We were least prepared for war when Biafran soldiers attacked my command in Ore Major Iluyomade
Interviewing Major Raphael Iluyomade was an alluring mission prompted by information supplied by Brigadier-General Godwin Alabi-Isama in his recently released war memoir, The Tragedy of Victory On-the-Spot Account of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War in the Atlantic Theatre. In the thorough tome, Alabi- Isama named Iluyomade as the soldier who led the fighters that foiled the Biafran rebels in their ambitious march toward Lagos, the then federal capital. This episode of the civil war was momentous and memorable. Indeed, in popular lore, so fierce was the combat at this front that it created an immortal expression in Yoruba language, Oleku Ija Ore, meaning, the battl of Ore was tough like no other. So, when Iluyomade surfaced at Alabi-Isama’s well attended book launch in Lagos on July 18, it was an opportunity to ask him for an interview, which he readily agreed to. Four days later, in the war veteran’s tranquil home in Ibadan, Oyo State, it was time to relive his experience at Ore as well as other combat situations during the hostilities that spanned 1967 to 1970. Just before the interview in Iluyomade’s spacious sitting room, the 76-year-old retired soldier from Ondo State demonstrated his enthusiasm for books, especially those that had to do with warfare, by opening his equally roomy and impressive library to the visitors. This unexpected excursion spoke volumes about the man, and validated his nickname, revealed by Alabi-Isama at the book presentation. Iluyomade, known as Hitler by his colleagues, had a rich collection of books on the German megalomaniac, and said he must have read no fewer than 23 books on the infamous war lord. There was no dull moment during the interview as Iluyomade served his narrative with arresting spice, punctuated by one or two occasions when he went to the library and then upstairs, first to fetch a Bible to back his credibility, and then to get pictures to buttress his claims. He spoke to two members of The Nation Editorial Board, comprising its chairman, SAM OMATSEYE, and FEMI MACAULAY; and BISI OLADELE, Oyo State Correspondent.
What would you say were your most memorable recollections of the Nigeria Civil war?
I have a very vivid account of how I participated, beginning with the Ore battle. I was the only officer that commanded the troops there, and they were very few on the ground. In actual fact, we did not prepare for any war then because we were not aware of Ojukwu’s intention to invade Lagos and the West.
I had been sent there with about 32 soldiers two weeks before then. I was a full lieutenant. We had gone there to conduct internal security, just to make the villagers aware of the federal presence. There were no road blocks. We were just there, moving round, marching here and there.
Some of the villagers hadn’t seen soldiers for some time because there had been no military base at Ore. Ore road was constructed as far back as 1961. That was my last year in secondary school. It linked Ijebu, Sagamu straight to Benin. It is good for the economy of the country.
The road must have been narrow…
Yes. And it was so commercially based. A lot of vehicles were plying the road. So, by the time the Nigerian problem cropped up, Ore was a strategic village. I took my 32 soldiers there. That was a platoon. A platoon comprised three sectors, and nine men made a sector. So, we were moving up and down. We didn’t carry any riffle; we didn’t mount road blocks. Some of the villagers were familiar faces because my home town was only a few miles away.
The battle started immediately Ojukwu declared the State of Biafra. There was panic all over the country. Immediately he declared the State of Biafra, level headed people knew that war must follow, because it was not the intention of the Head of States then, General Yakubu Gowon, to have his own country broken into pieces. The moment that was allowed, other people would pull out of the federation and armed struggle would definitely be the result.
At the time the State of Biafra was declared, General Obasanjo was in Ibadan. We hadn’t formed the second division then. So, I moved. Then Gen. Obasanjo called me on the radio or telephone that I should not allow anybody to come from the Midwest, and that if anybody came from the Midwest, I should arrest and treat him as a prisoner of war. But by then, all the Igbo people were moving out, including their families and their cartels. They were moving through the Midwest to the East.
How was it like when the Igbo were moving? Were there incidents?
There were no incidents. They were going peacefully because they had been called home by Ojukwu, their leader. So, every one of them from Lagos, and even Ibadan, started moving towards the East Central State. The moment they called all the Igbo back home, I knew that something dangerous was in the offing.
What did you observe as they were moving back home?
It was peaceful. They were moving peacefully because they couldn’t afford to fight. They had no weapons, nothing. They were moving with their families. It was peaceful. There were so many vehicles; I couldn’t count them.
When Obasanjo said you should not allow anybody through, was he talking about civilians or soldiers?
Anybody! You don’t know who a spy can be. A spy can be a labourer. He can be crossing on a bicycle, but he has an agenda; maybe a camera, powerful weapons and so on. So, definitely, you don’t give chances to such people. He told me that immediately I saw anybody from there, the person should be taken as a prisoner of war.
In what capacity did Obasanjo call you?
As the GOC; the commander of the unit in Ibadan. Well, we can call him area commander. He was in charge.
So, did you see anybody coming from the Midwest?
There was nobody except the people that were moving towards the East.
You were to prevent people coming from Midwest to where?
To the West. So, he told me that I should move my headquarters and my troops to Ofosu. Then I told him that I was very thin on the ground with only 32 soldiers, myself being the 33rd. What could we do in case they wanted to cross over? He promised to send some troops to reinforce me, and he sent about 150 soldiers, mainly from the second battalion based in Lagos.
What was the ethnic composition of the troops you had?
(Sighs) The first batch of 33 we were all Yoruba, and we were young, duly trained soldiers. We took them from the Iwo Road barracks, which was created by Adebayo. He allowed a Grade 11 teachers training college to be converted to a barrack. There was a small history behind that. So, we created the first 150 soldiers of Yoruba origin that passed out from The Nigerian Army Training Depot in Zaria. I was the first to command them. Those were the people I moved 32 of them to Ore before I was reinforced.
Was it the training college that metamorphosed into the current 2nd Division?
Yes. Because of what happened when they attacked us on 8th of August, which was a Sunday.
What year was that?
1967. After the reinforcement, they joined me there and the Midwest was invaded by the Igbo. They possibly wanted to use the Midwest as a buffer, so that by coming to Midwest, if any attack happened, the region would bear the shock before it got to the East Western states or Igboland, starting from Onitsha. So, we bore the brunt of the fighting; only very few soldiers. By the time I counted the number of soldiers, it was 179.
You talked about 32 of the soldiers being Yoruba. What about the others?
Yes. I couldn’t determine or find out where they came from, but there were so many Hausa among them.
The point was made that at the beginning of the hostilities, the position of the Yoruba was not known and was not sure, because nobody was sure where the loyalty of Awolowo and the Yoruba leaders of thought was going to be. So it is believed that because of that, the central command quickly sent a lot of Hausa/Fulani soldiers into the West so as to compromise the position of the Yoruba. Would you say that meant you had a lot of Hausa/Fulani soldiers with you?
Precisely! I think that was exactly what happened. Prior to the outbreak of hostility, there were minor but annoying things that had happened in Ibadan here, if I can go into the depth, because I was involved and I knew exactly what happened. The barracks here in Mokola was the Third Infantry Battalion. So, the northerners were harassing the Yoruba because it was one of the wishes of Ojukwu that every soldier should go back to his own state of origin: the Midwesterners should go to the Midwest and the Yoruba people should stay in Ibadan. The northerners should go to the north so as to accomplish the Aburi convention requested by Ojuwku.
So, when every soldier is in his own state of origin, Ojuwku would be confident to come and have a meeting with General Gowon. They (northern soldiers) refused to go. And by that time, there were threats to Yoruba officers by the Hausa/Fulani, particularly myself, because the battalion commander then, Major Sotomi, didn’t know what to do. Every now and then, he would call me to go and speak to the Hausa soldiersI don’t want to use the wrong wordso I would go there and talk to them as directed. They refused. They would say no. So, every day, they were arming themselves with rifles and ammunition inside.
You mean the Hausa/Fulani soldiers?
Yes. They were carrying ammunition with weapons, which meant that if any war broke out, they were at advantage, and they could shoot the whole of us.
Who was giving them instructions? Were they reporting to their immediate officers?
They were becoming unruly and they were not listening to instructions, except it was from their own people.
Which officers do you think were giving them instructions from the higher command?
There was one Captain Bugaji who was the adjutant of the battalion. He was a pure northerner. He himself disappeared during the war. He was one of the people captured, and we can’t trace his whereabouts any more. There was a day Gen. Hassan Usman Katsina came to Ibadan to speak to the troops. The governor, Gen. Adeyinka Adebayo, was with him. Some people from the army headquarters in Lagos were also with him. They did not allow any journalist to enter the compound. Then he spoke to us in a bad and undiplomatic way. He said that the (Hausa/Fulani) soldiers would not leave Ibadan and that if they were threatened, he would use 40 soldiers to defeat the Yoruba.
So, he boasted and boasted, saying, ‘Give me the green light, I’m going to produce Ojukwu himself.’ He hammered on that. He came with two other officers. Three Yoruba officers were theremyself, Makanjola who is no more now, and Adedipe, who is still alive. He lives at Iwo Road (Ibadan). What type of threat to a whole nation by a single man? We looked at ourselves and said we were done for, if we didn’t do anything or if our leaders didn’t do anything.
But Chief Awolowo was in Lagos. Maybe he heard what happened. And that was the only man we trusted. That was the only man. The military governor then, Adeyinka Adebayo, was (shaking his wrist) you understand what I mean?
You mean he was afraid?
He was perturbed. He didn’t know what to do except to report what had happened. But Gen. Usman Katsina came to Ibadan, maybe with the permission of Gen. Gowon who was the head of state then. Maybe he took permission from him to say what he said, nobody knew. As I said, I was a full lieutenant, so a junior officer. But I have every detail in my head, and that’s what I’m reproducing today.
Were the soldiers of northern extraction more in number?
They were more in number because the infantry soldiers, those who carry guns, those who fight the real battles, were predominantly northerners. The soldiers of Yoruba origin and those who came from other parts of the country were clerks, medical men, administrators and supply and transport officers in the petrol depot. So, when they ran away from the north, I was the one that trained them and converted them into infantry men, so that if there was a threat, they had to fight. I thought them the way to handle the rifle, tactics and a lot of things. I was the one nominated to train them, and I really did.
The intimidation by Usmam Katsina could be considered an affront on the Yoruba. What did the leaders do? Did you get the sense that the Yoruba leaders had their feet in their mouths?
As I said, journalists were not around. It was you journalists that would have brought this type of thing to the public domain. A lot of them did not know what really happened within the barracks. I was there. Makanjuola, who is late now, Adedipe and a few other Yoruba were there. So, the thing did not filter to the public. But maybe eventually, Gen. Adebayo told some men. But he would not state the details in order not to annoy the northerners. You understand my point? I’m boldly saying this, and nobody can contradict me because I was there. I was mature enough.
Many times, I would not sleep in the barrack because they (Hausa/Fulani soldiers) were carrying rifles. I didn’t want them to surround me and shoot me at night, because nothing would happen if they did. So, I had to go outside and sleep several times. There was a day my wife refused to follow me, insisting that whatever happened, she would sleep in the barracks (Iletimo barracks). It was like that until the whole thing started escalating and I was sent to command the troops at Iwo road. We called it 11 Battalion. I was the first person to command the place until they sent a senior officer, Olu Bajowa, to take over, and I became his adjutant. From there, a detachment of 32 soldiers was given to me to go to Ore.
Since there was no overt threat, what informed his decision to send you to safeguard the West? The war had not broken out, so to speak, and he couldn’t have read the minds of the Biafrans who were trying to come to the West?
It was a crisis situation and we did not know how it was going to end or how it was going to be quelled. There was a sort of indiscipline in the barracks. What I mean by indiscipline is that soldiers were allowed to carry weapons with ammunition attached to their rifles, which meant they could cock and fire at any time. They were ready for battle, but some of us were not.
But your station, so to speak, was on the federal side. One would have thought that you would have a sense of safety?
Yes!
Why then would Obasanjo ask you to safeguard the West from people coming from the Midwest because the Biafrans were still fighting?
By that time, they hadn’t declared a state of Biafra. But normally, as I said, to make the federal presence felt in Ore, they dispersed people there. I did another one immediately after the counter coup of July 29, 1966. One Lieutenant Obeya and myself were dispersed to Makurdi. We left Makurdi and went to the East and North border to find out or to enquire whether there were clandestine movement of the easterners towards the north to build bunkers or to make some military installations and so forth. We went to so many places. We did our jobs until bloodshed occurred again and a lot of people, particularly the easterners, were killed when they were going home in the train.
Remember they killed a lot of people in the north on July 29. They killed a lot of them. Two of us participated: myself and Colonel Yakubu Anifowoshe. Two of us were the only officers to join them when they held a conference to nominate somebody that would represent our unit. I represented the Third Battalion. Anifowoshe also came. So, we met at the brigade headquarters in Kaduna then. It was there the acting brigade commander, Major Abba Kyari, announced that Fajuyi had been killed and the head of state then, Ironsi, was killed. What would you say? Then someone said he felt sorry that Fajuyi was killed.
Who?
Abba Kyari. He felt sorry. Then I put up my hand and I said, ‘Sir, when you know that you were not fighting with the Yoruba, why should you kill that man? He’s their popular governor.’ I said the only thing you can do is to free Awolowo to please the Yoruba and Fajuyi’s death would be another thing. They would want to welcome their leader. That same night, Chief Awolowo was released.
There is this question about Awolowo’s release; we need to go back to that issue about the tension between the Yoruba and the Hausa, because in the military, there was tension but in the outside world, outside the military in Yoruba land, the Yoruba were not sure what was going on. They were not devoted to Biafra and they were not against Biafra. That was when Awolowo made that famous statement that if the east was allowed to go by any means, the west would not have any option. How did the west move from the position where it was harassed by the north to the point of fighting, as it were, for the northern cause?
Yes! That question can only be answered by the people in power in Lagos, especially Chief Awolowo himself. He was the second in command of the federal executive council. He was next to Gowon. Maybe the decision came between them and few Yoruba leaders. So, that one is outside my knowledge. So in actual fact preceding the war, lots of soldiers ran from the north to come to the west.
What sort of soldiers?
Yoruba soldiers: clerks, paymasters, those who are not fighters but they handle administration in the army. So, when they ran, they came here. We had to create that battalion plus 150 soldiers who were trained in the north. Recruits, I took part in their recruitment. They were trained and they came back. We did not want them to mix with 3rd Battalion. So, Gen. Adebayo created that place. He told me to go and put all the soldiers there at the Grade Two teachers training college. The Grade Two teachers training college was moved out to Molete, so the place was vacant and we occupied the place. I was the officer to handle that place, and by that time, we had no rifle, no weapon at all. So, what I did: we went to the bush, we cut trees and used them as weapons. We did some training with them: how to pick up a rifle and how to do bayonet fighting. We did exercise with them. That was tremendous courage. So, until things came up, we heard what Chief Awolowo said, we were all jubilating then. Another person you can interview is Wole Soyinka. I know the reason why I said so and I won’t divulge it.
Could you tell us why?
He was brilliant; an intellectual. He wanted to go and convince Odumegwu Ojukwu to change his mind about seceding from the country. He went there. By the time he was coming back, I saw him at Ore. I knew the type of car he was using. He was dressed in a round neck singlet with a towel around his neck. The car he was using was Fiat. I can’t remember the car’s registration number because I saw him at Ore heading towards Ibadan.
He was one of the few you allowed to come back from the…?
Yes, before the proclamation of Obasanjo. He came out. He’s a Yoruba man; a prominent Yoruba man too. I wouldn’t ask him to go back. He wouldn’t even obey me (laughter). So, that was the case until eventually the Aburi convention collapsed. Ojukwu refused to come and he went back. Many international people intervened but to no effect. He had made up his mind. In actual fact, the killing in the north was too much. The bloodshed was heavy. I witnessed a lot and the way they were killing people was barbaric. How can you kill a pregnant woman? After killing her, you take a bottle of beer and put it in her private part? My landlord, Mr. Edward, his throat was slit as if you wanted to…
Edward what?
I can’t remember the surname.
Where was he from?
He was from the east.
Did you witness this?
I witnessed it. I was in his house. I rented a room from him. They just killed him and left him there in the gutter.
They cut him into pieces?
Well, not cut him into pieces. But they slit his throat. Then I came back. One sensible officer then was Abacha. Then they arrested all non-Yoruba and the Igbo. Even if you were a Midwesterner then, you would be arrested. They put them in the car at the Third Battalion in Kaduna. Then they came with lorries. They were pushing them in tens, twenties, forties in a lorry, and took them to Jos Road where they were massacred just like Adolf Hitler killed the Jews.
With the Yoruba people too?
No, not Yoruba.
You mean the Mid-westerners and the Igbo?
Yes. If you could not pronounce toro, they do not know you to be a Yoruba man, you were done for. So, on one of these occasions, I was broke and needed money. I dashed to the bank. Mind you, I said I was the only officer and Anifowoshe to come out to join them. Anifowoshe, I can show you his office. He will tell you the real story, corroborating what I’m telling you. I went to the bank. That day, I took three pounds and came home to give it to my wife.
Then Abba Kyari stopped the killing. He said the killing was too much, they should stop. He even employed Ferret, that’s the armoured vehicle without tyre. The one we were using was Salladin. Ferret was predominant in the army then and Abba Kyari used few of them to go and stop the killing. Then after that they were still bringing some people out. Then Abba Kyari who knew this shouted against further killing. But coming out from the bank, they thought I was the one that went to reveal the secret at the beginning to the headquarters. So, I was arrested.
Who arrested you?
The Hausa soldiers. They took the people I was commanding. They arrested me, Omolade, Ukpong , Adedipe, Makanjuola, I think about five of us. We were arrested in front of our company headquarters and they made us to sit on bare floor. Then they surrounded us with their rifles. If you made any false move, they could shoot. This was in 1966. So, it was Abacha that came in the nick of time. He saw us and came out from his Land Rover. He said, ‘What is this, gentlemen? What is this? Come on, get up and go home. Leave these officers alone.’
Then he told the soldiers to disperse and we were released. Sani Abacha and Babangida were my mates in the military. We joined the army the same day, attended the same training. I went to India with Babangida and Abacha went to England. We all came back to be officers of the Nigerian army.
How did it get to a situation when from harassing the Yoruba, the same Yoruba soldiers had to fight for the northern cause?
By that time, Chief Awolowo and Gowon must have held protracted meetings, because it was dangerous. The Yoruba couldn’t fight. We had no soldiers of our own. If you move all the Yoruba soldiers in the army then, we could get about 1000. And this 1000, about 800 of them would be servicemen, no infantry. Very few. But some officers who were Yoruba were many in infantry. But the officers couldn’t fight this. We had to command some men, move to the field, but these men were not there. As I said, I was the one that converted some of these men to pure infantry. I trained them because I had been a trainer for some time. So, eventually the discussion on the political disagreement between Gowon and Chief Obafemi Awolowo came to the limelight.
