Tag: Nigeria

• By Musa Ilallah

Successive Nigerian governments have tried to close the country’s yawning electricity metering gap, rolling out a series of ambitious programmes with limited success. Today, Nigeria still has a deficit of more than six million meters, out of an estimated 12 million electricity consumers.

Why does metering matter? Is it not simply another way to make Nigerians pay more at a time when wallets and purses are already under severe pressure? In reality, metering delivers benefits that many people do not fully appreciate.

Beyond its direct cost-control advantages for individual consumers—particularly those who have suffered the arbitrariness of estimated billing—metering strengthens the entire electricity system and, by extension, the broader economy. It allows distribution companies (DisCos) to collect revenues more efficiently and transparently. Modern smart meters are sophisticated pieces of technology, capable of collecting, interpreting, and processing granular data.

That data is invaluable. It enables better planning by providing a clearer picture of demand, allowing investments and infrastructure to be targeted more accurately. Crucially, it also makes targeted subsidies possible. With reliable consumption data, government can identify who needs support and where they are, ensuring assistance reaches those at the bottom of the economic ladder. This is standard practice around the world.

For too long, Nigeria has relied on subsidies that are neither targeted nor supported by credible data, resulting in massive losses, fraud, and wastage. The petrol subsidy scandal that erupted in 2012 remains a vivid reminder of what happens when subsidies are applied indiscriminately: those who benefit most are often not those who need help the most.

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Metering, therefore, is of immense importance. It is one of the most underrated pillars of a functioning economy.

President Tinubu’s response to Nigeria’s metering challenge is the new Presidential Metering Initiative (PMI). For perhaps the first time, the issue is being driven by direct presidential intervention—an indication of how seriously the federal government views the problem.

As always, the devil is in the detail. The PMI has mobilised substantial funding from both federal and state governments to finance the rollout of the millions of smart meters required to close the gap. This marks a notable departure from previous efforts, which treated metering almost exclusively as a federal responsibility.

With state governments now involved, there is a broader sense of ownership—an important factor given that states hold equity stakes in the DisCos, who are ultimately responsible for deploying the meters.

Another point to note: the PMI rollout is expected to involve a mix of imported and locally assembled smart meters. The case for local meters is straightforward: Nigeria must deepen local content across all sectors of the economy. This has become even more pressing following the launch of the Nigeria First policy.

The argument for imported meters is equally compelling. The scale and urgency of the task mean that Nigeria cannot afford to rely on a single source. While local manufacturing capacity has grown in recent years, it is not yet sufficient to deliver millions of meters within a short timeframe. In short, patriotism must be balanced with pragmatism.

Beyond local manufacturing, the PMI also promises benefits for local technical capacity. A successful mass rollout will require thousands of trained technicians, creating opportunities for young Nigerians willing to acquire new skills. The initiative plans to oversee such training programmes in collaboration with public and private sector partners.

These skills will likely extend beyond meter installation, forming a foundation for broader electrical expertise applicable to construction, manufacturing, automobiles, and other sectors.

On paper, the PMI appears well thought out and carries many of the hallmarks of a potential jinx breaker. But it must prove itself in practice. Its success will ultimately be judged by the quality and speed of implementation, and by whether it truly departs from past initiatives that stalled or progressed at a crawl.

Public awareness will also be critical. This is where institutions such as the National Orientation Agency can play a supporting role, leveraging their national reach and renewed momentum. For the PMI to succeed, all hands must be on deck. This is not a task for government alone. Every stakeholder in the electricity value chain has a role to play in successful implementation—because when DisCos plug revenue leakages, they are better positioned to meet their obligations to generation companies, which in turn can pay their fuel suppliers. It is yet another example of the cascading benefits of effective metering.

Will the PMI live up to the high expectations surrounding it, or will it follow the path of previous interventions? In 2026, Nigerians should have a clear answer to this all-important question.

• Ilallah  is a public affairs analyst based in Abuja

By Stephen Onyeiwu

Nigerians have been waiting anxiously for the economy to “turn a corner”, following economic reform initiatives undertaken by President Bola Tinubu in 2023. These included removing the country’s fuel subsidy and freeing up its foreign exchange market.

There have been signs of improvement. Key among these are stronger economic growth, and a rise in capital inflows and diaspora remittances. Foreign reserves have risen to the highest level in seven years. Core inflation has declined and the foreign exchange market is less volatile.

But ordinary Nigerians aren’t feeling the benefits. There’s anger and resentment, as evident in the nationwide protest in June 2025 against hunger and insecurity.

How might one explain this mismatch?

The answer lies in living conditions, which have not improved and may well have deteriorated since the economic reforms.

Many Nigerians are still without jobs – the unemployment rate has been estimated at about 30%. But this is an underestimate, considering that millions of under-employed Nigerians in the informal sector are counted as employed.

Because of the lack of jobs, about 93% are engaged in low-income informal sector activities. Public spaces and highways in the country have been taken over by roadside hawkers and other informal sector workers.

Nigerians are also chronically poor and food insecure. According to the World Bank, the number of poor people in Nigeria rose from 81 million in 2019 to 139 million in October 2025. Most have no safety net or means of protection from unforeseen events like illness, natural disasters or loss of jobs.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades, I argue that Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach. Macroeconomic stability can’t be expected to automatically create jobs and alleviate poverty. Time and again, trickle-down economics has been shown to be a flawed economic philosophy.

It is time for the Tinubu administration to take decisive and unprecedented steps to translate macroeconomic improvements into better living conditions for Nigerians.

Why reforms aren’t feeding through

Most Nigerians have not felt the impact of improvements in macroeconomic performance because of the following:

Economic growth is not robust enough: Growth needs to be 6%-8% a year for at least five years, for most Nigerians to feel the impact of an improved economy. Much of that growth must come from labour-intensive sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing and agro-processing.

Jobless growth: Employment-intensive sectors of the economy haven’t been affected by the reforms. The manufacturing sector, for instance, remains weak due to the high cost of imported raw materials, poor infrastructure, competition from cheap imported goods, and the high cost of borrowing.

Income stagnation and declines in real purchasing power: The few Nigerians with jobs have found that their income lags behind the rate of inflation. The fact that Nigeria’s inflation rate has fallen does not mean that prices have decreased. It simply means that prices are rising more slowly than they did before. And the minimum wage in Nigeria is one of the lowest in the world.

Non-inclusivity of growth: The gains from macroeconomic stability in Nigeria have not been broadly shared. There are two reasons. First, the main drivers of growth are sectors that are not labour-intensive: oil and gas, financial services, digital services, hospitality, music, art and design. Second, many Nigerians don’t have the skills and competencies to be employed in these sectors.

Perverse sectoral distribution of capital inflows: Although foreign capital has increased, much of it is portfolio investment in bonds, government treasury bills, and the stocks of financial institutions. The opportunities for employment generation are therefore very limited.

Economic challenges that need to be addressed

To translate recent policy reforms into better living standards, more needs to be done.

Job creation: The government should work with the private sector to resuscitate the manufacturing sector and agro-processing. Incentives should be given to foreign and domestic investors to invest in manufacturing and agro-processing. A rejuvenated manufacturing sector will integrate the Nigerian economy into global value chains.

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Only about 2% of capital inflows this year is foreign direct investment. The rest is portfolio investment in government bonds and securities, as well as corporate stocks – especially in banking. Portfolio investment does not create jobs. Equity investment in manufacturing, agro-processing and even agriculture is preferable for job creation.

Cash transfers: Reduce the huge cost of running the country and use the savings for cash transfers for vulnerable Nigerians. Only about 8.4 million households (out of a population of 238 million) have received cash transfers of between N25,000 and N75,000. This is grossly inadequate. Giving more people cash would represent a big change for many Nigerians, no matter how small the transfer. Cash transfers that are paid for by a reduction in governance cost will not create inflation but enable Nigerians to invest in economic activities and be productive.

Public works: The government should accelerate the rate of job creation by using direct labour for targeted public works projects. Nigeria has many bad roads and dilapidated public buildings.

Streamline the foreign exchange market: There is still a gap between the official and parallel rates of exchange. There are many black-market foreign currency traders. In a well-functioning foreign exchange market, a sprawling black market should not exist.

Reduce the size of the informal sector: This can be done through the development of the manufacturing sector, which will draw surplus labour from the informal sector.

Economic development should be about people, their well-being and their economic dignity. While stabilising the economy, the government should intentionally put in place mechanisms to ensure that macroeconomic improvements result in better living conditions.

Onyeiwu is professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College, Pennsylvania, United States. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the “https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-has-improved-but-ordinary-people-still-feel-the-pinch-economist-offers-some-solutions-271496”

By Hafiz Bakare

In October 2025, the re-designation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) by the Trump administration sparked significant debate regarding its tone and intent.

Nigeria and the United States subsequently found common ground to collaborate on the airstrike which took place on Christmas Day 2025. This collaboration was a direct result of diplomatic engagement that followed significant Nigerian and international reservations about President Donald Trump’s initial communication, which many saw as threatening and misinformed.

The primary reservations regarding President Trump’s communication re-designating Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) on October 31, 2025, focused on its *inappropriate tone, selective framing of the security crisis as purely religious persecution, and a perceived threat to Nigerian sovereignty.

The Nigerian government, led by President Bola Tinubu, strongly refuted the U.S. characterization that Christianity faced an “existential threat,” stating it did not reflect the country’s reality or values. Officials stressed that violence affected citizens of all faiths, including Muslims, and was tied to broader issues like terrorism, resource conflicts, and governance challenges.

Many Nigerians, including ethnic organizations and diplomats, viewed Trump’s subsequent threat of potential U.S. military intervention (“guns-a-blazing”) as an insult to national sovereignty and a dangerous oversimplification that could exacerbate sectarian tensions.

Nigeria’s initial, more assertive diplomatic response was soon replaced with a toned-down version to de-escalate tensions, highlighting internal government deliberation on how to manage the diplomatic friction.

Analysts and some U.S. lawmakers argued that framing Nigeria’s complex security landscape in narrow religious terms was counterproductive and detracted from the wider problem of tackling jihadist violence and widespread insecurity affecting everyone.

Trump’s rhetoric, including threats to enter the country “guns-a-blazing” and instructions to the “Department of War” to prepare for action, was seen as inflammatory and a violation of diplomatic decorum.

Some observers viewed the move as an attempt to appeal to Trump’s domestic religious base in the U.S. rather than a nuanced foreign policy effort.

A visiting bipartisan delegation of U.S. Congress members later clarified that the CPC designation was intended to foster reforms through dialogue and partnership, not military force, dismissing any plans for U.S. troops on the ground.

Experts urged the U.S. to use its leverage to pursue a broader, more nuanced approach to religious freedom that acknowledged Nigeria’s complex, multi-layered crises rather than a single-issue focus.

The two countries did find common ground, leading to a collaborative operation. The U.S. airstrikes on December 25, 2025, targeting ISIS in Sokoto State, were conducted in coordination with and with the approval of Nigerian authorities.

Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar confirmed that President Tinubu gave the “go ahead” for the operation after discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Nigerian government officially described it as a “collaborative effort” and “precision strike operation”. Nigeria provided intelligence and strategic coordination, while U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) carried out the kinetic action at the request of the Nigerian government.

While collaboration was confirmed, a slight divergence remained in the public framing. President Trump’s statements emphasized targeting those “persecuting Christians”, while Nigerian officials stressed the operation was about general counterterrorism and ensuring the safety of all innocent civilians, irrespective of religion.

Yes, the initial reservations have been addressed to a reasonable extent through ongoing dialogue and practical security cooperation. The shift from Trump’s initial threats of unilateral military action to a coordinated operation with Nigerian consent indicates successful diplomatic de-escalation.

Following a high-level meeting in Washington, D.C., in November 2025, both nations agreed to a non-binding cooperation framework and the creation of a Joint Working Group to unify their approach to counter-terrorism and civilian protection.

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Since late November 2025, the U.S. has conducted daily intelligence-gathering flights over Nigeria using contractor-operated aircraft to monitor militant movements and support Nigerian tactical operations.

High-level engagement and bipartisan congressional visits have helped clarify the U.S. intent as partnership and capacity-building rather than “punishment” or “invasion”.

The incident has spurred more concrete actions from the Nigerian government, including a declaration of a nationwide security emergency and planned recruitment of more police officers, demonstrating a commitment to addressing security concerns internally.

In November 2025, Nigeria unveiled its National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Strategic Plan 2025–2030, which prioritizes bilateral cooperation with the U.S. to enhance intelligence analysis and modernize Nigeria’s security architecture.

However, a few Nigerians still have sovereignty concerns despite the collaboration while the fundamental disagreement over whether the violence constitutes “religious persecution” or “regional insecurity” persists, with the U.S. administration and Nigerian government continuing to use different language to describe the same conflict.

Overall, both nations ultimately chose pragmatism, leveraging the moment of diplomatic tension to reinforce their shared interest in counterterrorism, ensuring the bilateral relationship remains a strong, albeit complicated, partnership.

•Bakare is a consultant and a former bank chief executive.

By Lekan Olayiwola

A year of reforms, security operations and civic pressure has left Nigeria with a clearer picture of its strengths and its blind spots as the country enters a decisive political cycle. As institutions move and reforms multiply, Nigerians are sending signals about dignity, trust and recognition that will shape the country’s path in 2026 and beyond.

Nigeria rarely announces its turning points. They surface instead through patterns of repeated decisions, familiar silences, and the slow accumulation of consequences. In 2025, a year thick with reform rhetoric, institutional motion and civic agitation, several realities became newly legible, not because they were unprecedented, but because they could no longer be ignored.

Across security, elections, labour, education, welfare, borders, gender, youth and diplomacy, Nigeria in 2025 did not resemble a state frozen by indecision. Institutions moved. Policies were issued. Operations were launched. Reforms were pursued with visible energy. Yet this motion often lacked alignment between agencies, policy intent and lived outcome; and between action and understanding.

The defining question was therefore not whether the state was acting, but what it was able to hear, absorb and adjust to while acting. What follows is not an indictment, nor a catalogue of failure. It is a careful reading of signals and responses, of convergences and disconnects, and of the widening space between institutional effort and public experience, alongside a cautious projection of what these patterns suggest as Nigeria moves on in 2026.

Governance is working, listening is uneven

One of the clearest lessons of 2025 is that Nigeria’s challenge can no longer be reduced to incapacity. Across sectors, institutions demonstrated technical competence. Elections were organised. Security operations were executed. Revenues tracked. Reforms designed. Data generated. Yet alongside this activity, a quieter pattern emerged.

Institutions processed figures more readily than feelings, systems more easily than suffering. Votes were counted, but many voters felt unseen. Security operations disrupted threats, but communities often felt unheard. Welfare transfers moved resources, yet dignity did not always survive the process. Education spending expanded, even as anxieties around safety and learning outcomes lingered. What became legible was not failure, but a partial vision of governance where lived experience is treated as anecdote rather than evidence.

Policy language drifts from everyday life

Policy language in 2025 grew increasingly sophisticated. Nigerians were offered strategies, frameworks, roadmaps and architectures. Yet everyday life continued to be narrated in terms of checkpoints, unsafe classrooms, porous borders, unexplained hunger, youth without voice. This was not merely a communication problem. It was structural, a widening gap between how power explains reality and how citizens inhabit it.

Where institutions speak in abstraction, citizens respond through emotion: frustration, withdrawal, migration, protest or quiet disengagement. None of these responses are irrational. They are the predictable outcomes of being unseen. The lesson of 2025 is that when governance language floats above lived experience, legitimacy thins quietly even as formal authority remains intact.

Truth is abundant, hearing is selective

Nigeria in 2025 was not short of truth-tellers. Workers raised alarms early. Communities spoke repeatedly. Journalists documented persistently. Analysts warned. Faith leaders reflected. Young people signalled distress, sometimes politely, sometimes disruptively. What emerged was not silence, but selective hearing.

Institutions absorbed truths aligned with stability management and risk containment, while postponing those that demanded deeper moral reckoning. Data travelled faster than testimony. Metrics moved more easily than meaning. This was rarely driven by malice. It was the product of systems designed to prioritise control over comprehension. The effect, however, was familiar: truth circulated widely, but seldom reshaped decisions.

Perhaps the most unavoidable signal of 2025 was that Nigeria’s challenges no longer arrive neatly packaged. Security bleeds into education. Hunger intersects with climate stress. Border failures feed domestic insecurity. Electoral credibility touches youth trust and civic space. Treating these as separate files sustains the appearance of action while preserving fragmentation. Lived experience, however, is cumulative. Citizens feel the full weight at once, not in policy compartments. By the close of 2025, this reality had become increasingly difficult to deny.

Civil society, labour groups and communities were often diagnosing problems earlier than institutions responded to them. Warnings preceded escalation. Signals arrived before crises. Yet formal responses frequently came only when costs rose, and intervention became unavoidable. This lag is not unique to Nigeria, but in a strained governance environment, it carries particular consequences.

If 2025 revealed patterns, 2026 is likely to extend them. Institutions will remain active. Security will stay central. Reforms will continue. Preparations for the next electoral cycle will intensify. What may lag is trust. Unless lived experience is more deliberately integrated into decision-making, action alone may not restore confidence.

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The risk is not collapse, but legitimacy fatigue, a slow erosion of belief that institutions understand the human consequences of their choices. Security responses may stabilise territory while leaving relationships fragile. Electoral systems may function while public faith remains conditional. Youth voices may grow louder or more inventive if recognition continues to be deferred.

Even as formal systems persist, another vocabulary is gaining ground. It speaks of dignity, empathy, care and restoration not as soft ideals, but as governance assets. It insists that experience is evidence, that trust is infrastructure, and that legitimacy cannot be engineered by process alone. This language is not yet dominant. But it is acquiring moral authority precisely because it names what many Nigerians feel is missing.

The question 2025 leaves behind

Nigeria’s central challenge is no longer best framed by asking whether the state can act. A more urgent question is whether the state can listen and learn while acting. Empathy, in this sense, is not sentimentality. It is institutional intelligence: the capacity to treat human experience as data, dignity as a metric, and trust as infrastructure. Where this intelligence is absent, reforms struggle to land. Where it is present, even limited capacity can generate legitimacy.

Nigeria entered 2026 with options still open. The country can continue refining systems while leaving lived experience to chance or it can begin weaving human reality into the centre of governance. This does not require abandoning authority or order. It requires widening the circle of what counts as evidence.

The most enduring legacy of 2025 is that Nigerians did not withdraw. They spoke, warned and imagined better alignment between authority and care. As the country moves forward in 2026, the decisive question is whether institutions will continue to respond after the fact or learn to recognise the signals before trust thins further.

•Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher and policy analyst. He can be reached at lekanolayiwola@gmail.com