category (ix) of paragraph (1).

(4)Paragraph 5 is for registration of tractor, that is to say category (x) of paragraph 1..

The requirements include the production of a Certificate of Road Worthiness issued under Regulation 58 at the time of the application for registration.

Regulation 58(1) and (2) of the RTR states:

(1) Every commercial vehicle, trailer, taxi, stage carriage, omnibus, shall before being registered or licensed and every 6 month thereafter, be examined by a Vehicle Inspection Officer.

(2) Examination Certificate – where at such examination a vehicle is found to be roadworthy, the Vehicle Inspection Officer shall issue a certificate to that effect as in Form M. L. 9 in the Sixth Schedule, which shall remain valid for 6 months. Such certificate shall be carried in the registration book and produced when required by Licensing Authority, a Vehicle Inspector or a Police Officer.”

Their Lordships held that this requirement applies only to vehicles that come under paragraphs (2) and (3) only, that is, commercial and passenger carrying vehicles and trailers.

Their Lordships held that it is, therefore, clear from the above that the provisions of Regulation 5 is loudly silent in respect of private motor vehicles.

I agree with the learned trial Judge. The provisions for particulars of motor vehicles are to be found in the RTR which as I have already demonstrated do not require a private motor vehicle to have a Certificate of Road Worthiness.

It follows therefore that the words “any of the particulars…” refer to the particulars as are required in respect of each category of motor vehicle as set out in Regulation 58 of RTR.

Their Lordships held that from the foregoing it can be drawn that a private motor vehicle is a motor vehicle belonging to a particular person, or which is for the use of a particular person or group, and for the carrying of their personal effects and not for public use or for hire or reward.

His Lordship Joseph Eyo Ekanem, JCA held that

‘‘Before drawing the curtain on this judgment, I need to remind public bodies and public officers that a public body or public officer vested with statutory power must take care not to exceed or abuse its or his power.

“It or he must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. This is to prevent arbitrariness and the rule of man rather than the rule of law. See Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel State (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 4) 572, at 591.

“The Vehicle Inspection Officers went beyond the powers vested in them by the law and the Road Traffic Regulations, by violently stopping the private motor vehicle of the Respondent on a public highway, using menacing tactics and dangerous implements to demand for Certificate of Road Worthiness which the said vehicle is not required to have.

“Such conduct sends a wrong signal to the citizens who may adopt such strong-arm tactics as a means of settling disputes’’.

The Appeal was dismissed.

 

Representation

1. O. Monye, Esq. (Director, Civil Litigation, Ministry of Justice, Delta State, (with him, G. I. Ugbechie, Esq – Senior State Counsel) – for the Appellants.

Respondent in person.

 

• Reported in (2021) Modern Weekly Law Report (MWLR) pt 11 P. 331-385 – Modern Weekly Law Report (MWLR) is a publication of Doyen Law Publishers Limited)

Justice Lewis Allagoa of a Federal High Court sitting ìn Lagos has warned lawyers to desist from filing frivilous applications in the 14-year-old Nospecto investors funds case.

Justice Allagoa on Monday, February 14, berated the lawyers after dismissing a preliminary objection seeking a discontinuation of the suit in which 13,741 investors through their lawyer – Debo Adeleke – are in court over their N22.4billion investment kept with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

The judge observed that lawyers for some of the parties in the case had developed interest in filing “silly and frivolous applications” for the purpose of stalling the case of trapped investors’ funds instead of serving the interest of justice.

The judge cautioned that his court would not indulge such act, adding that he was interested in the quick dispensation of justice so all parties could know their fates.

Justice Allagoa further observed that from the records of proceedings, the same motions that were earlier raised at the high court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, heard and determined were brought back to the high court again for determination, thus prolonging the real matter from being heard.

“I think lawyers should work to the satisfaction of the interest of justice.

“The investors’ money is crying for collection and you busy yourselves filing silly applications, wearing wigs and gowns, riding in expensive cars, while the investors of the trapped funds are suffering and dying”, the judge lamented.

The Judge had earlier dismissed the preliminary application brought before it by the 3rd respondent in the suit, Nospetco Oil and Gas Limited from the chambers of Rickey Tafa, SAN, which had prayed for discontinuation of the suit.

The judge held that there was no reason for bringing such motion.

The Judge therefore awarded a cost of N100,000  against the 3rd defendant.

Justice Allagoa however granted an application seeking striking out of the names of Rowland Badejo, and three other investors, led by Chief Roland Otaru, SAN, who had earlier filed an application for discontinuance of the suit.

The Judge held that although they had the right of the choice of their legal representatives, they could not foist such right on other investors.

Adeleke, head of MCI-law chambers, commended the court for its appraisal of the matter, likening the ruling to the biblical King Solomon’s judgment of over 2,000 years ago, saying it would stand the test of time.

“The ruling is a further manifestation that the court is the last hope of the common man. Even though justice might seem to be delayed due to shenanigan attitude of some lawyers, at the end of the tunnel there would be light, meaning that justice would, one day be delivered.

“We thank God and his lordship for his erudite ruling in the matter.  It is hope rising for the hapless and innocent investors who are dying at geometrical progression since inception of their case by our law firms”, he said.

Tracing the genesis of the case, Adeleke said the matter which commenced in 2008 traversed all the courts in the land, i.e. from the Industrial Court, Federal High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court.

According to the lawyer, all the courts emphatically and collectively agreed, that the funds kept at the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, by Security Exchange Commission, (SEC) belongs to the Investors.

He said besides, all the courts equally agreed that Nospetco Oil and Gas Ltd operated ultra vires and outside its strait jacketed object clause.

Hence it was described as “a wonder bank”, a euphemism of saying it was operating illegally.

Consequently, SEC statutorily confiscated the money from Nospetco Oil and Gas Ltd and kept same for and on behalf of the Investors.

It could be recalled that the Supreme Court in its judgment stated copiously and emphatically that the money kept with the CBN belongs to the Investors and the Investors should collect their funds from the CBN by taking their grievances to the appropriate quarters or court.

Adeleke said that the CBN Suo-moto (on its own) advertised in two National Dailies, The Guardian (12/02/2008) and Vanguard Newspapers (13/02/2008) for the investors to come and collect their money.

He said but none of the investors has been able to collect his or her money from the CBN hence the MCI-Law chambers was approached by 13,741 investors and their total investment currently with the CBN is N22,434,771,466.84.

Adeleke further said that continue holding of investors money is uncalled- for and insensitive to the plight of the Investors who are dying at geometrical progression while others are living in abject poverty and daily going through the agony of slow death.

The 14 years old legal battle began in 2008 when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), declared a scheme founded by Nospetco Oil And Gas Limited illegal.

Nospetco was registered solely for the importation, sale and distribution of petroleum products and cooking gas.

The firm started a collective investment scheme between 2004 and 2005 and encouraged thousands to invest N450, 000 per slot, with a promise of a monthly N40, 000 return on investment on each slot.

Shortly after the respondents had invested in the firm, SEC, in 2007, stopped the firm’s operations, describing it as illegal.

The regulatory agency also froze its various bank accounts and deposited the money with the CBN on behalf of the investors.

But the apex court dismissed Nospetco Oil & Gas claims, declaring that the money actually belongs to the Investors.

Justice Allagoa has fixed further hearing ìn the matter for March 30.