Just when I was about submitting the first part of this article for publication last week, breaking news came in that Turkey just shot down a Russian jet it claimed violated its airspace. This action further complicated the fight against ISIS. Equally too, the US issued a travel advisory to its citizens which is expected to last till February 2016. In Belgium, some major cities were on lockdown because of imminent terrorist strike. Back home, Boko Haram (BH) continued it suicide bombing campaign, the latest being in the ancient city of Kano.
All these point to the fact that we are not merely dealing with local issues, but issues that are intertwined and have a global connection with no easy answers. Beyond the merciless killing of innocent souls like it did with the Russian plane where over 200 people died, the group also wages economic war. By its action, Egypt’s tourism industry, on which so much of the country’s financial future depends, has been negatively affected.
And once again, the global aviation industry has also plunged into crisis. The big question remains who controls what and what is/are the goal(s) of these terrorists? If they can evade security at the airport and plant bombs on planes, then we are not safe. The implication is that they have sympatisers everywhere.
Two weeks after watching the Aljazeera documentary I referred to last week, I read a lengthy article published in “The Atlantic” by Graeme Wood titled “What ISIS Really Wants.” Wood’s detailed twenty two page treatise on the group is the best I’ve read so far – I still research and read articles to gain theoretical understanding of the group and what drives them.
“The Islamic State,” he wrote “is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse.”
With this opening statement Wood posed the question: Where did it come from, and what are its intentions? “The simplicity of these questions,” he stated “can be deceiving, and few Western leaders seem to know the answers.”
He referred to a December edition of The New York Times which published confidential comments by Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the idea.” That in itself is the biggest dilemma.
According to Wood, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, which some analysts believe may have contributed to significant strategic errors in dealing with it.
Does this sound familiar when the issue of BH is raised? It appears so. First we were told it was a mere political tool foisted on us by some politicians for political reasons. Next, we were told we are where we are today because the leader of BH was extra judicially murdered by agents of the state. We were also told that BH is thriving because of the unemployment crisis in the land. These are among several theories propounded with no concrete easy practical answers that would really make us understand what we are really dealing with, except that it takes pleasure in killing innocent people hiding behind religion.
During the last administration we read how some BH “negotiators” fleeced the government of millions of naira claiming they were acting on behalf of the group. The government is finding it increasingly difficult identifying who to negotiate with because it is difficult knowing who they really are. Abubakar Shekau, the presumed “leader” has been reportedly killed more than twice. So, it’s challenging to finger what really the grievances of the group are.
In trying to find answers to the rapid rise of ISIS, Wood wrote: “Our ignorance of the Islamic State is in some ways understandable: It is a hermit kingdom; few have gone there and returned. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. But his address and the Islamic State’s countless other propaganda videos and encyclicals are online, and the caliphate’s supporters have toiled mightily to make their project knowable. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.”
I learnt from him that with this ideology, it follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy. Things will however get complicated if there emerges a Russian-Iranian coalition against ISIS. This will encourage resentment in the Sunni community because a Shiite enemy will always be seen as a threat. Similarly, a Western-led coalition will further ISIS rhetoric that the West is waging a war against Muslims. No easy answers.
However, one aspect which a non-Muslim like me found enlightening is the aspect that deals with the nature of the Islamic State from two standpoints. First, he says we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al Qaeda to an organisation that has decisively eclipsed it. “The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.”
His point is that Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organisation was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. The Islamic State – by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. Since they now control a territory, Bagdadi confidently declared himself a Caliph.
Finally, Wood dwelled on other issues like devotion, territory, the Apocalypse, the Fight – ideological purity of Islam and Dissuasion. All these are very deep issues – some followed by interviews with scholars and academics – that went to the core of Islam that cannot be fully explained in a thousand plus words article.
Former President Olusegun Obasanjo – who has met with some leaders of the group in the past – said recently that BH is a matter of socio-economic development, but for it to have hold of the people they must tie it up to something, and they tie it up to some form of religious agitation. “So what do I see? I see a situation where first of all the government must have the upper hand militarily, then after you have had the upper hand militarily you have to deal with the genuine issues of socio-economic development. And I believe that if that is well-handled such issues will disappear.” We earnestly hope so.
While OBJ has a strong point, it is now our common responsibility to ensure that our vibrant youth populations truly understand what their religion preaches. Religious issues are highly emotional which is why a religious war is the most dangerous of all wars. Understanding our religions is critical.
On combating ISIS, I’d like to end with this quote from The Economist: “Military force is not enough on its own, though. It will make the rest of the world safer in the short run, but the critics are right that Islamic terror will end only when the Middle East lives in peace. The parallel aim, therefore, must be for regional powers to stop fighting through their proxies, and for the creation of federal states in Syria and Iraq that give Sunnis, Shias, Alawites and Kurds confidence that they can live together with decent representation in government. That requires strengthening the administration in Baghdad. And it means bringing an end to Syria’s civil war.”
