By Abdulrasheed Sado
Since the dawn of the nuclear age with the discovery of nuclear fission and the subsequent development of the atomic bomb under J. Robert Oppenheimer, humanity has grappled with a weapon capable of unprecedented devastation. While nuclear weapons have only been used twice in war, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, their proliferation during the Cold War and persistence today continue to pose an existential threat to civilization.
The fundamental question arises: what is to be gained from a world that could be destroyed by the power of the atom? The arguments for a world free of nuclear weapons are compelling and multifaceted.
The primary and most terrifying argument against nuclear weapons is their unparalleled destructive capacity. A single modern nuclear warhead can instantly obliterate an entire city, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. A large-scale nuclear exchange could immediately kill tens of millions, with many more succumbing to fallout. Scientists warn that even a limited regional nuclear war involving a few dozen warheads could trigger firestorms that loft soot into the atmosphere, leading to a phenomenon known as “nuclear winter”. This scenario would cause global cooling and darkening, potentially collapsing global agriculture and leading to mass famine and the death of billions through starvation and societal collapse. Humanity’s survival currently hinges precariously on perpetual restraint and sheer good fortune.
The 21st-century security landscape has fundamentally altered the reassuring premises of Cold War nuclear deterrence. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which posited that no side would launch a nuclear attack knowing it would invite its own annihilation, relied on the assumption of rational actors. However, this assumption fails when confronted with the threat of nuclear terrorism. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed, this calculation “doesn’t operate in any comparable way” in a world of suicide bombers. Terrorist groups willing to sacrifice themselves cannot be deterred by the threat of retaliation, as George Shultz noted, they are “almost by definition not deterrable”. The continued existence of national nuclear arsenals significantly increases the risk that nuclear materials or warheads could be stolen, sold, or otherwise acquired by non-state actors.
The current global environment fosters nuclear proliferation; as long as some countries possess nuclear arsenals, others will feel compelled to obtain them. The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned a grand bargain where non-nuclear states would not acquire weapons, and the five recognized nuclear-weapon states (U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France) would pursue disarmament. However, decades later, disarmament by major powers has stalled, and many are modernizing their arsenals. Meanwhile, additional countries outside the NPT have developed nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and presumably Israel). This risks a “nuclear tipping point” where many more nations might rapidly go nuclear, sparking regional arms races and significantly increasing the likelihood of conflict.
The longer nuclear weapons exist, the higher the cumulative probability of their use not by intent, but by accident or error. History is “replete with close calls” where nuclear war was nearly triggered by mistakes, including technical glitches, false alarms, misunderstood signals, or rogue personnel. Incidents like the 1983 Soviet false alarm or the 1979 NORAD computer glitch illustrate how easily errors could lead to unintended launches. The danger is compounded by the “hair-trigger alert postures” nations maintain for deterrence, leaving little margin to distinguish a false alarm from a real attack.
Beyond practical security, there is a strong moral argument that nuclear weapons are “intrinsically unacceptable instruments of war”. These devices inflict mass, indiscriminate killing, often targeting civilians, and cause horrific long-term effects like radiation, genetic damage, and environmental ruin. Many ethicists and humanitarian organizations argue that weapons capable of annihilating cities violate fundamental principles of the laws of war: distinction and proportionality. The international community’s growing awareness of the humanitarian impact led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force in 2021. Signed by nearly 100 non-nuclear countries, it reflects a broad sentiment that “nuclear weapons have no place in the modern world”. As International Rescue Committee (IRC), asserted, “there is no such thing as responsible possession of nuclear weapons”.
Global equity and trust
The current system of nuclear possession is seen by non-nuclear states as a “double standard,” where some countries claim the right to possess these weapons indefinitely while denying them to others. This breeds resentment and erodes cooperation. The situation in the Middle East, where Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons outside the NPT while international efforts focus on preventing Iran (an NPT-signatory) from acquiring a weapons capability, highlights the need for global equity and trust. According to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, “the hypocrisy of the situation regarding nuclear weapons is completely unacceptable. Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has probably had its own nuclear weapons since the 1960s, even though it does not directly admit this. How can most politicians around the world, including in Finland, accept Israel’s nuclear weapons, yet encourage it and the United States to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program?”
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Addressing common counterarguments
Some argue that nuclear arsenals have prevented great-power conflicts, pointing objection to the absence of direct war between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. The fear is that removing deterrence would lead to conventional world wars.
While nuclear deterrence may have played a role, it came at a tremendous cost and risk. Near-apocalyptic events like the Cuban Missile Crisis show the world avoided nuclear war “despite them,” not because of them. Relying indefinitely on luck and rational restraint is extremely dangerous. Moreover, deterrence fails against irrational actors or with increasing proliferation. Conventional conflicts and proxy wars continued during the nuclear age, demonstrating that nukes did not “end war,” only made it infinitely more dangerous.
Skeptics argue that a ban could never be fully verified, allowing a determined actor to hide warheads or a secret program, achieving “nuclear blackmail power”.
While a “formidable verification challenge,” global nuclear disarmament is “not insurmountable”. The current non-proliferation regime, via the IAEA, already conducts rigorous inspections. An abolition treaty would expand these measures, including total surveillance of former weapons sites, continuous monitoring of fissile material, and intrusive inspections. Technical tools and verification protocols from past arms reduction treaties like START are advancing and could form a basis.
On the argument that we cannot uninvent nuclear weapons or erase the knowledge. Surely, the scientific know-how to build a nuclear weapon will always exist, and fissile materials will remain from civilian programs, leading some to argue that complete elimination is a mirage.
However, while the knowledge cannot be destroyed, stockpiles of weapons and production facilities can be eliminated. Securing and converting fissile materials to peaceful uses or placing them under international control would significantly raise the barriers to rearming. The goal is to make any rearmament effort difficult, time-consuming, and immediately apparent to the international community, allowing for intervention.
Finally, that nuclear disarmament could undermine national security or alliances.That nuclear-armed states and their allies worry about vulnerability if they give up their deterrent. Allies under a “nuclear umbrella” might fear emboldened adversaries.
Disarmament must be a cooperative, gradual, and reciprocal process with confidence-building at every step. No responsible leader would agree to unilateral disarmament. The process would be carefully phased, with robust verification providing assurance against cheating. For allies concerned about the loss of a nuclear umbrella, alternative security arrangements—such as bolstered conventional defense capabilities, missile defenses, and binding alliance commitments—would be strengthened.
The path forward
The arguments for eliminating all nuclear weapons “decisively outweigh the objections”. A nuclear-weapon-free world would remove the single greatest existential threat to humanity—the possibility of a civilization-ending nuclear war—and foster greater global trust and cooperation. While the challenges are significant, they are manageable through careful, collective action. As Cold War veterans in the documentary Nuclear Tipping Point emphasized, the choice is stark: eliminate these weapons or face eventual disaster. The current status quo of indefinite deterrence is not stable or wise; it is a temporary truce based on fear, susceptible to breakdown by miscalculation, technical failure, or malicious intent. If thousands of nuclear warheads persist, “it is less a question of if they will be used again, but when”.