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  • Israel-Gaza ceasefire and aftermath

    Israel-Gaza ceasefire and aftermath

    In the end, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, which United States president Donald Trump desperately coveted, eluded him. It instead went to a Venezuelan opposition politician, Maria Corina Machado, despite last ditch efforts by the US president to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and orchestrate a realistic path to lasting peace. Mr Trump’s 20-point peace plan incorporated significant elements of the France-Saudi peace plan, and bore Turkish, Qatari, and Egyptian imprints. Altogether, stripped of all diplomatese, the ceasefire deal clearly indicates a number of consequences regarding the Middle East, and especially Palestine. Put simply, the plan implies that Hamas lost the war it triggered in October 2023, Iran is demystified, Hezbollah is significantly degraded, Yemen is virtually isolated and rendered impotent, Syria has been inoculated against terror, and Arab States can breathe a little easier because the Iranian Axis of Resistance will be of less concern to them in the short term.

    The ceasefire deal will be consummated over three phases. It starts with the release of all Israeli hostages and hundreds of Palestinian detainees, which is expected to take place in the next 72 hours starting from yesterday; withdrawal of Israeli troops in phases from Gaza and the demilitarisation of Hamas; and the rebuilding of Gaza over the next three to five years. In the medium term, which may be more challenging, other key points of the Trump plan will be revealed. There are as yet no clear indications those other terms will be met, including the more vaguely stated two-state solution. But next week, Mr Trump will take a victory lap in Israel where he will address the Israeli parliament, though the deal owes so much to Gulf States leaders, especially Qatar and Egypt, and also Turkey as well as Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu.

    There are three angles to the ceasefire deal, which is already being celebrated almost like a peace deal because of its impact in ameliorating suffering in Gaza and removing Israel as the cynosure of global attention. President Trump, despite his theatrics and narcissistic politics, placed himself at the centre of the resolution of the Gaza war, and must feel immensely disappointed to have been passed over in the award of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. His idiosyncrasies facilitated the deal. He begins a deal by blustering, progresses to taking hostile actions, and then offers a deal which at that point becomes almost irresistible. He talked tough on Gaza by proposing to turn the territory into a resort, asked some Arab states to encourage Gaza emigration, and then joined Israel to bomb Iran, Hamas’ main backers. Secondly, he kept up an unusual and in the long run beneficial relationship, political and business, with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States as a whole. He asked no moral questions and made no ethical demand of them, and entered into both private and public business deals with those countries, precisely the kind of powerful leader they wish to have on their side.

    Thirdly, he sustained incredibly close and powerful diplomatic and personal relations with Israel both in his first term, and in the opening months of his second term, including breaking the anathema of relocating American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also went more than one step better in backing Israel unconditionally in its war in Gaza, at least publicly, while privately bringing enormous pressure to bear on the Israeli prime minister. It made it possible for him to compel Mr Netanyahu to apologise to Qatar for the attempt on Hamas leaders’ lives in Doha early September. And it also made it possible to leverage on his enormous popularity in Israel to compel Mr Netanyahu to agree to the ceasefire deal over and above the objections and reservations of Israeli political coalition leaders.

    The second angle, entirely constituted by Mr Netanyahu himself, is even more profound than the Trump angle. He may be a corrupt and controversial politician, and may be mercurial to boot, but he has the right instincts of a leader. At a time when most of Israel believed it was brinkmanship to engage in some of the wider and ramifying actions he took in the past two years on the international stage, the prime minister doubled down on his decisions, stuck to his guns, gingerly held on to his Knesset coalition, and broke so many diplomatic tables that no one thought possible. It took nerves to launch a blitzkrieg on Iran, decimate Hezbollah, while at the same time fighting a vicious campaign next door, in Gaza and Syria, and long range strikes against Yemen. The extraordinary and unprecedented military successes that greeted his efforts earned Israel global respect, even if the world, minus America, deplored and loathed Mr Netanyahu’s gung-ho policies. He showed what it is to be a leader, that it cares less about public relations, that it is about courage, intuition, and tactical brilliance. Yes, Israel fought a similar war in 1967 during the Six-Day War, but in its recent campaigns it made the world glimpse technology’s lethal effect on modern warfare. Indeed, it took a Trump and Netanyahu leadership nexus to unfurl the frightening and apocalyptic possibilities which determined leaders are capable of conjuring.

    The third angle, constituted by Qatar, Turkiye and Egypt, is no less crucial for the resolution of the Gaza conflict, and they will continue to play a huge role in pacifying the region in the years ahead. Without their efforts, it is doubtful whether the ceasefire could have been reached at the time it happened. Hamas, it has become clear, miscalculated in instigating the war in Octobers 2023. They knew they stood no chance of defeating Israel militarily, but they counted on Hezbollah to pressure Israel from the North, Iran to give back-up should it be needed, and the rest of the world to give it public relations advantage because of the untold humanitarian catastrophe expected to be unleashed. They didn’t count on Mr Trump’s return to the White House, probably misjudged the resolve of Mr Netanyahu and his vulnerable Knesset coalition, and had romantic ideas of what influence the outraged world could muster. Worse, they never believed Israel could dismantle the Axis of Resistance so rapidly and so effortlessly, nor budge over the humanitarian disaster the invasion would trigger. Having embedded their command posts, armouries and tactical units beneath and within public buildings such as schools and hospitals and international organisations buildings, Hamas hoped to achieve some form of stalemate. All the calculations, however, unravelled quickly.

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    Now, as a result of that attack on October 7, 2023, the power dynamics of the Middle East has been reconfigured. Lebanon stands the chance of reclaiming its sovereignty from Hezbollah’s stranglehold; Iran is weakened and a shadow of itself, particularly of its boastful self; Syrian militias toppled the Assad dynasty because Iranian support was no longer available; nearly the entire Hamas leadership has been wiped out making it possible for the Palestinian Authority operating form the West Bank to lay claims to Gaza; Gaza lies in absolute ruins and will be administered by external forces in the foreseeable future; and Israel has emerged much stronger than before the war, with Mr Netanyahu’s political and leadership reputation considerably bolstered.

    However, the world must watch out for the unseen consequences of the war. Mr Trump may be widely acknowledged for his diplomatic skills today, but the essential core of those skills, if world history and end times prophecy are anything to go by, are much brittler than imagined. Fascists, of whom Mr Trump is arguably numbered, often achieve great successes and triumphs in the short run; but in the long run, they collapse under the weight of their eccentricities and contradictions. The US president is today acclaimed in the US, Israel, and Middle East, but his achievements have been secured mostly by bullying tactics, domestic and international, and by taking advantage of the follies and foibles of incompetent or timid regional leaders. He will come to grief sooner or later, possibly damaging America’s reputation irreparably. For Israel, the ceasefire and the hostages release may buoy the reputation of Mr Netanyahu, but as a student of history, he will recall that the spectacular success of the 1970 Yom Kippur War was insufficient to save the leadership of Gold Meir who was blamed for the country’s lack of preparedness and initial military setbacks that caused massive casualties. She accepted blame and resigned in 1974.

    For Hamas, having retarded the Palestinian cause by its terrible miscalculations, not to say damage Gaza’s infrastructure and caused nearly 70,000 dead, it may be the end of the road. Neither they nor the less influential Islamic Jihad, will play any significant role in Gaza for a long time. Even if they try to play some political role in the future, they are unlikely to meet with as much success as they had after they took control of the strip in June 2007. Nor will they have the kind of financial assistance from the Gulf States as they had previously received. A ceasefire may have taken effect, but the long-term goal of a two-state solution may remain far-fetched. They toyed with it after Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Oslo I & II Accords of 1993 and 1995, but a final peace treaty was torpedoed by Palestinian leaders. It is not certain that such a zero-sum game is not still the regnant philosophy in the disputed region. Indeed, the last has not been heard of the war, the last one being the fifth in the series of Israel-Hamas wars.

  • Israel-Gaza conflicts end up the same

    Israel-Gaza conflicts end up the same

    • By Brent E. Sasley

    The brutality of the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, and the ruthlessness of the Israeli response, has made some observers wonder if this time, the severity of the violence will finally force Israelis and Palestinians to come up with a real and lasting solution to the conflict over Gaza.

    The problem is, all previous wars between Israel and Hamas have ended up with the status quo ante, and there’s no convincing reason to think this time will be any different. Wars between Israel and Hamas in 2008, 2008-09 and 2014 all ended in ceasefires that have done nothing to resolve the conflict. The result has been ongoing clashes, rocket fire on Israel, Israeli air strikes on Gaza and skirmishes between fighters, all of which have continually led to the killing of civilians.

    A real change in the regional order requires either a political process between Israel and Hamas, or the complete destruction of the latter. Neither of these scenarios is likely, even now — unless diplomats choose to reject this old pattern and replace it with something new.

    Why are we likely to end up in the same pattern this time?

    First, despite the fact that it can claim a devastating number of lives, Hamas does not pose an existential threat to Israel. The State of Israel is a fully integrated member of the international community. It has the region’s most powerful military and a nuclear arsenal, and an American security umbrella. Under these conditions, the most that Hamas can do is engage in intermittent “small” attacks against Israel. All it wants is to survive the current Israeli response so it will be back in position to strike again.

    This means that there is no way for Hamas to force Israel to make real concessions. The most that Hamas has achieved is to exchange kidnapped Israelis for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. But that doesn’t do anything to tamp down the specific disputes between the two.

    Second, neither side has expressed any interest in a genuine political process. Hamas has built its reputation and very purpose on its ability to “resist” Israel. Further, Hamas’ oppressive rule in Gaza has deprived it of the legitimacy it once had as a serious political alternative to Fatah, leaving its legitimacy tied only to such resistance.

    Research has shown insurgent groups only agree to participate in a diplomatic process if they are allowed to share in governing. Yet for Hamas to do so would be to give up its emphasis on violence, its sole reason for existence. The most Hamas has been willing to consider has been negotiations toward a ceasefire or an exchange of captives and prisoners — and that only through an intermediary.

    For its part, no Israeli government from anywhere on the political spectrum has ever indicated any interest in negotiating with Hamas. It, too, has only been willing to consider talks limited toward ceasefires or the release of hostages.

    Third, the status quo ante has been beneficial for the political right in Israel, in the sense that having Hamas in Gaza absolves Israel of having to negotiate with the moderate Fatah over division of the West Bank. So long as a terrorist organization exists on its borders these governments have argued that a peace process is impossible, and no Palestinian state is viable.

    There are reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself has been clear about this strategy. He has been quoted as saying in 2019 that anyone who opposes a Palestinian state should strengthen Hamas at the expense of Fatah. A manager who is most skilled at maintaining the status quo rather than a visionary or statesman who can make bold moves toward peace, Netanyahu is not likely to disrupt a system that has allowed him to avoid making concessions in a peace process. A militarized response that degrades Hamas’ capabilities is a way for him to claim that he has taken action against the organization without addressing concessions on statehood that Netanyahu is clearly unwilling to deliver. The price of Hamas terrorism is one he has been willing to pay.

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    If the scale and brutality of Hamas’ attack this time has convinced Israel that the status quo ante really is untenable, Hamas would have to be militarily defeated. But doing so would be extraordinarily difficult — which is the fourth reason change is unlikely.

    Israel’s primary responses to previous Hamas attacks have been the use of air power. But air strikes alone are not enough to eliminate the organization. Even if Israel could demolish all of the above-ground structures that Hamas could use, the organization still has its network of tunnels beneath Gaza that it could use as a base of operations to launch a prolonged guerilla war.

    The only sure way to defeat Hamas is through a sustained ground invasion and long-term occupation. This would require the Israel Defense Forces to move slowly and methodically through both open spaces and urban areas to capture or kill Hamas fighters and leaders. This will put Israeli lives at risk — a risk that Netanyahu has tended to avoid — and lead to more Palestinian casualties, both civilians and militants. The longer such an operation continued, the more likely Israel would be subject to increasingly heavy international pressure to end the operation, probably before the military objective is met.

    Fifth, defeating Hamas on the battlefield would be inadequate to change the status quo because the conditions that have strengthened it over the years would remain in place. Studies of past counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns all stress the importance of long-term planning regarding the post-war settlement.

    It does not appear that Israel has a plan for stabilizing and governing Gaza after the war. Neither the Israeli public nor Israeli leaders have any appetite for administering a territory so damaged from years of war and blockade.

    A possible alternative is a coalition of actors including some combination of Arab states, Fatah, some European states, the Arab League and the United Nations. But the taint of colonialism would probably stick to the endeavor. Palestinians are also unlikely to view this as anything other than demeaning.

    Perhaps the best alternative is a multi-stage process, each phase building on the previous one. The first stage would be Israel convincing Hamas that its destruction really is imminent unless it is willing to engage in a political process, by a relentless military campaign that targets Hamas in Gaza and a diplomatic initiative to convince the international community to undercut Hamas’ finances and to stop hosting Hamas leaders.

    Such a process would require that the Israeli government reduce its commitment to expanding settlements in the West Bank and stop allowing right-wing Jews to march toward the Dome of the Rock, one of the holiest Islamic sites that sits atop the Western Wall, one of the holiest places for Jews. It would also require that Israel remove the blockade on Gaza. All of these policies convince Palestinians that Israel has no interest in peace. The removal of the blockade could be done piecemeal, in tandem with or in response to steps taken by Hamas to end its commitment to violence and improve governance of Gaza.

    Despite a few calls for such a process among Israelis and Palestinians, doing so in the immediate aftermath of Hamas’ murderous violations and the ongoing deaths of thousands in Israel’s bombing campaign does not seem possible. But ultimately, the sheer number of deaths since Oct. 7 might finally be enough to make leaders and the public on both sides accept both the need and the hope for change — if everyone involved understands the deeper causes that have actually hobbled past attempts at peace.

    •This article was first published in www.politico.com with the headline ‘Israel-Gaza Conflicts End Up the Same. Here’s How This Could Be Different’

  • Investors monitoring devt as oil price slips over Israel-Gaza face off

    Investors monitoring devt as oil price slips over Israel-Gaza face off

    Oil price slipped yesterday on the heels of the ongoing Israel-Gaza crises, raising concerns that Nigeria’s revenue potentials or targets may be threatened. Although Israel and Palestine are not major oil producers, but the recent global oil price fluctuations are indications of what may likely happen if urgent steps are not taken to stem the crises.

    The fluctuation in the oil market, experts argued, is a double edged sword for the country. They argued that while an increase in global crude oil prices could be of benefit to the country, on the flip side, it will take a toll on the pump price of petrol in the domestic market considering that Nigeria depends on imports of the product to meet local fuel needs.

    On Monday, Reuters reports that oil prices slipped as diplomatic efforts in the Middle East intensified in an attempt to contain the conflict between Israel and Hamas, easing investor concerns about potential supply disruptions. Brent crude futures were down 41 cents, or 0.4 percent, at $91.75 a barrel; West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude futures were down 70 cents, or 0.8 percent, at $87.38 a barrel. “The imminent risk to supply seems to have gone down,” said Phil Flynn, analyst at Price Futures Group.”

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    “People are paring back positions until they see how this plays out.” Still, Israel continued its bombardment of Gaza on Monday after launching air strikes over southern Lebanon overnight. Both oil benchmarks notched week-on-week gains for the last two weeks, on the possibility of supply disruption in the Middle East — the world’s biggest oil-supplying region — if the conflict were to spread. “Escalating wrath in the region will strengthen economic headwinds, potentially rising oil prices will push global inflation higher, monetary tightening could resume, and global oil demand growth will be dented,” said PVM analyst Tamas Varga.

    Elsewhere, U.S. President Joe Biden last week announced the suspension of sanctions on OPEC member Venezuela, after a Venezuelan government deal with the opposition. That could bring exports back to the market, but the extent to which this could mitigate the impact of supply risks in the Middle East is unclear. “The move is expected to add 200-300,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan crude to the global export market, which isn’t necessarily a market-moving event on its own, nor are those barrels expected imminently,” RBC analyst Michael Tran said in a note.