I believe that with political will and cooperation of the Northern elite, we can flush out these vermin in our blood in six months.
It is a choice, and not a difficult one. Bello Tunji and Dogo Gide are human beings. The bandits are not spirits. We only need to be spirited” –
Sam Omatseye in ‘The Maidens of Maga’, Monday, December 1, 2025.
“If Nigeria truly wants to break the cycle of insecurity, corruption in defence spending, weak intelligence coordination, and the embarrassing militarisation of internal policing, then the appointment of General Christopher Musa as Minister of Defence must come with a national agenda—clear, uncompromising, and measurable.
Nigeria is too security-fractured for business as usual.
We need a Defence Minister who will disrupt the old order, confront the rot, and rebuild trust between the armed forces and the citizens” –
culled from Idowu Oboro’s:
“If General Christopher Musa Becomes Minister of Defence: The Agenda Nigerians Must Demand”
Last week on these pages I wrote, quoting Chima – Oforgu
in his seminal work on terrorism in Nigeria: “Who is really paying for Nigeria’s bloodbath?
We talk endlessly about “terrorists”, “Fulani herdsmen”, “bandits” – as if they are ghosts who appear from thin air, armed to the teeth, fuelled, fed and endlessly re-supplied by magic.
They are not ghosts.
They are funded.
And the sponsors are not barefoot militants in the bush – they are people in suits, kaftans and uniforms; sitting in air-conditioned offices in Abuja, Lagos, Kaduna, Dubai and beyond”.
The Nigerian security situation has just been brutally captured in a trending WhatsApp post which, mutatis mutandis, reads as follows:
“Nigeria Is Being Taken Over slowly and in Silence.
This Is Not INSECURITY. It’s a CONQUEST.
Nigeria is currently undergoing a systematic territorial takeover by armed groups. This is not random criminality. It is not isolated insecurity. It is a coordinated expansion of hostile forces exercising real control over Nigerian territory determined, more than ever to turn Nigeria into a radical Islamic country.
In the North-West, bandit networks are displacing entire communities, imposing illegal taxation, controlling farmland, and forcing civilians to either flee or submit. In the North-East, jihadist factions including ISWAP are consolidating safe operating zones, enforcing parallel governance under the pretext of “Sulhu” or peace talks, and building logistical routes deeper into the country.
Both groups are advancing SOUTHWARD.
Their operations are no longer confined to the peripheries.
They are now penetrating Niger, Plateau, Benue, Kogi, and reaching the borders of the Federal Capital Territory.
This is a strategic progression:
Control the rural zones → dominate transportation corridors → threaten cities → challenge the state.
The indicators are clear:
1. Loss of state monopoly on violence in multiple LGAs.
2. Parallel administrations emerging in forest regions.
3. Mass abductions targeting schools and community leaders to cripple social confidence.
4. Strategic raids near Abuja to undermine national authority.
5. Southward infiltration toward economic population centers aimed at causing maximum socio- economic dislocation.
This is what territorial conquest looks like in the 21st century:
Not declarations of war, but the state slowly losing ground to non-state actors who act like governments.
Civil authority retreats.
Armed actors remain.
Communities adapt for survival”.
What to do
Terrorism in Nigeria is complex and multi – dimensional. It has led to devastating consequences, among them, loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, displacement of people, and monumental economic instability. One critical way of addressing insecurity in Nigeria is identifying, and tackling, the financial networks and individuals that sustain these terrorist groups.
One approach is the naming and shaming of terrorism sponsors, which can be a potent tool in curbing, in deed, defeating, terrorism since funding is terrorism’s live wire.
Terrorist organisations rely heavily on funding, both internal and external, to carry out their terrible operations.
These funds are often sourced from wealthy individuals, organizations or from even state actors who choose to support terrorist activities especially for religious purposes as we have here in Nigeria.
In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been known to receive funding from various sources, including local and international sponsors.
Naming and shaming involve publicly identifying individuals or organisations that support terrorist activities. This approach aims at isolating sponsors, disrupt their financial networks as well as deter others from providing similar support.
Its effectiveness will depend on several factors, including the accuracy of information, international cooperation, and the willingness of governments to take action.
On these pages last week, I proved conclusively, and beyond all reasonable doubt, that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu does not lack the political will to take important political decisions.
What then are the
potential benefits of publicly naming, and shaming, terrorism sponsors?
These include
deterrence, as doing so will naturally deter others from providing such support, fearing reputational damage as well as the legal consequences of being so publicly outed.
This will naturally reduce terrorism since funding, as I indicated earlier, is integral to their multi- pronged activities – be it weapons acquisition, training, kidnapping, killing etc
Another benefit is International cooperation which is of critical importance in successfully fighting terrorism, especially in the Sahel region and neighbouring countries with their porous borders where it is now obvious no country can single – handedly defeat terrorism.
International cooperation can also lead to sanctions such as asset seizures and, even arrests, across several countries, working in synergy.
There is also the additional advantage of domestic pressure.
As things stand today in Nigeria, there are clear evidence of some elements of state security working with terror sponsors, not only to facilitate attacks but, more importantly, to ensure that terrorists are protected from the long arms of the law.
Naming sponsors will galvanise public opinion and push government to take stringent actions against miscreants.
Of course, naming sponsors has its down side. It can lead to retaliation and can even put some lives at risk. Government should, however, be able to adequately protect whistle blowers as they will be providing intelligence against very powerful persons.
Government must also guide against inaccurate evidence which can lead to wrongful accusations thus damaging innocent individuals or organisations.
To effectively do this, the policy should depend mostly on:
Intelligence-led operations in disrupting terrorist networks. There must also be international collaboration with global partners to share information and coordinate efforts.
There must be proactive
community engagement to encourage reporting of suspicious activities.
Highest importance must, however, go to information sourced through financial intelligence – bank records, transfers, suspicious transaction reports etc.
There is equally the very important role of the National Assembly which must waste no time in providing an appropriate legal frame work for the policy.
Several countries have successfully implemented naming and shaming strategies to combat terrorism financing. For instance, the United States’ Terrorist Financing Targeting Center has been instrumental in identifying and sanctioning individuals and organizations supporting terrorist groups.
Concluding, I am not in any way, suggesting naming and shaming of terrorism sponsors as a monocausal solution to what we are seeing increasing in leaps and bounds in our country.
On the contrary, it should be part of a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of terrorism.
By adopting a multifaceted approach, Nigeria can effectively tackle both the individuals, as well as the financial networks supporting terrorism in Nigeria and thus be able to create a safer environment for us all.
