A divided presidency

The Ibrahim Magu confirmation saga depicts a presidency in disarray, despite the clever attempts by some commentators to hang the Senate for what is clearly a presidential faux pas. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, as amended, clearly locates the locus of the federal executive powers in the President of the Federal Republic. Section 5(1) is unequivocal in vesting the executive powers of the federation on the President, which he is entitled to exercise either directly or through the Vice President and ministers of the government or other officers in the public service of the federation.
In constituting the office of the President, Section 130(2) invests the President as the head of state, the chief executive of the federation and commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the federation. In the exercise of his executive powers, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004, (EFCC Act) grants the President the power to appoint the chairman and members of the commission subject to the confirmation of the Senate. In furtherance of the same executive powers, the National Security Agencies Act, (NSA Act) which established the Department of State Security Services, as one of the three agencies under the act, also grants the President extensive powers in the appointment and control of officials of the agencies.
By virtue of Section 3(2) of the NSA Act, “the principal officers of the agencies shall in the discharge of their functions under this act (a) in the case of the state security services and the national intelligence agency be responsible directly to the president”. The clear vision of the drafters of this act is that Mr. President is empowered by the direct control of the SSS and the sister security agency, to be on top of all security matters, whether internal or external, affecting the country, and also to be in a position to receive first-hand information from the agencies about their findings and actions.
So how on earth could the SSS all by itself, make very damaging findings against Mr. President’s preferred nominee for the office of the chairman of an important agency like the EFCC, and choose to keep the President in the dark about such findings? Of course, this column does not encourage the President to interfere in the daily activities of the SSS or any of the security agencies, or put pressure on any of them to write favourable reports, but an agency which he oversees, and which as a matter of course reports to him, cannot harbour a contrary opinion to his, and not bring it to his earliest notice for evaluation.
Even more damaging would it be to the integrity of a synchronised presidency, if there are fifth columnists within the presidency that operate alternate executive power centres, with the capacity to undermine a clear and an unambiguous directive of Mr. President. If the President, as reported, after the first rejection of Ibrahim Magu, by the Senate, had ordered an investigation of the allegations against his nominee, and after a thorough effort, Magu was exonerated, then any further adverse report against that adopted by the President should call for a disciplinary action, unless the President was manifestly misled by those he trusted to investigate the allegations.
Head or tail, the President must assert his executive powers, otherwise, it becomes a presidency of anything goes; apologies to our old army of anything goes. The President cannot be right in appointing Mr. Magu, after a thorough scrutiny by officers of the state working at his behest, and at the same time, also wrong to the extent that he is nominating a man tainted, as alleged by SSS, which again is an agency acting on behalf of the President. That will be a classic case of approbating and re-approbating at the same time; for both the nomination and the letter of indictment are in fact and in law, his executive conducts.
The President cannot in one breath, through his nomination and re-nomination, tell the Senate that Mr. Magu is a fit and proper person for the office he is nominated for, and in another breath, through the letter from the SSS, which reports directly to him, tell the same Senate that his nominee is not fit for the high office, and expect the Senate to approve the nomination. With all due respect to the averments of many commentators arguing otherwise, if the Senate approves Mr. Magu despite the unambiguous letter from the SSS, then they can be accused of dereliction of duty. This is without prejudice to their individual misgivings against Mr. Magu.
I guess it is proper to state unequivocally that by his efforts so far, Mr. Magu has shown enough enthusiasm and competence in discharging the onerous and dangerous responsibility of fighting graft and corruption in our country. Indeed, Mr. President may actually be persuaded by the brave efforts of Mr. Magu in discharging his duties even in an acting capacity, to push for his confirmation. Mr. President may also be persuaded by media reports that some governors indicted for mismanaging the special grant from the Federal Government, and some senators indicted for corruption, may have conspired to bury his nominee for efficiently discharging his duties to their detriment.
While Mr. President has my sympathy, in the war against corruption, he takes the blame for giving the Senate the weapon with which to shoot down his nominee. If he feels that Mr Magu’s potential as an anti-corruption warrior far outweighs the allegations by the SSS, he has the prerogative to overrule the agency and direct it to withdraw its letter to the Senate, knowing that whether the war on corruption succeeds or fails, he bears the can. He is also entitled to ask another agency, as he reportedly did, to investigate the SSS report and make its findings official.
But he is not entitled to do nothing; or worse still, allow the agency to reiterate their indictment and expect that the public din will overwhelm the Senate or even precipitate a hurried approval of his nominee, as if the indictment by the SSS is inconsequential. Of note, Section 4 of the NSA Act provides for a coordinator to supervise the National Security Agencies, in the mould of the National Security Adviser. Unless for reasons not in the public domain, it is strange that the NSA is standing idly by, while the President is being ridiculed by those the NSA supervises.
For purposes of emphasis, the point of this intervention is to impress on the President to keep his executive house in order, so that Mr. Magu can be given the constitutional endorsement to go on with the war on corruption. If President Buhari is as wily as his brother Generals Olusegun Obasanjo and Ibrahim Babangida, one will be tempted to say that he is playing high-wire politics with the nomination of Ibrahim Magu as the substantive Chairman of the EFCC.