With about two months to the April terminal date of the six-month extension of emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states from November last year, the central government will need to stop pussyfooting in the anti-terror campaign against relentless and remorseless Islamic fundamentalism represented by Boko Haram. By that date, if there is no news of success, which is likely, it would mean that a mere militia has defied the country’s armed forces in a virtual war for one year, given that the emergency introduced in May 2013, initially for six months, was extended for the same period.
It is noteworthy that the newly-appointed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Marshall Alex Badeh, in his inaugural statement, indicated the complication that would arise by the end of the extension, if the precarious security situation remained. He said: “I was telling my colleagues that we must bring it to a stop by April 2014 so that we do not have constitutional problems in our hands. We do not want to go back to the Senate and start begging and lobbying.” Referring to the equally new Chief of Army Staff, he added, “If we do our work cohesively, I can say that General Minimah will finish that thing in no time.” It is interesting that he suggested a possible failure of integration. Certainly, glossing over such a critical factor cannot be in the best interest of the operation. Furthermore, lack of cohesion in this context sends a negative message about the professionalism of the forces.
The questions are: Will the presidency seek further extension of emergency rule? Will it toughen the conditions of the emergency? Can it do so without considering the possible political disadvantage to the governing party, especially in view of the approaching 2015 general elections? How will the legislature treat such a development? Can the country afford to have demilitarisation of the troubled areas?
To go by the course of the conflict so far, there is no question that victory against the insurgents within what is left of the emergency period will be a miracle. Evidence of the apparent deadlock was perhaps provided, last week, by the invasion of Konduga, Borno State, with Boko Haram fighters killing 51 residents and abducting 20 girls. Eyewitness accounts said the rebels numbered about 400 and some of them were dressed in military camouflage; they stormed the town in army trucks led by an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC); they unleashed destruction on the community for four hours, and fled around 10pm when a military aircraft intervened. It is instructive that the state governor, Kashim Shettima, who visited the scene, said the attackers “are better armed and better motivated.”
Against this background, the government ought to finally come to the realisation that its counter-terrorism measures are not only ineffectively limited; its approach is also hopelessly inadequate. It is apt to contemplate whether the restrained emergency, with the retention of democratic structures, specifically, elected executive and legislative institutions, which was a politically correct move by President Goodluck Jonathan, is itself not a drawback. In other words, is the theatre of war sufficiently militarised for the purpose?
From the signs, it is illusory to regard this confrontation in terms other than warfare. Therefore, it is important that the armed forces must not pull their punches if indeed they desire to drive home the point that the Islamist group is punching above its weight. This situation calls for a multiplication of force, pure and simple.
In connection with the advocacy of all-out aggression, there is a puzzling paradox in the expected counter-argument, which is based on so-called human rights grounds. The April 2013 incident in Baga, Borno State, which saw the military facing harsh criticism for alleged deployment of excessive firepower in an encounter with Boko Haram, reportedly resulting in high fatalities and structural damage particularly on the part of the civilian populace and the vulnerable, is a good example of how defenders of human rights tend to lose focus of what is really important. Quick to jump to conclusions, devoted antagonists of the administration seized the opportunity to level charges of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity at the army. Indeed, international observers, notably the United Nations (UN), Britain, USA and Human Rights Watch (HRW), understandably expressed concern about the alleged atrocities and called for a probe.
Remarkably, the controversy failed to settle the issue of just how much force is acceptable in this battle. Boko Haram has been on the rampage since 2009, and the rather belated imposition of emergency rule only served to acknowledge the mind-boggling scale of the crisis which has been extremely costly in terms of loss of lives as well as property, not to mention developmental atrophy. For instance, and revealing of the group’s apparent contempt for Badeh’s time-table, not long after he spoke of ending the carnage, the rebels carried out devastating attacks in Adamawa and Borno, which claimed 138 lives.
The truth is that warfare, which is what this is all about, must necessarily come at a price; and the fear of recording unfortunate non-combatant casualties must not be a basis for frowning upon the option of maximum belligerence. What is important, and must be emphasised, is a thoroughly professional approach by the enforcers of the emergency.
Interestingly, the role of the volunteer youths who constitute the Civilian JTF (Joint Task Force), specifically, their selfless informal contribution to the government’s anti-terrorism efforts, not only demonstrates the undeniable value of effective intelligence, which will prove crucial in winning the war; it also underlines the support of the locals for the cause of the armed forces.
Regrettably, there are grave allegations, maybe not unfounded, of an anti-terror racket that is working against the goal of crushing Boko Haram, which would mean a loss of easy state funds for the campaign that end up in private pockets. In addition, it is believed that there are political undercurrents which may have little to do with the supposed religious impulse of the rebels. There is no doubt that these possibilities also hinder progress, just as the limited military operation.
The tragedy of defeat, for that is what the under-performance of the military represents in this case, is that it may likely spur other nonconformists as well reinforce general insecurity across the land. “The war against terror must be won,” Jonathan reiterated while decorating the new military chiefs. However, talk cannot be enough. The seriousness of the situation must be addressed with a sense of totality.
