- By Felix Oladeji
The global conversation on climate change in Africa tends to be focused on physical risks. Climate models show that the continent is considered to be among the regions of the world that could be hardest hit by the changing climate. And with 600 million Africans still without energy access and 36 percent of the continent’s population living in extreme poverty, low levels of resilience and adaptation in many countries are likely to exacerbate the socio-economic impacts of climate change and make the continent’s pressing development imperative more challenging to achieve.
But what if this is only part of the picture?
The data landscape on emissions in Africa is relatively more fragmented and diverse than other regions. The detailed emissions data from multiple sources indicate the following emissions breakdown for the continent:
Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF): 2.2 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), about 40 percent of total; agriculture: 1.1 Gt CO2e, about 20 percent of total; industry: 0.8 Gt CO2e, about 15 percent of total; power: 0.5 Gt CO2e, about 10 percent of total; and transportation, waste, and buildings: 0.8 Gt CO2e, about 15 percent of total.
At a total of 5.4 Gt CO2e, these numbers suggest Africa currently contributes just under 10 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions—a somewhat higher share than often cited, as this includes non-energy emissions and all greenhouse gases. However, it is worth noting that at 4.5 t CO2e per annum, the average per capita emissions in Africa are much lower than the annual OECD average of 10.0 t CO2.
The sectoral mix on the continent is skewed more towards agriculture and LULUCF and less towards industry, power, and transportation compared to the typical emissions profile of a developed country. By comparison, over three quarters of European emissions come from industry, power, and transport. Because of its different emissions profile, the de-carbonization pathways of African countries will likely differ—in some respects significantly—from those of developed countries. The continent’s sectoral composition, which includes a high economic focus on basic materials production, rapid economic growth and urbanization rates, constrained government budgets and capabilities, and last but not least, the imperative of continued inclusive growth to advance living standards and health, will also affect its de-carbonization choices.
While generalizations are difficult, key differences in typical African de-carbonization journeys will likely include a strong focus on decentralized renewable power solutions alongside grid-scale renewables to enable universal energy access; some build-out of gas power capacity to provide near-term flexibility to balance renewables’ intermittency; and a greater emphasis on agriculture, land-use change, and cooking.
The scientific consensus is that global warming of 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels will be exceeded during the 21st century unless rapid and deep reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades. It is also clear that not all regions will be affected equally. Parts of Africa, for example, are warming faster than many other world regions, and there is a high probability that African countries will be among the most severely affected by intensifying climate hazards. At the same time, the continent’s levels of adaptation and resilience are among the world’s lowest. Around 80 percent of African countries have vulnerability scores in the lowest band, meaning that they are likely to be more sensitive to climate hazards and less able to adapt to or cope with climate change.
Moreover, low levels of insurance and savings in many African countries mean that recovery after a disaster typically takes much longer. This puts lives and livelihoods at risk on an unprecedented scale, threatens human health and wellbeing, and jeopardizes hard-won economic gains, which, in turn, could undermine societal stability.
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Furthermore, the deep structural changes now underway in the global economy as countries gear up to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050 are resulting in another set of economic risks for economies in Africa, commonly referred to as transition risks. The main concern is that a move towards de-carbonization globally could lead to a decrease in demand for fossil fuel exports and a prioritization of low-carbon-intensity production alongside cost by buyers of commodities, which could negatively affect the global competitiveness of African exports. As African economies are generally more dependent on commodity exports than most regions, this could have adverse consequences for employment and fiscal health. These risks are amplified by the generally more constrained monetary capacity of most African countries, which limits their ability to invest in structural countermeasures.
As a result of its high exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards, a third of the people considered most at risk in the world live in Africa. About 370 million people—roughly 30 percent of the total population of the continent—live in areas which are likely to experience high levels of climate hazards and to have high vulnerability. By contrast, 19 percent of the total population of Asia, four percent of Latin America, and two percent of Oceania are exposed to this combination.
An analysis by the McKinsey Climate Analytics team suggests that if the world sees a 2°C increase in average temperature by 2050, the number of Africans exposed to one or more physical hazards related to climate could almost double from approximately 460 million people today to more than 900million. This increase is partly due to rapid population growth (tempered by increasing urbanization), but the primary drivers are the broader geographic reach and increasing intensity of climate hazards, with 45 percent of the population likely to be exposed to at least one climate hazard by 2050 compared to 36 percent today. The top four physical hazards confronting Africa in a 2°C-by-2050 world are as follows: Heat stress: Upwards of 640 million Africans could be exposed to more days with high levels of heat and humidity; Agricultural droughts: About 175 million people in agricultural regions could experience an average of seven to eight droughts per decade, making it much harder for smallholder farmers to maintain a livelihood in rain-fed agriculture; Flooding: Nearly 130million more people could be exposed to severe riverine and/or coastal flooding driven by rising sea levels and intense rainfall events which could breach existing defences; and urban water stress: About 20 million more people living in urban areas could experience water stress, meaning that they may not have access to adequate water supplies for drinking, washing, and maintaining industrial operations. This situation is likely to be exacerbated by continued unplanned urbanization.
The direct economic impacts of these events could intensify the hardships.
Rising temperatures may reduce the amount of time it is possible to work outside by a quarter, cutting productivity, particularly for those employed in outdoor occupations, while increased droughts throughout the growing season could impact crop yields. External research suggests that staple crops such as rice and wheat could be hardest hit with possible yield losses of 12 percent and 21 percent respectively by 2050.
As things stand there is insufficient funding available to the continent either to adapt to the risks or capture the opportunities available. Initial steps may include setting up a cross-regional effort to overcome investment barriers, and engaging with donors to match climate finance pledges with concrete projects. Decarbonize the grid and commit to an energy transition plan to provide universal zero-carbon energy access. The steps may include drawing up an integrated plan for achieving universal energy access by 2030 and fully decarbonizing power production by 2040, and identifying key roadblocks and working with international development partners on removing them.
•Oladeji writes from Lagos.
