As far as orders go, President Goodluck Jonathan’s directive to the security forces to locate and rescue the seven foreigners abducted by the Ansaru Islamist sect on Sunday in Bauchi State is an indication of concern and eagerness for a quick resolution of the hostage crisis. Ansaru, otherwise called Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis- Sudan (JAMBS), a splinter group of the more well-known Boko Haram sect, has carried out a few abductions and terrorist attacks that ended badly for security agencies. The sect, whose name is translated as “the Group that dedicates itself to helping Muslims in Africa,” had in January claimed responsibility for the attack on a convoy of Mali-bound Nigerian soldiers near Okene in Kogi State. It also proudly claimed responsibility for the attack on the Police Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) office near Abuja in November 2012. In May 2011, the group, still in metamorphosis at the time, was believed to be responsible for the abduction of Messrs Chris McManus, a Briton, and Franco Lamolinara, an Italian. Both hostages, who worked for a foreign construction company in Northern Nigeria, were killed in a botched rescue carried out by a combined team of Nigerian and British forces in March 2012 near Sokoto.
Two months later in Kano, an attempt by Nigerian Special Forces team to free a German engineer, Edgar Fritz Raupach, also went horribly wrong, leading to the killing of the expatriate and some of his abductors. It was also believed that the same Ansaru group was responsible for that abduction, especially as Boko Haram had disavowed kidnapping as a terror weapon. Perhaps, the Kano debacle was at the back of the minds of Ansaru leaders when they darkly hinted to Nigerian security agents that any attempt to carry out a rescue operation in the recent abductions was likely to end in failure.
The botched rescue in Sokoto and Kano led Hardball to ask the Nigerian forces to declare a unilateral moratorium on hostage rescue. In the June 4, 2012 piece, Hardball had declared: “It is apparent that Nigerian security forces have not yet acquired the know-how of rescuing hostages. The spectacular failure of the Sokoto rescue effort, which involved British Special Forces, should have informed Nigeria of the need to exercise restraint in the Kano hostage case. That restraint was not observed. In both the Sokoto and Kano rescue efforts, security forces attacked the terrorists with all they had when what would have guaranteed success were stealthy methods and surprise. The Kano effort, for instance, lasted for 30 minutes, and like Sokoto, involved the deployment of armoured tanks and overt troop movements. It is hoped this would be the last time attempts would be made to free hostages when the possibility of success is less than assured. Indeed, it is time Nigeria declared a moratorium on hostage rescue rather than continue to risk the murder of hostages by their captors. From evidence provided by security forces, the hostages in Sokoto and Kano were killed by their captors when it seemed the chances of escaping with the hostages were lost.”
It is in consideration of the foregoing that this column views with apprehension the order by Jonathan that the hostages be located and rescued. It is possible that the Nigerian forces had learnt a thing or two from the failures of the past, and have probably acquired better equipment and skills. However, as Hardball warned last year, if the chances of a successful rescue are not high, it would indeed by unwise and politically costly to embark on uncalculated heroism. Unlike the Sokoto case where two foreign hostages were involved, and Kano where one foreign hostage was involved, the Bauchi case involves seven hostages. And unlike the Sokoto debacle where Italy was kept in the dark as British and Nigerian forces stormed the terrorists’ hideout, this time, Italy will take more than a passing interest in what happens to its abducted citizen. And with France intervening in Mali, hostage-taking may have just begun.
In the end, the responsibility of taking action on the hostages lies with Nigeria. We must hope that the Algerian example of January 19 does not hold more than a fleeting fascination for the Nigerian government. In the Algerian case, where terrorists held more than 150 foreign workers hostage at a desert gas plant, Algerian Special Forces carried out a brutal counterattack to send a message that it would neither negotiate with terrorists nor allow a drawn-out siege. Consequently, 69 people died, including at least 39 hostages and 29 Islamist kidnappers in the effort to retake the plant. It was a heavy price to pay for a simple message.
