Four hundred and ninety-two delegates are participating at the national conference in Abuja. But, will the report of the conference see the light of the day? Group Political Editor EMMANUEL OLADESU revisits past attempts at resolving the national question and how successive administrations aborted the goal through hypocritical commitment.
Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) will be aglow with festivities on March 17. Four hundred and ninety-two delegates to the national debate will get the mandate of President Goodluck Jonathan to discuss the problems of Nigeria. Many of them would be accompanied by their relations, friends and associates. They will draw allowances. Since it is a paid job, observers point out that they are not going to render a totally selfless service.
The eminent Nigerians are not attending a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), but a ‘national dialogue’ with limited powers. The conference is fashioned out in the image of the Jonathan Administration. The Secretary to the Federal Government, Senator Pius Ayim, has disclosed that there will be ‘no-go areas’. The unity of Nigeria, he warned, is non-negotiable. The legal backing for the exercise is not clear. The Chairman of the conference, Justice Idris Kutigi (rtd), and delegates from the six geo-political zones are not empowered by the any act of the National Assembly to meet for three months. At the end of the deliberation, it is not clear that the report will be subjected to a referendum.
The acrimony between the ruling and opposition parties may shape the proceedings at the conference. The conference is taking place at a time of national distress. The fragile federal country is enveloped in anxiety and uncertainty. Insecurity, electoral terrorism, infrastructural decay, power outage, bad roads, corruption, and now, fuel scarcity, have provoked outrage. Although Nigeria has just celebrated 100 years of the amalgamation, the mistake of 1914 still hunts the amalgam of incompatible tribes. Foremost legal scholar and former university don, Prof. Itsey Sagay (SAN), observed that, since the wrong step was taken by Lord Fredrick Lugard, the North and South have never resolved two discords. These are the disagreement over power sharing, especially the Presidency, and distribution of the national revenue. The North has always wanted to keep the Presidency and the South has been resisting the idea, he said.
However, the national question, according to pro-national conference crusaders, may not be restricted to the fight over the federal power and control of resources. How should power rotate between the North and South? Should oil-producing states have the largest share of proceeds from the resources? But, the fundamental question extends to how the component units under the lopsided federal structure have fared. Thus, there are puzzles: Should there be state police? Is the Land Use Act not due for review? Which tier of government should create and control the local government? If a region wants to have a railway, is it permitted by the Railway Act of 1955? Why should the distant Federal Government control 55 per cent of the national revenue, leaving 45 per cent for 36 states and 774 councils? Is devolution of power foreclosed? How can the indigene/settler rift be constitutionally settled?
Yet, opinion is still divided on the desirability of the dialogue. A section of Nigerians believes that it is a decoy and jamboree. In their view, since the President, who had opposed the conference, suddenly retraced his step, there is cause for suspicion. The opposition is of the opinion that Dr. Jonathan is trying to shore up the battered image of his administration. But, those who seem to have confidence in the project point out that the men of integrity attending the conference would make a difference. Analysts have suggested that many delegates have actually contributed to the problems confronting the beleaguered country as bad civilian rulers and collaborators of past military regimes. Also, the delegates cannot tap much from past experience, since previous attempts at constitutional conference were backed with hypocritical commitment by successive administrations. Thus, past attempts were discredited by a wider segment of the stakeholders, owing to legitimacy crisis.
Had the military concentrated efforts on its constitutional responsibility of defending the national territorial integrity, perhaps, the story would have been different. Between 1960 and 1966, major crises that threatened stability did not emanate from the federal structure. They were products of political intolerance among early regional leaders competing for federal power. Indeed, the three regions – North, West, Midwest and East – had a measure of autonomy. They operated separate constitutions. They had opportunities to make progress in an atmosphere of healthy competition. The formula for revenue sharing was agreed upon. It was based on principles of derivation, need and national interest. What the political leaders failed to address was the problems of the minorities, in spite of the popularity of the Willinkson Report. The military coup of 1966 obstructed the orderly political evolution.
A historian, Lateef Raji, recalled that whenever there was a change of government, the first priority was to put in motion a mechanism for ‘national talk’. The goal, he said, was to divert attention and achieve stability. “From Ironsi to Obasanjo, the scenario is the same. But, the report often ended in the dustbin”, he lamented. Raji said: “To avoid a repeat, the solution is that the people should own the process. This is where referendum is important”.
During the long military period, the dictators made some feeble efforts to re-order the society. But, the military rulers lacked the skill for the important assignment because they were not trained to rule. Civil rule was barely six years old when the military sacked legitimate authorities in 1966. But the new Head of State, Major-Gen. Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, was a novice. He reluctantly set up a small Constitutional Study Group headed by the late Chief Rotimi Williams to identify the constitutional problems “in the context of one Nigeria.” But, as noted by a political scientist, Prof. Isawa Elaigwu, people lost confidence in his regime when he enacted a decree, which made Nigeria a unitary state.
Ironsi’s successor, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, also set up an adhoc Constitutional Conference. At that time, the country was engulfed in crisis and on the brink of disintegration. The military governors of the four regions-North, West, Midwest and East-nominated the regional delegates. Ethnic warlords, especially the displaced First Republic politicians, made the list. Nominations outside the banned political class were few. The majority of delegates had political affiliations. It was a rancorous meeting. Old wounds resurfaced as the politicians injected their bitter competition and regional projections into the conference processes. The regions were divided by their stiff competition for relevance and other antagonistic pursuits. Delegates from the North and East canvassed confederalism. The West, led by the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, insisted on federalism. Middlebelt and Lagos delegates supported the West. But they also called for the creation of additional states. Certain elements had created had created tension between the West and Lagos, leading to the “Lagos belongs to the West agitation.” The deliberations ended abruptly, owing to the disagreements. Later, the civil war broke out.
The late Gen. Muritala Muhammed took over from Gowon in 1975. He set up a 49-member Constitution Drafting Committee (NDC). Some of its members were handpicked by the government. The body was chaired by Williams. The draft produced by the it was tabled before a Constituent Assembly. One third of the members were appointed by the military regime. Although the assembly had two-third of elected delegates from the old provinces and newly created states, its recommendations were not binding on government. Following the submission of the report, the regime tinkered with it by making some fundamental alterations without further consultations with the peoples’ representatives.
The setting up of the NDC led to the revival of political activities. The 1979 Constitution was not without weaknesses. But, whenever tension arose between the Federal Government and states, the Supreme Court was always the next point of call. Nigeria was gradually building a strong political culture. However, the military drew the curtains on the Second Republic abruptly.
The military President, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, also set up another Constituent Assembly, which fashioned out the 1989 Constitution. It never saw the light of the day. A delegate was elected from each local government. But there were also government nominees. It paled into a wasted effort. Like the previous ones, the 1994 National Constitutional Conference set up by the late Head of State, Gen. Sani Abacha, was a waste of time and resources. The conference lacked legitimacy. Many credible Southern politicians boycotted it in protest. Representation was based on the existing local governments and federal constituencies. Gen. Abacha also nominated his own delegates to the conference. The conference produced a constitution that was not promulgated or adopted. It is worthy of note, however, that during the conference proceedings, there was no single case of uprising in the Niger Delta. The militants were had hope that the conference would resolve their grievances.
However, historians believe that certain lessons can be learned from the moribund 1994 Conference. Its legacy is the current six zone structure. Prominent politicians who were delegates rubbed shoulders with the military by setting a terminal date for the military rule. It is therefore, the belief of some stakeholders that, since many patriotic Nigerians are delegates to the 2014 Conference, they will dwarf the delegates that may be planted into the conference to project a hidden agenda. When the Presidential Advisory Committee on National Conference led by Senator Femi Okurounmu was collating suggestions on conference modalities, a delegate to the 2005 conference, Olorunfunmi Basorun, said that representation was as important as the agenda. He added: “If the right people become delegates, they can begin to assert personality and, without fear and hindrance, put the national question on the front burner. That is, if the right people make the list of delegates.”
Political watchers have pointed out that past conferences were dogged by crises of representation. Reflecting on the flawed distribution of delegates, the Presidential Constitution Review Committee (PCRC) set up by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, noted that, “in spite of different approaches to constitution making in the colonial and post-colonial years, the various constitutions have not emanated from the full involvement of the Nigerian people. This has, in turn, generated extensive alienation from the various constitutions”.
The alienation of stakeholders in 1998/99 characterised the making of the defective 1999 Constitution. To ensure a rapid transfer of power from the military to civilians, the Justice Niki Tobi Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC) was hurriedly set up by former Head of State Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, to organise a nation-wide consultations on the 1995 Draft Constitution produced by the Abacha Conference. The procedure, said the PCRC, was flawed, adding that the CDCC team only visited selected locations out of the 774 local governments to collate views for two months. “The committee was not structured and probably did not have resources and time to involve the civil society more intimately, hold the required consultation, build ownership around the processes and document, and use the constitution-making process to address the national question”. The PCRC also observed that the CDCC produced a draft that was approved, following amendments by the Military Council that failed to satisfy Nigerians, irrespective of class, gender, ethnic or religious groups.
Obasanjo’s National Political Reforms Conference (NPRC) also failed the test of legitimacy. Before setting it up, the former President had experimented with an ‘All Parties Committee for the Review of the 1999 Constitution’. Civil society groups criticised the committee, saying that it was undemocratic. When the Abuja Conference took off, it was made up of five delegates from each state nominated by the governors. For partisan reasons, some governors nominated their cronies and godfathers. The Federal Government also nominated some delegates. Government’s criteria for their nominations were not disclosed. Although the conference did extensive job, it collapsed on the later of the third term agenda.
As the Abuja Conference was holding, the Pro-National Conference Organisation (PRONACO) was holding an alternative peoples’ conference in Lagos. It was chaired by the late Chief Anthony Enahoro. The symbols of the civil society groups – Prof. Wole Soyinka, the late Beko Ransom-Kuti, and the late Prof. Jadesola Akande – prepared the ground. The aggrieved civil society groups, which claimed that they were excluded from the Abuja conference, nominated delegates to the conference. The most significant achievement of the Lagos conference was the recommendation on the restructuring of the country. They suggested a federal country of 18 regions or component units. PRONACO argued that the 18 nationality-based regions can serve as the federating units for a stable Nigeria. The report was ignored by the Federal Government.
What difference would the Jonathan Conference make? Will the report see the light of the day? Can the 492 wise men save Nigeria?
