Early this week, the 10-man committee set up on August 4 by the Coalition of Northern Groups, appropriately called ‘Arewa’, and Igbo leaders to find an amicable solution to the June 6 quit notice issued to the Igbo living in parts of the North could not find common ground. The Arewa and Igbo leaders had hoped that after the 10-man committee’s exhaustive deliberations, the quit notice would be rescinded. Not only was common ground not found, and a further 10-day extension of the committee’s sitting recommended, it was even apparent that the Arewa leaders had hardened their position in the face of what some observers described as the mollifying softening of position by the self-appointed Igbo leaders led by Chi Nwogu. Worse, in the estimation of many people, is the fact that as the two groups met, there was nothing to indicate that they represented their peoples or accurately approximated their yearnings.
The statement issued by the northern coalition after the stalemated meeting early this week is instructive. According to the coalition which produced a communiqué after a town hall meeting in Kano: “Nnamdi Kanu’s recent action of forcefully grounding movement of people including those from other regions by shutting down most Southeast cities notwithstanding the mild and ineffective condemnation by some Igbo political, cultural and religious leaders has foreclosed the avenues for an expected early peaceful resolution. It is further justification of our concern expressed in the Kaduna Declaration and subsequent correspondences with the Acting President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the International Community. These renewed threats contained in Kanu’s unwarranted utterances and actions compel us to push further for definite national and international action that would decide the Biafran matter to conclusion once and for all.”
The coalition adds: “In our usual truly patriotic aim to forestall the drift toward anarchy in Nigeria, and also to alert the international community as to where responsibility would ultimately lie if such momentous events ever came to pass, we have followed up our earlier effort by another round of initiatives of extending similar communications to relevant authorities. Accordingly, we have met with many leaders and groups with positive developments, while our doors remain open for discussions with more groups, leaders and agencies genuinely interested in addressing the separatist issues with a view to finally achieving a peaceful and stable Nigeria.”
There is no explanation as to why the northern coalition should take it upon itself to grapple with the separatist struggles of a minor but admittedly vocal section of the Igbo, or why it thought the grounding of the Southeast by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) last May was maliciously directed at the North alone. But in the absence of the federal government’s meaningful and coordinated policies and measures to tackle the restiveness in the Southeast, the northern coalition has presumptuously assumed the onerous and indescribably complex responsibility of pacifying the Igbo. When the Coalition of Northern Youths addressed a press conference in June and announced a quit notice to the Igbo in the North effective October 1, it was not immediately clear what the intentions of the youths were, nor whether they were not working alone. It soon became clear, however, that they had much wider northern support than initially thought.
The shutdown of the Southeast on May 30 by IPOB affected all Nigerians living and working in the Southeast. The implication of the shutdown for Igbo businesses were more far-reaching than for any other ethnic group. Yet the northern youths anchored their quit notice on that singular shutdown, declaring it as the immediate trigger for their action, as well as on the general agitation by the IPOB and perhaps too the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) to achieve an independent republic. When the northern youths who issued their incendiary quit notice would not be arrested, let alone interrogated by the police or other security agencies considering the wider consequences of the vexatious notice, many people began to suspect that the actions of the youths had much more support in the North than first believed. That fact was soon corroborated by the open declaration of support for the youths by some angry northern leaders.
There are two major issues involved in the infamous quit notice. One is the separatist agitation in the Southeast, especially that part of it led by IPOB. Two is the response of the self-appointed northern youths. The second issue is much more germane today, for this column has already tackled the first issue, to wit, the separatist tendencies in the Igbo region. This column has always maintained that without bringing closure to the factors that propelled Nigeria to a civil war, the country would be playing the ostrich to expect that frictions between ethnic groups would always be automatically adjusted and mediated. The reasons for the war have not been tackled, and there is no indication they will be tackled soon. Consequently, the factors that caused the war, whether immediate or remote, will continue to fester. In addition, argued this column not too long ago, President Muhammadu Buhari’s abrasive assessment of and approach to separatist agitations, not to say his more damaging exclusion of the Igbo from the country’s top security apparatus, were bound to worsen the anger and alienation felt by the Southeast.
Of more consequence today, therefore, is the assumption of responsibility by northern coalition groups, both youths and adults, since they have become indistinguishable, to tackle the IPOB/MASSOB agitations. Without doubt, a worrisome part of the North supported the quit notice issued to the Igbo in June, though exasperated political leaders of that region have been sensibly cautious in voicing support or opposition. The core North may overall be highly impacted by the Southeast agitations, but there is nothing to show that it is more highly impacted than other parts of Nigeria, including the Southwest and the Middle Belt. Since the presidency failed to act when the northern coalition issued its ultimatum, the northern youths assumed that the support of their miffed elders and the seeming indifference of the lackadaisical presidency gave fillip to their campaign to put pressure on the Igbo. But while pressure may be brought to bear on the Igbo, it is not certain that the northern groups properly measured, in the same way the presidency is capable of doing, the consequences of those pressures which they inappropriately brought upon the Southeast and the Igbo.
By abdicating its responsibility, and apparently surrendering it to the northern youth coalition, the presidency may be setting the stage for a dangerous escalation of what is building up into a huge crisis. Much worse is the unpalatable fact that the meeting between the self-appointed northern coalition and the equally self-appointed Igbo leaders attempts to diminish the gravity of the malfeasant act of issuing fellow Nigerians quit notices. There are calibrated ways to handle separatist agitations, and the presidency should never have allowed that responsibility to be assumed by any group, no matter how personally offended. It amounts to self-help for any self-appointed group to purport to tackle separatist agitations. That function is the exclusive preserve of government, and anyone who appropriates that function ought to be apprehended by the law in order to prevent both escalation and outbreak of ethnic conflict.
It must be emphasised that separatist agitations are in themselves not a crime, depending on how the campaigns are waged. Often they mask a cry for help, reflect underlying injustices, and indicate that a troubling and destabilising disequilibrium needs to be urgently addressed. What indeed constitutes a dangerous escalation is the response of the self-appointed northern coalition whose countermeasures completely abandons the causes of the friction to focus on the impact of the separatist campaigns on interethnic relationships and business. This is wholly wrong. The presidency should wade into the matter very strongly to calm the raging storm. It must make it clear that self-appointed ethnic teams negotiating with one another will not be tolerated, let alone allowed to organise talks that produce non-binding and illegal resolutions, no matter how sensible.
And more importantly, having unwisely allowed separatist agitations to go on for far too long than is safe, and having also mismanaged them, the government must find quick and very innovative ways of reaching out to disaffected ethnic groups, running an inclusive government — which it is not doing at the moment — and creating conditions and enacting measures capable of healing wounds and promoting social, political and economic justice. The northern youths’ quit notice, the stalemated negotiations between self-appointed ethnic representatives, and the hardening and worsening separatist agitations are an indication of failure of leadership. The presidency has itself to blame. If it does not find a wholesome and realistic solution to the seething discontent ravaging the land, it should be prepared to accept blame for its abdication of responsibility.