Tag: hero

What is the place of the late General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi in the history of Nigeria? Following the bloody coup masterminded by mostly young Igbo officers, there were lots of misunderstanding, suspicion and resentment against his administration, particularly in the defunct Northern and Western regions. As a leader who was obviously not prepared for the challenges of governance, the late Aguiyi-Ironsi displayed much naivety in the way he handled the demands of various stakeholders. Deputy Political Editor RAYMOND MORDI looks at the policies that probably alienated the late Head of State from a large chunk of the country. 

As Nigeria marks the 51st anniversary of the January 15, 1966 military coup, which facilitated the emergence of the late Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi as the first military Head of State, one issue associated with him that has refused to go away is the distortion of the country’s federation. Prior to the bloody military coup that ended the First Republic and ushered in the era of military rule, Nigeria had a true federal structure. The regions were autonomous and viable; they took full responsibility for determining their destinies. Each region developed at its pace; each region was responsible for generating its own resources. They retained 50 per cent of the revenue and remitted the remaining into a common pool at the centre, to be shared later by the federating units.

No region waited for monthly allocations or handouts; none called on the Federal Government to fix any road, furnish any school or equip any hospital. The regions were responsible for determining their own affairs and by so doing contributed to the strengthening of the centre.

But, the emergence of Aguiyi-Ironsi changed all that. He became the Head of State in turmoil. The circumstances of the time foisted the responsibility on his shoulders. It was a period of strange experimentation when the command system in the military was replicated in public administration. Advocates of federalism believed that that trial was a colossal failure.

He thought that concentrating powers in the centre would facilitate unity and enhance cooperation among the ethnic groups. He promulgated the Unification Decree 34 on 1966 May 24, abolishing the federal structure and concentrating powers at the centre. With the decree, the regions were deprived of right to minerals in their states; the Federal Government became the custodian of the country’s treasures and resources.

A Lagos-based lawyer and commentator on national affairs, Chijioke Ogham-Emeka, said the greatest irony in the criticism against Aguiyi-Ironsi’s arrangement is that although General Yakubu Gowon restored Nigeria’s federal structure on September 1, 1966, yet the country has been administered substantially in the spirit of the vilified Decree No. 34. For instance, under the 1999 Constitution, Nigeria is supposed to be a federation. But, the extraordinary powers lumped at the centre makes it essentially a unitary structure.

He said: “If we realise that Nigeria must be one and that only a unitary structure can achieve that, why should we not call a spade a spade and post-humously apologise to (or at least vindicate) Aguiyi-Ironsi? Nevertheless, history itself has vindicated him. A true Nigerian was ‘crucified’ for the cause of a united Nigeria and today his murderers are the largest beneficiaries of a unitary and united Nigeria.

“If we operate a federal system of government why not allow the Niger Delta people to control their oil resources and pay royalty into the Federation Account? Why should the concept of ‘federal might’ not be reduced in practice to a myth? Why do we deceive ourselves?”

Many observers agree that the development of the country has been slow since Aguiyi-Ironsi’s abrogation of the federal structure in 1966. The ceding of the control over mineral deposits to the Federal Government is responsible for the culture of states folding their arms and going cap in hand to Abuja every month for allocations. Unlike the pre-1966 era, when states were competing in the area of development and revenue generation, today no state can take any decision over any mineral deposit within its area. The result is that the country has been made to rely on ‘easy money’ from crude oil exports. Even though most states are sitting on potential wealth, there is no incentive to harness same for development, because it belongs to the federal purse.

One of the features of Decree No. 34 was the unification of the civil service of the abolished regions. According to reports, popular feelings in the North and the West then underscored dejection and disillusionment. The understanding in the North was that civil servants from the South will invade the North to displace northerners from the public service, because they had more professional expertise. The rumour was not dispelled. For the northerners, the unification of the civil service was the most annoying aspect of the decree. On May 27, 1966, riots broke out in the North in which many Easterners were killed. The nature of the problem on ground also exposed the fragility of the military then. Soldiers believed that Aguiyi-Ironsi had further sowed the seed of discord and violence. It thus became difficult to deploy the partisan military to quell the riots.

What is the place of Aguiyi-Ironsi in the history of Nigeria? He was a jolly good fellow; a good family man and a professional soldier whose intention was to unite the country, after the abortive coup. But, there were misunderstanding, suspicions and resentment against his policies, particularly in the defunct Northern and Western regions.

Aguiyi-Ironsi’s critics said he assumed political leadership without vision and plan. His administration faced persist criticisms from different parts of the country. As a leader that was obviously not prepared for the challenges of governance, he was confused over the demands of various stakeholders. Students and activists persisted in their clamour for the release of Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, the symbol of patriotic pan-Nigerian fervour. The West was disappointed that Aguiyi-Ironsi was silent about the fate of the jailed opposition leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Delegations from the various provinces in Yorubaland protested to Fajuyi, saying that his continued imprisonment was unjust. The Head of State turned a deaf ear. The perception of the North and the West was that the new regime was to the advantage of the East, the home region of the ruler. In fact, while reflecting on that period of national anxiety, Gowon told his biographer: “There were complaints that only Igbos came to advise Aguiyi-Ironsi.”

As Head of State, he inherited a country deeply fractured by its ethnic and religious cleavages. The fact that none of the high-profile victims of the January 1966 coup were of Igbo extraction, and also that the main beneficiaries of the coup were Igbo, led the Northern part of the country to believe that it was an Igbo conspiracy. Though he tried to dispel this notion, by courting the aggrieved ethnic groups through political appointments and patronage, his failure to punish the coup plotters crystallised this conspiracy theory.

His failure to try those behind the coup according to the dictates of military law fuelled opposition against his administration. The Head of State reportedly became hostage not only to radical opinion in the media in the South that hailed the coup plotters as heroes, but also to the curious five-point agreement he had negotiated with Nzeogwu in Kaduna back on January 17.

According to reports, the coup was investigated by the police and the report was ready by March. Subsequently, a panel was set up to review the report and come up with formal charges. But, the panel went to sleep; it never sat. Major Adewale Ademoyega corroborates the above in his book, Why We Struck, stating that each time the matter was brought up for discussion at the Supreme Military Council (SMC), that Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the Governor of the West, was opposed to any trial.

One of the arrowheads of the July 1966 revenge coup, General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, confirmed that Aguiyi-Ironsi’s failure to try the coup plotters was a major factor that led to the second coup. In Lindsay Barrett’s book, Danjuma: The Making of a General, Danjuma, accused the late Aguiyi-Ironsi of doing nothing to bring Nzeogwu and his fellow conspirators to justice.

Meanwhile, there were allegations that the mutineers were being treated specially in prison. Thus, the failure to bring the mutineers and murderers to book gave a platform for the numerous military coups of the following years. It established the notion that a “successful” coup plotter would never be called to account for his actions. Nigeria paid the price for this in subsequent years, with coups becoming the fashionable way to change a government.

Owing to increasing tensions in the land, former leading politicians in the Western and Eastern regions were detained on March 7, but those of the Northern region were left alone, because of political sensitivities resulting from the coup. Indeed, Aguiyi-Ironsi made an effort — ultimately insufficient — to pacify the North. He had appointed and promoted the son of the Emir of Katsina as the new military governor, released northern ministers who were detained by Nzeogwu in Kaduna, reappointed Sule Katagum to the Public Service Commission and placed Malam Howeidy in charge of the defunct Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN).

In May, among other promotions, he promoted three substantive northern Captains (Ibrahim Haruna of Ordnance, Murtala Muhammed of Signals and Mohammed Shuwa of Infantry) who were then acting Majors to the ranks of temporary Lt. Cols. But, he fell short on more culturally sensitive matters. For example, the military governor of the Northern Region, Major Hassan Katsina, was discouraged from attending the funeral of the late Prime Minister in Bauchi.

Reflecting on Aguiyi-Ironsi’s tenure, eminent scholar Prof. Isawa Elaigwu noted that, though the nature of the coup became more suspicious to many Nigerians, the Head of State’s subsequent actions only aggravated it. The political scientist said in his book, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman: “In a way, it may be argued that General Aguiyi-Ironsi was a victim of circumstances — circumstances which required the quick use of his mental capacity and political subtlety — two traits Ironsi did not possess in adequate amounts.”

The composition of the administration’s advisory team was also another source of discontent. Chief among them was Francis Nwokedi, former permanent secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, who had become close to him during his days in the Congo.  Others were Pius Okigbo (economic adviser) and Lt. Col Patrick Anwunah who was later Chairman of the National Orientation Committee. The most common complaint against the appointments was that, although highly qualified and distinguished, they were either all Igbos or Igbo speaking.

On February 12, Ironsi took his most sensitive decision when he made Nwokedi the sole commissioner for the establishment of an administrative machinery for a unified Nigeria – even though he already appointed a separate Constitutional Review Panel under the late Chief Rotimi Williams which had not submitted a report.