The three regional structure left behind by the British satisfied the yearnings of the majority nationalities to the detriment of the non-majority nationalities. But the satisfaction of the majority aspirations was only to the extent that the structure kept the majority nationalities intact. The agitation for more states by the minority groups did not show any fidelity to any coherent state-creation philosophy.
The agitation for minority states were grouped around a) the Middle Belt State, b) the Calabar-Ogoja-River state, and c) the Mid-West state. None of these proposed states had any internal coherence. A more illustrative definition would be to call the proposed Middle-Belt state, a non-Fulani/Hausa state, the proposed Mid-West state, a non-Yoruba state, and the proposedCalabar-Ogoja-Rivers State, a non-Ibo state. In fact the foundation for the agitation for these proposed states was precisely a negation for the justification for the creation of states. This conundrum continues to plague the agitation for the creation of more states today.
When the Mid-West region was created in 1964, after excision from the old Western Region, the new Western Region became the model ofa mono-nationality state thus satisfying the theoretical model of a nationality-driven federalism.
This did not last. When Gowon created twelve states in 1967, it turned out to be another example of a mishmash of federalism. Only the Ibo nationality was grouped together into one state. The Hausa/Fulani was divided into three states namely, Kano, North-Central and North-Western states; the Northern minorities were grouped into two states, namely Kwara, and Benue-Plateau states, the Southern minorities were grouped into three states, namely the Rivers, South-Eastern and Mid-Western states; while the Yoruba nationality was divided into Lagos and Western States.
In other words, and this is very important, major exercises in state creation, in the post-independence period did not follow the nationality-driven agitation for state creation. Gowon’s states suffered further mutation in 1976, when further states were created. Two issues were thrown up by this exercise. Two major nationalities, the Ibo and the Yoruba were further fragmented into several states.
The Ibo was split into Anambra and Imo states while the Yoruba was split into Ogun, Ondo and Oyo states in addition to the existing Lagos state. The other issue was that an attempt was made to use the nationality factor to address the minority nationalities. The Benue-Plateau state was broken into Benue and Plateau states; the North-Eastern state was divided into Bauchi, Borno and Gongola states;and Niger state was created out of Sokoto.
The point which I wish to make has been made. There was no consistent application of any coherent principle in the various state creation exercise. Every exercise in state creation created new minority groupings while satisfying the aspiration of some. Looking at the nationality configuration of Nigeria, it was an error of political judgement to have propounded a theory of federalism based on the nationality factor. But let me add here that even Chief Awolowo in his proposed 18 state structure for Nigeria ended up modifying his concept in the sense that seven (7) of the eighteen states he advocated ended up being classified by him as “mixed language states”.
What in fact we seem to have done in Nigeria is adopt the German model of federalism without being explicit about it. Article 29 of the German constitution laid it down that no single state will be more than 30% of the population or territory of the nation and that “the division of the federal territory into [state] may be revised to ensure that each [state] be of a size and capacity to perform its functions effectively.” In breaking the Fulani/Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba nationalities into fragmented states, Nigeria sought to address the mischief of the instability of the first Republic and the civil war where it was felt that it was the size of the regions that contributed to the instability and the ensuing civil war.
However by giving the impression that creation of state is driven by the agitation for recognition of nationality identity, long after it had been repudiated, various Nigerian governments, whether civilian or military, for cheap popularity had embarked on state creation exercises, and thereby fuel the agitation for the creation of more states.
The paradox of the whole exercise is that each new state which satisfies the aspiration of a nationality creates new minorities which breeds new agitations. The political atmosphere and intra-personal relations are further poisoned by the language of propaganda employed to justify the agitation for new states. The language of propaganda usually centresaround allegation of persecution of the nationality making the allegation.
They usually allege that members of the nationality are denied employment and promotion opportunities, and that development projects are not cited in their areas. These allegations usually breed antagonism and the successful cases are usually accompanied by expulsion of nationals of the nationality from the public service of the state from which the new state is being carved out.
The division of existing state assets between the old and the new state is usually acrimonious.
The crux of the matter is to what extent can Nigeria continue down the path of state creation. Is there a maximum number of states that Nigeria can be divided into internally? Going down the historical path of state creation in Nigeria, the answer would have to be, NO, as a) the issue of economic viability had never been an evaluatory factor especially after 1967 when fiscal federalism was abandoned as a revenue distributable principle in Nigeria, and b) Nigerians have the capacity to split an atom beyond the capability of physics and physicists.
Nigerian tendency to adapt and reduce everything to its level of absurdity has led to an unending agitation for state creation.
What this calls for is a sophisticated application of the doctrine of federalism, an approach which Nigeria has not shown an affinity for so far. The mantra in Nigerian public discourse of federalism is the phrase “TRUE FEDERALISM”.
The pertinent question really is: Is there any such political animal as “TRUE FEDERALISM”?
Earlier in this paper, I have identified three types of federalism, namely Separate (split or compact) federalism, interlocking (or cooperative) federalism and asymmetric federalism. But the types of federalism are more than these.
There is also “bi-federalism” which is a variant ofthe asymmetrical federalism where in addition to federal, state and local governments, other nationalities are conferred with the powers and structure of governance. For example, in the United States, American Indians have been allowed to establish Native American governments with limited sovereign powers.
Then there is a Brazilian innovation to federalism where “municipalities are treated as federal entities … invested with some of the traditional powers usually granted to states in federalism”.
Then there is what is called a two-sided federalism which as is obvious from the term is a federation made up of only two parts. Examples are the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czechoslovakia made up of the Czech Republic and Slovakia until the dissolution in 1993, Cyprus made up of the union of Greeks and Turks before the invasion of the island by the Turkish army, the United Republic of Tanazania made up of the union of Tangayika and Zanzibar, and Iraq which in 2005 granted federal status to the Kurdistan region.
Then there is “intra-state federalism” which is characterized by governments of component states being represented in federal political institutions. For example, this is the German experiment where the state governments appoint their members to represent them in the Senate.
This should be distinguished from the pre-1966 Nigerian experiment where even though the regions appointed the Senators to represent them, they were not appointed as members of the regional governments.
What then should we regard as True Federalism? In Nigeria, it has become a mantra that is preventing us from adopting an ingenious adaptation of the elements of federalism to the realities of the Nigerian political situation.
This is not to deny that federalism should have some common characteristics such as propounded by the principle of subsidiarity. An analysis of the Federal Governments of the United States, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and India may raise the issue whether that includes a limited central government given the complexities of globalization.
Nationality-driven federalism was the vogue in the pre-1966 period but this was highly adulterated by the non-application of the principle to the so-called minorities. From then on, the overriding principle has been to override the doctrine of nationality-driven federalism, in favour of the principle that no one nationality will be grouped into one state, where that state will be large enough to threaten national unity.
This explains the fragmentation of the Fulani-Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo into several states. Even if the nationality-driven federalism had been adopted in Nigeria, it could only have been applicable to the big three or big four (if one accepts the Ijaw claim of being a big nationality), it could not have applied to the remaining 260 nationalities.
Confronted with the fact that the unending state creation exercise has just fuelled the agitation for more states, and the whole exercise is becoming an exercise in absurdity, another variety of federalism has crept into Nigerian contribution to the doctrine of federalism, and that is zonal federalism. The proposal to divide Nigeria into six zones was proposed at the 1995 Constitutional Conference and adopted. However, it did not find its way into the 1999 Constitution.
The proposal for the adoption of Zonal Federalism will lead to the same skewed Federalism which we inherited at Independence. It will address the concerns of the majorities as the North-West zone will cater for the Hausa/Fulani, the North-East will cater presumably for the Kanuri, the South-East for the Ibo and the South-West for the Yoruba.
Whose interests will the North-Central and South-South zones represent?Under the circumstances, the only accurate description of the North-Central Zone is non-Fulani, and the only accurate description of the South-South is non-Ibo and non-Yoruba. In other words, we know what they are not and not what they are. Just as was the case in 1960-1966, Zonal Federalism will totally ignore the aspirations of the minorities.
I will not, in this lecture, take up the issue of the legitimacy of that Constitutional Conference on the grounds that it was boycotted by the mainstream of the proposed Western zone. The issue of legitimacy has been raised in terms of the military midwifing the 1999 constitution.
The late Chief Rotimi Williams, SAN, put it pithily when he said that the 1999 Constitution told a lie about itself when it said “We the People….” Whereas it should have been “we the military….” True enough. But on the same grounds, every constitution since 1979 has told a lie about itself.
But there is a more fundamental basis for raising the issue of legitimacy. The 1960 Independence Constitution was the only Constitution that was freely negotiated and represented the consensus among the leaders of the Nigerian nationalities. It was not the product of one conference but a product of several conferences lasting about ten years. As already pointed out, it was not a perfect constitution partly because it was not fair to the minority nationalities. But it was based on a consensus freely agreed to. All constitutions since then have reflected the wishes of the governments in power and to that extent, they are illegitimate.
Constitution making is different from the process of constitutional amendment. A cursory look at most constitutions, especially Federal constitutions, will show that conference decisions which brought them into being often require unanimity.
The struggle for state creation is driven by what I would call identity federalism: a cry by a group for its identity to be recognized. The antagonism that accompanies the agitation is because to make a compelling case, the group desiring the recognition has to employ identity-differentiation politics.
The crux of the issue is this: Should the demand for identity recognition need to result in state creation? A utilitarian appraisal of federalism in fact recognizes the richness of its flexibility while not detracting from its raison-d’etre: the need for a bonding of disparate communities for the common good.
A good illustration is the constitution of the German Federal Republic which recognizes three different types of states. Bavaria, Saxony, and Thuringia are called “Free-state” (Freistaat); Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen are called “City-states” (Stadstaaten)”, while the remaining thirteen states are called “area states” (Flachenlander).
This German example suggests a possible way forward for the Nigerian project. A cry for identity recognition will not be satisfied by the creation of a Local Government. The term “Local Government” does not have the same gravistas or panache needed to satisfy or uplift.
We can toy with such terms as “canton”, “city-state”, “local-state”, “Ogoni state”, “Jugun state” or whatever other coinage we can come up with.Each will be headed by a High-Commissioner and each will have full autonomy over local issues, such as primary and secondary schools, local roads, local hospitals and such issues as will pass the test of subsidiarity. It will have its own direct allocation from the Federation account and all of these will be guaranteed by the Constitution.
For this to work, however, we will need to revisit the revenue allocation formula to enshrine the principle of revenue derivation. The Constitution can create a development fund to which all states will have access so that no state will fall below a development safety net.
Before ending this lecture, let me dwell on two more issues that are in the centre of the debate about Nigerian federalism. The first is the issue of State Police. Three arguments have been adduced in favourof this proposal. The first is that it is in tandem with the doctrine of federalism.
The second is that this was our practice up to 1966. The third is that it is a more effective way of policing as the members of the police would be drawn from the local community. These are cogent reasons but they are controvertible. The first argument that it is in tandem with federalism has already been addressed when I dealt with the issue that there is nothing like TRUE FEDERALISM. Canada, a federation, does not have state police.
Nigeria has to adopt a federalism that is in tandem with its political and cultural realities. During the first Republic, the Native Authority Police was used to suppress and oppress opposition leaders. Their rallies were broken up, they were hauled into prison and some were murdered. Have we learnt any lesson from the past? Are our political leaders more tolerant now than the pre-1966 political leaders? The answer lies in this empirical fact.
When INEC conducts an election in a state, the margin of victory is acceptably narrow. When SIEC conducts elections in the same state, the governing party usually wins with a margin of 90%-100%. Present day political leaders especially at the state level have a high intolerance and vicious level, that there are many elite refugees in Abuja and Lagos having been driven out of town by their governors. If they could do this without state police, then you can imagine what they would do with a state police under their control.
For the avoidance of doubt, let me also say that I am opposed to the alternative proposal being flouted by the Northern Governors Forum that Governors should be allowed to issue instructions to the Commissioners of Police and that these instructions should be obeyed.
That is like a State Police through the back door, with the Federal Government picking up the bills. A good compromise is a constitutional amendment that calls for the personnel and officers of the Nigerian Police based in a state to be drawn from the inhabitants of that state but they will still operate as members of a unified Nigerian Police Force.
The last issue is that of Resource Control. From unification in 1914 to 1967, Nigeria operated a revenue derivation policy which allowed the regions to keep the proceeds of economic activities in their regions. This was the formula freely negotiated and agreed to by Nigerian leaders.
The fact that the formula was changed to enable Nigeria to fight a civil war did not mean that the formula should not have reverted to the pre-civil war formula once that war was over. Anyone who has visited the Niger Delta area, who has seen the devastation in the area and who witnesses the continuing health hazards to which the people there are subjected, will not begrudge them resource control.
It is immoral to continue to oppose a revenue distribution formula based on the derivation formula.
I have come to the end of this lecture and yet I feel there is something still needing to be addressed.
This nation is lost and drifting. And we the elite are to blame. In every nation in the world, it is the elite who work out a grand vision and develop a grand consensus around that vision to propel the nation forward. It is the elite that constitutes the engine of change.
In Nigeria, gross ethnicism has destroyed each and every attempt by the Nigerian elite to produce a consensus to drive the nation forward. I am not talking about a consensus to loot. That consensus is already there.
I am not talking about a consensus to oppress the poor, the widow and orphans. That consensus is already there. It has to be a consensus on building a
nation where the poor, the widows, orphans and the oppressed will be protected. The consensus must be on how to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor.
The consensus should be on how to grow and distribute the common wealth such that no group is favoured, none discriminated against and all develop a sense of belonging. A consensus based on equity. A nation where one zone occupies the no. 1 post, another zone occupies the nos. 2 & 4 posts, another zone occupies no 3 post, another zone occupies nos 5 & 6 and Secretary to Government posts, but two other zones have no posts is not an equitable nation.
In his Sallah message, the Governor of Jigawa State, SuleLamido, said “Oppression and injustice and wickedness are responsible for the current crisis in the country. We should seek forgiveness from God and mend our ways so that things change for the better…”
Here are the words of the last stanza of the 1960 national anthem which we jettisoned:O God of all creation,Grant this our one request,Help us to build a nation Where no man is oppressed,And so with peace and plenty Nigeria may be blessed.
Data from the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) facilities and the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), show that the Federal Government will exceed power generation capacity of 7,000 megawatts (MW) by end of the year.