Emergency must be made to work because it is the ultimate action in the terror war
If the declaration of emergency in three states is President Jonathan’s end-game, will it be the end of the mayhem in the north?
In a poignant irony that bespoke defiance, signalling that the latest presidential move against terror may not automatically guarantee victory, Rev. Faye Pama Musa, Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Borno State, was murdered in his Maiduguri home by gunmen suspected to belong to Boko Haram, the Islamist terror militia on the rampage in the northern part of the country. Faye, the head pastor of a Pentecostal church in Maiduguri, the state capital, was reportedly shot at close range by two assailants at about 7.30pm.
Remarkably, only 15 minutes earlier, President Goodluck Jonathan, in a nation-wide broadcast, had declared a state of emergency in three Northeast states, including Borno, which had been under a mindless reign of terror and senseless killings by Boko Haram insurgents. The two other states under focus are Yobe and Adamawa.
Emergency rule, in an official sense, had always been a rational possibility in the beleaguered states which continued to experience escalated violence against the people by a rebellious group bent on enthroning sharia, an impossible mission in a country founded on secularism. In effect, therefore, there was already an environment of virtual emergency in these states before the presidential intervention of May 14. Consequently, Jonathan’s imposition of emergency rule has merely acknowledged the mind-boggling scale of the crisis and further stamped governmental visibility on the process of a resolution, wisdom that perhaps should have been demonstrated much earlier.
In his business-like 15-minute address to the nation, Jonathan captured the sheer grotesqueness of the challenge facing his administration in the context of the terror war. He said: “Already, some northern parts of Borno State have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies. These terrorists and insurgents seem determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation and to progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. In many places, they have destroyed the Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority and in their place, hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty.”
He built up his argument for the necessity for a different approach to resolving the urgent situation, saying, “They have attacked government buildings and facilities. They have murdered innocent citizens and state officials. They have set houses ablaze, and taken women and children as hostages. These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten her territorial integrity. As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this.”
Potent words, but, sadly, they betray impotence. Correct logic, but that is inadequate. There is a simple question for Mr. President, beyond his understandably sentimentalised premises. How and why did things degenerate so dangerously? It is inexcusable that the government was a passive spectator as the adversarial contempt worsened. The two-year-old Jonathan presidency seems to have just experienced an awakening; and it would likely have a tough time tackling such a whammy, which it allowed to get out of hand before introducing the emergency.
Even for an administration that seems to have come to terms with the gravity of the challenge, there is a strong element of pussyfooting in its reaction, which is perhaps understandable in the context of political balancing. Did Jonathan take into consideration the fact that two of the affected states, Borno and Yobe, are governed by an opposition party, All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), and, therefore, mellowed in order to escape the charge of victimisation? In other words, was there an opportunistic angle to the development?
This is a real possibility because the declared state of emergency is respectful of democratic institutions, allowing the continuance of elected executive and legislative structures. It is pertinent to note that this apparent restraint is in contrast to previous examples in the country. In the past, although triggered by different circumstances, the imposition of emergency rule in parts of the country had been accompanied by the suspension of democratic structures, namely, in the defunct Western Region in the 60’s; in Plateau State in 2004; and in Ekiti State in 2006.
His explanation of how the emergency will operate is reassuring for its emphasis on self-discipline in connection with the conduct of the enforcers. It is hoped that his cautionary words will be taken seriously and adhered to by the troops that will be responsible for quelling the terrorists and normalising the abnormality. According to Jonathan, “The troops and other security agencies have orders to take all necessary action, within the ambit of their rules of engagement, to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists. He added: “This will include the authority to arrest and detain suspects, the taking of any building or structure used for terrorist purposes, the lock-down of any area of terrorist operation, the conduct of searches, and the apprehension of persons in illegal possession of weapons.”
It is important to highlight the fact that intelligence gathering will be critical to the success of the campaign. Ironically, the sore apparently festered for lack of effective intelligence. Undeniably, the failure of intelligence that has so far characterised the terror war cannot be divorced from citizen cynicism and a regrettable disconnect between the government and the people. The enforcers of the emergency will need to win the confidence and trust of the populace in the affected areas; this is a sine qua non for success. First, confidence works. Intelligence follows; and, ultimately, force. We have flipped the cards. We still need the three in that order.
The government’s resort to this show of muscle, obviously, has implications for its earlier consideration of amnesty for the terror champions. With the resurgence of violence in the Niger Delta, the pardon approach has been exposed for its policy and moral inadequacies. It suggests that the government has realised the futility of the forgiveness-approach. However, it is unlikely that the employment of force, though seemingly necessary, will be sufficient in attaining the desired peace. Even while the emergency lasts, the authorities will need to engage in lateral thinking that will accommodate complementary solutions to the problem.
We cannot escape the point that Boko Haram rampage derives from the failure of government at all levels. Ironically, the rage and devastations of the group have immiserated the people further and crippled the capacity for meaningful governance. That explains the need for this effort to work, or else we shall be at a vulnerable place as a people.
This shows that we must address the structure of this country in a sovereign sense in order to frame the terms of engagements among the various peoples. Otherwise, this sort of ferment of discontent will serially inflame the land.
Although the crisis in the affected states demands urgent action, this should not distract the government from the picture of general insecurity across the country. It is a disturbing fact that the country is at an all-time low in terms of security, and the people are nonplussed. The government cannot afford to alienate the people, and must not only address the terror war but also the various manifestations of insecurity across the land.
It remains to be seen how the terrorists will react to the introduction of greater force. The possibility that they might relocate to surrounding states in the area is a major reason the government must not concentrate on the affected states to the detriment of the larger society. The authorities must not only ensure the shrinking of their operational space but must also decisively cripple their activities.
Evidently, this is Jonathan’s last card, and he cannot afford to fail. For, emergency rule is the ultimate; and it is difficult to imagine what next. In his address, he spoke of “a return to normalcy within the shortest possible time.” Nigerians are waiting and watching.
