Will there ever be a Nigeria without Boko Haram? Will the guns and bombs of the sect ever cease? Those questions formed the opening paragraph of my article published in 2012 in the days of President Goodluck Jonathan, when the terror group had not started taking territory. At the time, the sect had demonstrated enough mindlessness and thirst for blood to be taken seriously, but probably had not hit upon the grimmer idea of suicide-bombing or seizing territory. Despite its savagery, I felt Nigeria would survive Boko Haram. Perhaps a picture of that survival is starting to appear. Territories captured have been recovered, closed roads are reopening, and Borno State has, for the first time in years, celebrated a peaceful Sallah. Yet, the thrust of that earlier piece was how to manage the post-Boko Haram peace era and deal with factors that bred Boko Haram in the first place, to prevent a recurrence. President Muhammadu Buhari will do well to galvanise his team and the entire nation along those lines.
I reproduce that piece here:
Given its rage and capacity to cause maximum damage, not to mention the tough talk of its leaders, will there ever be Nigeria without Boko Haram? Is there any chance that one day the guns of the Islamist sect will stop booming and its bombs silent, the energies of its leaders and suicide bombers channeled to healthy ventures?
My answer is yes.
True, the group has terrorised the country enough for everyone to take it very seriously. Oceans of blood were continuously spilled. Their dead victims are gone, never to contribute anymore to the growth of their families or country. For survivors, life will never be the same after their encounter with the sect. Many may never walk again. Property lost can only be valued in billions, perhaps, trillions of naira. Boko Haram has also caused all sorts of problems for government across the board, the security community and virtually everyone. Relentless terror has taught public officials to have a healthy fear of the group, just as day-to-day life has substantially changed, especially in the Northeast.
Still, a post-Boko Haram era is possible, whether government succeeds in crushing it or the group, by itself, unravels and ends its atrocities.
But I have an enduring worry: are we preparing for that peacetime? You can grapple with the tensions and challenges of the moment, even manage to contain them (as the military do), but there is more work to be done. Preventing a repeat scenario of those tensions and challenges is where the ultimate victory lies. That is the peace era, defined not merely by momentary cessation of violence but by the sustenance of law and order and mutual respect for one another. Peace era stimulates creativity, productivity and growth. Is the Jonathan administration merely working towards the end of Boko Haram, or is it looking to evolve sustained peace?
Niger Delta militancy in the last decade is a relevant scenario. Like Boko Haram, it started with isolated cases of disorder before it got everybody in the region and beyond worried. Before we knew it, not only oil facilities were being blown up, nor were expatriate workers the only targets and victims of kidnappers; local chiefs, grandpas and grandmas and their grandkids were being taken too, to be ransomed at handsome fees. Naturally, business activities declined in the region, to take root beyond our national borders. And then President Umaru Yar’Adua came along, succeeding to get the region’s fighters to lay down their arms and embrace amnesty. It worked. Tensions cooled and, to boot, some of the former militants have been trained in entrepreneurship skills to help them get a life worth the name.
Yet, and this is my major concern, I do not think government has really come to grips with the issues that remotely caused or precipitated the militancy in the first place. Life in the oil-rich delta is still pretty much unflattering. Several communities are left without power, clean water or any viable means of livelihood. Many areas lack schools of any kind, and where they are available, are unworthy of the name. Regional soils and waters are despoiled, leaving residents with few sustenance options. The Jonathan administration can look beyond the amnesty-induced peace and work towards evolving enduring harmony propelled by capacity-building and growth. The rehabilitated ex-militants represent a tiny fraction of the Niger Delta population, much of which live in abject poverty. Resolving infrastructural challenges will help to check gloom in the region. In other words, the government merely looked to contain the militancy, which it did, but failed to create an environment that will be sustained on growth based on needs met, not on fires put out.
The Boko Haram matter should be approached from a wider, more comprehensive perspective. So far, government’s response is not flattering. Predominant assessment is that it is not doing enough to halt the sect. The move by the Jonathan administration to stop the United States government from designating Boko Haram as a terrorist group has also worsened matters. But I think that, one way or another, the terror reign will end someday; how that will happen is beyond me. Yet, one question remains: what happens after the guns and bombs of the sect cease? Beyond politics and rhetoric, has the Jonathan administration assessed the factors that gave rise to the emergence, and ferocity, of the sect and mapped out strategies to contain them? Is neglect of the people one of the reasons? Is infrastructural challenge another? What about youth unemployment?
I have argued in this space that the federal government does not need to create a Ministry for the North to pacify Boko Haram, my position being that such creations are largely political and have very little positive effect, anyhow. The Niger Delta Ministry has changed little in the region. Still, there is a lot a federal government can do to solve problems and stimulate growth in the states. Apart from initiating and executing its developmental programmes, it can inspire the state governments to drive growth and put their people out of misery. To inspire, it must shed party toga. Its intentions must also be transparently genuine and the president must be fatherly and above board. He must be courageous, with an eye on enduring legacies.
That is one way to prepare for a post-violence era and make way for the emergence of a new Nigeria.
- First published under the title ‘Nigeria after Boko Haram’ in November 2012
