Author: The Nation

  • Firm mobilises 24-hour global campaign to accelerate clean energy transition

    Firm mobilises 24-hour global campaign to accelerate clean energy transition

    As the world marks the 4th International Day of Clean Energy, Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL) has unveiled plans to roll out a 24-hour global clean energy campaign, anchored by a series of physical and virtual events across Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and other regions.

    The initiative underscores the company’s global mandate to accelerate energy transitions in emerging and developing economies by working at the intersection of energy, climate and development. Through partnerships with governments, development institutions and the private sector, SEforALL supports efforts to decarbonise energy systems, expand energy access and catalyse green industrial growth.

    The campaign will spotlight solutions that deliver sustainable energy to households, businesses, public services and entire economies—opening pathways to a more resilient, inclusive and prosperous future.

    Central to the company’s work is the Universal Energy Facility (UEF), a multi-donor fund launched in 2020 to fast-track progress on SDG7 and the Paris Agreement.

    The UEF provides results-based incentive payments to clean energy companies that deploy verified electricity connections through mini-grids and stand-alone solar systems, as well as clean cooking solutions that meet predefined service standards across Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.

    As part of the International Day of Clean Energy, the company named by the United Nations as one of the official leaders of the Day—will roll out a 24-hour clean energy activation, alongside three flagship events spanning two continents.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    The campaign will focus on two often under-prioritised pillars of the global energy transition: clean cooking and innovative financing models for electricity access in underserved communities.

    Despite notable global progress, more than 2.1 billion people still depend on polluting fuels such as firewood and charcoal for cooking—exposing households to dangerous indoor air pollution, accelerating deforestation and worsening climate change. Meanwhile, large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa remain without reliable electricity, constraining economic growth and access to essential services.

    Driven by the conviction that both challenges are solvable with existing technologies and targeted investment, SEforALL’s Clean Energy Day activities will connect local action with global impact.

    In Lagos, Nigeria, SEforALL will convene policymakers, private-sector leaders and community stakeholders for an in-person Clean Cooking Experience, combining a policy roundtable with live demonstrations of clean cooking technologies available in the Nigerian market. The event will highlight the health, climate and economic gains of transitioning away from polluting fuels.

    In Vienna, Austria, the company will host a high-level event bringing together ambassadors, government officials, international partners, youth leaders and the media to spotlight clean cooking in schools. The programme will feature a panel discussion, a photo exhibition and a reception showcasing how modern cooking solutions can improve health outcomes, protect the environment and enhance education for millions of children globally.

    SEforALL will also mark the fifth anniversary of the Universal Energy Facility, demonstrating how results-based financing is expanding electricity access across Sub-Saharan Africa. The event will include the announcement of a new European Union- and Danish Government–funded initiative aimed at accelerating private-sector investment in green mini-grids in Sierra Leone, alongside the opening of a new call for applications.

    In addition, the company will launch “24 Hours for Clean Energy,” a digital activation inviting individuals, businesses and organisations worldwide to share commitments and actions in support of SDG7. Using the hashtags #InternationalDayOfCleanEnergy and #CleanEnergyDay, participants will help create a shared global moment of visibility and solidarity around clean, affordable and reliable energy.

    By linking grassroots engagement with global advocacy, SEforALL’s Clean Energy Day activations reinforce the message that energy poverty, climate action and development are deeply interconnected—and that solutions delivered in one part of the world generate benefits for all.

  • A model partnership

    A model partnership

    • Seplat, NGIC deserve applause for seeing the ANOH Project through

    Last week, newspapers reported a major development at Seplat Energy Plc’s 300 mmscfd (million standard cubic feet per day) Assa North-Ohaji South (ANOH) processing facility: the crossing of that critical milestone when natural gas is first introduced into processing equipment and pipelines, marking the start of production (first gas).

    Seplat had in a statement on January 16 said that the facility has since commenced gas supply to Indorama, under “firm and interruptible” offtake Gas Sales Agreements (GSAs).

    “Since first gas, wet gas production has been stabilising, delivering 40-52 MMscfd of processed gas directly from the ANOH gas plant to the Indorama Petrochemical Plant. Condensate production has reached 2.0-2.5 kboepd and is expected to increase with gas production as the plant ramps up to design capacity”, the firm further stated.

    Also, preparations, it said, are under way “to initiate sales of processed gas to the Nigeria LNG (NLNG) with an offtake agreement structured on an interruptible basis and will support the gas plant to further scale production towards full design capacity of 300MMscfd.”

    Of particular interest is that the ANOH Gas Processing Company (AGPC) is a joint venture between the Nigerian Gas Infrastructure Company (NGIC) – a subsidiary of the NNPC Limited and Seplat Energy. Its coming on stream reportedly followed the completion of the 11km Indorama gas export pipeline and receipt of regulatory approval from the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC).

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    Seplat will further note on its website – ‘the  integrated plant consists of two 150 MMscfd gas processing units, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) recovery units, condensate stabilisation units, a 16MW power plant and other supporting facilities, and has been built to operate with zero routine flares’.

    The ANOH project, according to Seplat’s chief executive, Roger Brown, would be the first of the seven critical gas development projects identified by the Federal Government to commence operations.

    We commend the company and its partners for seeing the project through to completion. Noteworthy is the company’s goal which, in the words of its chief executive Roger Brown, is ‘to increase energy access for Nigerians in terms of both power and clean cooking fuel for the local communities, while advancing delivery of the company’s mission to support economic prosperity in Nigeria’.

    What makes the development doubly exciting is that this is coming at a time of sustained growth in the gas sector over the past three years, with daily average production hitting 7.59 BSCFD in July 2025 as against the 6.99 BSCFD recorded in 2024 and 6.91 BSCFD posted in the full year of 2023; conversely, there has been a marked reduction in gas flaring from 7.38% in 2023 to 7.55% in 2024 and 7.16% as of July 2025.

    The immediate implication is that the nation’s aspirations in domestic gas utilisation are not only firmly on course, but are being pushed with renewed fervour just as the operators’ eyes are firmly set on the zero flare target.

    We urge the Federal Government and the NNPCL to stay the course. The immediate task here is to push the remaining six projects already identified as critical with the same zeal to ensure their completion.

    The bigger task however remains that of optimising the country’s vast gas potential. Presently, Nigeria is known to hold Africa’s largest natural gas reserves – some 210 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven reserves; yet much of these lie untapped ((some estimates put it at over 200 Tcf) – a mere tip of the iceberg. 

    It is time the NNPCL in particular paid greater attention to growing the sector steadily and progressively through sustained and sustainable partnerships both in the upstream and the downstream gas sectors.

    Now that the AGPC partnership has demonstrated its immense possibilities, the national oil company will certainly do well to explore further collaborations with tested players in the sector to deliver value to Nigerians.

  • Inexplicably wide

    Inexplicably wide

    • We are talking about low interest rates on savings and high bank charges on loans

    The Nigerian economy has turned around for the better, with the headline inflation moving from 26.7% in January, 2025, to 15.2% in December, 2025. The national economy which grew at 3.8% year-on-year in 2025, is projected to grow at 4.1% in 2026.

    But amidst these positive outlooks, banks’ interest rate on savings remains low at 2.7%, while charges for loans are as high as 60% for some sectors of the economy.

    A report released by the Central Bank of Nigeria, in furtherance of its transparency and full disclosure stance, shows that manufacturing, mining and quarrying, public utilities, finance and insurance and construction pay as high as 60% for loans, while oil and gas pay about 46%.

    The capital market loans stand at 19.5%, and power and energy at 48% per annum. At the lower rung, education loan stands at 23%, government loans at 19%, and real estate loans at 46.5%.

    For general commerce, borrowing stands at 45%, water supply, sewage, waste management and remediation activities borrow at 36%, while information and communication stands at 30%.

    So, except for government loans, capital markets and education loans, borrowing for the other sectors are on the high side. We worry about the impact of high borrowing interest rates on the various sectors of the economy.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    In a globalised economy, Nigeria’s cost of production must be comparatively favourable, otherwise the country will be outsourcing jobs to foreign manufacturers.

    In China, which is a major source of imported goods into Nigeria, the average cost of borrowing is between 3-4%. In Thailand, the rate hovered around 6.7% in 2025, while it ranged between 5.4% to 8% in Vietnam, in the same period. In the countries mentioned, the driving force for the low interest rates is the monetary and fiscal policies of the countries.

    So, what could be responsible for the high lending rate in Nigeria?

    Nigeria needs to find answers to what makes lending rates high, if it is to compete in a globalised economy. We believe that an enhanced interest on savings, which stood at about 2.7% in the last year, would help. After all, the banks are custodians of saved funds, which they in turn loan to customers.

    So, if the interest on savings are abysmally low, then customers would not save, and the banks would find it difficult to aggregate the funds to loan to those who need them.

    The other major challenge faced by banks are the harsh operating environment. Banks in the urban and rural areas rely mostly on privately-sourced electricity and security, at huge costs, to function effectively.

    There is also poor credit record in the country, which makes risk management very difficult. That challenge is compounded by lack of a national data base, which allows borrowers to abuse their credit history to the detriment of the banks. Nigeria needs a strong credit bureau to stop such abuses.

    There are corrupt practices afflicting the borrowing culture. While many borrowers use borrowed funds for activities which are different from what the funds are loaned for; corrupt credit risk managers take cuts from the funds loaned to customers.

    There are also insider dealings, where company owners are also directors of banks. Such underlining corrupt practices are usually responsible for most failed banks. We urge for strong oversight policies to stem such insider dealings, and serious punishments for those who get involved.

    To reduce the high cost of borrowing for the real sector, the Federal Government and its monetary and fiscal policy authorities must find answers to these challenges.

    What baffles the ordinary Nigerian is how banks declare humongous profits, pay incredible benefits to their management staff, and yet claim that the operating environment is too harsh to make lending rates reasonable.

  • Senate, pass the electoral law amendment bill

    Senate, pass the electoral law amendment bill

    • By Tochukwu Jimo Obi

    Sir: The lingering delay in the passage of the Electoral Act Amendment Bill by the Senate is not just worrisome; it constitutes a clear and present danger to the successful conduct of the 2027 general elections. Electoral reforms are time-sensitive, and any hesitation at this critical stage threatens to undermine public confidence in the democratic process.

    It is important to note that the House of Representatives has already done its part by passing the amendment bill. The burden now rests squarely on the Senate, whose inaction raises serious concerns about institutional commitment to electoral credibility. When one arm of the legislature moves ahead while the other stalls, the entire reform process is weakened, and the country pays the price.

    More troubling is the fact that the timeline for political party primaries, as stipulated by law, is fast approaching. With only a few months left before these primaries are expected to commence, the absence of a clear and updated legal framework creates confusion for political parties, aspirants, and electoral managers alike. This uncertainty opens the door to legal disputes, inconsistent interpretations of the law, and avoidable conflicts.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    The delays also place the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in an extremely difficult position. Electoral management is not an event but a long process that requires early planning, legal clarity, and timely execution. INEC ought to have begun resolving key operational and technical issues by now, especially those that depend on the amended provisions of the law.

    Of particular concern is procurement. Election materials, technology, logistics, and training all require substantial lead time. Delays in passing the amendment bill restrict INEC’s ability to plan effectively, initiate procurement processes, and align its operations with the anticipated legal framework. This not only strains the commission administratively but also increases the risk of last-minute arrangements that could compromise efficiency and transparency.

    There is little doubt that if the amendment bill is passed in good time and subsequently assented to by President Bola Tinubu, the 2027 general elections stand a real chance of being an improvement on what Nigerians witnessed in 2023. Electoral reforms, when properly implemented, strengthen institutions, reduce disputes, and enhance voter confidence.

    The Senate must therefore rise above partisan interests and procedural delays. National interest demands urgency, focus, and responsibility. Electoral credibility is a shared obligation, and history will judge harshly any institution that fails to act when the stakes are this high.

    •Tochukwu Jimo Obi,

    Obosi, Anambra State.

  • Nigeria’s security partnership with the U.S

    Nigeria’s security partnership with the U.S

    Sir: On January 22, Nigeria and the United States held the inaugural session of the U.S.–Nigeria Joint Working Group in Abuja — a diplomatic and strategic engagement born from mounting international concern over insecurity, religious freedom, and civilian protection in Africa’s most populous nation. Led on the Nigerian side by National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu and on the U.S. side by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker, the meeting underscored the complex interplay between national sovereignty, international scrutiny, and the imperatives of cooperation in confronting what both governments described as endemic threats to human security.

    The working group emerged in the aftermath of the United States’ re-designation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act in October 2025 — a move triggered by allegations of systemic violations of religious freedom, particularly against Christian communities. The designation, and the diplomatic tensions that followed, signalled a shift in U.S. policy toward Nigeria’s chronic insecurity, compelling a bilateral conversation that now seeks to translate contention into coordinated action.

    At face value, the establishment of a joint working group reflects shared interests: both governments publicly profess a commitment to reducing violence, safeguarding religious freedom, and ensuring that all Nigerians can practise their faith without fear. Hooker emphasised the need to deter violence against vulnerable groups, investigate attacks, and hold perpetrators accountable; a statement intended to resonate with universal human rights norms.

    Yet beneath the diplomatic language lie deeper questions about narrative framing, national agency, and the practical realities of security governance. Nigeria has long grappled with multifaceted threats — Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, banditry and kidnappings in the North-central states, and communal conflicts that defy simple categorisation. In many of these theatres, violence affects Christians and Muslims alike, raising important questions about the extent to which religious identity accurately explains the patterns of insecurity.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    This contextual complexity means that the bilateral dialogue, while necessary, must be grounded in a nuanced understanding of Nigeria’s security architecture and socio-political dynamics. For instance, recent abductions in Kaduna State, one of the catalysts for the high-level engagement underscore how criminal violence and terrorist opportunism often intersect with governance failures that transcend sectarian boundaries. Any credible partnership must therefore avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and instead address root causes such as poverty, state capacity deficits, and fractures in community trust.

    Moreover, the working group’s emphasis on religious freedom ought not to be detached from the broader rule of law and human security framework. Nigeria’s plural society, as NSA Ribadu rightly emphasised, does not allow for selective protection. Violence framed along religious lines must be treated as an attack on the state itself, a declaration that underlines the government’s constitutional commitment to citizens of all faiths. Yet turning such principles into durable policy action demands more than diplomatic proclamations; it requires tangible reforms in policing, intelligence sharing, judicial accountability, and community engagement.

    The U.S. role in this partnership also raises questions about equilibrium and influence. While increased cooperation including intelligence sharing, technology support, and potentially defence assistance can enhance Nigeria’s capacity to confront violent extremism, it must not overshadow the imperative of preserving Nigerian sovereignty or create perceptions of external imposition. Legitimate security cooperation should empower Nigeria to build its own institutional resilience rather than foster dependency or undermine local ownership of solutions.

    Furthermore, the current environment of heightened scrutiny, both domestically and internationally; highlights the importance of data integrity and transparent reporting on incidents of violence. Civil society organisations, government statisticians, and security agencies must collaboratively generate credible evidence that informs policy decisions and counters the proliferation of exaggerated or de-contextualised narratives that risk inflaming tensions or eroding public trust.

    Ultimately, the Joint Working Group is a diplomatic instrument that can yield strategic dividends only if it is matched by political will, accountability, and operational coherence. Its success should be measured not by the frequency of meetings or the rhetoric of communiqués, but by measurable improvements in civilian protection, verifiable decreases in targeted violence, and strengthened institutional mechanisms that uphold religious freedom and human dignity.

    Nigeria’s security challenges are vast and entrenched, but they are not beyond solution. A partnership with the United States offers resources, expertise, and a platform for joint action. Yet for this cooperation to be transformative, it must embrace holistic strategies that integrate security, development, justice, and human rights, and it must be anchored in the lived realities of everyday Nigerians who yearn for peace, stability, and freedom.

    •Felix Oladeji,

    Lagos.

  • Abba Yusuf, Kwankwaso and politics of mandate

    Abba Yusuf, Kwankwaso and politics of mandate

    • By Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu

    Sir: In Kano today, politics is no longer whispered in corridors; it is argued loudly in markets, mosques and on social media timelines. Since Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s reported decision to part ways with the NNPP, the city has become a theatre of competing loyalties, sharp sarcasm and deeper constitutional questions. Supporters have reduced complex political choices into street labels. Beneath the banter, however, lies a serious national issue: who truly owns a political mandate?

    Governor Abba Yusuf did not emerge from a vacuum. His ascent to the Kano Government House was inseparable from the Kwankwasiyya political machinery, a movement painstakingly built by Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso over two decades. From red caps to ideological messaging, the movement transcended party platforms and became a political identity. In the 2023 elections, many voters did not merely vote for a party; they voted for Kwankwasiyya as a symbol of continuity, defiance and populist appeal.

    Yet, Abba Yusuf is no ceremonial beneficiary. He contested, won, survived legal battles and now governs with all the constitutional powers vested in an elected governor. His mandate, in law, is personal. Once sworn in, no political godfather—however influential—can legally issue directives from outside the Government House. This is where the tension lies: the clash between moral ownership of political capital and constitutional authority of office.

    Kwankwaso’s influence in Kano politics is undeniable. Beyond elections, he represents a moral compass for millions who see him as a symbol of resistance against elite dominance. His supporters’ anger is therefore not merely partisan; it is emotional and ideological. To them, Abba Yusuf’s political identity was inseparable from Kwankwaso’s shadow.

    However, governance demands autonomy. A governor who appears perpetually tethered to an external authority risks administrative paralysis and legitimacy questions. Abba Yusuf’s defenders argue that Kano cannot be governed from outside its constitutional structures. They insist that the electorate voted not just for Kwankwaso’s endorsement but for Abba Yusuf’s promise to lead.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    The real casualty in this contest, unfortunately, risks being governance itself. When political energy is consumed by loyalty tests and factional supremacy, policy focus suffers. Kano’s challenges—urban congestion, youth unemployment, education deficits and security concerns—require a governor fully immersed in administration, not constant political firefighting.

    There is also the electoral implication. While Kwankwasiyya remains a formidable grassroots force, incumbency is a powerful weapon. State resources, visibility and administrative control can reshape political narratives quickly. The assumption that loyalty automatically translates into electoral dominance may underestimate the pragmatism of Nigerian voters, especially when power dynamics shift.

    Yet, Abba Yusuf’s path is equally fraught. Detaching from a movement that delivered his victory carries political costs. Kano’s electorate is emotionally invested, and symbols matter. If his administration fails to convincingly outperform expectations, the narrative of ingratitude could harden into electoral punishment.

    Ultimately, this is not just a Kano story; it is a Nigerian one. It forces a national reflection on whether mandates belong to parties, movements, godfathers or the individuals elected by the people. The Constitution is clear, but politics rarely is.

    Perhaps the wisest outcome lies not in triumph or humiliation but in recalibration. Political movements must learn to institutionalise beyond personalities, while elected officials must acknowledge the moral debts that brought them to power. Neither absolute loyalty nor total independence offers a sustainable path.

    In Nigeria’s democracy, mandate is both a legal instrument and a moral contract. Kano’s unfolding drama reminds us that ignoring either side of that equation comes at a cost—sometimes heavier than any political suffering.

    •Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu,

    Abuja.

  • Junta makeover in Guinea

    Junta makeover in Guinea

    A couple of weeks ago in Guinea, Mamady Doumbouya, a general who led a 2021 military takeover in the West African country, got sworn in as civilian president. He thereby transitioned from being a military usurper in power to becoming a popularly  elected ruler of his people. Doumbouya, 41, took office for a presidential term that was only recently elongated to seven years, from a previous timeline of five years. Under new alterations to Guinea’s constitution, the term is renewable once.

    The presidential inauguration took place in front of tens of thousands of supporters and several heads of state, Doumbouya having been declared winner of a poll that held 28th December, 2025, in his country. Presidents from Rwanda, The Gambia, Senegal and some other African countries as well as pricipals of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission were in attendance. Nigeria’s Vice President Kashim Shettima represented President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the event, alongside the vice presidents of China, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea. Even officials from France and the United States were on hand. Assimi Goïta, a general who has led neighbouring Mali since a military takeover in 2020, also graced the occasion.

    The election on which Doumbouya rode to shed his military garb was the first in Guinea since he toppled President Alpha Condé four years earlier. He had justified that military takeover on alleged corruption and economic mismanagement under Condé, who in 2010 became the country’s first freely elected president since its 1958 independence from France. During the four years of junta rule, the military dissolved state institutions and suspended Guinea’s constitution as it negotiated with regional bodies, including ECOWAS, on restoration of democratic civilian government. Meanwhile, the junta was widely reported to have cracked down on civil liberties, banned protests and harassed political opponents under Doumbouya’s leadership. Whereas he initially pledged not to run for president when he seized power, Doumbouya stood election against eight other candidates in the December 2025 election. Reports said formidable opponents stayed away in exile, and the opposition at some point called for poll boycott . Following the election, Guinea’s supreme court affirmed Doumbouya as having received 86.7 percent of the vote.

    Besides reneging on his initial promise not to run for election, Doumbouya oversaw the rewriting of Guinea’s constitution to permit members of the military leadership to run for office, and extend the presidential term from five years to seven. Critics argued that his clampdown on political opponents and dissent left him with no major challenger in the December poll, such that analysts predicted an easy victory for him. The election runner-up who won 6.59 percent of the vote filed a petition accusing Guinea’s electoral body of manipulating the results in Doumbouya’s favour, but he withdrew the petition even before the supreme court gave a verdict.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    Dressed in a traditional gown at his inauguration as president in a ceremony at the General Lansana Conte Stadium on the outskirts of Conakry, the Guinean capital, Doumbouya swore an oath to uphold the constitution that was only in September altered to allow him to stand for election. “I swear before God and before the people of Guinea, on my honour, to respect and faithfully enforce the Constitution, the laws, regulations and judicial decisions,” he said. Accompanied by his wife, Lauriane Doumbouya, he told the capacity-filled arena he would uphold the tenets of democracy, transparent governance and the interest of all Guineans at all times. He also stressed that under his watch, the country’s peace and national cohesion would not be compromised. His ascension as an elected president is the perfect playbook for makeover from junta rule to civil rule.

    From the moment he seized power in September 2021, Doumbouya showed a knack for influencing the political space. Just 36 years old at the time, the broad-shouldered colonel and a relatively unknown member of Guinea’s elite army unit accused the government of ousted Condé of having disregarded democratic principles and that citizens’ rights were trampled on. But his own time as junta head did not exactly promote democratic rights. While seemingly enjoying some popular support because many Guineans were frustrated with the failures of civilian leadership, politicians questioned Doumbouya’s democratic credentials because political parties were banned by his junta, activists allegedly disappeared mysteriously and media outlets were shut down. Even the election he won by landslide was argued to be a sham as he ran in a severely depleted field. A former prime minister now on exile was reported describing the process as a charade and the outcome “fabricated.”

    Ahead of his poll victory, the soldier-man, now a general, often ditched his military camouflage in favour of traditional Guinean attire of loose-fitting robes with elaborate embroidery or casual sportswear. He maximised populist opportunities, with pictures showing him at the opening of schools, or transport and mining infrastructure, or cycling through the streets of Conakry, the capital. The message, obviously, was that he is a man of action working for the people. “He presented an image of someone who can be close to civilians, who fits with being a civilian leader and can be a representative of the people,” one analyst was cited saying. “In some ways, he was distancing himself from what brought him to power namely a coup, and the fact that his entire career has been in the military,” the analyst added.

    Doumbouya’s background aided his political transformation. In the 15 years before he seized power, he gained extensive international exposure, including being educated in France and serving in the French foreign legion. He was at different points of his career in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Central African Republic, Israel, Cyprus and the United Kingdom. And because the 2021 coup was widely welcomed by Guineans, he has remained a popular figure.

    Since his junta days, the new president cultivated a reputation for seeking to put Guineans in control of their own economic destiny. In a country grappling with high levels of poverty despite abundant natural resources, including the world’s largest reserves of bauxite and iron ore deposits, this aspiration struck a chord. Doumbouya’s leadership attracted a 75 percent Chinese-owned mining project to revitalise Guinea’s ailing economy, with production commencing last year at a major iron ore site after decades of inaction. The success or otherwise of this project may define his incoming presidency, as he appears determined to keep some of the processing and value-added parts of the industry in Guinean hands to ensure greater benefits. Across the broader mining sector, his government cancelled dozens of contracts over the past year where it was felt that affected firms were not investing in Guinea. “This move towards resource nationalism makes him look like a local hero, like he’s really fighting for the rights of his citizens even if that means business disruptions,” one analyst was reported saying.

    The emphasis on national interest also informed a pragmatic approach to international relations. Unlike coup leaders elsewhere in the sub-region, Doumbouya has not outright rejected former colonial power, France, in favour of Russia. But neither, despite his background in France and having a French wife, has he been accused of being a puppet of Paris. He very much wants to be seen as running things primarily in the interests of his country’s 15 million population, half of which is currently mired in poverty and experiencing record levels of food insecurity according to World Food Program (WFP) reports.

    With his switch from khaki to civvies and the world applauding, Doumbouya holds out a guidelight to military usurpers digging their heels into power elsewhere. Already in West Africa, juntas in the Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have spurned international pressure for swift return to civilian rule and decreed prolonged transitions. In Mali, Goïta’s government approved a bill for a five-year renewable term for the head of state, following a national dialogue boycotted by political parties. In Burkina Faso, the junta led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré extended its rule till at least 2029, reneging on an earlier promise to hold elections in 2024. In Niger, coup leader Abdourahamane Tchiani was in recent months sworn in for a five-year transition, aiming to rule until 2030 at least.

    These junta leaders initially postured as interim messiahs interested in stabilising their countries and swiftly handing over to elected dispensations in which they would take no part. If they now want to take a cue from Doumbouya, they should, at least, submit to electoral processes to whitewash their lust for power.

    •Please join me on kayodeidowu.blogspot.be for conversation.

  • Rural insecurity behind Nigeria’s food crisis

    Rural insecurity behind Nigeria’s food crisis

    • By Lekan Olayiwola

    Nigeria’s food crisis is often described in the language of numbers: inflation rates, tonnage of grains lost, millions displaced, and millions hungry. These figures matter but they obscure a deeper truth that is now impossible to ignore. Nigeria’s food insecurity is inseparable from its peace deficit.

    Not peace understood narrowly as the absence of war, but peace as the presence of functioning rural systems including security, markets, trust, and governance that allow food to move from soil to table. It is time to rethink priorities, align food policy with peacebuilding, and to address blindspots that well-intentioned strategies have left untouched.

    Food security is a peace question, not only an agricultural one

    Over 90% of Nigeria’s food is produced by smallholder farmers. When these farmers are displaced, intimidated, or cut off from markets, food security collapses regardless of how many fertiliser programmes or mechanisation schemes exist on paper. Since 2019, more than 2.2 million Nigerians have been displaced by farmer–herder violence, banditry, and insurgency, largely across the Middle Belt and northern states.

    These are not marginal regions. They are core food-producing zones whose disruption reverberates nationally. Broken planting cycles reduce supply; insecurity raises transport costs; scarcity feeds inflation. Food inflation is therefore not merely a macroeconomic problem. It is the economic expression of unresolved rural conflict.

    Collapsing rural market systems

    The least discussed and most consequential dimension of Nigeria’s food crisis is the collapse of rural market systems and logistics networks. Markets are institutions of trust not just places of exchange. Violence disrupts this trust long before it destroys production. Traders stop travelling. Storage facilities fall idle. Processing mills shut down. Informal credit dries up. What remains is a fragmented economy where food may exist in pockets but cannot move.

    This explains a paradox increasingly visible across Nigeria: surplus rotting in some areas, hunger intensifying in others, and prices rising everywhere. It also explains why well-meaning humanitarian cash transfers sometimes backfire. Where local supply chains are broken, cash fuels demand for imported processed food rather than stimulating local agriculture. The result is dependency without recovery.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    Mapping market collapse: Borno, Zamfara and Benue

    National averages conceal profound regional differences. Understanding where and how markets have collapsed is essential to crafting effective policy. In Borno State (aid dependency without markets), the epicentre of the Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgency, agricultural collapse is near-total in many local government areas. Farmers have been displaced into camps; vast tracts of arable land are inaccessible. Markets exist physically, but function weakly, sustained largely by humanitarian supply chains rather than local production.

    With the World Food Programme now warning that assistance will be cut from over one million people to fewer than 100,000 due to funding shortfalls, Borno faces a dangerous transition from aid-supported survival to market failure without a bridge in between. Food insecurity here is acute not only because of violence, but because no viable rural market system is ready to replace humanitarian distribution.

    Zamfara State (production under extortion) represents a different pathology. Farming has not disappeared, but it has been absorbed into a criminal economy. Local intelligence and field reports consistently show that farmers who remain on their land are forced to pay “taxes” to armed groups to plant, harvest, or transport produce.

    The result is a shadow price system. Food is grown, but at inflated cost; traders avoid the region; transporters charge premiums or refuse routes altogether. What reaches national markets arrives expensive and scarce. Here, food inflation is driven less by displacement than by violent rent-seeking embedded in rural production.

    Benue State (market disruption in the breadbasket), often called Nigeria’s “food basket”, illustrates perhaps the most overlooked danger. Large-scale displacement from farming communities has not only reduced output, but fractured local markets that once connected surplus producers to urban consumers.

    Unlike Borno, Benue has not been heavily humanitarianised. Unlike Zamfara, criminal control is more diffuse. The damage lies in the erosion of trust, mobility, and coordination; farmers fear returning, traders fear rural routes, and markets hollow out quietly. The national food system loses one of its most reliable anchors.

    Implications of the UN hunger warnings

    UN agencies project that nearly 35 million Nigerians may face acute food insecurity in 2026, with northern states disproportionately affected. These warnings are often read as humanitarian alerts. They should also be read as economic and political signals. Crucially, the crisis is unfolding alongside a collapse in global humanitarian funding.

    In northeast Nigeria, food aid is being cut precisely as the lean season approaches. This creates what field analysts describe as a “hunger vacuum”; aid withdraws before markets recover, leaving communities with neither production nor purchasing power. Without functioning rural markets, humanitarian withdrawal does not restore self-reliance; it accelerates crisis.

    Government policy: Necessary, But not sufficient

    Vice President Kashim Shettima’s remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos correctly framed food security as a national security issue. Programmes focused on climate-resilient crops, agricultural finance, and “food security corridors” acknowledge key challenges. Yet there remains a disconnect between policy design and rural reality.

    Most interventions assume that farmers can access land, produce can reach markets, and that markets exist to absorb supply. In many conflict-affected regions, none of these assumptions hold. Fertiliser is irrelevant if fields are inaccessible. Improved seeds are meaningless if transport corridors are unsafe. Credit schemes falter where traders have withdrawn. This is not a failure of intent. It is a gap in diagnosis.

    Why peacebuilding must enter food policy

    Food security strategies that ignore peacebuilding risk becoming exercises in technical futility. Security operations alone cannot rebuild markets; neither can subsidies without safety. What is needed is a shift from seeing peace and food as separate policy domains to recognising them as mutually reinforcing systems.

    This includes securing rural trade corridors, not only farms, to allow produce to move safely. Rebuilding local markets and storage infrastructure alongside agricultural support. Supporting community-level dispute resolution over land and mobility, restoring the social contracts that underpin production. Designing hybrid aid–market models that gradually replace food handouts with local procurement and market stimulation.

    From emergency response to structural repair

    Nigeria’s food crisis did not emerge overnight, and it will not be resolved by slogans or summits. It is the cumulative result of insecurity, governance gaps, and the slow erosion of rural systems that once worked. The path forward lies not in choosing between security, agriculture, or humanitarian action, but in integrating them. Sustainable peace is not a by-product of food security; it is one of its foundations.

    If policy can recognise this, treating market restoration with the same seriousness as fertiliser distribution, Nigeria can begin to stabilise not just prices, but livelihoods. The alternative is a cycle of crisis management that grows more expensive, more fragile, and more dangerous with each passing season.

    •Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher/policy analyst. He can be reached at lekanolayiwola@gmail.com

  • U.S. winter storm leaves 1 million without power

    U.S. winter storm leaves 1 million without power

    • Heavy snow forces 10,000 flight cancellations
    • 24 states issue emergency declarations

    More than 1 million customers in the U.S. as far west as New Mexico were without electricity and over 10,000 flights were cancelled  yesterday during a monster winter storm that paralyzed eastern and southern states with heavy snow and ice.

    As snow, sleet, freezing rain and dangerously frigid temperatures swept into the eastern two-thirds of the nation yesterday, the number of power outages continued to rise. As of 2:16 p.m. EST (1916 GMT) yesterday, more than 1 million U.S. customers were without electricity, according to PowerOutage.us, with at least 330,000 in Tennessee and over 100,000 each in Mississippi and Louisiana. Other states affected included Texas, Kentucky, Georgia, West Virginia and Alabama.

    Roughly 245 million people across 40 states — stretching all the way from New Mexico and Texas to parts of New England and the South — are expected to be affected by what could potentially be a historic storm.

    At least 24 states have issued emergency disaster declarations ahead of the winter storm: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Washington, D.C., has also declared a state of emergency.

    Impacts from the snow and ice are expected to cause power outages, widespread travel shutdowns and school closures. “In the wake of the storm, communities from the southern Plains to the Northeast will contend with bitterly cold temperatures that will hamper cleanup efforts, prolonging infrastructure impacts and hazardous travel into at least early next week,” the National Weather Service said.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    More than 10,800 U.S. flights scheduled for yesterday were canceled, according to flight tracking website FlightAware. Over 4,000 flights were canceled on Saturday.

    Washington, D.C.’s Ronald Reagan National Airport said airlines had canceled all flights at the airport yesterday. FlightAware data indicated that more than 80% of yesterday flights were canceled for several airports in large metropolitan regions, including New York, Philadelphia and Charlotte, N.C.

    Delta Air Lines (DAL.N), opens new tab yesterday said that it intended to operate on a reduced schedule “subject to real-time frozen precipitation and afternoon storm conditions.”

    The airline had adjusted its schedule on Saturday, with additional cancellations in the morning for Atlanta and along the East Coast, including in Boston and New York City, and said it would move experts from cold-weather hubs to support de-icing and baggage teams at several southern airports.

    The National Weather Service’s latest forecast for yesterday through Monday morning calls for heavy snow from the Ohio Valley to the Northeast, including up to 18 inches in New England. Much of the Southeast and parts of the Mid-Atlantic are expected to get rain and freezing rain.

    Forecasters predicted “bitterly cold temperatures and dangerously cold wind chills” from the southern plains to the Northeast in the wake of the storm, bringing “prolonged hazardous travel and infrastructure impacts.”

    Calling the storms “historic,” President Donald Trump on Saturday approved federal emergency disaster declarations in South Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Indiana, and West Virginia.

    Seventeen states and the District of Columbia declared weather emergencies on Saturday, the Department of Homeland Security said.

    Power lines could be particularly vulnerable because of the potential for ice, officials said.

    “The situation with this storm is pretty unique, just because it’s going to stay cold for a period of time,” Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem said on the “Fox News yesterday Briefing” program. “This ice that has fallen will keep those lines heavy, even if they haven’t gone down immediately.”

    The Department of Energy on Saturday issued an emergency order authorizing the Electric Reliability Council of Texas to deploy backup generation resources at data centers and other major facilities, aiming to limit blackouts in the state.

    Yesterday, the DOE issued an emergency order to authorize grid operator PJM Interconnection to run “specified resources” in the mid-Atlantic region, regardless of limits due to state laws or environmental permits.

    U.S. electric grid operators on Saturday stepped up precautions to avoid rotating blackouts.

    Dominion Energy (D.N), opens new tab, whose Virginia operations include the largest collection of data centers in the world, said if its ice forecast held, the winter event could be among the largest to affect the company.

  • Katsina’s peculiar banditry

    Katsina’s peculiar banditry

    Katsina State has been in the news, albeit for unsavoury reasons. Still grappling with the backlash of its decision to free 70 bandits facing trials in various courts, the state government scored another low with reports that one of its local governments has set aside N300 million in the 2026 budget for the payment of ransom to bandits.

    Former Secretary to the State Government, Mustapha Inuwa who stated this also disclosed that several councils grappling with insecurity usually make monthly payments running into millions of naira to bandits operating in their areas.  He fears the community-initiated peace with bandits in 18 local government areas of the state will retard overall development and progress.

    Under the deal, hundreds of villagers abducted by the rampaging bandits were said to have been freed. The proposed freeing of the 70 bandits facing trials is the second arm of the deal. So, it would seem a fait accompli.

    Inuwa’s disclosure on the budget for bandits has upped the ante in the controversy that recently rocked Katsina State due to its decision to free 70 bandits facing trials in the courts. Sequel to mounting criticisms over the controversial decision, the state government had sought to rationalise its decision to free the bandits on the grounds of consolidating a peace deal entered into between communities affected by insecurity and repentant bandits.

    Hear the state Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Nasir Muazu, “World over, everyone knows that after a war is fought, there are usually prisoner exchanges. If you take Nigeria for example, during the civil war, many prisoners were set free and exchanged between the Nigerian side and the Biafran side”.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    He also drew parallels with the release of Boko Haram prisoners after an agreement was reached even as he linked the freedom of Chibok school girls to the release of some Boko Haram prisoners. “So, it is not an issue of whether an offence has been committed or not, so long as there is peace. The issue is that prisoner exchange is not a new thing in the history of war and peace”, the commissioner asserted.

    The two incidents stand out the Katsina State government very distinctly in the curious manner it responds to the challenges of banditry. But they also signpost the reasons banditry seems to be taking a very dangerous dimension in that state. This is not the first time that state government is treading this dangerous path.

    During the previous regime of Aminu Masari, the government had entered into controversial peace pacts with the bandits for the cessation of attacks on rural communities. Various incentives were offered them including money for peace to reign. In one instance, the governor posed in a photograph with bandits’ leaders clutching sophisticated weapons as a sign of a purported peace accord and eventual reining in of the marauders.

    It did not take long before the bandits went back to their former criminal ways rendering the purported peace accord a nullity. The situation has even got worse with Masari’s exit from power. The complications posed by that noxious policy must have led the current state governor to the plan to free 70 bandits standing trials under a dubious peace accord they entered into with the communities. But the disconcerting thing here is the inability of the present regime to learn from the mistakes of previous endeavours. Even then, the propositions, as well as the arguments canvassed by the state government as justification, are largely flawed.

    There is the challenge of the propriety in discontinuing the court trials for offences the bandits allegedly committed. What of accountability for the crimes they were alleged to have committed? And is Katsina State government not indirectly rewarding criminality given the tendency of such reprieve emboldening criminals to hold the state to ransom as the current situation suggests?

    Even then, the comparisons of prisoner exchange which Muazu cited are largely flawed. It gives the miserable impression that Katsina State is a sovereign state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Or are we contending with the verity of a bandits’ republic which this column has in many articles severally simulated?

    The argument that many villagers abducted by the bandits across 18 local government areas have already been freed under the agreement makes the matter more frightening. The war against banditry is largely a federal endeavour even as the support of other levels of government cannot be discountenanced.

    It is inherently wrong for the Katsina State government to seek parallels between the prisoner exchange of the Nigerian civil war and the criminality of the bandits standing trials at the courts.

    Yes, there may have been prisoner exchange before the Chibok girls were released. But the fact is that such gestures never went down well with the public. Neither have they been able to stem the tide of Boko Haram insurgency till date. The uncanny irony is that some of those released under such deals were known to have gone back to their former evil ways with greater vengeance and lethality. The same fears are being evoked by the proposed freeing of 70 bandits on the guise of seeking elusive peace.

    It will not only compromise security but result in counterproductive outcomes. That such deals do not lead to fruitful outcomes except regularly oiling the purses of the bandits is evidenced by the setting aside a whooping N300 million by a local government to settle bandits. It has become a recurrent expenditure with no benefit to the common people of the state.

    But the step taken by that local government should not come as a surprise. Not with the recent advocacy by fiery Islamic scholar, Sheik Ahmad Gumi. He had at the peak of the US threats to attack Nigeria warned against such attacks with a call on governments to include the bandits in the budget. So, the said local government may just be hearkening to Gumi’s call especially in the absence of official condemnation of that dangerous proposition.

    That is perhaps, all that is needed to grow banditry as an industry. It is a vicious cycle that will not only swell the industry in Katsina and beyond but also stall all efforts to convey public goods and services to the traumatised rural communities. Things cannot continue this way without serious repercussions to law and order; the authority and sovereignty of the Nigerian state.

    Duplicity in responses of various levels of government and their agencies to banditry, kidnapping and associated criminalities accounts for why mass abductions are getting out control. That was the troubling scenario in penultimate Sunday’s initial denial by the police and the state government of the serial kidnap of 177 worshippers from three churches in Kurmin Wali, Kajuru Local Government Area of Kaduna State. The indecent haste of the denial threw complications into the incident, stalled quick response and rescue and allowed the bandits to ferry the captives to hidden dungeons.

    Neither the purported remoteness of the area nor the imperative for caution should stand as excuse for that embarrassing bungle. It really spoke volumes on the nation’s responses to metastasizing security infractions.