Tag: Wahab Shittu

Being text of a paper delivered by law teacher and prosecutor Wahab Shittu at the Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption (PACAC) roundtable on July 24.

Tackling abuse of Stay of Proceedings in India

The case of OlisahMetuh v FRN is revolutionary for outlawing stay of proceedings in criminal trials and upholding the constitutionality of section 306 of ACJA, 2015.  We ought to commend the Supreme Court for the courageous decision and the controversy against the ruling is needless and groundless.

The concern that has arisen from the abuse of stay of proceedings to stall criminal trials may not have been peculiar to Nigeria. In India, the Supreme Court ruled that a stay of proceedings by an appellate court in any pending trial to either corruption or civil or criminal cases shall not operate for more than six months without a speaking order.  The justification as observed by the court is that the “cancer of corruption has eaten into the vitals of the state and needed to be nipped in the bud.”  Secondly, the other justification is that the power to stay the trial of proceedings has to be exercised with ‘restraint’ particularly in corruption cases. In further providing justification for the ruling and condemning the element of delay in the criminal trial process particularly as it relates to corruption, the Supreme Court of India observed as follows:

“It is well accepted that delay in a criminal trial, particularly in the Prevention of Corruption Act cases, has deleterious effect on the administration of justice in which the society has a vital interest.  Delay in trials affects the faith in Rule of Law and efficacy of the legal system.  It affects social welfare and development…Even in civil or tax cases it has been laid down that power to grant stay has to be exercised with restraint.  Mere prima facie case is not enough.  Party seeking stay must be put to terms and stay should not be incentive to delay. The order granting stay must show application of mind. The power to grant stay is coupled with accountability.”

Clearly from the foregoing the constitutional mandate of expeditious disposal of a trial should be respected.

The India template may have laid down the time limit for the stay of proceedings to six months but our Supreme Court in the Olisah Metuh v FRN did not impose any such time limit but ruled in favour of outright ban of stay of proceedings in criminal trials.

This is consistent with statutory provisions as enshrined under section 306 ACJA and section 40 of the EFCC Act.  This may also have arisen as a result of the fragrant abuse of stay of proceedings by counsel to stall the progress of criminal cases.

As Professor YemiAkinseye George puts it:

“Prior to Metuh, the Nigerian criminal justice system had literally become a failed system principally on account of its painful and pathetic inability to conclude High Profile Criminal Cases, particularly those involving politically-exposed persons (PEPs). Such cases dragged on interminably in the justice system…”

This is a major source of concern which the Supreme Court decision in OlisahMetuh v FRN sought to address frontally, and I dare say, courageously.

Summary of arguments

The impact of the revolutionary decision of the Supreme Court in OlisahMetuh v. FRN are far-reaching.

• The effect of the combined provisions of sections 306 of the ACJA, 2015 and 40 of the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act2004 is that no court has the power to stay proceedings in criminal trials.
• The effect of section 22 of the Supreme Court Act is limited to making an interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant and does not cover powers to order stay of proceedings in a criminal trial which are outlawed by sections 306 of the ACJA and 40 of the EFCC Act.
• Stay of proceedings in criminal trials is incompatible with the spirit and letters of section 36(4) of the Constitution which provides that ‘any person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to a fair hearing in public within a reasonable time’.
• The attitude of court as evidenced by the recent practice direction issued by respective heads of court is to fast track trials of cases involving corruption, economic and financial crimes, human trafficking, money laundering, rape, kidnapping and terrorism amongst others.
• Section 6(6)(b) of the constitution of FRN (as amended) does not confer specific powers on the Supreme Court to stay further proceedings in criminal trials.
• Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act cannot be invoked to stay proceedings in criminal trials as such exercise of powers is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court and by extension the Court of Appeal.
• Delay of criminal trial proceedings is dangerous to justice delivery system. When proceedings are stayed, trials of cases are delayed. In many cases vital witnesses may have died, evidence may have been tampered with etc. in the end, justice is defeated.
• The argument that the decision outlawing stay of proceedings in criminal trials infringes right of appeal of the defendant is not correct. There is a distinction between stay of proceedings and right of appeal. The defendant is at liberty to raise whatever issues he/she is aggrieved about during the trial process on appeal at the end of the case, which right of appeal is still constitutionally guaranteed to the defendant. Consequently, the fact that the defendant is not allowed to stay proceedings does not translate to the erroneous view that his right of appeal is no longer guaranteed. The point being made is that stay of proceedings is antithesis of speedy trial guaranteed by the constitution. If the constitution advocates speedy trial, why emphasize stay of proceedings at the expense of speedy trial process?
• Closely related to this argument is the fact that the decision outlawing stay of proceedings is not peculiar to criminal trials. It is also adopted in election petition proceedings and it has been assisting tremendously in delivering speedy trial process. If Counsel has no difficulty with compliance in election petition proceedings why should stay of proceedings in criminal trials be different?
• Rather than advocate for right to stay proceedings, the emphasis in my view, should be on advocacy for constitutional timeframe for concluding criminal trials. It is also important to monitor security and investigative agencies in delivering on quality investigation. In many instances, cases are lost on account of poor investigation.
• Significantly, we should enhance the quality of investigation outcomes. The first proposal that I wish to make is that no case should be taken to court without proper investigation no matter the extent of public outcry. Secondly, emphasis should be placed on investigation led arrests as opposed to arrest led investigations. Thirdly, arraignment of suspects in court should be based on verifiable, conclusive and supportable findings arising from diligent investigations. Fourthly, investigators must be available at all times to give evidence in proof of the outcomes of the investigations. Fifthly, investigators must carry out all necessary steps including obtaining all relevant evidential materials in support of investigations.  It is also important to guarantee the security and welfare of investigators including potential witnesses as well as sensitive documents in aid of the trial process.  More importantly, it is important that the investigation process is adequately monitored to forestall compromise and severe sanctions should apply in the event of breaches. The other element that should be guaranteed is the security of evidential materials recovered during investigations if possible ensuring that such materials do not fall into private hands who could be subject of attacks targeting of course the recovery of those documents. It is also important to constantly test the character, integrity and moral standards of investigators including ensuring availability of up to date training programmes for investigators. There should also be stiffer penalties available to officers who deliberately bungled investigations for pecuniary or other vested interests. My final take on this is to call for a code of ethics to be put in place for all categories of investigators as a policy framework
• There is urgent need to domesticate the ACJA across the states of the federation to ensure speedy justice delivery. Nigeria stands to benefit quick dispensation of justice and observance to human rights, if the provisions of administration of criminal justice act are domesticated and implemented in states across the country.
• Advocates of stay proceedings in criminal trials are quick to rely on the FRN v. Dr. Bukola Saraki where the Apex court granted stay of proceedings. Significantly, that case was distinguished by the Supreme Court in the Olisah Metuh v FRN’s case and the reasoning behind the distinction can hardly be faulted.

Significantly, the apex court’s decision in FRN v. Dr. Bukola Saraki’scase respectfully can be criticised in the light of the provision of section 306 of the ACJA and section 40 of the EFCC Act outlawing stay of proceedings in criminal trials.

The question may be raised whether one is permitted to criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in FRN v. Dr. Bukola Saraki? The right to criticise judgment of courts is part of the fundamental right of every citizen of freedom of expression in section 39 of the Constitution.  What is not allowed is any attempt to scandalise the court or raise allegation of impropriety or misconduct  without proof. Indeed, the Supreme  Court has always appreciated constructive criticism of its decision having regards to their finality and overall impact on the nation’s legal system. In Adegoke Motors v Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt 109) 250 at 274-275, the revered Chukwudifu Oputa JSC alluded to the finality of the decisions of the Supreme Court when he said that “we are final not because we are infallible, rather we are infallible because we are final. Justices of the Court are human beings capable of erring.  It will be shortsighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth.  It is also true that this court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions.  Similarly, the court incalculable harm through its mistakes.”

Late Justice Kayode Eso also acknowledged the right to criticise judgments of the Supreme  Court in the case of Adigun v Governor of Oyo State (No. 2) 2 NWLR (Pt.56) 197 at 214 – 215 when His Lordship held that

“the decision of the Supreme Court is final.  Final in the sense of real finality in so far as the particular case before it is concerned. It is final forever, except there is legislation to the contrary, and it has to be a legislation ad hominem”. In recognition of the enormous powers of the apex court, Justice Eso was of the view that “It is such dread powers that must necessitate great care in the caliber of the Court and such dread that must necessitate pungent and constructive analytical criticism of every judgment of the Court in the law Journals and similar fora.” In reaction to the view of some judges and lawyers that it is contemptuous to subject decisions of courts to criticism, Justice Eso stated that “the judgment of a court should not be treated with sacred sanctity, once it gets to the right critical forum”.

In the light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in OlisahMetuh v FRN, the case of FRN v. Dr. BukolaSaraki cannot be relied upon to stay proceedings in criminal trials.

The attitude of the court has been to discourage frivolous interlocutory appeals at the expense of the merits of substantive matters. Order 7 of the Court of Appeal Practice Directions 2013, provides that “the courts shall refuse to hear appeals arising from interlocutory decisions of the court below where the matter deals with any of the issues in 3 above and the court is of the opinion that the grounds raised in the appeal are such that can conveniently be determined by way of an appeal arising from the final judgment of the court below.” Instead of entertaining interlocutory appeals, the Court of Appeal may order the trial court “to accelerate hearing in the substantive suit.”

Order 10 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Practice Directions, 2013 is in parimateria with Order 7 of the Court of Appeal Practice Directions, 2013. It provides that the apex court “will only determine applications which cannot be taken with the substantive appeal.” For the avoidance of doubt, each Panel of the Supreme Court shall take all steps “to reduce the time spent on hearing and determination of interlocutory applications both at the trial court and appeal and in the process minimize avenues for parties to make use of interlocutory applications as a means to frustrate or delay the expeditious conduct of cases at the Courts below.”

It is clear from the foregoing, that both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal had, before the enactment of ACJA, adopted measures to discourage parties and their counsel from resorting to interlocutory appeals to frustrate the hearing and determination of cases of economic crimes and terrorism. Consequently, the abolition of stay of proceedings and interlocutory appeals cannot be said to be illegal and unconstitutional.

Conclusion

The legal reasoning and justification behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Olisah Metuh v FRN can hardly be faulted particularly because the decision cohered with existing principles and authorities mainly sections 306 of ACJA and section 40 of the EFCC Act respectively.  The second reason for the justification of the decision concerns the broader consequences of the decision for the administration of justice and the broad philosophy of speedy trial process.

The Supreme Court in the Olisah Metuh Vs FRN may have addressed the problem of delay caused by stay of proceedings and interlocutory appeals, but are these the only causes of delay in the trial process? In a recent report, the Justice Galadima-led Committee has identified the root causes of delay in criminal trials to include: Poor investigation, weak prosecution, lack of witnesses, poor funding and subversion of ethics by defence lawyers amongst others. We need to reflect on all of these if we are genuinely concerned about accelerating the pace of criminal trial proceedings.

As officers in the temple of justice, our preoccupation should be the attainment of justice at every opportunity and it is certainly not ethical and professional to deploy our legal training and expertise to defeat the ends of justice.

The other point that I need to make is that delay in trial proceedings is a stakeholders problem and nearly all involved in the criminal trial process are culpable – defence counsel, prosecution counsel, investigative agencies, the court system, and the blame is mainly attitudinal. The challenge is how do we legislate against negative attitude from the stakeholders? One other challenge is how to explore the advantage conferred by section 306 ACJA in reducing negative deployment of interlocutory appeals to stall the criminal trial process by counsel.

As law officers, we all have a duty to reverse this negative trend and the Supreme Court may have started the revolution by its decision in OlisahMetuh v FRN.

However, the impression must not be created that it is only defence counsel who frustrate trial court proceedings. We need to be honest with ourselves to recognise that prosecutorial agencies frustrate trial proceedings by needless delays to arraign suspects in court thereby leading to congestion of our prisons to the prejudice of defendants.  Moving forward, it is necessary to design a mechanism for checking these seeming excesses of the prosecution in the criminal trial process in line with best practices. In the UK for example where there has been a substantial delay in bringing a prosecution, the court may stay or halt further proceedings as an abuse of process. This may take care of the plight of awaiting trial inmates who are detained in our prisons without being brought to trial and also assist in decongestion of our prisons.  It is submitted that such awaiting trial inmates of our prisons could halt their trials on the ground of unjustifiable delay and likely prejudice to the trial process on account of that unreasonable delay. In such circumstances, the court will consider the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the right against delay was asserted by the defendant and whether there has been any prejudice to the defendant as enshrined under article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Right.  We may need to replicate similar provisions in our statute books to forestall irresponsible prosecution or abuse of prosecutorial powers.

My view is that following the UK example and the template of article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and reinforcing our constitutional provision prescribing trial of the defendant within a reasonable time, it is recommended that trial courts should have the jurisdiction to stay further proceedings where there has been a substantial delay in bringing a prosecution in circumstances clearly suggesting gross abuse of the process to the prejudice of the defendant.  This will be consistent with the philosophy of even-handed justice where justice is delivered not only in favour of the state, the victim but also the defendant. I so propose.

Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court in OlisahMetuh v FRN in outlawing stay of proceedings in criminal trials may have initiated a revolution for reform of our criminal justice system and as counsel we need to key ourselves into the revolutionary movement by being not just counsel of knowledge and professionalism but essentially, by being counsel of virtue with respect for values and high ethical standards.

• Shittu is EFCC External Prosecuting Counsel and Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of Lagos (UNILAG) & currently a Postgraduate (Ph.D.) Research Student as well as Principal Partner, W.K. Shittu & Co. (Legal Practitioners).

Being text of a paper delivered by law teacher and prosecutor Wahab Shittu at the Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption (PACAC) roundtable on July 24.

Decision promotes trials within a reasonable time

it is my further submission that the decision in FRN v Metuh actually strengthens constitutional safeguards dealing with criminal trial within a reasonable time.

In concluding the judgment, His Lordship, Hon. Justice Ogunbiyi observed as follows:

“The Appellant/applicant’s motion for stay of proceedings is violently in conflict with the provisions of section 36 (4) CFRN 1999 (as amended), section 306 ACJA, 2015 and section 40 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004 as well as the plethora of case law authorities cited.  The application is hereby refused and dismissed.”

Per M. D. Muhammad, JSC also stated @ 180:

“It is clearly not within the jurisdiction of the trial court to make the orders of stay of proceedings which application, following its refusal by both courts below, is further agitated at this court.”

The significance of the decision of the Supreme Court in OlisahMetuh v FRN lies not only in its revolutionary impact but more fundamentally on its jurisprudential reasoning and force of justification. The Supreme Court decision in OlisahMetuh v FRN apart from holding the legality of the Section 306 of ACJA and Section 40 of the EFCC Act prohibiting court from staying proceedings in a criminal trial also held that the provisions of both laws do not contravene the Constitution.

On the contrary, the court held that both provisions are in agreement with Section 36(4) of the constitution, which provides that any person charged with a criminal offence “shall be entitled to fair hearing in public within a reasonable time”. The court further held that it is only logical to interpret the spirit of the foregoing constitutional provision to translate that, where the grant of an application for stay will unnecessarily delay and prolong the proceedings, it should not be granted.

1. iv) Decision distinguishes Olisah Metuh v FRN from Bukola Saraki v FRN

The Supreme Court in distinguishing the Olisah Metuh v FRN’s case from the Supreme Court decision in BukolaSaraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) SC 531 held:

“This court (the Supreme Court) pronounced also in OlubukolaSaraki v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) SC 531 that the Code of Conduct Tribunal is not a court of superior record of jurisdiction, but a court of quasi-criminal jurisdiction.

“Therefore, the application of the cases to the circumstances of this case (Metuh’s case) cannot be relevant, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel to the first respondent (EFCC’s lawyer).”

1. v) Decision reaffirms that the Supreme Court lacks powers to stay proceedings in criminal trials

The court held that not even the Supreme Court has the power to stay proceedings in criminal trials thus:

“The conclusion, as stated earlier, is predicated squarely on the contention of Section 306 of ACJA and Section 40 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, whereby the trial court lacks the powers to order for stay of proceedings; also the court below under Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act as well as this court under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, also lacks the power to order for stay of further proceedings pending before the trial court.

“I wish to emphasize that this is a criminal proceeding. There are also clear constitutional and statutory provisions that enjoin and mandate the trial court not to delay criminal cases.”

1. vi) Decision complements recent practice directions issued by heads of courts

Notably, the decision in Olisah Metuh v FRN is designed to fast track the criminal trial process. Recent practice directions issued by respective heads of court in relation to matters involving corruption, economic and financial crimes, human trafficking, money laundering, rape, kidnapping and terrorism would seem to support the reasoning behind the Supreme Court decision in Olisah Metuh v FRN.

I refer specifically to Federal High Court (Criminal Trials) Practice Directions, 2013, Court of Appeal Practice Directions 2013 and Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Practice Directions, 2013 which are designed to achieve the objective of speedy criminal trial process – the essence being the elimination of delay and expeditious determination of criminal matters pending before the trial courts.

vii) Decision Links Section 306 of ACJA 2015 to Section 24(5) of the old English Judicature Act, 1873

The objective of speedy trial process was reemphasised by His Lordship Eko, JSC at 184 and 185 as follows:

“Section 306 of the ACJA, 2015 is fashioned in the manner or wording of Section 24(5) of the old English Judicature Act, 1873, that until 1988 was a statute of general application applicable in this country. Section 2495) of the Judicature Act, 1873 provided that “no cause or proceeding shall be restrained by injunction”. Jessel, M, E., commenting on this phrase in Artistic Colour Printing Co.” in Re L. R. 14 Ch. D, 502 at page 505 stated:

What does that mean? The court never did by injunction restrain a proceeding.  What it did was to restrain a party to the cause from going on.  Therefore, when the Act says “no cause or proceeding shall be restrained by injunction”, it means no party shall be restrained from going on ‘with his action.  This is what the Act means; otherwise) it would seem to imply that one branch of High Court had power to restrain another branch of High Court had power to restrain another branch”.

In Hart v Hart L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 0670, at pages 679 – 681, it was forthrightly stated that the Judicature Act did forbid an injunction to restrain a pending judicial proceeding.  Section 306 of the ACJA, 2015, like section 24(5) of the Judicature Act 1873, does forbid an injunction to stay further proceedings in pending criminal proceeding or trial.  In the Indian case APPU v. Raman I.L.R. 14 Mad. 425 the rationale of the object for the English enactment, which I think very true for the Nigerian Statute, was said to be “to do controlling proceedings in other courts”.  Contemporary Nigerian history shows the widespread abuse of injunctive remedies to stall trials of high profile offenders in the country being crippled by corruption. That is the mischief that section 306 ACJA, 2015 is addressing.

At common law, even the injunctions issued by the courts of Chancery in England for controlling proceedings in other suits are not orders issued to such other courts, but to the party being amenable to the jurisdiction of the court granting the injunction, and capable of being acted on by the process of contempt of court, and they are infact, orders in personam. Indian courts stated so in APPU v Raman (supra); VenkatesaTawker v. RamasamiChettair I. L. R. 18 Mad. 338 at 341.  Towing the same common law stance, this court in The Chief Registrar v Vamos (1976) 1 SC 33, had held that one superior court of record cannot issue an order of prohibition on another superior court of record.”

viii) Decision forestalls abuse of stay of proceedings and interlocutory appeals by counsel

The other justification for the decision in FRN v Metuh is its capacity to reduce the spate of abuse of stay of proceedings and interlocutory appeals.The guest speaker, Fidelis Oditah SAN, QC.at another forum lamented this development as follows:

“… the main instrument for the delay and stifling of criminal proceedings (and to a lesser extent civil proceedings) in Nigeria is the interlocutory appeal …”

It is in the sense of forestalling this abuse of interlocutory appeals that section 306 of the ACJA can better be appreciated.  This is because ‘section 306 has the potential to curb the misuse of interlocutory appeals to scuttle criminal trials…’

Professor YemiAkinseye George, SAN in a recent article titled ‘should the Supreme Court revisit its ruling in Metuh v FRN – A case review’ observed as follows:

“Section 306 is a pragmatic response to the embarrassing situation of interminable criminal trials foisted on the judiciary by a rapacious political class.  Most of the cases of abuse of interlocutory criminal appeals arose from cases involving high profile defendants with deep pockets.  They can afford to file as many interlocutory appeals as may be required to prevent the determination of the substance of the charges brought against them. The usual strategy is to couch the grounds of appeal as jurisdictional in nature with a view to forcing the trial court to give the appeal priority over the substantive matter before the court.  This is an abuse of the principle that a jurisdictional matter shall be given priority over other causes as they go to the root of the competence of the court. Unfortunately there are no clear guidelines for determining which objections are jurisdictional in nature. Virtually all the interlocutory criminal appeals were always couched as jurisdictional in nature or formulated as issues of law. An appellant is always at liberty to characterize his grounds of appeal as issues of law or of mixed law and facts…”

It is however not to suggest that delays in criminal trial process are occasioned by stay of proceedings and interlocutory appeals.  Poor investigation, weak prosecution, lack of witnesses, poor funding and wrong attitude of prosecution and defence lawyers are also fundamental factors.  These coupled with administrative, human, procedural and technical issues are also to be blamed for delays.

Decision Ensures speedy trials in spite of appeal on rulings on no-case submission

The impact of the Supreme Court decision in OlisahMetuh v FRN is indeed far-reaching.  It covers a situation where a trial court overrules a no-case submission who is then called upon to enter its defence.  In the event of the defendant filing an appeal against the ruling on no-case submission, such a defendant is not at liberty to stay proceedings on account of the appeal. In the Metuh’scase, the trial court overruled no case-submission.  The defendant filed an appeal and sought to stay proceedings before the trial court, the trial court refused the stay, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal which also refused to grant stay of proceedings.  A further appeal on stay of proceedings was unsuccessful. The implication is that the use of the mechanism of stay of proceeding to stall proceedings is no longer permissible.  This will have the effect of fast tracking the criminal trial process.

1. ix) Decision Strengthens fairhearing within a reasonable time guaranteed by Section 36(4) of the 1999 Constitution of FRN (as amended)

Secondly, the ruling will strengthen section 36(4) of the 1999 Constitution of FRN (as amended) which provide for fair hearing in public within a reasonable time for any person charged with a criminal offence. This delivers on speedy trial objective within the framework of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. This means that stay of proceedings can no longer be used to unnecessarily delay and prolong criminal trial proceedings.  The court also noted that applications for stay of proceedings are in conflict with section 36(4) of the Constitution and Section 40 of the EFCC Act and Section 306 of the ACJA 2015.

Kekere Ekun, JSC at page 181, paras. A-G: of the judgment held as follows:

“It is pertinent to observe that the new dispensation throughout the hierarchy of our courts, as evidenced by the recent Practice Directions issued by respective heads of court in relation to matters pertaining inter alia to corruption, economic and financial crimes, human trafficking, money laundering, rape, kidnapping and terrorism, is to fast track the hearing and determination of such matters, see: Federal High Court (Criminal Trials) Practice Directions, 2013, Court of Appeal Practice Direction 2013 and Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Practice Directions, 2013. The explanatory note to the Federal High Court (Criminal Appeals) Practice Directions States:

‘These Practice Directions establish a system of case management that will provide for the fair, impartial and expeditious administration of criminal cases arising out of cases listed in rule 2(1) of these Practice Directions and other related cases.’

Rule 2(1) provides:

‘This Practice Direction shall, save to the extent and as many otherwise be ordered by the honourable Chief Judge apply to all criminal cases, particularly those relating to Terrorism, Kidnapping, Trafficking in Person, Rape, Corruption and Money Laundering cases.’

The 2013 Practice Directions of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court respectively have the same objective.  This is not only in keeping with the constitutional requirement of a fair hearing within a reasonable time guaranteed to any person charged with a criminal offence, but also to forestall the frustration of criminal trials by mischievous defendants.”

1. x) Decision defines scope of Section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) on inherent powers of courts

The Supreme Court also took the view that section 306 of the ACJA 2015 does not derogate or impair the inherent powers vested in our courts under section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Specifically the court held on the point as follows:

“Section 6(6) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) does not confer specific powers on the Supreme Court to issue or grant an order or orders staying further proceedings in a criminal case.  This is so because the section only congers powers on courts to adjudicate matters between persons or between government or authority and to any persons in Nigeria with respect to their civil rights and obligations. (P. 176, paras. D-E).”

1. xi) Decision Reiterates thatSection 15 of the Court of Appeal Act cannot be invoked to Stay Proceedings in Criminal Trials

The Supreme Court also held that the powers of the Court of Appeal under section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act cannot be invoked to stay proceedings in criminal trials.  Specifically, the court held:

“The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, as provided for in section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, can be invoked only if the relief sought is that which comes within the jurisdiction of the trial court.  In other words, where the Court of Appeal acts in violation to the Act, the powers so exercised will be declared a nullity.”