•Civil War is as a crazed lion devouring its own flesh; only the sobriety that comes from weariness shall stop it.
War is hell. Civil war is hell gone mad. Once fighting began, Syria became a tragedy foretold. A society and government short on tolerance but fully conversant with ruthlessness and its attendant crafts of misrule were thrust into tumult by the protests many cheered as part of the “Arab Spring.” Arab it was. Spring it wasn’t. As events unfolded, what occurred proved worse than the most biting winter.
A harsh nation in a dark neighborhood where friends are more dangerous than enemies, Syria was not well suited for the protests. Rarely do protests against a paranoid regime yield placid results. While liberty and justice might be the aim, the result tends toward the opposite initially. Dictators do not respond to democratic protests by offering the olive branch or more democracy. They respond by offering more dictatorship. Such was the case in Syria. The morally vacant Assad regime would flash the mailed fist to deal with the protests.
A minority government with a callous reputation, the Assad regime knew the protests could roll into something challenging the regime’s very survival. The friends Assad has in the international community could be counted on fingers of one hand yet leaving at least two of those digits unencumbered in the accounting. Lurking behind the protests was the sectarian rivalry between Assad’s Alawite minority and the nation’s Sunni majority. Unless the protesters backed down after their initial forays, conflagration was inevitable. For good measure, toss in subterranean tribal fissures in both camps and a dose of international intrigue as leaven. The contrived peace that had been imposed by force was set to expire. It would do so in puffs of smoke, fusillades of bullets and the roadside heaping of the corpses of the innocent, the guilty and the indifferent.
This is the worst type of civil war. Pitting a minority regime against a fragmented majority opposition, the eruption forecasted stalemate. The regime enjoys the preponderance of material assets but not by such numbers as to overcome its lack of faithful followers. Most in government belong to the Sunni majority. Their membership in government was a marriage of convenience. Few things are as inconvenient as civil war. When the pinch came, their loyalty also became suspect. For Assad, this is more than a pinch. It is a vise grip closing on his throat. Thus, his government has effectively shrunk to where half of those in it are suspected opposition collaborators. Assad fights the rebels while keeping his second eye on perceived enemies within. It is hard enough to quash an uprising using all a government’s assets and energy. Using half of that inventory makes the task impossible.
The rebels have greater people power but the power is unharnessed, wild and as often directed against internecine rivals as against the ogre government. Thusly fragmented, it cannot be viewed as a unified opposition. It too is a marriage of convenience, wedding genuine democrats, opportunists, carpetbaggers, tribalists, Sunni chauvinists, and radical jihadists. Should Assad suddenly fall, these disparate elements will lunge with equal ferocity at each other as much as they will attack the hapless remnant of Assad loyalists. Because they lack unity and also have inferior arsenals and military experience, the rebels are not strong enough by themselves to topple Assad.
Aided by Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah, Assad has tipped the extant balance in his favor. He still remains unable to exterminate the rebels. As things stand, however, he believes he can preside over a rump Syria. Given the alternative of dangling from the wrong end of a thick rope or of being hauled before the International Criminal Court, Assad would gladly rule this abbreviated tract indefinitely.
Meanwhile the rebels are furious at the West. In Western calls for Assad’s departure, the rebels thought they heard the unmistaken language of material support. They saw Libya being repeated in their homeland. The West wanted Assad gone but did not want to entangle themselves in protracted misadventure. Libya had proven harder than envisioned. Syria would be harder still, with the outcome less certain. Te West, including America, has given clandestine support and weapons but not at a decisive magnitude. This dollop augments the war materiel provided by conservative Sunni regimes like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar; still, the total cannot tip the scales.
Ironically, some of these weapons will fall into the possession of Al Qaeda and other jihadist elements in the opposition. That this same situation played in Libya brings into question the primacy the West, especially America, publicly gives its anti-terrorism policies. While Syria can be considered a bad card in all categories, it is hard to believe Syria has been a more active and geographically diverse terrorist threat than Al Qaeda and its jumble of franchises and affiliated groups. Apparently, the war on terror has conditional primacy for the West. If there is chance to pick off an unfriendly Middle Eastern nation, the West will cooperate with the dreaded terrorists to achieve the task, even though who might ascend to govern the downcast nation remains uncertain. This tryst with terror groups strengthens the groups by equipping them and giving them a fighting chance at influence in or even leadership of the newborn government. Apparently, the West would rather toss the future of unfriendly nations upon the wheel of blind fortune than to focus on minimizing the impact of terrorist groups. Western nations evidently believe they can stifle large-scale attacks on their territories. Thus, they can now return to the timeworn practice of picking off recalcitrant nations.
This policy shows neo-conservative thought retains primacy even after the Bush years. President Bush designated several nations as evil. Syria was among them. While the world has moved on and danger spots have evolved, American policy seems to have remained static at its core. This is a most curious and low-minded policy. Osama bin Laden was begotten by the blowback from the West’s cynical support for jihadists in Afghanistan during the 1980s. This time it might produce a scourge more virulent. Hopefully, it will not be born in the urban battlefields of a crumbling Syria. However, if the West persists with this tack, the blowback will occur in some desolate, broken land.
The war has stabbed into the marrow of Syrian society. The death toll exceeds 70,000; one million people have been displaced. More are disfigured and wounded. None will forget this grisly woe. Horror is written on the face of children and lodges in the wombs of those who should be giving birth to a more optimistic generation. The mounting violence ferments sectarian tension. Senseless killing demands an answer: That answer is usually hatred. With each innocent Sunni killed, other Sunnis inch closer to blaming all Alawites for wanting to suppress them. The death of a guiltless Alawite sparks fear in that community of a bloodbath should Assad fall. Neighbor looks at long-time neighbor with new fear. In a civil war, even the initially indifferent become partisan because the ethnic or sectarian divide that shapes the battlefield comes to define the entire nation. This already harsh political system and the society underpinning are sundering, gradually but inexorably to the point that repair will be measured in decades not in years.
Superimpose international rivalry on this picture. What emerges is the turbid portrait of a genuine catastrophe.
Heretofore the West hoped to oust Assad by the power of positive thinking. When this failed, the spigot of clandestine aid was opened. That proved inadequate. A few months ago in an attempt to restrain Assad and pre-position the Syrian leader as being criminally responsible for potential American intervention, the American president proclaimed the use of chemical weapons would be “a game changer,” implying America would deliver militarily decisive aid to the opposition or get even more directly involved. The statement was tantamount to striding out on a narrow ledge. It would encourage renegade Syrian troops or rebels to deploy chemical weapons on a small scale to provoke a massive U.S. response. It would make little sense for Assad to order such a deployment unless he was certain the American statement was pure bluff. Assad is ruthless but not so reckless as to take the unnecessary gamble. The inhumane use of any chemical weapons was probably done by solders outside the chain-of-command or by agents provocateurs trying to elicit a muscular American response.
When confronted by foggy evidence of deployment of the despicable weapons, President Obama wisely retreated from the precipice. Exercising prudence, he did not take the bait. His move was roundly condemned by America’s conservatives as having sacrificed the nation’s credibility. These people complain because they somehow ache for more war notwithstanding Afghanistan and Iraq. They seem to prefer America on permanent war footing. It must be good for their stock portfolios as it makes little sense from the standpoint of national interests. To his credit, Obama ignored their protestations. He realized leaping to war based on such scant evidence would not have added to America’s global credibility. It would have confirmed either American naiveté or its war lust.
European leaders have been more hawkish than President Obama. In the face of Assad’s recently military gains, the European Union seeks to reestablish a more even balance. Consequently, it ended the arms embargo on Syria, meaning it will start openly supplying the opposition. However, given the EU’s history of half promises and given the uneven Libyan performance of key EU members, the opposition still might be disappointed by the wares it gets. The EU move will place pressure on America to openly supply the rebels. At some point, America will join the line.
Meanwhile, Israeli takes occasional potshots at Syrian installations and Hezbollah soldiers entering Syria. Israel dislikes Assad because of his support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and because of the disputed Golan Heights. However, Israel is wary of his downfall because of the complete breakdown of order it might occasion. Israel would rather see Syria in indefinite turmoil. The uncertainty furnishes a credible reason for Israel to be skittish about peace talks with anyone, including the Palestinians. Moreover, the global attention directed at Syria deflects the overall pressure on Israel to talk peace.
On Syria’s side stand Russia, Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah. In the shadows, hides China. Russia has too much invested in Syria, including a naval installation, to walk away from Assad. In a demonstration of support that counters the EU arms action and that will make Israel think twice about airstrikes, Russia is giving Assad new anti-air missiles. No nation makes such an expensive, obvious gift to a leader who it believes will soon be scurrying for his life. Iran has been Syria’s best friend in the region. Iran needs a friendly Syria as a conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Without a cordial Syria, Hezbollah’s supply line is truncated to the extent the group will lose ground in Lebanon. Thus, Assad’s fight for survival is its own. Iraq is also a conduit of war materiel and personnel to Syria and Hezbollah. A Syria in the hands of a Sunni government with jihadist inclinations could foment Sunni resentment in Iraq, moving that already frail, febrile nation to the threshold of civil war. The Syrian crisis magnifies the Sunni/Shi’a divide throughout the region which could spark real problems in other nations.
On balance, the western nations opposing Assad are stronger than the half-handful aligned with him. While this is serious business, it remains a bit of a lark for the West. Their existence is not threatened by the war. They have something to gain but little to lose in the contest. They will calculate how much to invest and will go no further. For them, this is a limited proxy war. For Assad’s allies, especially Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah, more is at stake. Significant interests, if not their outright existence, hold in the balance. While they have fewer assets than the West, they are willing to give more from the little they have. Much like the internal Syrian balance, the international balance of power and effort portends stalemate. However, the introduction of additional weaponry will escalate the lethality and destructiveness of the stalemate.
In what is likely a hollow gesture at this point, the US and Russia, though on opposite sides of this matter, joined by the UN seek to sponsor peace talks. Buoyed by recent tactical military gains, Assad is eager to attend talks. With his ship currently riding high tide, any agreement achieved at the talks must memorialize his currently strong position. A few months ago, observers were talking about the regime collapsing from within and Assad escaping in the dead of night with but the shirt on his back. Today, he speaks of running for reelection next year. The opposition has no present desire for talks. Their sine qua non is Assad’s ouster; but a strong Assad will not step toward the exit let alone walk through it. Consequently, the opposition wants to continue fighting in order to change the shape of the battlefield before approaching the negotiating table.
This problem is inherent with all wars, particularly civil wars. Rarely do both sides simultaneously see an advantage in negotiating. It may take years and concomitant war fatigue before the parties negotiate. In war, combatants rarely come to the table as a function of wisdom or reason. They usually do so because out of weariness.
Without divine intervention or the sudden irruption of wisdom among the leaders of both sides, war shall continue for some time to come. Those who head the rival sides have little to fear personally war’s continuance. They live in padded comfort far from the daily misery and the macabre. They bear little of the physical brunt of war. They don’t experience the physical danger or the material deprivation. The anonymous, common man, woman and child whose only dream was to live a decent existence in relative peace and comfort will bear the brunt.
Their dreams now shattered, they exist to survive. They are no longer human beings. They are objects in a dreadful game of sniper fire, indiscriminate bombing and rash executions. For them, this is not war and this war is not about them or their interests. In a situation like this, the prospective leaders who hold the interests of the people to heart are rarely those who possess enough military power to take over. Those who hold such power, on either side of the fight, are not those most interested in the people. This war is but a contest between those who want to rule but not necessarily improve the nation. For the Syrian people, this war is hell. For the rest of us, it is a hellish reminder that the best way to end a civil war is never to start one.
