Nathaniel Raymond, a lecturer at the Yale University Public Health School, is an American human rights investigator, specialising in the investigation of war crimes. Speaking at a briefing attended by United States Bureau Chief OLUKOREDE YISHAU, he provided evidence of Russia’s war crimes and other Atrocities in Ukraine. Excerpts:
Child transfer, re-education, and forced adoption
Today we are presenting probably the most important report yet from the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab’s Conflict Observatory team. This report documents a – excuse me – documents a clear and intentional pattern of child transfer, re-education, and in some cases adoption, what can be termed forced adoption, of Ukrainian children in Russia’s custody.
Before I walk through the key findings of the report, I want to present a headline legal analysis before we get into the details. In short, what this report shows is clear, prima facie evidence of Geneva Convention violations by Russia and a violation of other elements of international law specific to child rights and to the treatment of children during armed conflict. We’ll get into some of the details of what the Geneva Convention specifically and explicitly says Russia should have done with Ukrainian children in its custody in a moment, but what I want to say is that this evidence that we are about to present is in no uncertain terms clear evidence of alleged war crimes involving Russia’s treatment of Ukraine’s children.
The first finding I want to present is our research which is based primarily on the analysis of open-source information – in most cases, the statements of Russia’s government officials and other elements of state, local, regional administrations within Russia shows that at least 6,000 children – likely significantly more – have gone through a system of 43 camps and other facilities. Of that 43 number that we have geo-located and verified and identified in this report, 41 of those facilities, roughly over 78 percent of the facilities in this set are engaged in some form of re-education of Ukrainian children, primarily from the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk. We will say more about what’s involved in re-education activities in a moment.
Peculiar cases
In the case of two of the 43 facilities we identified – a psychiatric hospital and what’s called a family center – there are children who we’ve been able to confirm have been put into adoption and foster care by Russia. And in the case of one camp, we know that children sent to one of these summer camp facilities were then sent on for adoption and/or fostering.
The critical point here in terms of our research is it shows the massive geographic scope and scale of this ecosystem of facilities. They stretch from Russia-occupied Crimea on the Black Sea to Moscow, two facilities in Siberia, and then one as far east as Magadan on the Pacific coast, approximately 1,300 miles from Alaska – closer to the continental United States than they are, the children at that camp, than they are to Moscow, the Ural Mountains, or Ukraine itself.
As I mentioned, in one – actually two camps, children have been placed with Russian foster families. While the vast minority of the camps we identified, it is clear from evidence we’ve reviewed that in those two cases, children who went to those summer camps have been moved on to fostering and adoption. We’ll talk more about that in a second. The overall analysis that we’ve done shows there is a consent crisis as it relates to these facilities.
Now, let me pause here and talk about the two sort of big baskets of children and children’s experiences that we can simply use to understand this system.
In the first group, there are children from Donetsk and Luhansk who make up that 6,000 number, and that 6,000 number is based on the reports that we can find of transfers to camps and transfers between camps of specific groups of kids that we know we are not double counting, and it is the most conservative number we can come up with. That’s primarily from this camp system. And what we have found in that group is that they are from Russia-occupied areas in Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk. We’ll say more about the status of those kids and their ability to return to their families in a moment.
In the second group, we have what Russia would call “evacuees,” quote/unquote, from Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhya. Those children were largely in state institutions controlled by Ukraine at the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They were then moved by Russia officials into Russia or Russia-occupied territory, in one case including disabled children from a state hospital. In this group – the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson group – we see evidence of adoption and fostering occurring, which can constitute a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Convention.
The age group of victims
This age group can range from – across these two baskets – from four months of age to 17. We also see within the camp group at least two incidents, including one in Chechnya, of children, sometimes as young as at least 14 to 17, engaged in military training, which Caitlin Howarth will speak about in a moment, including use of firearms and operation of military vehicles.
I want to go a little deeper here on the status of return on the children who are in the – what we’re calling these summer camp facilities, and talk a little bit more about what we mean when we say “re-education.” And so let’s start with the question of what do we mean when we say re-education. Reading from the report, we’ve found that about 32 of the camps identified by Yale HRL appear engaged in systematic re-education efforts that, quote, “expose children from Ukraine to Russia-centric academic, cultural, patriotic, and/or military education. Multiple camps endorsed by the Russian Federation are advertised as” – quote – “‘integration programs’, with the apparent goal of integrating children from Ukraine into the Russian Government’s vision of national culture, history, and society.”
While this may seem benign, it represents a statutory violation, potentially, of the 1998 Rome Statute and the Genocide Convention’s prohibition on transfer of children from one group to another for purposes of changing, altering, or eliminating national identification, identity, ethnicity, et cetera. And it’s important to remember historically that this is one of the first trials as part of the Nuremberg tribunals after World War II against the Nazis.
It is easy to say this is just kids going to camps. Let’s talk more about that.
What we’ve found is that many of these parents who sent their kids to these camps had to sign power of attorney documents where the other party on this document that they were transferring custody of their children to was left blank. That represents invalid consent and a violation of international standards on consent. Additionally, the scheduled time of return for these children – and we have details about this in the report – that 10 percent of the camps we’ve identified, the children’s return to Ukraine was allegedly suspended.
Two camps
In the case of two camps, Artek and – excuse my pronunciation – Medvezhonok, children’s returns were suspended indefinitely according to the parents themselves. In the case of Medvezhonok, one of the largest camps we’ve identified, at one point it was hosting at least 300 children from Ukraine. And officials originally told the parents they’d return at the end of summer, but later rescinded the date of return. And Caitlin will speak more in a moment about the impact of these delayed returns, suspended returns on the children themselves and the incredible struggle of parents to not only reunite with their children, but to find out anything about their children’s location.
What this report shows is that all levels of Russia’s government are involved. We have identified 12 individuals in this report who are not currently on U.S. and/or international sanctions list. These 12 individuals and others we identify in the report are part of a whole – and I stress this – a whole-of-government activation to sustain and operate and promote this system primarily to a internal Russian domestic audience. And this includes up to four regional governors, and it reports – it appears – to a woman, Maria Lvova-Belova who is the child’s right commissioner, the children’s rights commissioner for Russia. And we identify personnel who report to Maria Lvova-Belova who is on the U.S. sanctions list.
Those aiding the atrocities
We also identify other individuals and organizations that are part of this ecosystem, supporting what we call in the report a patronage system that in the United States we would refer to as sort of a sister cities program where communities inside Russia using municipal funds are supporting the transfer of children from Ukraine to these camps that, again, to stress, are across Russia stretching over 3,400 miles or more across the country.
The Geneva Convention
What would it have looked like if Russia had followed international law? Well, they would have done four things that they not only have not done, which they are obliged to do as a state’s party to the Geneva Convention and a state’s party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child but they have actively violated.
One, they would have created a common registration system working with international governmental – inter-governmental organization, international agencies, such as those from the United Nations and other groups, who are mandated by international law to support family reunification and identification of missing persons, including children. That has not happened here, and we do not have a common registration database meeting any international standard from past conflicts.
Second, they would not have brought the children to Russia. They would have brought them, as the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Amended Protocol state, to neutral third-party country. That did not occur here. They were brought to Russia.
Third, they would have ensured clear communication for purposes of family reunification with family members inside Ukraine and ensured the integrity of the national identity and ethnic identity of these children while they were in Russia’s custody and facilitating communication.
Fourth and finally, Russia would not be holding these children indefinitely without information and would not be engaged in what’s called – under terms of law – emergency or forced adoptions during a time of armed conflict and crisis. They would have suspended those operations and waited for family reunification and appropriate judicial review of the status and the guardianship of these children. That has not happened here.
So to conclude, whether we are talking about the kids who the re-education camps, or we’re talking about the quote, unquote evacuee children from Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya, there is clear evidence presented in this report of alleged war crimes and potentially alleged crimes against humanity involving Russia’s activities with this – these thousands of children, likely significantly more than the 6,000 we identified, which represent not only a human rights crisis but also a child welfare emergency.
Putin’s January speech
The New Year’s Day speech by President Putin. In that speech, he is praising the efforts of those on a local and regional level that had been engaged in this program and encourages them to do more. As we had mentioned before, Maria Lvova-Belova, who is under U.S. sanction, who is the commissioner for child rights for Russia, appears to be the titular head of this program. And we identify officials that report to her at a deputy level and we also identify four regional governors. Those would be the highest officials that we’ve identified, and it’s clear that the human rights office of the Kremlin and the human rights ombudsman officials are intimately involved in this program, both on the adoption side and also on the larger – in terms of what we document in this report – re-education camp side.
Vladimir Putin, as the president of Russia, underneath international war crimes law – the law of armed conflict – has responsibility for what officials who directly report to him and officials at lower levels and independent civil society actors are doing. So he bears clear command and control responsibility whether or not this is being done by proxies acting in the name of Russia.
And it is clear that there have been two changes in Russia’s internal law and administration that have happened simultaneously to this program. One is changes to Russia’s adoption laws, which allow easier adoption – than prior to the invasion – of Ukrainian children. Point one.
Point two is an increase in monthly social security-type allowance to those who adopt or foster these children – up to $200 equivalent a month. So those actions are state actions to support this programme.
What the children go through
What we have documented in this report is that the group of children, the quote/unquote – to use Russia’s term – “evacuees” from Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya appear to be the primary group going into the adoption and fostering system. That said, we’ve identified at least, I believe, two camps, children who went to these summer camps, some of which were formerly pioneer camps from the days of the Soviet Union going back to Stalin, entered the adoption and fostering system.
And so in one case, we identify disabled children from facilities that were Ukrainian – one Ukrainian facility that then fell under Russian control at the time of the invasion. And so in the Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya group – unlike Donetsk and Luhansk, we’re talking about areas that were under Ukrainian control when Russia invaded. Those facilities were emptied and those children were brought into Russia or Russia-occupied Crimea, and then became part of the fostering and adoption system.
