One ground of appeal and a single is sue for determination is sufficient to sustain an appeal. The Appeal was against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan division, delivered on the December 5, 2001.
The plaintiff had claimed before the lower court through an amended statement of claim from the defendants jointly and severally the sum of N1, 782,222.78, being the balance of banking facilities and interest granted to the 1st defendant by the plaintiff at its Ilora Branch Oyo State in 1985 and 1987, which sum was outstanding at the close of business on August 11, 1993. The defendant defaulted in the payment of the said sum as agreed and the plaintiff demanded its payment from him having neglected, omitted and or refused to pay same.
The Plaintiff claimed interest on the said sum of N1, 782,222.78 at the rate of 39% per annum from the August 13, 1993 until judgment is given and thereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until final liquidation of the judgment debt.
At the end of the trial, the trial court delivered its judgment on October 27, 1997 held that the plaintiff had proved its case on the balance of probability. The court gave judgment in the sum of N150, 000 with interest at 15% per annum with effect from 30th April, 1987 till October 1997 and thereafter at 10% per annum until the whole amount is finally liquidated.
It further awarded the sum of N180, 000 with interest at 19 per cent per annum, but limited the liability of the third defendant to the sum of N250, 000.
Dissatisfied with the final judgment, the defendants filed a notice of appeal containing two grounds of appeal. Also dissatisfied with the judgment, the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court’s judgment and in its place ordered judgment entered for the plaintiff/respondent in the sum of N180, 000 with 19 per cent interest until the entire amount is fully liquidated.
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court of Appeal the respondent/cross appellant filed a notice of appeal with the leave of the Supreme Court containing 14 grounds of appeal.
The facts of this case briefly were that the appellant and 1st respondents were into Banker/Customer relationship. The appellant’s claim arose from the banking facilities granted by the appellant to the 1st respondent between 1984 and 1987.
The appellant pleaded and called evidence that the applicable interest on the facilities had varied from time to time according to the Central Bank of Nigeria Monetary policy Guidelines which the bank was obliged to apply.
The respondents admitted that the latter two facilities were still outstanding and had not been settled with the appellant. They however contended that the appellant was not entitled to the amount claimed by it on the facilities as it had applied arbitrary interest rates and charges in arriving at the amount claimed.
Various documents were tendered and admitted including Exhibits T1 & T2, W and E. The crux of the matter then was which of the Exhibits governed the transaction?
The trial court gave judgment in favour of the appellant but refused to base its judgment on the amount outstanding on the 1st respondent’s statement of account.
At the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the Court of Appeal ought to have held that variation of interest was proved and so should have upheld the claims before the trial court less what was found to be irregularly charged as bank charges and commission on turn over.
On the other hand, the respondents/cross appellants’ case was that the court below had no jurisdiction to grant the claims as originally presented in the trial court when that was not an issue at the Court of Appeal.
That the court below having found that the appellant was only entitled to damages upon the expiration of the facility, ought not to have awarded interest by way of damages when such claim was neither sought nor pleaded and proved. Six issues were submitted for determination.
It was contended that the appellant felt bound by the findings of the court below that the facilities expired. That they were only shopping for authority to justify the trial court’s finding of agreed interest in the absence of a claim for damages. They submitted that the law is trite that a party cannot raise an appeal on issue which was not made on the pleadings even if the parties addressed the court on it except with leave of court. They relied on amongst other cases RANSOME KUTI v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 211 per Karibi-Whyte, JSC at page 2450, ADELEKE v ASERIFA (1986) 3 NWLR (PT.30) 575 AND INYANG v EBONG (2002) FWLR (Pt.125) 703.
The respondents submitted that it is not in the character of the Supreme Court to take appeals directly from the decision of the trial court, relying on a number of cases GBADAMOSI v DAIRO (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 357) 812 at 827 and LADOJA v INEC (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 371) 934 at 996.
In response to the respondents’ preliminary objection, the appellant submitted that those grounds of appeal referred to by the respondents arose from the judgment of the court below, therefore they were competent.
The appellant urged the court to discountenance the argument and authorities cited in support.
In resolving the issues in the appeal, the Supreme Court held amongst others that ‘It is ideal to distill or formulate an issue from more than one ground of appeal but where this is not done or it is impossible, just only one issue may be raised from one ground of appeal.’
It was further held that “Therefore, a valid Notice of Appeal with one ground of appeal and a single issue for determination is sufficient to sustain an appeal.”
Finally, it held that “Where the court is of the view that a consideration of one of the issues is enough to dispose of the appeal, it is not under any obligation to consider all the other issues posed for determination.’
In the final analysis, all the issues formulated, and argued are resolved against the appellant. The appeal therefore fails for lacking in merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Cross-Appeal
The Cross appellants had contended at the court below that when the contract had expired. That special damages by way of interest had to be pleaded and proved, the rate payable being at the discretion of the court which in ordinary circumstances will be the usual court rate so that the creditor may not be at an advantage for its failure to promptly sign up judgment against the debtor.
The Cross appellants submitted that the court below was therefore partly wrong to the extent that it did not hold that whatever was claimable would not be a continuation of the contract to interest, but had to be pleaded and proved as damages or compensation as none was so pleaded or proved in the case. They relied on AIROE CONSTRUCTION LTD v UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 287. It was further submitted that it is trite law, that the court has no jurisdiction to grant a relief not claimed relying on, EKPENYONG v NYONG (1975) 2 SC 71 at 80-82 (Pt.108) 192 at 205.
In the cross-respondent’s brief of argument, the sole issue of the cross appellants was adopted.
The Supreme Court noted that ordinarily, interest is not payable on ordinary debt in purely commercial transaction, in the absence of a term to that effect expressly or impliedly in the contract or mercantile usage or custom of the parties or as may be contained in a statute.
In the circumstance, the cross appeal succeeded and was thereby allowed. The award of interest pre-judgment interest in damages, by the Court of Appeal was set aside, not having been specifically pleaded and proved by the cross-respondent. There was no order on costs.
