Having written about the civil war, what is your take on it considering the fact that part of the war was fought at Asaba?
I lost my family in the war. And this is a product of the civil war. There was a genocide committed by the Nigerian Army at Asaba. We were not Biafrans. The Biafrans would take their case anywhere. We Asaba people, we were not in Ojukwu’s Biafra map. We were in Nigeria’s map. Some of us fought for Biafra. Some people fought for Nigeria. General Iweze fought for Nigeria. My uncles, some of them fought in the Nigerian Air Force. So, for anybody to come and tell you there was no genocide is talking nonsense.
How about Biafran involvement in genocide?
There was no Biafran genocide. Because the underlying word in genocide is plot. Did they plot for any Nigerian side to be wiped out? There is a United Nations conclusive finding under Dr. Edem Kojo, in 1969, that there was a genocide against the Igbo. I can give you the paper. It is not a question of somebody cheating anybody. Nobody sat down and planned that this part of Nigeria would be wiped out.
What is your impression about General Alabi Isama’s war memoir, Tragedy of Victory?
General Alabi Isama’s book is incomplete because he failed to talk much about Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The leader of the January 15th coup was Christian Anuforo. Nzeogwu was not in the coup. Nzeogwu came later because of his way of life. Nzeogwu did not drink. Nzeogwu didn’t smoke. Nzeogwu’s driver was a Hausa boy. Nzeogwu never attended any Ibo town union meeting. He never attended any local, tribal meeting. His best music was martial music and his mentors were Gen (Tito) of Yugoslavia, Patrice Lumunba, and Che Guevara. Those were his mentors. And he would wake up 7am and go to mass but he was a Hausa boy, shaving, and wearing babariga. He never chased any woman. He wasn’t going to get married. His mission was to go and fight in South Africa. So, he needed a Nigerian leader that would help him. That was why he switched from the Sardauna to embrace Awo, no Igbo. The other leader was Emmanuel Ifeajuna, who has been into revolutions from the University of Ibadan. Revolution has been on his mind. And if you’re from my side, Onitsha people say that they are Igbo, like Ngwa people say they are not Igbo. Some people from Nsukka area, they relate with Idoma. We know who are the Igbo. Ifeajuna at his time was the greatest high profile athlete when he scaled 6.9 (metres) in Vancouver. He was the first black athlete. He pulled off his shirt, like what these athletes do now. And there was pandemonium in the city of Vancouver. If you go to any exercise book in the 50s, 60s, 70s, you will see him on the cover. All his life was at Ibadan and his best friend was Segun Awolowo, Christopher Okigbo, Wole Soyinka. Achebe was not a revolutionary, he was just a writer. And they were chasing the best women in Ibadan. That was why Christopher Okigbo was able to marry the princess from Attah. These boys were not talking tribes.
Some of those authors of books on the Nigerian Civil War were players in the war and could not have had the benefit of hindsight and research which you had. Why do you give much credence to Gen Olusegun Obasanjo?
You know Biafra surrendered unconditionally. I won’t come here to denigrate Ojukwu. But if Ojukwu had listened, Biafra could have gotten back its currency, it could have gotten its army reintegrated. Go and read the Think-Tank Memoranda of the Addis Ababa Peace Conference. A man, (Habeeb Bogiva) from Tunisia, said, when the British troop came, they said they’re bringing Obasanjo, he’s the only one who has the humanity that can make Biafra surrender and you’re telling me that he is a coward, that he was shot in the buttocks. That is their problem. Then, you have demystified the surrender. Biafra can now go and claim that they didn’t surrender. That is the meaning of that lie. What happened when the Biafrans came to Mid West, they were involved in collateral damage. And it was not a Biafran Army. There was no order from the headquarters for them to do what they did in Warri, which I acknowledged in my book. In fact, they were to move straight to Lagos. Gowon was flying to Zaria until the same Obasanjo you’re saying had no courage said no. And it was the same Obasanjo that took Nzeogwu’s paper from Kaduna to come and negotiate with Agunyi Ironsi during the fledging days of the 1966 coup. And I’m telling you, the coup was a perfect success. Go and read the biography of Mallam Aminu Kano. Aminu Kano was to be deputy to Awo in that coup. The principal aim of January 1966 coup was to install Obafemi Awolowo as the Prime Minister of Nigeria. And the boys would now move to South Africa. Nzeogwu was not interested in Nigeria.
We have spoken enough about genocide. Let us move away from that. There is this argument that the battle in Owerri was not conclusive. What to you were the elements that made it impossible for each of the sides to cave in during the crisis that lasted more than one year?
You know, I’m not an authority in military battles but I know that in a way, you’re asking me about the commander. They said Scorpion (Gen. Benjamin Adekunle) was the best that Nigeria could offer. I do not disagree with him on battleground confrontation. That is not my area. My area is on civilian consequence but I know about Owerri. The greatest Biafran commander was not my uncle Achuzia. Achuzia would go to battle with a battalion, he would come back with a company, sometimes the mission was not complete. He would shoot some of them himself. The greatest commander of Biafran Army was Timothy Onwuatuegwu and that is why I am saying here that Danjuma and all of them, in military convention, after the war and you announce that you have surrendered, you don’t touch soldiers, you arrest them. Obasanjo did that. He arrested all the soldiers in Owerri. And he was very nice to them, even though they said they didn’t get this or that. Up to when they got to Lagos. Black Scorpion would not do that. And I told you the story of Murtala Muhammed. Three trailers had koboko, (whips) not bullets. So, what would koboko do, if they had entered Biafran heartland? Koboko was for us – for gentlemen to be flogged to death. So, in answer to your question, Owerri was concluded. Remember that Major Utuk, the Calabar commander at Owerri, was surrounded by the 8th Brigade commanded by Timothy Onwuatuegwu who was the best. Any time that there is crisis, he’s the one they call. So, Owerri was taken back from the federal troop but at a stage, they allowed an area for them to escape back.
Who wanted to bomb Port-Harcourt?
The man is alive. I can give you his number. It was these people who did Ogbunigwe. So, when the British came and they knew, that was reversed – that they were bringing this commander down who had a lot of humanity in him. In fact, the man who stopped the war was Akanu Ibiam. Ojukwu was not ready. Ojukwu believed he was going to win because they knew (Aju Ala). The Ogbunigwe became (Aju Ala). In artillery acquisition, the Russians are better than the US. The Russian mortar can go 24 miles but the Biafran artillery, the (Aju Ala) was going 26 miles. The Russians were alarmed. That was the main reason they supported Nigeria. They had sympathy for the Biafrans because every revolution claims sympathy for the Eastern countries, like the MPLA, Ethiopia, Lumumba, they had this. For the first time in Africa, Russia said ‘we’re suffering from yellow malaise – that is China.’ This black danger is coming – 26 miles was this Biafran mortar. It’s very crude, it may not be direct. There were many other problems but people were still dying. So, what I’m saying is that, I’m not here to defend Obasanjo. I’m here to say that man has managed, whether it is luck, whether it is destiny, to remain like Peron of Argentina in the balcony of the power corridors of the world.
January 15 coup’s main purpose was to topple the federal authorities under the corrupt regime of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and at that point in time, there was genocide established going on in Gboko, Tiv land. There was mayhem on the streets of Lagos, Ikorodu, Ibadan, Ijebu-Ode, Ijebu-Igbo up to Ekiti area. Balewa was like Jonathan. He couldn’t arrest the situation. Go and read The Man Died; that is why I don’t joke with Wole Soyinka, no matter what they are saying. Nzeogwu was the first Nigerian trained intelligence officer. He started the SSS at Apapa in 1963. It’s in my book, Nzeogwu, the unknown. So, they knew there was going to be a January 17th coup. The coup was to eliminate all the western intellectuals; Tai Solarin, Wole Soyinka, Bola Ige. What happened was that they were fed up with what was happening. If you come out to the streets of west, they burn you alive, whether you’re for this or that. This was the situation when the boys came out. You cannot just say somebody murdered Sardauna or Balewa. Nobody shot Balewa. This was corroborated by Segun Osoba. He was there at the launching (Isama’s Book). He (Osoba) was a Daily Times reporter at that time. And I wrote my own because my aunty was a girlfriend to Balewa at that time. If you want a wife, you must come to Asaba – Babangida, even Balewa who wasn’t chasing women, they gave him my aunty. She told me that Balewa had asthma. Balewa couldn’t swim in that their State House, Marina. Living opposite Balewa was Okotie-Eboh, the richest man then. And when the January 15th boys came, they came for him. He was to be shot at sight. Mbadiwe was to be shot at sight. Balewa, not to be touched because he was a gentleman. Sardauna of Sokoto shot at sight. Akintola shot at sight. Agunyi-Ironsi shot at sight. People are mixing it up. So, Nzeogwu said, give me Agunyi-Ironsi, I know him. If you don’t get him dismantled, that is the word, not shot, the coup would not happen. They said, ‘go to Sardauna’. So, what he did in Kaduna, the coup was successful, coup was successful in the west. So, which place was the coup not successful? Lagos. Who stopped the Lagos operation? Major Obienu, another Igbo man. He was the commander of a unit in Abeokuta. He didn’t show up. His boys had taken over the key security structures. The man who was to announce the coup who was not Nzeogwu, not Ifeajuna, it was Ademulegun. That was his only job. Up till now, we’re still researching why he didn’t announce the coup. And he was to announce that there was a revolution and Obafemi Awolowo is released. That was Nzeogwu’s number one purpose. He said, ‘if you don’t bring Awo as the Prime Minister, I will not join you because he is the only one talking about free education,. And his best friend was Segun Awolowo. How did he die? Mystery. How did the man that they suspected killed him die? The same place that this publisher of Tribune had his own motor accident.
So, when Nzeogwu waited for them for four hours, he made that spontaneous announcement in Kaduna. He wasn’t supposed to announce it. So, who is telling me it is tribal? So, in summary, what I am saying is any book that starts writing Nigerian military without first acknowledging that first, there was a lot of blood on the streets. I’m not talking about military people. Blood in Ibadan, you couldn’t come out on the streets in 1966. I’m coming back to the second phase of Nigerian crises – the war. Gowon benefitted from the coup. There was nothing like revenge coup. Nobody did any coup. What happened was that the Nigerian federation came together and every group wanted something. The Igbo, I don’t know what they want – up till now, I cannot find their interest. But, I can tell you straight, the northerners always wanted power. They want to control the army. They want their religion (Islam) to be dominant in our culture. The Yoruba want all the banks, the stock exchange, they want to control the financial events of the country. And they want Lagos to remain the capital, no matter if Abuja is there. And they want the Yoruba language spoken not only in Nigeria but up to the world. And I acknowledge them for that. The minorities, I’ve read The Kahama Declaration by Isaac Boro. They wanted to be out of this federation because their wealth was being depleted but now that things have changed, it looks like they want to stay. Now, during serious conflagrations by these major tribes, they always go with the north. This time, they’re there. It seems the easterners are the main support. I’m looking at the two sides before we make our conclusions. Those of us who are Midwestern Igbo had it so bad during the war from both sides. Because the Biafrans came, they didn’t tell us they were coming in. And if they were coming in, that plan originally was Nzeogwu’s plan. Nzeogwu said he was going to lead it. And he told Ojukwu, don’t declare Biafra, let us fight against the north. These people have everything. Like now, the whole military instalment is just in Kaduna, Zaria. So, if there is a massive air force attack on Nigeria concentrated on Kaduna and Zaria, we’re finished. There is nothing here. So, I’m saying we cannot write a Nigerian civil war book without telling us about Nzeogwu. I thought the General, being a commander of a training school – he started with training school according to his book, should have told us more about Nzeogwu, whether he believed or not. He should have started with what happened before the military came in. He just went straight into the war and tried to defend what they were doing.
You cannot prescribe what someone is going to write. Someone is writing a book, he has a right to say, this is my focus.
I am being called to comment. I have a right to critique also. There are areas I agree with him. I’m not saying he has no right to write the book. It’s just that somebody said, why did Achebe do his own? I agree with you. What I am saying is if I’m doing a review of that book, I have a right. In fact, to me, that book should have been three books because I know Nigerian readers. They won’t finish that book.
But what is your overall impression about the book?
This book is a classic. It is the first chronicle coming from the Nigerian side since the edited Nigerian Army book from General Momoh. That one is vast and very complete. But, this one from a personal diary – that establishes Alabi Isama as a General. Most generals never kept diaries; this man kept diaries, kept photographs – so you can compare his book to the other category on the other side of Alex Madiebo. I’m talking about field diaries of Generals. The only thing that I’ve said is missing is he could have told us about the man who started it all – Kaduna Nzeogwu. And he didn’t.
Secondly, I agree with him that even though the Nigerian First Division was the most favoured in armoury, in administration, in support, in equipment, the Third Marine Commando gave the Biafrans black eye. They were the most deadly army Biafrans faced. I agree with him there.
You said something like there was never a counter or revenge coup.
There was no revenge because when you say revenge, that means some people were against it. The people who organised the January 15 coup were not Igbo.
That’s your claim
It is not a claim.
Before the war, the Igbo were prominent in politics, in the army and there was co-habitation. That first coup truncated that. So, the perception was that the Igbo wanted to take over and the first coup was to go back to status quo.
Scientifically, from our studies, there is nothing like a revenge coup. When somebody took away your wife and you go for revenge. When somebody stole your money or beat your child up, you go for revenge. That word, I want to define the word revenge. When you say there was revenge, that means somebody did something to them, right.
Let me say this. Up till now, the mainstream of Nigerian politics, even the Igbo, believe that there was a revenge coup. Even if you go through There was a Country, Achebe said that, ‘okay if we killed them on January 15, killing the 200 Igbo officers, why did we go to civilians?’ I’m saying the boys may answer Igbo names. (But) Nzeogwu was not Igbo, he was Hausa. Nzeogwu is from my area, Okpanam in Asaba. He spoke Hausa more than any other language. What I’m saying is that Nzeogwu was extraordinary. Nzeogwu had a brother – a professor of Agro-economics, one of the best in United States. His name is Okeleke Nzeogwu. He went to school at Mayflower School, (Ikenne). He was trained by Mrs. Sheila Solarin. And who brought him there? Olusegun Obasanjo. He didn’t bring him to Lagos. And if you go to that part of Nigeria (Ikenne), there is Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu Street. There were still fighting when Tai Solarin put the street there. There is a reason. Nzeogwu was the one who wrote the people who were to be – Tai Solarin was to be minister of education.
You said something now that if Obasanjo had been there and Nzeogwu was coming, the forces would have been resolved. I want to compare that to when Soyinka went to meet Obasanjo. He gave Banjo message to him. And he said, so long as he was the head of the Ibadan Garrison, his allegiance was to Lagos. Would he have given a different answer to Nzeogwu?
I don’t talk battle line diaries. I’m not a military expert but I’m an expert in conflict resolution in Africa. I have in my confidential report that originally, it was Nzeogwu’s plan. Nzeogwu had told Ojukwu, ‘don’t declare Biafra. If you declare Biafra, you’re inviting Nigerians who can fight on any pretext.’ At that point in time, the northerners had everything. There was only 89 enlisted Yoruba in the Nigerian Army. It’s there in my book. There was Daramola, Majekodunmi, Obasanjo, mostly Majors. The biggest of them had been killed – Samuel Ademulegun and Sonije killed because of their positions. So, what I’m saying is that Nzeogwu planned it. ‘Don’t give these people frontal confrontation. Let’s go through the west. Ogbemudia was part of their group. Obasanjo is not with Alabi. It is clear. He has shown it.
So, it was to be south against the north. Soyinka, Solarin, all were prepared to support it. Gowon was about to fly to Zaria. That was why Wole Soyinka came and he didn’t come with the Awo group. They were extreme radicals. He came with the Aluko, who was still teaching at University of Nigeria, Nsukka then. He mentioned three forces – the first one was Gowon, the second force was Biafra, then, the third, anyone that wins. That was why they were incarcerated. He wrote it in a book, ‘The Man Died’ in prison. But for anybody to come and denigrate Obasanjo while I’m still alive is not possible.
What do you mean by denigration? That the man did not run away from enemy fire? That he wasn’t shot in the rump? Because Daramola was there at the launch and he said that the general fled!
What I’m saying is that commanders are different. He wants to demonstrate that Obasanjo had no courage. I don’t think so. It shows that the Biafrans were not push-over. So, if Obasanjo saw the fuselage coming, it would be suicidal not to run away.
But, look at the context. The man wrote in ‘My Command’, and if you link it with ‘Not My Will,’ you’ll see the full gamut of the Obasanjo personae which ensured to put everybody down and pronounce himself as the only hero. That is the context in which the author wrote.
I’ve defined what that man said. He has destroyed the myth surrounding the Third Marine Commando and the Nigerian Army winning of the war when you say your commander ran away. That is what I’m saying. And I’m comparing what has happened.
