Tag: Biafra

  • At a time like this

    At a time like this

    If any era in Nigeria’s history qualified as one of heady optimism, it was the time leading to the inauguration of the Second Republic.

    The wounds of the civil war had healed faster than most people expected. Petrodollars accrued to the national exchequer faster than the authorities could figure out what to do with the new wealth. Biafra had provided powerful intimations of what black humanity can achieve when pursuing common purpose; a re-united Nigeria, home of the largest aggregation of black humanity, was going to take its rightful place in the global community, propelled by the dynamic leadership of Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo.

    Nigerians everywhere walked tall. Those studying abroad, most of them on government scholarships, rushed back on completion of their programmes, believing not only that home was where they belonged but that it was where their future lay. The Naira was worth almost two U.S. dollars. The economy was expanding, and jobs were there for the taking.

    In short, a future that would be marked by prosperity at home and major influence abroad was splendidly visible and clearly attainable.

    The 1979 Constitution, the fundamental law of the Second Republic, reflected the big thinking of that era, the planning for and investing in future political greatness, what with the American-style presidency and other institutions of state, just as a sprawling bureaucracy had planned for and invested in the nation’s future economic greatness.

    Framed by a team boasting some of the nation’s best and brightest, the Constitution was as bold and innovative as the times demanded, and just as comprehensive. It left nothing to chance.

    One of its more notable innovations, which has been attributed in the main to the per-eminent legal scholar Ben Nwabueze, was encapsulated in a Council of State composed of the President and the Vice President, all former presidents or heads of state, all former federal chief justices, the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, all state governors, and the Federal Attorney-General.

    Its remit, re-stated in the 1999 Constitution, is to advise the President with respect to his duties on a wide range of subjects in general, and on issues relating to the maintenance of public order in particular “when asked to do so.”

    This latter qualification makes it clear that the Council is an advisory body, pure and simple, and that it meets at the pleasure or convenience of the nation’s President. But it does not render it otiose.

    The underlying assumption was that the ex-officio members of the Council would be men and women who, having given of their best to their country, would stay splendidly above the fray and would never again seek elective office nor descend into the pit of partisanship. Thus, their good faith would never be in doubt.

    In a proper setting, the Council would be the repository of the nation’s collective wisdom and experience, a fount of inspiration, a moral force. It would be the body to turn to when the country is buffeted by strife and uncertainty – the very kind of period Nigeria is going through now.

    The nation is paralysed on practically every front. The ruling PDP is in disarray and scheming desperately to hold on to power. The economy is reported to be growing by leaps and bounds, but the nation slips farther and farther down the international misery index. Power supply remains fitful, impervious to the magic wand of privatisation.

    Interstate highways remain dangerously cratered. Youth unemployment, already alarmingly high, is soaring. Fully one-fourth of the crude oil lifted from our shores is stolen, and record-keeping of what is not stolen is scandalously shoddy.

    The immediate future promises only more of the same.

    And at the top, diffidence reigns. Not even the most fervent chants of Transformation can drown out the din of the rank innocence, the utter bewilderment up there.

    It is precisely at a time like this that the Council of State should be deliberating and helping to chart a way forward. However, that very concept has turned out to be another instance in the nation’s life of how a beautiful theory was murdered by a gang of brutal facts.

    The higher echelon of the Council today is not composed of the kind of people the framers of the 1979 Constitution had in mind – elder statesmen whose moral force would flow from exemplary rectitude and distinguished service; persons who would stay splendidly above the fray and would never again seek elective office nor descend into the pit of partisanship.

    General Yakubu Gowon, forever radiating goodwill, would pray and pray but nothing would change. Former president Obasanjo could just take over the proceedings to deliver another blistring missive. Shehu Shagari would turn up more from habit than conviction. General Muhammadu Buhari, still chafing from the outcome of the last presidential election, will not attend a meeting called by a person he regards as a usurper.

    General Babangida says he has finally given up trying to return to power, but he is nothing if not calculating. What example or inspiration can anyone expect from Ernest Shonekan? General Abdulsalami Abubakar is preoccupied tending to the vast fortune he acquired in just one year in the saddle and shopping around for more.

    The state governors could turn the meeting into a forum for settling once and for all – by fisticuffs if necessary – the lingering puzzle of which number is bigger: 19 or 16?

    It is therefore understandable that President Goodluck Jonathan is in no hurry to convene a meeting of the Council, as some of its statutory members are urging him to do. He is not constitutionally obliged to do so. To convene the Council in the present charged atmosphere would be the closest thing to political suicide. I doubt whether a meeting would serve any useful purpose.

    But the drift cannot continue. Dr Jonathan must move quickly to arrest it by reaching out beyond his present inner circle to enlist help from disinterested men and women of undoubted goodwill and sound judgment, people who can tell him what he needs to know rather than what they think he would like to hear.

    Meanwhile, it would help enormously if he travelled less, listened more, and devoted more time to the serious reading that improves the mind and enlarges vision.

  • What went wrong with Biafra  —Ben Gbulie

    What went wrong with Biafra —Ben Gbulie

    Col. Ben Gbulie is widely known for his role in the January 1966 coup in which he and other majors and captains upturned the political and military status quo in the country. Having been detained in Enugu alongside Victor Banjo and others who participated actively in the coup by the Federal Government, he was subsequently released by Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu at the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. He rose to the rank of a Colonel in the Biafran Army  where he held important positions which included the de facto commander of the 7th battalion, Nsukka, Supply and Transport and later as the Military Administrator of Aba Province. In this interview with Edozie Udeze and Chris Orji in Enugu, he reiterates how he and Gen.Alabi-Isama and others joined the Nigerian Army in March 1960, why Obansanjo’s My Command is full of half-truths and how Nzeogwu was killed, among other salient war related issues. 

    Gen Alabi Isama was emphatic in his book that the invasion of the West by the Biafran forces through Ore was a serious blunder. He said instead invading Lagos from Ilorin, or any other alternative route would have been a better military option. What do you think?

    Now, with regards to the war itself, I fought on the side of Biafra, what you call the rebel side. In other words, the Biafran side, because there was a country if you can refer to Chinua Achebe. And he (Isama) fought on the Nigerian side.

    Now, with regards to the Ore issue…First of all, Alexander Madiebo has actually resolved this matter; that the Biafrans going into the Mid-West was Ojukwu’s way of pleasing Banjo. And that alone raises a number of other questions, because I was detained prior to all that due to the coup of January 1966. And Banjo was also with us in prison. I don’t know if you have read my book titled The Fall of Biafra.

    If you have read it, you’ll see where I talked about Banjo speaking to us in Enugu prison before we were released by Ojukwu before the war started. And Banjo made it quite clear that he didn’t support any question of secession. That instead he wanted the creation of more states. Initially, the North didn’t want the creation of states. But they let superior argument prevailed and so they let the British guide them. And so they supported the creation of states. As at that time, Ojukwu in Enugu, well, in the Eastern Region, said it was not right to create states. That it was to emasculate the East. Ojukwu and the East were against the creation of states. So, when Banjo came out of prison with us, released by Ojukwu himself, he asked the Ojukwu the same question what about the creation of states.

    It is all covered in my book. Now, as to the question of we going into the Mid West in August 1967, it was a matter for Biafrans to decide. So, you don’t decide for us. Not even Alabi Isama himself, because Alabi-Isama is a strategist. He did courses in strategy and so there is no question of him asking why should we do this or why should we do that. No, he shouldn’t do that; it is all in the past. The thing had taken place.

    Banjo, by the way, a Yoruba man, took former Easterners to the Midwest, that alone in my book, I said, is a monstrous gamble. It is like paying your own assassin. So, there are many questions that came out of that. Do you understand? So, Banjo alone was bad news, because he didn’t support Biafra. But Ojukwu too, he was bad news, because he was pig-headed. He wanted to use Banjo to go to Lagos. But Banjo also wanted to use Biafran troops to get to his people, to overthrow Gowon and become head of state of Nigeria. This was very clear to everybody. So, whether we should have gone into the Midwest or not, it was the choice of Ojukwu and Banjo. So the critique is well-taken. But those two people are dead already. So, what am I going to say?

    The larger issue was that the Biafran high command didn’t collectively take that decision.

    Now, you are talking about Biafran high command. What was the Biafran high command? What was it? Ojukwu was everything. Okay, if you read Madiebo, he wrote an addendum by way of foreword in Alabi’s book. I have a copy of it. He did say that even the commander of the Biafran army did not know about Biafran crossing to the Midwest. We were not told. Ojukwu was not telling people about a lot of things. Even where our arms and ammunitions were kept, he didn’t tell anybody. He was always dealing with civilians, sending them abroad to even buy ammunitions of war for us. And if we want to face facts I must say that anybody on sideline outside Biafra could feel free to criticise our own way of handling things. But Isama did also give us credit for having some flashes of genius in the war. He did. And so I cannot fault him entirely.

    What other blunders were also caused by the Biafran high command?

    Good Lord! Again you are talking about Biafran commanders. Be very careful. You got to study Biafra and the way Biafrans were organised in the war before you start asking such questions. For instance, Ojukwu was the commander of the Biafran troops and at the time when Biafran troops entered the Midwest it was Njoku who was the commander. But Njoku was arrested and detained by Ojukwu. He was detained throughout the war. Don’t you know that? So, what is all these about? Biafran hierarchy or whatever, did we have any?

    Ojukwu was everything and that was one of the problems we faced. And eventually what happened? A number of people- Victor Banjo, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Alali and Agbam, they were shot by firing squad. Don’t you remember all that? Don’t you know? We equally had our own inherent problems. Even Nzeogwu was not involved in the war. He decided, because he was an Igbo man to go and give us support at the Nsukka sector. And he paid with his life. But Ojukwu never involved him in the war, because of petty jealousy. You ought to understand these things. Anyway, this is not to tell us that I hate my people, my dear Igbo people. No. It is to me that I am looking inwards and discussing with you what actually went wrong. Many things went wrong. For instance, the declaration of Biafra took effect at the wrong time. It was wrongly timed. Whereas other military leaders in the West, in the Midwest were cooperating with Gowon, even if you didn’t like Gowon.

    Don’t you remember that Adebayo was the governor of the West and both Awolowo and the western officers were saying that northern troops should leave the West. But eventually they supported Gowon and that didn’t mean they liked Gowon. You play up to someone until your time is ready. But Ojukwu had not much patience. That was not the way to handle it and he did not do it well, anyway. So, you can now deduce from what I am saying whether Alabi was right or wrong in some respects. I have told you that by hindsight, anyone can say anything. In other words, referring to what had happened based on what had happened and the result and that is what happened today.

    In other words, why did we go into the Midwest in the first place? After all, Midwest was actually a buffer area. Midwest was not enemy of Biafra. We had plenty Midwest officers who were Igbo or Ika. Why did we go there in the first place? By that we upset the apple cart as it were. So, it is only Ojukwu who can say that. Ojukwu promised us before he died (may his soul rest in peace) that he would produce the The Book. But he never produced it and died. And so I am not going to write it for him.

    I have written my book, The Fall of Biafra in which I criticised a lot of things. And there are many things I criticised and you know what, Ojukwu held a press conference saying – I am not going to rejoice with Gbulie on the fall of Biafra. He held that press conference in Lagos and until a long time we never saw eye-to-eye. Not because he was not my senior or commander. Oh, he was. For instance, the problem with our people is that we don’t look inwards, we don’t consider issues thoroughly.

    Do you know that Ojukwu was one of the people that aborted the coup of 1966 in which I participated? And he said so in his book Because I am Involved. That was on page 120 or something like that. I was just reading it this morning. Read the book yourself. He aborted the coup. And now get me right. When he was appointed the governor of the East and the Northerners started acting on the killings of January 1966, he started defending Igbo people.

    This was a man who created the impression ipso facto that the coup was an Igbo affair and then he later became a messiah for Ndigbo. That was where the problem lay. Because the people he was defending were being killed in large numbers in the North as a result of the impression that the coup was on Igbo affair.

    What situation gave rise to the issue of saboteurs in the Biafran army then?

    (Laughs) You know why I am laughing? Why I am laughing is that there is what you call the human element. Ojukwu was indeed entitled to his own human element. Ojukwu would say something and he wouldn’t want anybody to argue with him.

    By the way, that does not mean that some Igbo senior officers were not against him. They were. For instance, in the case of the sabotage levelled against Ifeajuna, Agbam and Alali, my thinking was that it must be true. Yes, it must be true.

    Ifeajuna, in my book, supported Banjo. He supported Banjo and the plan was that Banjo would get to Lagos with our own troops, the Biafran troops, overthrow Gowon, take over Nigeria. Then they would send Ifeajuna to the East, to his own Biafra, flush out Ojukwu and then he Ifeajuna would become the governor of the East. That was their plan. And a man called Wale Ademoyega would be made the governor of the West. So it was clear-cut and it was clear Ojukwu knew about this. Do you know that when we were released in March 1967, Ojukwu did so, because we were being held in his domain? He released us, that was after Gowon had taken power. After we were released, Ojukwu was clear-cut that he understood what was happening. He gave us instructions, those of Igbo, that we should go home, spend one week or so, then get ready to come back to join our various units. Thereafter, we were deployed. I was deployed to Nsukka. Now what happened to Ifeajuna and Banjo, who were living with him at the government house here in Enugu?

    That was why when Ifeajuna was told he’d been deployed to Nsukka, he turned him down. It is in my book. Ifeajuna was in government house together with Victor Banjo because before the Nigerian crisis, Ojukwu was the quarter-master-general of the Nigerian army. And Ifeajuna who joined the army later, by then I was an officer-cadet, but Ifeajuna had a university degree. He joined and their total aim was to rule the country. There was no doubting that. Now, if you read Professor Eleagwu’s book titled Gowon, even then Ojukwu was reported to have been planning a coup. That was in 1964. But ours was in 1966.

    Do you know why? As at that time, there was this federal election in which the NCNC refused to take part. And Zik decided not to recognise Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It is there. Eleagwu is talking sense and you have to read that book. It was Gowon who reported Ojukwu who was able to wriggle out of it.

    If the Biafrans had put their acts together, is it true that they would have won the war instead?

    Just a minute, wait a minute! The same Alabi also said if they had put their acts together in the Nigerian side, they would have won the war in three months. Do you know that Gowon gave us only twenty-four hours within which to win the war? Do you know it was called a police action – that is using only the police to overrun Biafra? That presupposed that the war would not last for more than one month? But what happened? Never you think that some people are weak. You think that some people are weak until the time comes for them to act, to prove themselves.

    But then, you don’t remember the tenacity of people, about the resilience of people, about the indomitable will of the people. You don’t easily conquer people like that. No, you don’t. So, Alabi is entitled to his views but I wish he can come and argue with me.

    Let’s go back to Nzeogwu. You mentioned professional jealousy…

    Oh, no, no. You are talking about jealousy. No, no. you see, he and Ojukwu had only clash of personalities. It wasn’t a question of professional jealousy between the two. That Nzeogwu did the January 1966 coup, he became very popular. He was a revolutionary. Yes, he was indeed. Ojukwu didn’t quite like this. It is in my book titled Nigeria’s Five Majors. We sent captain Udeh to Kano and he was arrested in the Officers’ Mess. Ojukwu was there with him while the coup was going on.

    There’s this belief that Nzeogwu was not actually killed by the federal troops…

    Look, Look! Wait, wait! I want to stop you there because if you ask me I was not there on the spot. But I do know that Nzeogwu would have died earlier. I do know, because I fought at Nsukka sector. He would have died earlier the way he was carrying on. He was having what I would call a maniacal or suicidal bravery. He would put his head and everything into what he was doing. He came to Nsukka on the second day of the war without anybody inviting him. Then, he took over command. Col. Eze was our commander and then Nzeogwu burst into our Zik’s hostels at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Eze was his senior by the way. But Nzeogwu would not know whether you are his senior or not. He would just take over command. He was very dynamic and so he started dishing out orders, including giving orders to the then Major Emma Udeaja, to me and to Eze himself.

    And that was the first issue of sabotage, because before you knew it, that was about 7pm of that day, there was an explosion downstairs. Somebody had exploded a grenade and Nzeogwu quickly dashed downstairs and threw another grenade. Remember in January coup, he threw grenade. He loved throwing grenades but he was a very great man. He was hurt in that grenade. He was a dare-devil, no doubt about it. So he could have died then. As at the time he died, nobody called him. Our headquarters, in fact, was at Opi Junction at the time. He just arrived and decided to go for an operation by himself.

    He went on patrol in the night and he used this armoured car, a monstrosity that had nothing but was called armoured vehicle. So, he paid with his life. They were ambushed by the federal troops. It was the same federal government that announced his death. So, anybody who tells you that Ojukwu killed him or something else is talking rubbish, complete rubbish. Nigeria announced his death and his body was taken to Kaduna, was buried in a cemetery in Kaduna with all military honours. This is indeed the complexity of the Nigerian situation. This was a man who did a coup and you termed it Igbo affair and the same man who organised it, you killed him and then gave him military burial. And you said he was misguided. Who was not misguided?

    The Abagana war sector was said to be the largest gathering of the army…?

    Hah! Which army? Whoever was there to say it was the largest army? Who had the statistics to say so? Where did they get the fact from? What was the strength of the army? It was the second division – second div., under Murtala Muhammed. They tried to cross through the Niger three times but failed. If you read Alabi-Isama, when they tried to cross the Niger, a lot of people died. A lot of people perished. Nigerians perished in the water. A lot of people, over 2000 people, died. So, he sent the troops, those carrying arms, ammunitions, petrol and other things through the main land. And they came in and there was an ambush at Abagana. I don’t want to go into that because I was not there myself. I went to see it but I was not there.

    Many people have claimed credit; that they were the people who did it. That is absolute rubbish because we know those who claimed credit when something good happened to Biafra. But anytime anything went wrong you won’t see them.

    Was it true also that the federal troops kept prisoners of war whereas the Biafran side kept killing their own during the war?

    Who said so? Can you please listen to me? The matter is that most people go with the winner. They never go with the loser. If we lost the war so anybody can concoct stories against us. That is rubbish. This one is not true and could never be. I can name many people killed even after the war by Nigerian troops. One of them was Tim Onwuatuegwu, another was Major Ukpai. Kalu Ezera was also killed. I don’t want to start naming them here now. So what are they saying? They died, they were killed. So, let’s let sleeping dog lie.

    Another issue was the Owerri sector. It became tough that the Federal troops would capture a part and the Biafran troops would regain it. Why was it so for a long time?

    Please, please, you should know that Owerri was strategic in its location. It was very near our airport and the centre of gravity for Biafra. The centre of gravity was the Uli airport. So, the airport was actually a beehive of activities in Biafra. Things were coming into the nation from there.

    We were surrounded by the federal troops, by land and by air. So, the only place that was available was Owerri. Don’t forget Alabi gave us credit for building two airports within the time of the crisis. Is it easy? Yes, there were things that happened as it were and you see the ingenuity of the Igbo man. So it was actually this tenacity of purpose and this indomitable spirit of the Igbo that made them to last so long in the war. Otherwise the war would have been a matter of days and it was over for us.

    Owerri was strategic. Initially it was captured by the 3rd Marine Commando under Col. Benjamin Adekunle. By the way, Adekunle and I met at Sandhurst. He was my senior there. But he was ruthless with his artillery, with his weaponry. He was always known to deploy artillery pieces and fire them all at the same time. He called them his own personal thunder. So, he captured the place, I mean Owerri, but Biafrans took it back because of the strategic nature of the place. It was like Nigeria going to capture Oguta. It was so strategic to us too. It couldn’t happen and we were prepared not to let it happen no matter how long. But eventually what must be must be. It happened when it had to happen. By then our leader had left for Ivory Coast.

    What is your comment on the book, There Was a Country by Chinua Achebe

    All I can tell you is that Chinua was a writer of high standards. He was a raconteur, a prolific story teller of immerse proportion. He was telling a lot of stories. I saw a lot of inaccuracies in some of what he said. I saw a lot of them. Anybody could see them. Alabi pointed them out. For instance, one of the causalities of our war was truth. So, Alabi said it was actually Biafrans who committed a lot of atrocities in Ikot Ekpene and other places in the area. And he was right. We didn’t impose the war on Nigeria, Nigeria imposed the war on Biafra. And we resisted because we wanted to protect lives and property. There were errors in that book but that does not make the book bad. Achebe is not alive today to defend himself.

    You have read My Command by Obasanjo and Isama’s book…

    Yes I have read all…

    Can you compare the two books?

    Listen. Let me answer it straight away. Obasanjo was captain when I was captain in the Nigerian Army. We served together but he was my senior just like he was Alabi’s senior too. We were in the same army engineer. He said he was my commander in his book. No, he was my OC that is Officer-Commander and OC and CO are two different things. But it doesn’t matter. I saw many lies in Obasanjo’s book.

    I saw them with my eyes because I happened to be with Obasanjo in the army. I also happened to be with Alabi in the Nigerian Army. I happened to know what was happening. I was in fact in the vortex of the crisis, for which I was detained by Ironsi from 1966 when the coup took place till 1967 when Ojukwu released us here in Enugu.

    Gowon said Ojukwu had no right to release us. So, he detained us again. So, from 1970 to 1974, I was in prison, languishing behind prison bars. We were eight of us. Alabi is writing on facts. This man called Obasanjo is writing on half-truths. I tell you something that book is full of half-truths and that is it. In the launching of Alabi’s book, Gowon wrote a foreword which though belated is what I believe in. That the government of the day, that is Gowon, appointed Obasanjo the commander of the 3rd Marine Commando.

    There is no disputing the fact. So, at the end of the war, whether Obasanjo was quarrelling with Isama or Akinrinade or with other people, it was not really what mattered. Obasanjo was the one who stood in for the federal government and received the instrument of surrender. That fact has to be made clear at all times. And Gowon put it quite clear for everybody. He had every right to do so because he was the commander, even though he was not there on the spot. Even though Akinrinade had come down before him, he was the commander. The commander was appointed by the head of state.

    And therefore if you want the buck, the buck stops on the table of the commander. Akinrinade came first and then Effiong came into it. Later Obasanjo came and we were called. If you read My Command, he addressed me there as a captain which was the rank I was before the war started. He said that Captain Ben Gbulie was Effiong’s secretary, while Lt. Col. Akinrinade was his, which is ridiculous. Then he pointed out that Akin and Gbulie were course-mates at Sandhurst which is the truth. So, you see there are complexities here and there.

  • Road to Biafra?

    Road to Biafra?

    Politics aside, it does seem that the Federal Government of President Goodluck Jonathan has no clue to the raging terrorism ravaging the northern part of the country. And the fact that the south has not been torched (yes, torched) yet by the terrorists is due largely to lack of capacity by Boko Haram, Ansaru et al and not any act of deterrence by our security forces.

    It is not as if they are afraid of coming down here or love us more than our compatriots in the north, the truth is that they don’t have the wherewithal yet, when they are ready they will strike here and may be to a more devastating effect.

    And at the rate at which the security situation in the country is deteriorating, these agents of death could sooner rather than later acquire what is required to cause mayhem in the south and thus throw the country into chaos and crises.

    With things looking likely to fall apart security-wise for the country under President Jonathan’s watch, it remains to be seen how long the centre would continue to hold if things continue like this. But while we all hope and pray that Boko Haram and Ansaru don’t tear our country apart, I think it is about time we put our heads together to find a lasting solution to this menace. This federal government cannot do it, or if you like cannot do it alone. We all must get involved.

    It doesn’t matter how many times Jonathan apologists haul abuses at those who dare to lay the blame squarely at his government’s doorstep, but the fact remains that if we leave our security solely in the hands of this President and his men, only God knows where this country would be tomorrow.

    If I sound like an alarmist, pardon me, I don’t mean to, but I am worried that since three years or so ago that Boko Haram began to unleash its terror on Nigeria, we have neither been able to peg them back or eradicate their menace. The list of the orphans, widows and widowers of terror kept on increasing. After every attack and killing our President went on air to promise hell for the terrorists; he always ordered the security agencies to get to the root of the matter and bring the perpetrators and their sponsors to book, yet nothing tangible or sensible has been achieved in this regard.

    Monday last week was a horrible day in the office for the people of Kano city, northwest Nigeria. A Lagos bound luxury bus with close to 70 passengers on board was heading out of the new luxury bus park at Sabongari area at about 5 pm when two suicide bombers drove in a Volkswagen Golf car. Pretending to be intending passengers, touts besieged the car asking the bombers their destination in order to direct them to the luxury bus next on line. But these agents of death had other destination in mind. They wanted to go to hell and were hell bent on taking as many innocent souls along with them as possible. As the loaded luxury bus was about leaving the park, they rammed their car into it and within seconds there was a loud bag and the area exploded into a ball of fire. The rest of the story you know.

    This latest suicide bombing in the ancient city is no different from several others in the past that have left the bulk of Nigeria’s northeast in ruins and Kaduna and Kano in the northwest in chaos. But what is so significant about this Sabongari luxury bus park bombing is the fact that that area of Kano is inhabited by non-indigenes mostly from the south, particularly Ibo from the southeast. Although the ethnic configuration of the victims shows the diversity of the population of Kano, the fact that the bombers chose that park to strike was an indication that they meant to cause ethnic unrest between the Hausa/Fulani host community and the southerners, especially Ibo.

    And anybody conversant with the history of Nigeria’s 30-month civil between 1967 and 1970 will recall that the ethnic massacre of Ibo in the north led to their massive exodus back home to the then Eastern region on the orders of the military governor Colonel Emeka Ojukwu. One thing led to another and Nigeria went into a civil war that cost millions of lives on both sides.

    Do these terrorists want to send us into another civil war? Yes, I think and I quite agree with the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero on this score. The revered traditional ruler who recently escaped assassination by unknown gunmen, rightly suspects that this must be the motive of the bombers. But can Nigeria survive another civil war? NO. We can’t as a people and a nation. In fact no country, I think, has ever survived two civil wars. The more reason why we should all put our differences apart, especially as regards the incompetence of the Jonathan regime and work together to defeat these agents of terror that are bent on destroying our nation. We must avoid the road to Biafra and save Nigeria.

    I strongly believe leaving the job to security agencies alone will not defeat Boko Haram or Ansaru and their likes. Intelligence plays a big role in identifying and apprehending the terrorists, and this can only be gathered if the people living with these terrorists give them up. One could recall that Lawrence Aninih that notorious armed robber that was terrorizing Benin City and environs, together with his gang in the 80s was only apprehended when the Binis got fed up and revealed his hideout to security agents.

    Boko Haram and Ansaru operatives, I believe don’t have their own separate mosques, neither do they live in the open desert. They live and worship among the people in the north. So, who is shielding them? Until this area is addressed by both government and leaders in the north, we might just be wasting our time in the fight against terror. If truly they have any grievance(s) let’s listen to and talk to them. Might at times is not always right, so the government should also apply some carrots to get these people off the path of terror.

    There is need for a change in tactic and strategy. We should also approach those countries that have traveled this road before and have come out of it to learn how they did it. Countries like Algeria, Turkey, and Colombia could have one or two things to teach us.

  • Jos crisis worse than Biafra war, says senator

    The senator representing Plateau North, Gyang Nyam Pwajok, yesterday said the protracted crisis in the state is worse than the 30 months of Biafra war that occurred between 1967 and 1970.

    Addressing reporters in Abuja, the senator urged the Federal Government to establish a Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Stability Fund to address the fallout of the crisis.

    He noted that the destruction caused by the 1994, 2001 and 2008 conflicts had not been reconstructed.

    Pwajok said: “When I talked about establishing a Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Stability Fund, somebody said it is actually more or less an incentive for further conflict. We had a civil war and we had to pass through a reconstruction effort. In fact, the damage this protracted conflict has caused can be more than the civil war damage in itself.

    “This is because the nature of the conflict is such that people have died on all sides, whether it is Muslim, Christian, indigene or non-indigene.

    “Many people have died, many others have lost their property, even in the nature of the relationship between communities. Victims end up becoming perpetrators and perpetrators end up becoming victims at certain moments.

    “If you check, the conflict of 1994 left behind structures that were battered. In the 1994 conflict, during military era, some of the destroyed property have not been reconstructed. In 2001, there was another conflict in which a number of structures were ravaged. Nobody has done anything about them.

    “In 2008, a number of structures were destroyed; nothing has happened in some areas. Yet, there is government’s effort to reconstruct, even at the state level and even help the residents to stand on their feet. Once there is a fresh conflict, the property gets burnt again.”

     

     

     

     

     

  • Feedback on ‘Achebe’s  personal history of Biafra’

    Feedback on ‘Achebe’s personal history of Biafra’

    In keeping with my promise last week, here are some of the scores of reactions my piece of October 24 on the subject above generated in texts and emails.

     

    Sir,

    Thank you very much for balancing the story objectively. We need more of your likes to educate our people on what really happened in that Civil War. As you are aware, our people, for lack of reading their history books, can believe anything, including the fact that goats in Nigeria had eight legs before the Civil War! As for Prof Achebe, Olatunji Ololade summed his self-propelling lies thus, “There was an elder.” I cannot agree more!

    Kayode A, Abeokuta.

     

    Sir,

    Your article on Achebe’s Biafra story was well written. Those of us Igbo who lived here before and after the war understand you. Both sides have certainly erred and strayed. What we need to learn is the futility of resorting to violence and murder as a method for redressing wrongs. Peaceful demonstrations and powerful articles like yours and powerful speeches and lectures like Azikiwe’s in the pre Independence period are, in my view, better. The newspaper articles and the action of the Save Nigeria Group urging the observance of the Constitution regarding the succession of Yar’Adua by Jonathan proved that this method can work. And it is a more civilised way of dealing with such issues.

    Dr. Ekweani, Kabala Hospital, Kaduna.

     

    Sir,

    You missed Achebe’s point. I’m neither Igbo nor northerner nor a fan of both people, but, my dear, we need to say the truth. And you are the one not saying the truth not Achebe. Why didn’t northern officers stop at killing Ironsi and Igbo army officers? Jan ’66 coup saw less than 35 casualties, but July ’66 coup saw well over 300 victims. Was that not enough revenge? Why oh why, did they go ahead to kill civilians in such large numbers and expect the Igbo to stay calm for the sake of one Nigeria? Your article justifies the murder of countless innocents. This is one area anti Achebe writers, including you, glossed over. If hatred for the Igbo wasn’t a factor, why didn’t Gowon institute policies to assuage Igbo feelings? How on earth did you expect a tribe that lost 30,000 souls in massacres across the North not to opt for secession?

    Tonye Kalango, Port Harcourt

     

    Sir,

    I read with dismay and I found it very nauseating reading miles of inaccurate nonsense you wrote about Chinua Achebe and the Civil War. I don’t like distortion of facts which is your trade mark. You exhibited a stunning ignorance of what happened during the war. Yoruba and Northerners both hate Ndigbo. Why don’t you leave us alone to go as Biafrans? You hate us and you still want us to be in Nigeria. I believe you are confused and your confusion emanated from a deeper ignorance different from what Achebe has written in the nice book, “There was a country”.

    Collins Ewenike, Imo State.

     

    Sir,

    For the first time you are writing southern issue without your acidic bite. Thanks for not joining our Yoruba brothers to shout down peoples account as if they have skeletons in their cupboard. Ojukwu failed the Igbo by not writing his account before he died. Please beg Gowon not to make the same mistake again. We, the new generation Igbo, need as much information as possible on the Civil War so that when the time comes in the near future we will not suffer the same fate again.

    Andrew Udeze

     

    Sir.

    Your piece of 24/10/12 got it all right. However, you equally allowed the manipulation of historical events to affect you, which reflects in your write up. You may note that Anthony Enahoro’s proposal for independence in 1956 was in 1953, which Sir Ahmadu Bello sought for its amendment with the clause “as soon as practicable’. The eventual motion for Independence was proposed by Chief S. L. Akintola in 1959. The Yoruba nation, in its desire to erase the contributions of Akintola, conspired to ensure that all his landmark inputs were obliterated from historical events. Sir, please crosscheck this area of your work and don’t allow students of political history quote you in error.

    Mohammed Adebayo Ameenu

     

    Sir,

    Thanks for the refreshing angle on the one of the causes of the Civil War. Achebe has only succeeded in opening a can of worms, and creating disaffection between new generations of Nigerians.

    +2348034058476

     

    Sir,

    Your fact on Igbo triumphalism and their celebration and gloating at the death of Sardauna is very true, as I recall as a seven year old in Makurdi, a recorded popular song in Igbo with the lyrics ‘ewu ne barkwa’ ( meaning a goat is crying or gloating). Regrettably that’s what the Igbo still think and call all Northerners. What puzzles and annoys me is why would an icon like Achebe today remind me of the sad era of me running for cover with my siblings whenever Makurdi came under Biafran bombing? History is okay but Nigerians, especially the Igbo, should let the sores of that period of the life of the nation go.

    Adoga Anyebe

     

    Sir,

    I can’t understand what Achebe wants to achieve by raking up an old wound with so much hatred at a time this nation has so much present day challenges to surmount. What Nigeria needs today is how to heal old wounds so as to move forward. I suppose Achebe is familiar with the saying that if you cannot improve on the silence it is better to keep quiet!

    I think Achebe and some members of his generation with long memory for hatred are part of the problem with Nigeria. Period!

    Dr Festus Aisabokhale

     

    Sir,

    I hold you in a very high esteem, and your critique on Achebe’s latest offering, ‘There was a Country’, has only reinforced my respect for you.

    You pointed out, from your perspective, the lapses inherent in the work without abusing the author. There is no doubt that Achebe is human, and therefore he is not infallible. The good thing about this work is that it has opened up the debate for a soul searching exercise, and even the healing of the wounds of the past.

    It is right for those that do not agree with Achebe to state their own perspectives, without resorting to inflammatory statements or abuses. I do not share the view of some commentators that we should bury the past and forge ahead. The holocaust is still being discussed in the Western world, in spite of being a very sensitive issue.

    If, as you pointed out, Achebe glossed over the murder of innocent military officers of Northern extraction by Major Nzeogwu and other conspirators, then you have towed the same line of argument as Michael Hollman, one of the first reviewers of the book, who stated that the book is ‘partisan in perspectives’. I was uncomfortable to learn from you that Achebe did not acknowledge the contributions of nationalists like Herbert Macaulay and Bode Thomas to our independence. However, the lapses inherent in the book do not detract from its importance and relevance to our fledgling society. For once, both the generation that did not witness the Civil War and those that witnessed the brutal conflict are engaging themselves in intellectual exercises; some in the right direction, others, unfortunately, in the wrong direction.

    Erasmus Ndulue.

     

    Only well informed and respected columnists like you and Duro Onabule, would serve as guides to ensure the youths do not stray from the path of probity. Abusing Achebe and demonising his tribe, simply because his views were seen as ‘being partisan’ will not help matters. We need other perspectives to balance the stories of our unfortunate past. As you rightly pointed out, ‘The truth of the Civil War was that there were rights and wrongs on both sides’.

    Another critic, Clem Baiye, in Tell of October 29, even pointed out that Achebe did not address the issue of the opposition of the minorities in the Southeast to the secession of Biafra in his work. It is however simplistic and reductionist for most commentators to dwell solely on Achebe’s comment on Awolowo’s role during the war. Those commentators turned a blind eye on Achebe’s observation of Awolowo’s meticulousness in managing the affairs of Action Group, as pointed out by Clem Baiye in Tell.

    Having said that, I have placed an order for the book, and your critique will surely serve as a guide for a student of political history like me.

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • Biafra: BZM is childish, says MASSOB

    Biafra: BZM is childish, says MASSOB

    The Igbo separatist group which declared Biafra Republic on Monday has been dismissed by the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biarfa (MASSOB).

    MASSOB itself has been campaigning for the Southeast sovereignty.

    But yesterday, MASSOB faulted the Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) which made the declaration in Enugu in the aftermath of which its leaders were remanded in prison and hundreds of its members arrested by the police.

    MASSOB described the declaration of the Biafra Republic as “an empty declaration, childish and not well-guided”.

    It’s leader Chief Ralph Uwazuruike, who spoke through Director of Information Mr. Uchenna Madu, said leader of The Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) Mr. Ben Onwuka took the action because of his anti-MASSOB.

    The statement by Madu on behalf of Uwazuruike said: “Onwuka (Leader of BZM) was a a member of MASSOB in Lagos who was expelled because of anti-MASSOB activities and rebellious tendencies.

    Samuel Edeson (National Chairman) who was once a regional administrator in Onitsha, he was also expelled because of his rebellious tendencies.”

    Madu added: “The said BZM has no office or Biafran structures as a platform for running Biafra affairs. The Biafra declaration was done by MASSOB leader, Chief Ralph Uwazurike on May 22, 2000 at Freedom Square, Faulks Road, Aba after sending Biafran Bill of Rights to the United Nations.”

    He said MASSOB cannot be cowed into disclosing its diplomatic relationship with some foreign nations because of “an unguided and faceless group who wanted to capitalise on MASSOB’s struggle for Biafran actualisation to be relevant.”

    “MASSOB supports every genuine move by any group in this struggle for Biafra actualisation but we doubt the BZM leadership methodology on Biafra actualisation without resorting to violence. We fought all these years to maintain the peace and non-violent method as greatest tool for actualizing our dream”

    He added that the leader of the BZM has no valid address of no house, adding, “the group is trying to cause problem in the Southeast because the leadership consists of faceless people who have no house or anything to identify them.”

    “MASSOB urges the public to dismiss them as attention seekers; we have overgrown the era of marching the streets with Biafran flags. MASSOB is now consolidating on building structures and diplomatic negotiations with other countries, including the re-declaration of Biafra in May 22nd, 2000, submission of Biafra Bill of rights to United Nations and Chief Uwazuruike’s attendance of OAU Summit in Lome, Togo in 2000 among other achievements”.

    The Campaign for Democracy (CD), Southeast region urged President Goodluck Jonathan to order the unconditional release of over 500 BZM members, who have been detained by the police following the Enugu rally.

    In a statement in Onitsha, CD said: “It is very unacceptable and wicked for police in Enugu to arrest defenseless activists, who are not armed with any weapon.

    “The movement was just agitating for their freedom as enshrined in Chapter 4; Sections 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the amended 1999 Constitution, which provides the freedom of association and peaceful assembly,’’ it said.

    The statement condemned the “kangaroo” manner which the BZM activists were arrested, arraigned and remanded in prison custody.

    “This is very sad and acceptable to the entire Igbo-nation, going by the on-going killings by the Boko Haram religious sect in the northern part of the country.

    “The Federal Government is not doing enough to checkmate their criminal activities against the Nigerian nation.”

     

  • Biafra war veterans want Gowon, others tried for genocide

    Biafra war veterans want Gowon, others tried for genocide

    Disabled Biafran war veterans on Tuesday in Owerri, the Imo State capital called for trial of former head of state, Gen. Yakubu Gowon and other then military leaders for genocide at the International Court of Justice.

    Speaking at the Veterans’ Village in Okwe, Onuimo Local Government Area, the war veterans who backed Prof. Chinua Achebe’s book “There was a Country” said that late Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s advice to Gowon led to the death the defenseless Igbos.

    Lawrence Akpo, a Staff Sergeant in the war disclosed that it was late Awolowo’s strategy that blocked all entrance through which relief materials could get to the Biafra territories.

    “This resulted in starvation which killed thousands of Igbos who could not survive the famine.

    “There was kwashiokor that killed so many people than gun; I ate raw cassava with pepper for several weeks in the bush to survive, “he said.

    According to him, all this was because Chief Awolowo reneged on the agreement he had with the Biafra leader late Chief Odimegwu Ojukwu in Calabar where he was jailed.

    “If Awolowo had maintained his part of the agreement, the north would not have fought the war, but rather he supported Gowon against Biafra because he was promised ministerial appointment,” he said.

    He said the genocide committed in the war was far worse than what Charles Taylor did in Liberia and what Adolf Hitler committed against the six million Jews who were forced to go through the gas chambers.

    “We were defenseless and they capitalized on that to overrun us,” Akpo stated.

    Another veteran, Festus Mba, agreed that the war was aimed at eliminating the Igbos.

    He said no compensation would equal the massacre of the Igbos.

    His words, “We are not asking for reparation because no amount of money can compensate the genocide, what we are saying is for the actualization of sovereign state of Biafra.”

     

     

  • The Biafra Zionist Movement

    The Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) was founded about two years ago. The movement was founded by a United Kingdom-based lawyer, Benjamin Onwuka, who said it was founded to give “seriousness” to the Biafran dream.

    Onwuka, who hails from Item in Bende local government area of Abia state, said the plight of Ndigbo in Nigeria informed the birth of the BZM. He said the movement has the backing od Igbo intellectuals in the Diaspora, particularly those residing in the United States and South Africa .

    It was learnt that many of the pro-Biafran groups based abroad discovered the seriousness of Onwuka and decided to align their groups with BZM. Having ganered enough support, Onwuka decided to return to Nigeria to campaign for the cause, with the backing of those abroad.

    He had before then shuttled across Nigeria, Europe , and America . Having found its teeth, the group sent an application to the United Nations for an observer status for the Republic of Biafra.

    The application was submitted to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. Another application for an independent status was sent to the African Union with a request to convene a meeting of Heads of State and Government.

    The application to the UN secretariat, dated August 6, 2012 with reference BZM/OS./REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA gave the grounds of the application as insecurity of lives and property and alack of religious freedom/worship.

    “It is now abundantly clear that the security of lives and property of the Biafran People are no longer guaranteed in the entity called Nigeria.

    “It is also very clear that the Right of the Biafran peoples to peacefully practice their religion and freedom of association under the United Nations Charter of freedom of Association is no longer safe and guaranteed in the entity called Nigeria.

    “Therefore, the people of Biafra have resolved that on 5th November 2012, we shall be re-declaring our independence and opt of Nigeria in order to guarantee and protect the Biafran Peoples’ Right to practice their religion without being killed and bombed.”

     

  • MASSOB, BZM battle over Biafra

    MASSOB, BZM battle over Biafra

    There was a big battle in the East yesterday over next Monday’s plan by a group to revive Biafra Republic.

    The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) frustrated by the Biafra Zionist Movement (BZM) to resuscitate the republic.

    MASSOB operatives are believed to have abducted BZM leader worldwide Benjamin Onwuka, national chairman Edeson Samuel and national secretary Nweke Nweke to thwart the group’s plan.

    MASSOB said the abduction was an invitation to BZM leaders to explain the motive behind their plan.

    BZM’s Director of Mobilisation Cornelius Anyanwu said the abductors stormed the venue of a meeting scheduled for yesterday and picked the three men while they were waiting for the meeting to start.

    The MASSOB men, he said, claimed they were acting on orders of MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazuruike to bring the BZM officials to Okwe, Imo State.

    Uwazuruike denied the allegation, saying he knew nothing about the matter.

    MASSOB Director of Information Uchenna Madu said the BZM leaders were not abducted but merely taken away for interrogation on the planned return of Biafra.

    He said MASSOB wanted to know BZM’s strategies and how to help the group, if necessary.

    Madu said: “We don’t want them to ridicule Biafra with that re-declaration because they have no structure on ground. They should tell us where they are coming from and what they intend to achieve.

    “We cannot tolerate this re-declaration because allowing it will amount to making a caricature of Biafra.”

    He said the BZM leaders were taken to Enugu and not Okwe, adding that they would be released after “a satisfactory explanation” of their plan.

    Madu insisted that Uwazuruike was not aware of the BZM leaders’ abduction.

    But Anyanwu said he believed that MASSOB’s action was informed by its working understanding with the Federal Government and security agencies.

    He insisted that whether BZM leaders are released or not, there was no going back on the Biafra revival plan.

    Biafrans the world over, he said, were looking forward to the re-declaration.

    Denying that MASSOB is against BZM, Madu said: “MASSOB as the pioneer organisation and champion of Biafra struggle is not against any genuine group clamouring for Biafra.

    “We need and also, appreciate more political pressure against the Nigerian state, any Biafra pressure, agitation and protest is a compliment to MASSOB’s 13 years of consistency, uncompromised and unshakable spirit of Biafra struggle.

    “MASSOB will not accommodate gambling or using it to achieve cheap popularity by any group, it is suicidal for any Igboman to trade with the future of Biafra people.

    “MASSOB under Chief Raph Umazuruike represents the genuine interest of Ndigbo, Biafrans in general in non-violent method.

    “Freedom can never be achieved on a platter of gold or mere wishful thinking, prices must be paid, sacrifices must be made, the struggle for Biafran freedom is not a childish venture and we believe that the so-called group wants to be relevant.

    “Because of Biafra and love of Ndigbo, our leader, fearless and brave leader, Uwazurike sacrificed his comfort and houses in Lagos and Imo states, members were killed by security agents and many others imprisoned’.

    “Uwazuruike and his men saw and conquered death on the burial day of Gabriel Ogu, who was shot by police on the day Biafran flag was hoisted.

    “Uwazuruike vowed before the dead and living, that he will not relent or abandon the Biafran cause after 13 years of a long walk to freedom, he is still faithful and unrelenting to Biafran actualisation’’

    “The role of the United Nations (UN) towards Biafra is good and cordial; UN observers have been monitoring our activities such as civil disobedience, sit at home, worldwide demonstrations, civil protests etc.

    “The International community is aware of MASSOB’s self-determination struggle for Biafra; Umuazuruike has never and cannot compromise the integrity of Biafra struggle.”

  • Achebe’s personal  history of Biafra

    Achebe’s personal history of Biafra

    A little over four years ago, precisely October 9, 2008, Chinua Achebe, one of the world’s greatest novelists and essayists and, for me, Africa’s greatest literary figure, delivered the keynote lecture on the occasion of the Silver Anniversary of The Guardian at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. The lecture, entitled “What Nigeria is to me,” was vintage Achebe; simple, eloquent, coherent, rigorous and full of insight.

    He delivered the lecture on tape but his physical absence did not make it any less riveting for the distinguished audience that gathered that beautiful morning to listen to him.

    For me, the most memorable lines of that lecture were his concluding paragraphs. “Nigeria,” he said in reference to our first and second national anthems that have respectively described the country as ‘motherland’ and ‘fatherland’, “is neither my mother nor my father. Nigeria is a child, gifted, enormously talented, prodigiously endowed and incredibly wayward. Being a Nigerian is abysmally frustrating and unbelievably exciting. I have said somewhere that in my next re-incarnation, I want to come back as a Nigerian again. But I have also in a rather testy mood in a book called The trouble with Nigeria dismissed Nigerian travel advertisements with the suggestion that only a tourist with an addiction to self flagellation (will) pick Nigeria for a holiday. And I mean both. Nigeria needs help; Nigerians have their work cut out for them, to coax this unruly child along the path of useful creative development. We are the parents of Nigeria, not vice-versa. A generation will come if we do our work patiently and well and given luck; a generation will come that will call Nigeria Father or Mother, but not yet.”

    Achebe’s logic was impeccable; a country is what its citizens make of it, not the other way round. And until a generation of those citizens emerge who can feel proud of what their progenitors have bequeathed to them, the country cannot rightfully lay claim to father- or mother-hood.

    Few people, if any, would disagree with Achebe that Nigeria is yet to arrive at that happy milestone in its 52 years of independence from British colonial rule. The reason for the country’s failure to do so are many, not least of which is the failure of leadership which Achebe as essayist dwelt on extensively in his now famous little book, The trouble with Nigeria.

    Of course, the failure of leadership has not been the only trouble with Nigeria, even though it’s arguably the biggest. Also up there with the failure of leadership are problems of ethnicity, corruption and selfishness, all three – and even more – of which seem pervasive not just among our leaders but also among their followers.

    For Achebe, obviously, the work cut out for Nigerians, whatever their status or profession, is to conquer these and other vices, or contain them at the least. For the writer in Africa the “overall goal”, he says in his latest book, THERE WAS A COUNTRY: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF BIAFRA which has provoked a huge controversy, is “to challenge stereotypes, myths and the image of ourselves and our continent and to recast them through stories – prose, poetry, essays and books for our children.”

    Reading through the book, it seems to me the great writer has failed his own test of challenging stereotypes and myths about, and images of, the various nationalities that make up our country. Instead, he seems to emerge at the end of the book as an Igbo supremacist at worst, or its apologist, at best.

    Take for example the issue of the nationalist struggle. “The original idea of one Nigeria,” he claims matter-of-factly, “was pressed by leaders and intellectuals from the Eastern Region. With all their shortcomings they had this idea to build the country as one. The first to object were the Northerners, led by the Sardauna, who were followed closely by the Awolowo clique that had created the Action Group.”

    This was clearly a blatant distortion of history because neither the Sardauna nor Awolowo objected to independence from colonial rule as one Nigeria. What Sardauna objected to was the timing for the simple and understandable reason that for historical reasons the South had a huge head-start over his region in producing the skills required for running the government, and he needed time to do something about the gap.

    However, whereas the Sardauna objected only to the timing of the demand for independence, every school child knew it was Awolowo’s Action Group through its member, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and not Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe’s NCNC, that moved the original motion for our independence by 1959.

    That AG’s Enahoro moved the motion did not, of course, necessarily mean the party spearheaded the independence struggle. As Achebe said, Zik was a pre-eminent figure in that struggle, even more preeminent than Awo. Surely, however, the writer knew that before Zik there were non-Igbo politicians like Herbert Macaulay, Sir Adeyemo Alakija, Chief Bode Thomas, Kitoye Ajasa, etc – the so-called Black Victorians on account of their English lifestyle and aspirations – who wanted the colonialist to leave.

    Take again his position that other Nigerians, and even the British ex-colonialists, harboured a visceral hatred of the Igbo because of their successes in life. He does admit some flaws in what he says is the Igbo character which he blames somewhat as the source of this universal envy of the group, but quickly glosses over these in his attempt to blame others for the civil war that led to the deaths of millions of his countrymen in the Biafran enclave.

    “The British dislike (for the Igbo),” he said in The Guardian silver anniversary lecture I mentioned above, “was demonstrated when they accused the Igbo of THREATENING to break up a nation state they had carefully and labouriously put together.” (Emphasis mine).

    How anyone, least of all Achebe with all his respect for scholarly rigour, would describe Lt Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu’s declaration of a Republic of Biafra as a mere threat to break up Nigeria simply beggars belief.

    In his defence of Achebe’s book in an interview in the new newsmagazine, Verbatim, Professor Fabian Osuji, a former minister of education and now the Director-General of the Ikemba Odumegwu-Ojukwu Centre, Owerri, said General Yakubu Gowon was wrong to blame the Igbo for seceding. Gowon, he said, “did say that if there was no secession, there would be no war. Alright, which means that secession led to the war? But he was not honest enough to say what led to the secession.” This, he said, quite rightly, was the pogrom against the Igbo, especially in the North, which made them feel completely insecure outside the East.

    Osuji’s position merely echoed Achebe’s when he said in his book he believed that following the pogrom in the North which he claimed without stating any evidence was compounded by the involvement, even connivance of the Federal Government, “secession from Nigeria and the war that followed was inevitable.”

    However, if Gowon, as Osuji says was not honest enough to say what led to the secession, Osuji himself was not honest enough to say what led to the pogrom.

    In his Guardian silver anniversary lecture, Achebe does admit, albeit half-heartedly, that the first coup was a remote cause. “In the bitter suspicious atmosphere of the time,” he said, “a naively idealistic coup proved a terrible disaster. It was interpreted WITH PLAUSIBILITY as a plot by the ambitious Igbo of the East to take control of Nigeria from the Hausa-Fulani North.” (Emphasis mine).

    In his book, however, he failed to admit even the plausibility that the coup was an Igbo coup. Instead, he sought to revive the rationalisation that the coup was meant to rid the country of the corrupt and inept politicians who led the First Republic. Nowhere in the book was there any mention of the fact that mostly senior Northern army officers who had no role in public policy were also targeted and murdered in cold blood.

    Again nowhere in the book was there any mention of the role of Igbo triumphalism, as exemplified in the so-called unification decree and the manner it was declared without consultation by General J.U.T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, and also as exemplified in the widespread gloating over the manner the Sardauna was killed in his residence by the coup leader, Major Chukwuma Nzegwu Kaduna, played in provoking the pogrom.

    One highly symbolic example of this triumphalism was recounted by the expatriate managing director of the New Nigerian, Charles Sharp, in an article I have had cause to refer to on these pages. “I,” he said in the article entitled “The story that got away” (New Nigerian, January 20, 2003), “had a personal experience of the arrogance stemming from the South when Cyprian Ekwensi and his committee arrived at the NNN and informed me they were taking over. He wasn’t precise about who ‘they’ were, but a team from Enugu would run the newspapers. I was ordered to terminate the contracts of the expatriate staff and offer my own resignation as managing director. My immediate reaction was one of disregard and silence, for I was in no position to protest or adopt postures.” (This article is highly recommended reading for anyone with any interest in the story of the collapse of the First Republic.)

    What happened at the NNN, still then owned by the North, was enough to alarm the people of the region, especially their leaders, that their region was now regarded as conquered territory.

    No doubt, Achebe is a great writer but with his latest serving, he has largely failed the biggest test of good writing which is not just to be highly readable, which THERE WAS A COUNTRY is, but to tell truth to your readers.

    The truth of our civil war was that there were rights and wrong on both sides of the war. For once, it seems, Achebe chose to speak the truth, at times only half-truths, about one side and gloss over, or even deny, the truth about the other side – his side.