The collapse of true federalism in Nigeria has its root in the military incursion into politics on January 15, 1966. Group Political Editor EMMANUEL OLADESU revisits the fall of the first legitimate government and the crisis of nation-building the military coup unleashed on the polity.
It was a day of confusion in Lagos, the former Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The city was enveloped in panic. Many civil servants on their way to work in the morning turned back. Markets closed abruptly, almost at sunrise. Around Ikoyi and Obalende, which was a stone throw from the State House, people ran helter sketer. Political, economic and social activities were instantly paralysed.
Ministers were woken up by gunshots from aggrieved soldiers. Some of them were alerted to the danger earlier, but they had ignored the warning signal. Some of them stayed in doors, waiting for information. Others drove to their offices in boldness. But the Federal Secretariat Complex, Ikoyi, was empty. Those outside Lagos were trapped in their destinations because there was no movement. Nigerians were seized by anxiety and tension.
Before January 15, 1966, coups were not new in Africa. But a political scientist, Prof. Isawa Elaigwu, said that “this date marked the effective explosion of the military on the Nigerian political arena”. Bloody mutinies have been reported in Sudan, Egypt and Togo. But the coup of the five majors still dazed the political class. Soon, the news was all over the place that the Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was missing. Many hours later, it was confirmed that the Head of Government had been killed and his body deposited in a bush on the Lagos/Abeokuta Road. Simultaneously, a pall of gloom descended on Northern Nigeria. The Premier, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, had been killed. The same tragedy had befallen the Premier of Western Region, Chief Ladoke Akintola, and Minister of Finance Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh was the only minister killed by the army. Also killed by the rampaging soldiers were some senior military officers, including Brigadier Maimalari, Brigadier Ademoyega Ademulegun, and Col. Ralph Sodeinde.
Anger was bold on the face of the coup leader, Major Chukwuemeka Nzeogwu, who had come on air to inform anxious Nigerians about the forceful change of government. He cited many reasons for the change of government. The ring leader and his allies; Emeka Ifeajuna, Adewale Ademoyega, and others, accused the government of corruption, tribalism and lack of discipline. They promised hard times for the ‘ten per centers in high places. To reposition the country, they said, was a priority. Nzeogwu and his colleagues portrayed the soldiers as modernising agents.
However, the euphoria was short-lived. On the second day, January 16, the tune changed. Due to human error, there was a hollow in the execution of the coup. Killings were restricted to the North and West. Since no prominent Igbo politician was killed, the uprising was decked in an ethnic garb. Thus, it has been observed that the way the coup was executed created suspicions and stigmatised it with ethnic colouring. Up came the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, who tricked the mutineers to come to Lagos, where he asked them to surrender to him. Although he became the beneficiary of the mutiny, he claimed that the coup plotters deserved punishment to restore discipline to the military and appease the North for the death of their political and military leaders. As part of his scheme to assert authority, later, the politically ambitious G.O.C asked the Council of Ministers, at gun point, to resolve to hand over to the military. The ministers, led by the late Dr. Kingsley Mbadiwe, could not muster the strength to resist the military’s incursion into politics. The Acting President, the late Dr. Nwafor Orizu, was also helpless. Having correctly interpreted the body language of the power-thirsty soldiers, they caved in. The parliament and council of ministers went with the wind of change.
Had the civilian leaders taken decisive steps ahead of the tragedy, the destruction would, probably, have been averted. The Minister of Information, the late Chief Ayo Rosiji, had been inundated with complaints of a likely coup by junior officers by Brigadier Ademulegun in Kaduna. The Ondo-born Army officer had urged him to convey the information to Balewa in Lagos. He advised that the Prime Minister should act with speed, warning that delay could be dangerous. Ademulegun emphasised that the lives of senior politicians and military officers were in grave danger. Rosiji’s biographer, Nna Mba, stated that when the former minister mentioned it to the Prime Minister, Balewa, “gave a characteristic fatalistic response”. He admittedly dismissed it with a wave of the hand. Perhaps, Balewa was preoccupied with the preparations for the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government holding in Lagos that month. The Prime Minister said he was not afraid because death would be the ultimate end of existence. Also, in his memoirs, former Inspector-General of Police Alhaji M. D. Yusufu recalled that similar warnings by the police were blatantly ignored by the Prime Minister.
The result was disastrous. Following the coup, Nigeria was instantly assailed by a monumental crisis of nation-building. Ironsi’s first step was threatening to federalism. Soldiers of northern origin were angry that the coup masterminded by the Igbo officers was aimed at shifting power from the North to the East. The inexperienced military Head of State dismantled the federal structure and foisted on the country a centralised, unitary system when he enacted Decree 1, 1966. He appointed four military governors; the late Col. Adekunle Fajuyi (West), Col. Usman Katsina (North), Col. David Ejoor (Midwest) and Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (East). He set up an ad hoc constitutional conference which hit the rock, although he failed to set up a federal cabinet in time. “ It took Ironsi three months to make any political move, but actually five months for him to opt for greater centralisation of power through unitarism”, recalled Elaigwu in his book titled: “Gowon: The Biography of a soldier-statesman”. “In a way, it may be argued that General Ironsi was a victim of circumstances which required the quick use of his mental capacity and political subtlety-two traits Ironsi did not possess in adequate amounts”, he added. Besides, Eliagwu pointed out that “the political pulls within the system may have made Ironsi vacillate in making radical changes in the federal-regional relations”.
Barely six months after the first coup, Ironsi was killed in Ibadan, capital of the Western State, when he was guest of Fajuyi. In the retaliatory coup, Fajuyi, who was defending Ironsi, sacrificed his life. He was killed by soldiers of northern origin avenging the murder of Bello and Balewa.
Senior officers were not prepared for the challenges imposed by the sudden regime change. Following Ironsi’s death, a succession battle rattled he top hierarchy. Young military officers from the North refused to take orders from the second-in-command to Ironsi, the late Brig. Babafemi Ogundipe. They insisted that the Chief of Army Staff, Col. Yakubu Gowon, should assume the reins. The governor of the Eastern State objected, saying that it was against the seniority principle. He warned that a dangerous precedent, which could erode discipline, was being set.
Gowon succeeded Ironsi as the Head of State. Tension later brewed as cases of mistrust among the various officers from the diverse, heterogeneous country were rife. Ojukwu advised soldiers of eastern origin to return home, since their lives were no more safe outside the region. The chain of events cumulated in the declaration of the Republic of Biafra by Ojukwu, who proclaimed himself as the Military Head of State and Commander-In-Chief of the new country he carved out of Nigeria. A bitter civil war ensued, with heavy casualties recorded on both sides. No fewer than one million lives were lost. Although Nigeria won the secession battle, it did not win the battle for national unity.
Analysts have reflected on the justification for the first coup. Was it the best option at the time? Were soldiers in government better than the civilians in the first 13 years and later, 15 years of military rule? Today, coup is old fashioned, but historians have always noted that Nzeogwu may have acted out of patriotism, although the coup could also have been executed with minimal casualties. But the coup was infectious. Other coups and blood-letting activities of the military in July 1966, 1967, 1975, 1983, 1985, 1986 by Major Gideon Okar’s group, the pre-emptied Vatsa coup of 1988, and Gen. Sani Abacha’s displacement of the interim contraception headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, were built on the foundation laid by the five majors.
On all counts, soldiers deviated from the cause of moral decency. Seized by greed, they pillaged the treasury and did incalculable damage to public discipline. For example, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Jos, Prof. E.U. Emovon, noted that Gowon’s method of a blend of militarism and humanism yielded under the stress of corruption and nepotism perpetrated by his lieutenants. Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, who had resolved to restore confidence in government by fighting corruption, breached human rights in the process. His successor, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, presided over a corrupt administration which wrecked the economy. Gen. Abacha became a despot.
Observers pointed out that, had the foundation laid by the civilian authorities been sustained, the coup may have lacked justification. But the warring civilian leaders, who fired salvos from their ethnically-inclined political parties, had their own inherent weaknesses. The polity witnessed political stability when the federal government and the regions shared powers in an atmosphere of cooperative federalism and critical inter-governmental relations. But electoral tensions and recurrent suspicion between the North and the South, which complained about domination, later heralded political instability. Renowned historian Dr. Mba contented that there is substance in the criticisms that they lacked courage, conviction and vision of the society they had hoped to lead after the attainment of independence. She also agreed that “the political elite had also been held responsible for promoting ethnicity for political gains”.
Mba also agreed that, in the First Republic, “corruption was practised and not checked”, adding that the inability or lack of will on the part of Balewa to insist on all his colleagues observing the rules contributed to the general demoralisation and breakdown of the government’s authority.
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the historian advised that leaders should ensure that politics is based on principles and issues, not on personalities or ethnicity, and should be conducted according to enforced rules of fair play. Mba also advised that personal ambition must not be allowed to supersede the communal or national good, and power must not be used only or even mainly to further personal ambition. The historian had solid advice for youths who would drive the ship of the fledgling nation-state in the future. Young Nigerians must learn to unlearn the ethnic prejudices which had burdened previous generations so that they may work and socialise together freely. By so doing, they may create a more egalitarian and just society in the future,” Mba said.
