Last week, the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, unexpectedly proposed dialogue with the Goodluck Jonathan government wearied by years of uprising in the Northeast. The structure and terms of the dialogue, which the sect expects could lead to a truce and possibly peace, are truly bewildering. But the offer comes at a time of increasing turmoil in that region and amidst fears the violence could still spill over to other parts of the country and even beyond. The sect says it is prepared to give dialogue a chance if the government in turn shows some sincerity in negotiating an end to the violence that has undermined governance in that region since 2009.
Interestingly, the terms of the Boko Haram offer are neither complex nor controversial. Speaking in a telephone conference with journalists in Maiduguri, the deputy leader of the sect, Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez, says the sect wants the government to arrest and prosecute the former governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sherrif, with whom it has a long-standing axe to grind, compensate the sect for its losses, rebuild Mosques destroyed in the 2009 uprising led by the former leader, Mohammed Yusuf, release all arrested sect members, rehabilitate displaced wives and children of members, and ensure that the dialogue take place in Saudi Arabia. It is not the business of the sect what the government hopes to do for Boko Haram victims whose lives and businesses have been shattered. But as difficult as these terms seem, it is unlikely they would be impossible to surmount.
What is in fact difficult is the structure of the dialogue. The sect has asked for what is unprecedented in the annals of peace talks, a request the federal government in its first reaction has not appeared to give deep thoughts to. The sect takes the unusual step of listing the names of those who should represent the government in the talks, and also supplying the names of those who should represent the sect. In other words, the sect does not really expect the government to have a say over who should represent the country, and definitely no say whatsoever over who should represent the sect. As a chronicler of modern history, Palladium cannot recall one instance in which those who levy war against the state have such total control over peace terms and structures. Though the sect was gracious enough to list only five names to represent it, it magnanimously conceded six names to the government side. But it retains control in its entirety over who should sit at the negotiating table. Such temerity.
If indeed it is true that the dialogue offer is really coming from the Boko Haram leadership, it is likely the Jonathan government will give the sect some attention. My private doubts, however, are that the sect merely wishes to needle the government with carrots that are far from anyone’s reach, and taunt it with an offer the sect knows will be rejected offhand. I have never supported dialogue between the government and terrorists, in particular because of the nature of the Boko Haram war against the people of Nigeria. Though Abdulazeez is now attempting to dissociate the sect from much of the violence that has brought the northern parts of the country to heel, claiming that criminal and political Boko Haram were behind some of the violence, it is a fact that the sect itself had in the past claimed responsibility for bombing places of worship and remorselessly indicated its proselytising mission to subject about a half of the country to Sharia rule.
However, I acknowledge that the poignancy of my suggestion that the sect be defeated, both because of its incendiary objectives and its cruel and divisive methods, has been considerably blunted by the scorched-earth methods deployed by the Joint Task Force (JTF) in fighting the insurgency in the region. This column had in recent months drawn attention to the complaints by Borno Elders against the indiscriminate use of force by security agents and the extra-judicial killings that have become a part of the war against the sect. As the latest Amnesty International (AI) report on the crisis shows, the Nigerian government’s unorthodox approach to pacifying the region has led to massive human rights violations. But rather than investigate the Borno Elders’ and Amnesty’s claims, the government has appeared to connive at the unlawful means employed by the JTF in tackling the crisis.
The sect is probably right to say that much of the violence taking place in the Northeast is inspired by forces outside the control of the original Boko Haram. Having set the genie loose, however, the sect’s leaders have proved unable to rein in the renegades who carry out killings in the name of the sect. This ubiquitousness of the sect and its look-alikes, apart from weakening their control, may also have partly convinced the sect’s original leaders that in the end both their goals and the control they so earnestly desire to exercise may even prove difficult to sustain in the long run. The fact is that violence in the region is spiralling out of the control of any group, whether of the real Boko Haram or of the fake Boko Haram, including out of the hands of those who are suspected to be the sponsors of the sect. And as much as the people would have loved to cooperate with the JTF to help end the menace, the security agencies have themselves virtually completely alienated the local populace by their hostile and spiteful methods.
The Boko Haram offer may be curious and dishonest, but it is even more unlikely that they sought the approval of those whose names they have haughtily put forward to represent the government side in the negotiations. Gen Muhhamadu Buhari would of course not agree to by pigeonholed by the sect, for he is smart enough to know that whatever he undertakes in the search for peace would be misconstrued and even used against him both now and in the future. Already, his party, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), has spurned the mediatory offer to the general to be a part of the negotiating team. He is unlikely to accept the offer even if it came from the government itself.
Though I have long advocated that the sect be defeated, I do not see that prospect happening anytime soon. The reason is that the security agencies have alienated the local populace, carried out extra-judicial killings, and generally fought the terrorists with unremitting brutishness. The crisis will naturally continue to spiral. Worse, there is a high possibility that the government’s repressive tactics will gradually turn the hearts of the people towards Boko Haram, especially if the sect cleans up its act, fights those it describes as criminal and political Boko Haram, and shows more consideration to the local populace and sensitivity to their plight. To prevent this from happening, the military authorities must urgently reorganise the fighting forces in the region, insist that officers adhere scrupulously to the rules of engagement, and openly punish every infraction by undisciplined soldiers.
Given some of the recent high-profile killings in the Northeast, many of which were carried out by unknown gunmen, I believe the saddened elders and people of the region would welcome and back concrete and sensible initiatives to bring the violence to an end. The killing of the distinguished civil war general, Muhammadu Shuwa, is a case in point. The government must not think it has all the time in the world, or that the longer the war goes on the more likely the sect would run out of steam. The fear in some quarters is that the longer the war, the higher the chance that one careless killing, whether normal or extra-judicial, or whether inspired by government security agencies or Boko Haram itself, could push the country over the cliff.
Boko Haram has made its own suggestions, as dishonest as the sect may seem. Let the government, which has so far proved incompetent in fighting the menace or finding a way out, also come up with its own initiative to bring the insurgency to an end, re-establish peace, more importantly enthrone justice, which it appears incapable of, and begin the process of rebuilding the blighted Northeast and extirpating the reasons that provoked the rebellion in the first instance. Certainly, we do not have all the time in the world.
