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Tag: insurgencies

  • Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III) (part 2)

    Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III) (part 2)

    Some of the leaders of the insurgency have University education which accounts for their vastly improved organization. They are familiar with the terrain in which they operate and have wide social connections in the region. In addition, there is some evidence of both local and external support in terms of funding and training for the insurgents. Some senior government leaders and politicians in the North are under investigation for giving the insurgents financial and logistical support in their operations. The full extent of such collaboration by a few of the leaders in the North is not known. But there is little doubt that some Northern leaders secretly support the insurgents for political reasons. These leaders want political power at the centre to return to the North.

    The skills of the insurgents in producing lethal home based bombs, and other weapons of mass destruction used in the massive suicide bombings of their targets indicate some external support as well for the sect. One of the fallouts of the Libyan war is the proliferation of arms in the Sahel, some of which have found their way into Nigeria and other states in West Africa. The recent attacks on Mali were facilitated by the easy access of the insurgents to some of the weapons from the Libyan war. The insurgents do not seriously appear to lack access to arms and ammunitions or to considerable financial and logistical support. The open terrain in the North and the wide dispersal of the local communities are conducive to the type of insurgency being waged by Boko Haram in the region. There is some evidence that the insurgents enjoy the support of some law enforcement and security agents. This accounts for their good intelligence which keeps them a step ahead of the security forces. The Churches, main targets of their attacks, are clearly visible and, in view of their large number, cannot be fully protected by the security forces, already overstretched by the security challenges they now face.

    Some of the leaders of the insurgents are believed to have received their military training in the use of arms in Pakistan and the Yemen. Certainly, the insurgents have received considerable financial and logistical support from Al Qaeda, the formidable terrorist group based in Pakistan and the Yemen. Mutallab, the University educated, well bred young man, involved in the attempted bombing of a US bound plane is a good example of young educated Northerners who have turned their back on the Northern establishment into which they were born, but from which they have become totally alienated as a result of the social and economic inequalities in the region, far exceeding those in the South where education provides the basis for social and economic advancement, including access to job opportunities. These young educated Northerners despise their Northern leaders for the widespread corruption in the country, including the North. They have a vision of a society based on the Sharia, the Islamic legal doctrines. Boko Haram is also able to recruit easily from the ranks of the poor, the talakawa, who abound in the North. The talakawa have nothing to lose by joining the insurgency which promises them a better life and equal economic opportunities. It is from this group of the poor that Boko Haram has continued to receive its local support. The insurgents seek the overthrow of the established authorities for political reasons. In most cases, this type of insurgency is tribally or ethnically based. It is a product of a colonial legacy in which different tribes and ethnic groups were brought together under colonial rule.

    At the moment Boko Haram is not known to be operating outside Nigeria. It is local in origin and outlook, with a single specific objective; the destruction of the old established order and its replacement by a new order based on Islamic laws and strict Islamic doctrines. It is limited to the Northern part of Nigeria. Al Qaeda, the fundamentalist Islamic movement, based in Pakistan, but with tentacles all over the Arab world is an example of an insurgency whose operations and activities cut across the entire Moslem world. Nigeria is a multi-religious country. The country’s constitution guarantees to all its citizens the freedom of association and freedom to practice their religion. Boko Haram is opposed to this. Where the North is concerned it wants the creation of Islamic states. This is why Churches and the Christians are the main focus of its attacks. The insurgents resent the spread of Christianity in the North. They want the Hausa- Fulani North to be wholly Moslem, to be governed strictly according to Islamic laws. The problem is that it is not only the immigrants from the South that are Christians. There are large numbers of the Hausa-Fulani who, over the years, have converted to Christianity. The new generation evangelical Churches in the North have achieved remarkable success in extending Christianity to the largely Moslem North. The fundamentalist Moslems in the North feel beleaguered by this development which they fear threatens their way of life.

    So far, the Nigerian security forces have failed to effectively tackle the Boko Haram terrorists. They have stepped up their activities and operations in the North. The authorities have attempted without much success to counter Boko Haram by the application of military force. Dialogue may offer a way out of the insurgency but Boko Haram has not yet committed itself to this. At the moment, there is very little room for maneuver on either side of the dispute. The issues involved in the insurgency are so fundamental that any negotiations at this point in time are unlikely to succeed. There is a distinct lack of trust on either side. The group has persistently ignored the pleas of the Northern leaders to abandon their terrorist acts and operations. Instead, Boko Haram has intensified and widened its insurgency. There is a complete deadlock between the two sides. What is likely to happen is that the insurgency will gradually run out of steam and external support. This will make it easier for the Nigerian state to manage and contain the conflict. The federal authorities need to be more proactive in tackling Boko Haram. A sustained programme of public enlightenment on the danger to the state of Boko Haram should be started. This should be complemented by a more sustained and determined effort by the federal government as well as the Northern governments to invest more in providing easy access to education and jobs in the North.

    The security forces will need to do much better in intelligence gathering to pre-empt terrorist attacks by Boko Haram. A greater infiltration of the sect by the security forces for intelligence gathering is also called for. In this regard the federal authorities are looking for international support and assistance in intelligence gathering and equipment. The US government has been reported as being willing to offer some assistance on this. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was reported as making this offer during her recent official visit to Nigeria. Britain and other western countries will also be disposed to offer similar assistance.

    It is doubtful whether the Nigerian state has the capacity to neutralize the insurgent groups. Ethnic and religious divisions compound the security problems of the Nigerian state. Poor police and army intelligence makes it far too easy for Boko Haram agents to operate in the North. But it has to be admitted that there is also some support in the North for the principal aim of the sect, which is to make most of the North theocratic, instead of being secular.

    It will also be necessary to take practical and effective measures to cut off the local and foreign financial and logistical support for the insurgency. The CBN and the local banks have a huge responsibility in this regard. Without funding and logistical support Boko Haram will lose local support and become less effective.

  • Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III)

    Nature and dynamics of insurgencies (III)

    The 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria was a sham. It was certainly unpopular in both Northern and Southern Nigeria at the time. In the North, the powerful Moslem Emirates were opposed to it, as it was feared that a centralized administrative system would weaken their authority, while in the South the fear of the Lagos based educated elite was that it would lead to the extension to the South of the obnoxious practice associated with indirect rule, and the curtailment of the few political rights that they enjoyed under the legislative council system. Lord Lugard and most of his successors as governors were committed to the maintenance of the existing aristocratic Emirates and social order in the North. They admired the Islamic way of life in the North. Northern Nigeria seemed more orderly and stable. Why disrupt this order by bringing in foreign cultural influences, including western education? While allowing the Christian missionaries to start schools in Southern Nigeria, the British colonial authorities did little to encourage education in the North. Churches were virtually barred by the British colonial government from starting schools in the North. The practical effect of this basic commitment by the British colonial authorities to maintain and protect the Islamic way of life in the North was that a yawning gap between the North and the South in western education began to develop rapidly. This gap in education between the North and the South is one of the major sources of conflicts and instability in the country, even today. It is directly responsible for the emergence of religious sectarian groups in the North such as Boko Haram. The pre-independence political process in Nigeria has also contributed to sectarian violence in Nigeria. On the surface, the constitutional framework at independence appeared flexible enough to permit compromise, adjustment, and change. It seemed loose enough to satisfy regional aspirations and at the same time to accommodate conflicting national interests. What it did in reality, however, was to conceal the essence of the Nigerian political process which, in practice, showed that there was a basic incompatibility between the formal side of the system and the political needs of the country. As one observer of the post independence situation in Nigeria rightly remarked, “the organization of power in Nigeria for the creation of political stability, whether for democratic or non-democratic purposes, is extremely weak’.

    Economic and social factors account for some of the friction between the largely Moslem North and the largely Christian South. The lack of a consensus over societal values, including a division over religion, is also a major source of the frequent religious conflicts in Nigeria as exemplified in the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria which, despite years of political domination of the country, continues to lag far behind the South in terms of economic and social development. The North is far poorer than the South. Per capita income in the North is less than half of that of the South where, until recently, economic progress had created a small but rapidly mobile middle class. Some of the educated Southerners have migrated to the North for jobs and commercial enterprise. Most of these Christian emigrants in the North have been largely successful financially as their education has given them an advantage over their Northern Moslem brothers. There are vast economic opportunities in the North. But the Northerners are ill equipped to take advantage of these opportunities because they lack access to education. They are simply unable to compete with the better educated Southerners who dominate commerce in the region. The Northern Moslems resent this development for which they blame, not only their own selfish leaders, but Christians who have lived with them for generations as well. Even without religious differences, this situation of economic inequality was bound to generate some hostility against Southerners living in the North. The grievances of the Boko Haram insurgents range from religious and cultural differences with the South to their inability to take advantage of the economic opportunities available in the North. Over time, they have seen how their hopes for a better society and living conditions have failed to materialise.

    The progressive breakdown of the old and powerful Emirates has also created an opportunity for these insurgents to challenge the old traditional authority in the North. The old and powerful emirates no longer have any power of coercion and rely on state security forces for the maintenance of law and order in their domain. Over time, they have also lost the moral authority that they enjoyed in pre-colonial times. Even though the process of modernization has been slower in the North, the hold of the Emirates on political and economic power has declined significantly. They have lost their political stranglehold on the people. Recently, there have been physical attacks by the sect on some of the Emirs. The insurgents want a return to the old values of a society governed under Islamic laws. They want to establish an Islamic theocracy in the North as they believe that this would provide them with equal opportunities for social and economic development. They believe it will end the corruption of their own Northern leaders and make the Northern ruling class more accountable to the talakawa, the poor. Their vision is that of a strict Islamic society in which their basic needs would be met by the state. This is the religious nexus binding the insurgents to one another. The widespread poverty in the North has provided the Boko Haram insurgents with a formidable instrument for seeking the overthrow of the existing order in the North. This order has not served the people well.

    When the Boko haram insurgency first came to light in 2009, it was a weak, poorly organized, and inchoate movement. Since then, it has been transformed into a powerful organization posing a serious threat to national security with an impressive strategic strike capability. This transformation has been made possible by a more determined, better educated, and committed leadership.

    •To be continued

  • The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (II)

    The nature and dynamics of insurgencies (II)

    This religious and sectarian insurgency emanating from the Arab world has now spread to Nigeria where, since 2009, the government has had to face the growing security challenge posed by Boko Haram (Western education is evil) to its authority. Before then, very little was known of the existence of this sect and its objectives. It was preceded by the activities and operations of the militants of the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that posed a grave security threat to Nigeria’s oil installations. Here, the grievances were mainly local and economic. Through dialogue, the federal authorities have been able to reach an agreement with the militants involving training abroad for them and some generous financial compensation. But even this can only be a partial solution to a problem that is deeply rooted in the political and economic history of the Delta region.

    The nature of the colonial legacy is responsible to a large extent for the emergence of political instability and the consequent emergence of insurgency in Nigeria. The Boko Haram sect is the product of a political and social process that failed to ensure an even development in the country, with the North lagging far behind the South in economic and social development. The insurgency in the North is a symptom of a deep seated malaise going back to the colonial area during which colonial policies adopted led to the North, the largest and most populous part of the country, falling behind the rest of the country in virtually all respects. Boko Haram is the direct consequence of the failure of northern leaders to invest in the education of their people. It is this failure, and not mere religious differences, that accounts for the deep seated grievances of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. The process and pace of modernisation in the North have been much slower than in the South. This situation creates frustration among the northern youths who find themselves unable to compete with their southern counterparts in all respects, even in the North.

    Northern Nigeria had been politically restive for some time. Before 2009 when Boko Haram first emerged there was the Maitasine rebellion which the Obasanjo government succeeded in putting down, largely through the application of force. But the underlying problem that produced Maitasine in the North was not really addressed. Boko Haram is the direct successor of Maitasine. Most of the northern states have since come under the savage attacks of the Boko Haram insurgents. There is now a serious danger that the insurgency may extend to other non-Fulani parts of northern Nigeria. Plateau State is the new target of attacks, though the competition for land between Fulani herdsmen and the indigenes in the region is also a major factor in the ethnic clashes there. Plateau State, part of the old Middle Belt, has a large Christian population as well. Its people have always historically been at logger – heads with the Hausa-Fulani who want to dominate the area. So, here the battle is for the control of this mineral rich part of Nigeria. It is both economic and political.

    A recent country report on global terrorism by the State Department of the United States showed that in 2011, 136 attacks were carried out in northern Nigeria by Boko Haram resulting in the death of 590 people. In terms of the global number of casualties in the Boko Haram attacks, Nigeria was placed fifth, after Afghanistan (3,353), Iraq (3, 063), Pakistan (2,033), and Somalia (1,103). It was reported that in 2011 there were some 978 terrorist attacks in Africa with Nigeria alone accounting for over 20 per cent of those attacks. The report stated that the sect was more deadly and vicious in its attacks in 2011 than in 2010. In 2010 only 31 attacks by Boko Haram were reported by the media. This figure increased in 2011 to 136. This year the number and frequency of Boko Haram attacks are likely to be even higher as the sect has increased its tempo during the current year. Already, it is estimated that Boko Haram attacks have resulted in the death of over 1,000 people in northern Nigeria since 2009.

    A former head of the Nigerian Army, Gen. Danjuma, has publicly expressed concerns that Nigeria may become a failed state like Somalia which has integrated on account of a long drawn out insurgency. Many northern leaders have also condemned the sect and blamed it for the situation of economic paralysis in the North There is increasing public concern that the sect seems to execute its vicious and bloody attacks so easily and with almost complete impunity. Despite its best and brave efforts the Joint Task Force, comprising the Army and the Police, has not yet been able to evolve a strategy to effectively tackle and contain attacks by the sect. Vast swathes of northern Nigeria have been rendered ungovernable and ‘no go’ areas. In the states that have been hit by Boko Haram, economic activities have been totally paralysed. The Plateau State has been one of the main targets of these attacks. It has suffered more casualties from the Boko Haram attacks than other states in northern Nigeria. The attacks appear religious in nature as most of them have been targeted at churches and Christians in northern Nigeria. Christian leaders have been restrained in their response to these attacks, but have warned that they may be obliged to urge their people to retaliate as the government has been unable to offer the victims of these random attacks any protection. A few mosques have also been attacked. But these attacks are directed against Muslims who are thought to have fallen behind in the strict practice of the Islamic doctrine and have fallen for the trappings of Western civilisation and way of life that the sect considers evil and unacceptable to strict Islamic doctrines.

    The Boko Haram phenomenon and the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria have to be considered as one of the unsavoury consequences and legacies of colonial rule in Nigeria. British colonial rule in Nigeria sought to create a new state by bringing together under a single colonial administration a country of such wide cultural and ethnic diversity. The central historical fact of Nigeria is that, like most of the other African states, it owes its existence as a nation state to European imperial ambitions in Africa. Lord Lugard, the first colonial governor of Nigeria, and the man who carried out the amalgamation of Nigeria, admitted at the time that Nigeria was ‘a mere geographical expression’ of this new British dependency. The territorial boundaries, the political institutions, and the images of these African states, are the result of European ambitions and rivalries in Africa. But colonialism was both a factor of cohesion and a source of friction. While it brought under one rule people with different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, it did very little to integrate them into one nation.

    The roots of the current insurgency by Boko Haram also lie in the fragility of the political institutions that Nigeria inherited at its Independence in 1960. Post-colonial Nigeria has remained a weak state. The post-colonial political and economic systems were far too weak to contain the centrifugal tendencies in the country. The federal system of government agreed upon at Independence was unbalanced. It failed to provide an equitable distribution of power at the centre. It is this quest for a more balanced political system that has been at the centre of Nigeria’s post-colonial political history. The post-colonial framework was itself the product of the nature and style of the British colonial administration in Nigeria. It created huge divergences in administration in northern and southern parts of the colony.

     

    •To be continued

     

  • Obasanjo and Sanusi: What has good farming got to do with bad economics?

    Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, exudes virtually the same prickly temperament as Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former president. Both are highly opinionated, messianic, truculent and impatient with contrary views. Throughout Obasanjo’s two terms in office, he hardly ever climbed down from his public policy high horse, nor ever acknowledged he was clearly wrong on any decision he took. He was right on the huge payout to Nigeria’s creditors, and he was right on all the higher denomination banknotes he ordered issued. He was right on the levelling of both Odi in Bayelsa State and Zaki Biam in Benue State; just as he was right on all the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) chairmen he whimsically replaced. Obasanjo, in short, was never wrong on anything, and indeed does not believe he can ever be wrong, now and in the future.

    Sanusi may reject this comparison, but like Obasanjo he has never thought himself wrong on anything. He was not wrong on the reforms in the banking system or on the continuing fever of reforms he has unleashed in that sector. He was not wrong on fuel subsidy removal, and now he is not wrong on the decision to introduce N5000 banknote. Perfectly and enthusiastically polemical like Obasanjo, he deploys his fluency, much more than his logic or economics, in intimidating his opponents. If necessary, he summons sarcasm to undermine his opponent’s logic, just as he is doing in his current tiff with Obasanjo. Last week, at an Institute of Directors’ roundtable advocacy forum, the former president had suggested that if all Sanusi was trying to do was curb inflation with higher naira denomination, the CBN governor would inadvertently stall production. To Sanusi, this was a red rag to a bull. Obasanjo’s very words were: “I understand that now he (Sanusi) is focused on fighting inflation, which is a good idea. But if this (N5000 note inclusive) and all that he is focused on is fighting inflation, it will kill production.”

    Sanusi’s reply, which came predictably quickly and with characteristic sarcasm, was ear-piercing. Said he: “This is an interesting country because my uncle or my father, who is our former Head of State, Gen. Obasanjo, you know he is a very successful farmer, but he is a very bad economist. He stands up and says that this higher denomination (N5000 note) will cause inflation and improve hardship… General Obasanjo did N20, he did N100, N200, N500 and N1, 000. He introduced more higher denominations in Nigeria than any former head of state. Obasanjo did N100 note in 1999, he did N200 in 2000, he did N500 two years later, and in that period, inflation was coming down because it was accompanied by prudent fiscal and monetary policy.” On the surface, Sanusi’s sneering and abrasive comment appeared to only damn Obasanjo with faint praise. In reality, however, apart from other wounding remarks, he actually brutally dismissed the former president’s economic logic as unsound.

    Sanusi was unsure whether to call Obasanjo an uncle or a father; indeed his tone was gently mocking. However, he is at least sure the former president’s instinct and judgement as a farmer do not extend to “simple economics.” For as he put it, “We all know that we cannot have inflation by printing higher bills if you don’t increase money supply, and this is simple economics.” No one is sure who will have the upper hand in the banknote controversy, but if we know Obasanjo as well as we pretend to do, he will not let Sanusi have the last word. The former president was in fact uncharacteristically mellow in his initial reaction to the banknote; trust him to be a little bit more acerbic in his next comment. In his fairly long banking career, Sanusi has not been known to suffer both fools and the wise gladly. Even without classifying Obasanjo, the CBN governor will not suffer the former president gladly, nor let him have the last word. And both abhor stalemate.

    If Hardball were to hazard a guess how the war would end, he would refer readers to a long list of Obasanjo’s polemical victims, chief among whom was Otunba Gbenga Daniel, former governor of Ogun State, who is left twitching on the floor with barely a sign of political life in him after many duels with the former president. Sanusi will need all the approvals he can get from an incurious President Goodluck Jonathan to survive the fusillade from the one he cheekily described as the good farmer of Ota and bad economist of Abeokuta.