Category: Letters

  • Deception of early rain: Navigating 2026 farming season

    Deception of early rain: Navigating 2026 farming season

    Sir: As we enter the 2026 planting cycle, the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) has issued a stern warning that every farmer and policymaker must heed: do not be fooled by the “pseudo-rains.”

    The recent heavy downpours witnessed in parts of the South and West are not the heralds of the growing season, but a climatic mirage. Vincent Weli, NiMet’s Director of Weather Services, has been clear: these rains are unlikely to last beyond two weeks, and a harsh dry spell is set to follow. For a farmer, planting now is not an act of faith; it is a gamble against the odds that could lead to total crop failure.

    Historically, farmers relied on ancestral wisdom, the behaviour of migratory birds or the flowering of specific trees to time their planting. But in an era of rapid climate change, these traditional calendars are being shredded. We are seeing delayed Harmattans and erratic “false starts” to the rainy season that traditional methods can no longer predict with 100% accuracy.

    NiMet has significantly modernized, recently launching an AI Research and Integration Team to sharpen their forecasting. Yet, a gap remains between the high-tech satellite data in Abuja and the man with the hoe in a rural village.

    Read Also: World Customs hails Nigeria’s report on ports efficiency

    To survive 2026, the relationship between the forecaster and the farmer must shift from “command and control” to a partnership of understanding. Farmers should view NiMet’s bulletins not as mere weather reports, but as economic advisories.

    NiMet is scheduled to release the full 2026 Seasonal Climate Prediction (SCP) on February 10. This document is the “Bible” for the year. It will detail the length of the growing season and identify which regions face drought or flood. If the forecast predicts a shorter season, farmers must pivot to drought-resistant or early-maturing seed varieties rather than sticking to the “usual” crops.

    Meteorology is a science of probability, not prophecy. While NiMet’s accuracy has improved to international standards, the “last mile” of communication is where the system often falters. We cannot expect a smallholder farmer to navigate a complex PDF on a website; they need a clear, actionable text message: “Do not plant maize this week. Dry spell coming in 10 days. Etc.”

    The 2026 season poses a significant risk to national food security. The Ekiti State government’s recent advisory, urging patience despite early rains is a model of proactive governance that other states should follow.

    Agriculture is no longer just about hard work; it is about data-driven decision-making. As we wait for the official February 10 outlook, the message to our farmers is simple: Keep your seeds in the barn. The sky may be crying, but the earth is not yet ready to give life.

    •Michael Adedotun Oke, Gwagwalada, Abuja.

  • Time to end government subsidies for pilgrimages

    Time to end government subsidies for pilgrimages

    • By Peter Ovie Akus

    Sir: The news that the federal government of Nigeria has allocated N11.5 billion for religious pilgrimages in the 2026 budget is heartbreaking and soul rending. It is a waste of scarce public resources at a time when the government is implementing several reforms in various sectors of the economy which are painful for most Nigerians in the short-term but highly rewarding in the long-term. We have to break with this age-old, anomalous, and aberrant tradition if we truly want to make Nigeria great and prosperous.

    Between 2022 and 2024, federal and state governments in Nigeria spent N120 billion sponsoring Christian and Muslim pilgrimages. In 2024 alone, the federal government approved a N90 billion subsidy on Hajj, to the consternation of many. Over the past decade, an estimated N2 trillion has been spent on both Christian and Muslim pilgrimages.

    In spite of all these religious shenanigans which are a drain on our commonwealth, most Nigerians do not know God or love him. Our leaders pretend to love God and sponsor these pilgrimages not as a form of service to God but to gain political capital and win support in elections. The citizenry often engage in acts that show that they often place their personal interests above the national interests. They worship God with their lips but their hearts are far away from him. This is the reason why we have so much corruption, bloodletting, banditry, kidnapping, and other vices in our society.

    Subsidies for religious pilgrimages only benefit the economies of the host countries. According to Statista, Saudi Arabia generates an estimated $12 billion annually from religious tourism. The Nigerian government should begin to look at ways that we can also benefit from religious tourism by promoting our traditional religions. Instead of spending billions of naira every year sending citizens to Rome, Jerusalem, Mecca, etc., why can’t we make billions of naira receiving religious tourists in Ife, Benin, Sokoto, Anambra, Benue, to mention a few?

    Read Also: Türkiye, Nigeria target $5bn trade volume as Erdogan, Tinubu seal new economic push

    There have been attempts to end religious subsidies for pilgrimages albeit with limited success. The 2012 Steve Oronsaye Committee recommended ending such sponsorships but it remains unheeded. In 2016, the then governor, Akinwunmi Ambode of Lagos State stopped the sponsoring of pilgrimages with funds from the public till. Nasir El-Rufai did the same during his governorship of Kaduna State. The heavens did not fall.

     It is regrettable that we have states that can’t pay minimum wage, provide quality education, infrastructure, and healthcare, yet budget billions of naira annually for sponsorship of pilgrimages. Ending government subsidies for pilgrimages is an idea whose time has come. The monies saved from such wasteful ventures should be channeled into national development.

    •Peter Ovie Akus

    Ontario, Canada.

  • Nigeria’s Back-to-Farm initiative

    Nigeria’s Back-to-Farm initiative

    • By Felix Oladeji

    Sir: Speaking at the 56th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Vice President Kashim Shettima highlighted the federal government’s Back-to-Farm initiative as part of Nigeria’s strategy for restoring agricultural livelihoods and strengthening food security. The programme was framed as evidence of Nigeria’s commitment to rural recovery and sustainable development. Yet beyond the symbolism of international visibility lies a more urgent responsibility: translating policy promises into measurable improvements for displaced farmers at home.

    The Back-to-Farm initiative seeks to provide displaced farmers with agricultural inputs, access to capital, and institutional support to enable their return to productive farming. Coming amid rising food inflation, insecurity, and widespread displacement, the programme represents a necessary intervention in a long-running crisis that has weakened Nigeria’s food systems and deepened rural poverty. In many conflict-affected regions, abandoned farmlands, disrupted supply chains, and reduced yields have become defining features of everyday life.

    Under the initiative, beneficiaries are expected to receive seedlings, farm tools, mechanisation support, and access to credit facilities. On paper, this promises a pathway from dependency to self-reliance. However, Nigeria’s history of agricultural interventions urges caution. From the Green Revolution of the 1970s to more recent schemes, many well-intentioned programmes have faltered due to weak implementation, corruption, and poor monitoring. If Back-to-Farm is to succeed, it must break decisively from this legacy.

    Accountability must therefore be central to the programme’s design. Transparent beneficiary selection, community-based oversight, and independent evaluation mechanisms are essential. Without these safeguards, the initiative risks becoming another politically convenient announcement that delivers limited tangible impact.

    Read Also: Fed govt’s ₦501bn power sector bond records full subscription

    Equally important is market integration. Increased production alone does not guarantee improved livelihoods. Farmers must be connected to reliable markets, storage facilities, transport networks, and agro-processing hubs. Without such linkages, surplus produce may rot while rural incomes stagnate. The initiative must therefore be embedded within broader value-chain development strategies that ensure farmers can secure fair and stable returns on their labour.

    Technology and extension services also have a critical role to play. Digital platforms can provide real-time information on weather patterns, pricing trends, and best farming practices. Revitalising agricultural extension systems will help smallholders adapt to climate variability and improve productivity. These investments are not luxuries; they are prerequisites for sustainable rural transformation.

    Security remains a foundational condition. Farmers will not return to their lands if they remain exposed to violence and extortion. Thus, Back-to-Farm must be complemented by credible security reforms that prioritise rural protection, community policing, and justice delivery. Agricultural recovery cannot thrive in an atmosphere of fear and lawlessness.

    Financing will further determine the programme’s longevity. While government funding is essential, strategic partnerships with private investors, development agencies, and financial institutions can expand the initiative’s reach. Blended finance models, microcredit schemes, and results-based grants can help transform short-term assistance into long-term resilience.

    Beyond economics, the initiative represents an affirmation of dignity. Farming in Nigeria is not merely an occupation; it is a cultural inheritance and a social anchor. Restoring displaced farmers to productive land is an act of national reconstruction. It signals that rural citizens matter, that development is not confined to urban centres and that food producers are central to national prosperity.

    However, inclusion must be intentional. Women and youth, who form the backbone of agricultural labour, often face structural barriers in access to land and credit. If Back-to-Farm is to fulfil its promise, it must deliberately integrate these groups into decision-making and resource allocation processes.

    By presenting the initiative at Davos, the Nigerian government has elevated agricultural recovery to the level of global performance. This visibility brings opportunity for investment, partnerships, and technical support but it also brings obligation. International audiences will measure Nigeria not by speeches but by outcomes. Failure to deliver will erode credibility; success will enhance trust.

    Ultimately, the initiative can become a cornerstone of Nigeria’s food security strategy if it is anchored in accountability, institutional coherence, and local participation. Seed distribution and credit access must be matched by governance reforms, security improvements, and market development. Only through such an integrated approach can agriculture become both a means of survival and a driver of inclusive growth.

    •Felix Oladeji,

    Lagos.

  • Kano killing and the menace of drugs abuse

    Kano killing and the menace of drugs abuse

    • By Ibrahim Mustapha

    Sir: The brutal murder of 35-year-old housewife, Fatima Abubakar, and her six children in Dorayi Charanci quarters, Kano State, is one tragedy Nigerians should never become numb to. Yet, like many violent crimes before it, the shock will fade, the outrage will cool, and life will move on—until the next horrific headline reminds us that something is deeply broken in our society.

    This was not just a crime; it was a reflection of our collective failure; a failure of values, of institutions, of families, and of a system that continues to abandon its youths to poverty, idleness, and drug addiction. No rational human being—no matter how angry or provoked—can slaughter innocent children in cold blood. Acts of such savagery are often committed by minds already destroyed by hard drugs and hopelessness.

    Drug abuse has quietly become one of the most dangerous fuels of violent crime in Nigeria. Across cities and rural communities, many young people roam the streets without jobs, skills, or hope. In search of escape, they turn to drugs. Once intoxicated, conscience disappears, fear vanishes, and violence becomes easy. As the old saying goes, an idle mind is the devil’s workshop—and drugs provide the devil with tools.

    The arrest of suspects by the Kano State Police Command offers a glimmer of hope. Justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. If found guilty, the perpetrators must face the full wrath of the law. Anything less would send a dangerous message that human life is cheap. However, even the harshest punishment cannot heal the wounds left behind. The pain of a father who lost his wife and six children will linger for a lifetime.

    Sadly, this is not an isolated case. From Kano to Kaduna, Lagos to Port Harcourt, stories of defenceless Nigerians murdered in cold blood are becoming disturbingly common. Only last year, a nurse from Barau Dikko Teaching Hospital in Zaria was followed home, robbed, and hacked to death after closing from work.

    Read Also: Türkiye, Nigeria target $5bn trade volume as Erdogan, Tinubu seal new economic push

    These killings share a familiar pattern: desperation, drugs, and moral collapse. While security agencies deserve commendation for their efforts under difficult conditions, policing alone cannot solve this crisis. Guns and handcuffs cannot cure addiction, unemployment, or broken homes. The roots of the problem run much deeper.

    Unemployment remains a major trigger. Millions of young Nigerians wake up every day with no jobs, no income, and no clear future. Frustration pushes many into drug abuse, and drugs push them into crime. Weak parental supervision, erosion of moral values, and easy access to illicit substances have only made matters worse.

    The solution must therefore be comprehensive. Prevention is key. Drug-abuse education should be mainstreamed in schools, religious centres, and community forums. The media must go beyond reporting crimes to consistently exposing the dangers of drug addiction. When youths understand the consequences, many can still be saved. Empowerment is equally critical. Governments at all levels must prioritise job creation, vocational training, and entrepreneurship support. Sports, arts, and creative programmes should be revived to productively engage young people and redirect their energies.

    At the enforcement level, agencies like the NDLEA must be better equipped to disrupt drug trafficking networks. Dealers and suppliers should face severe penalties. However, youths already trapped in addiction need rehabilitation, counselling, and reintegration—not just prison sentences that harden them further.

    Communities cannot afford to stand aside. Parents, traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth organisations, and civil society groups must reclaim their role as moral gatekeepers. Drug abuse is not only a government problem; it is a societal one. The killing of Fatima Abubakar and her six children should not be remembered as just another tragic statistic. It should serve as a wake-up call. If Nigeria truly wants to end the cycle of violence, it must confront drug abuse, youth unemployment, and moral decay with urgency and sincerity.

    Until then, more innocent lives will be lost—and we will all share the blame.

    •Ibrahim Mustapha,

     Pambegua, Kaduna State.

  • 2027 Guber: Can Senator Buba Shehu win Bauchi?

    2027 Guber: Can Senator Buba Shehu win Bauchi?

    Sir: As Nigeria inches closer to the 2027 general elections, the political temperature across the Northeast is steadily rising. Of the six states in the region, the All Progressives Congress (APC) currently governs four, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe, while the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) controls Adamawa and Bauchi. For the APC, reclaiming Bauchi is not merely a state contest; it is a strategic necessity in consolidating dominance in the Northeast.

    Political analysts often remind us that all politics is local. Nowhere is this truer than in Bauchi State, where history, identity, and grassroots connection frequently outweigh elite credentials and federal influence. As the race for 2027 gathers momentum, the central question is not just whether the APC can win Bauchi, but who within the party has the capacity to deliver that victory.

    Within the Bauchi APC, the contest is shaping up as a high-stakes battleground involving heavyweight figures: Minister of Health, Professor Muhammad Ali Pate; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar; Senator Shehu Buba Umar of Bauchi South; and former NAPIMS Managing Director, Bala Wunti. Each brings distinct strengths, yet Bauchi’s political history suggests that not all strengths translate into electoral success.

    Bauchi’s politics is unique, even by Nigerian standards. Since 1999, power has changed hands regularly after eight years, as seen in the transitions from Adamu Mu’azu to Isa Yuguda, and later to Mohammed Abdullahi Abubakar. This swinging pattern reflects a politically conscious electorate shaped by the enduring NEPU legacy, the sensitive Katagum–Bauchi balance, and an unwavering demand for grassroots leadership.

    Read Also: ‘Nigeria opposition politicians incoherent, lack imagination, alternative vision’

    While Professor Ali Pate boasts international exposure and technocratic depth, his political challenge lies at home. Among many Bauchi voters, he is perceived as distant from local political struggles, earning the nickname “Wakilin Turawa”, a subtle but powerful reflection of weak grassroots resonance. Similarly, Bala Wunti is widely regarded as competent and capable, yet Bauchi APC’s recent history with political newcomers raises red flags. In 2023, Air Vice Marshal Saddique Abubakar emerged suddenly to clinch the party ticket, only to suffer a resounding defeat at the polls. A similar pattern played out in 2015 when M.A. Abubakar rode the Buhari wave to victory but failed to secure a second term in 2019.

    Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar, though a seasoned political actor, faces another challenge common in Bauchi politics: perceived aloofness from the grassroots. In a state where political success depends on daily engagement with local realities, distance; real or imagined, can be costly.

    Against this backdrop, Senator Shehu Buba Umar stands out as a politically grounded contender. Several critical factors tilt the scale in his favour. Notably, all Bauchi governors since 1999 have emerged from Bauchi South, aligning squarely with Senator Buba’s constituency. The enduring Katagum–Bauchi political factor further strengthens his position, as does his deep-rooted grassroots network across the state.

    More importantly, Senator Buba is widely viewed as the only aspirant within the APC with the political reach and local acceptance required to confront and defeat an incumbent party. His long-standing engagement with party structures, traditional institutions, and grassroots actors has earned him the quiet support of many political stakeholders. In Bauchi, where elections are often won long before polling day through alliances and local trust, this advantage cannot be overstated.

    In a highly competitive state like Bauchi, emotion must give way to strategy, and strategy demands choosing a candidate who aligns with the state’s political realities.

    For the APC, winning Bauchi in 2027 is part of a broader objective: securing all six Northeast states in both the gubernatorial and presidential elections. Achieving this requires a deliberate, state-by-state approach that prioritizes grassroots candidates and addresses genuine local agitations. In Bauchi, the choice of governorship candidate will not only determine the fate of the state election but could significantly influence the party’s presidential performance.

    As history has repeatedly shown, Bauchi does not reward political experiments. It rewards familiarity, structure, and grassroots connection. In that equation, Senator Shehu Buba Umar appears not just as a contender, but as the APC’s most viable pathway to victory in 2027.

    •Zayyad Mohammed,Abuja.

  • Nigeria’s mines of blood

    Nigeria’s mines of blood

    Sir: It is a blood-curdling aberration that in Nigerian mines where minerals should be mined and minded, blood often flows. More damning is the reality that a country rich beyond measure in minerals is reluctant to clean up its often bloody mines.

    On January 22, gunmen attacked and killed about seven miners at a mining site in Kuru, Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State. According to the reports, they arrived at the mine and started shooting indiscriminately, leading to the death of the miners. The youngest of the slain was just about 15 years old.

    With Nigeria’s vast landscape awash in mineral resources, the government has in recent times talked up mining and the resultant mineral resources as a way to diversify its economy and reduce the emphasis on oil. As a result, the government has recently started seemingly paying more attention to Nigeria’s minerals sector and what happens in the mines.

    For so long as Nigeria paid disproportionate and disastrous attention to oil as its chief source of revenue and major driver of its economy, other sectors of the Nigerian economy were largely neglected. These included the solid minerals sector, which has largely suffered neglect and exploitation.

    In most countries of the world awash with mineral resources, conflict is never far away, with the race to exploit the mineral resources often resulting in violent instability and insecurity for the immediate communities. Unfortunately, Africa has been a blood-soaked experiment in how mineral resources can spin countries into an unending and bloody cycle of bone-chilling violence.

    It Is no secret that the brutal civil wars fought in Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone were inextricably  linked to the mineral resources in those countries, specifically   the huge diamond reserves in those countries. The atrocities committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo remain well-documented, with the country remaining a heart-breaking example of what happens when the government fails to adequately regulate the mineral resources ecosystem within a country.

    Read Also: Tinubu opened political space for young Nigerians – City Boy Movement DG

    Similarly, the rush for Sudan’s gold has played a stirring role in the conflict that is reducing one of Africa’s most iconic countries to its knees, taking a particularly crushing toll on women and children.

    It is no coincidence that in Nigeria, the poorly regulated solid minerals sector has contributed to rising insecurity. Gold reserves in some states in the North have largely fuelled insecurity in those areas, with foreigners, bandits, locals, and government officials all locked in the race to make the most profits.

    For those who fuel Nigeria’s grave security crisis, it is no surprise that they find solid minerals an attractive proposition, as selling them on the black market would give them the financial resources they dearly need to keep their deadly activities going.

    Nigeria continues to lose humongous amounts of money in revenue because of the activities of illegal miners. Many of these illegal miners are just unemployed young people seeking to earn a living. But a good number of them include those fuelling insecurity in Nigeria. The toll their activities take on their immediate communities, the environment, and the country as a whole is huge.

    It is clear that Nigeria can by no means continue to tolerate their excesses. While it is crucial to protect Nigeria’s mineral resources to boost revenue, it is even more important that those who drench Nigeria’s mines in blood are made to face the full wrath of the law.

    • Ike Willie-Nwobu, Ikewilly9@gmail.com

  • On the matter of gold refinery in Lagos

    On the matter of gold refinery in Lagos

    Sir: Recently, the Northern Elders Forum came up with another allegation which painted it as a champion of regionalism. The body faulted the decision of the federal government to site a gold refinery in Lagos State.

    According to NEF, “The decision to locate Nigeria’s gold refinery in Lagos while gold is mined from northern soil is not a policy error. It is not an oversight.  It is a deliberate act of economic dispossession. It strips value addition from northern communities….”

    I think it is high time for Nigerians to begin to scrutinize the sincerity of purpose of regional leaders. These people parade themselves as leaders of the North but they are not accountable to anybody. They talk of the North as If the North is a sovereign entity. Unwisely, they deepen disunity and mistrust.

    The NEF and ACF have never published an audited report of their accounts. They never bother to explain to any northerner how they generate and utilise their fund in running their organizations.

    The accusation against the federal government is misleading. The federal government has said that the gold refinery is a private company.

    “There is no iota of truth in the allegation. The new gold refinery is the initiative of Kian Smith, a 100 percent privately owned mining company which aims to facilitate the development of the local gold industry through innovative practices”, said Segun Tomori,Special Assistant on Media to the minister of Solid Minerals Development.

    “We are shocked at the debilitating degeneration in the quality of leadership of the NEF, an organisation that used to act as a think tank of serious discourse decades ago, which, by its recent utterances, has become a parody of its pioneers”, he further said.

    Read Also: First Lady tasks Nigerians on environmental protection

    It is time we stop propaganda and face the reality.

    The Northern State Governors should emulate Governor Dikko Radda on how to woo private investors to their states. For example, last year, Katsina State government hosted Katsina Economic and Investment Summit 2025. One of the fruits of the summit is the investment of $3.5 Million by TORQ Agro Nigeria Limited.

    The company is establishing an integrated farm and hatcher in Batagarawa Local Government Area. This would create 2,000 jobs. Also the company will invest another N42 billion in Soya beans processing and oil refinery.

    Bauchi State government also hosted an economic summit last year.

    Again on the propaganda of marginalization, last year at the government-citizens engagement held at Arewa House, Kaduna, the chairman of ACF board of trustees, Bashir Dalhatu commended President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on the ongoing roads construction across the North. Among these are the Abuja-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano Road, Sokoto-Badagry Super-highway, Kano-Maradi Rail line, AKK gas project among others.

    •Comrade Bishir Dauda Sabuwar, Unguwa Katsina.

  • Senate, pass the electoral law amendment bill

    Senate, pass the electoral law amendment bill

    • By Tochukwu Jimo Obi

    Sir: The lingering delay in the passage of the Electoral Act Amendment Bill by the Senate is not just worrisome; it constitutes a clear and present danger to the successful conduct of the 2027 general elections. Electoral reforms are time-sensitive, and any hesitation at this critical stage threatens to undermine public confidence in the democratic process.

    It is important to note that the House of Representatives has already done its part by passing the amendment bill. The burden now rests squarely on the Senate, whose inaction raises serious concerns about institutional commitment to electoral credibility. When one arm of the legislature moves ahead while the other stalls, the entire reform process is weakened, and the country pays the price.

    More troubling is the fact that the timeline for political party primaries, as stipulated by law, is fast approaching. With only a few months left before these primaries are expected to commence, the absence of a clear and updated legal framework creates confusion for political parties, aspirants, and electoral managers alike. This uncertainty opens the door to legal disputes, inconsistent interpretations of the law, and avoidable conflicts.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    The delays also place the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in an extremely difficult position. Electoral management is not an event but a long process that requires early planning, legal clarity, and timely execution. INEC ought to have begun resolving key operational and technical issues by now, especially those that depend on the amended provisions of the law.

    Of particular concern is procurement. Election materials, technology, logistics, and training all require substantial lead time. Delays in passing the amendment bill restrict INEC’s ability to plan effectively, initiate procurement processes, and align its operations with the anticipated legal framework. This not only strains the commission administratively but also increases the risk of last-minute arrangements that could compromise efficiency and transparency.

    There is little doubt that if the amendment bill is passed in good time and subsequently assented to by President Bola Tinubu, the 2027 general elections stand a real chance of being an improvement on what Nigerians witnessed in 2023. Electoral reforms, when properly implemented, strengthen institutions, reduce disputes, and enhance voter confidence.

    The Senate must therefore rise above partisan interests and procedural delays. National interest demands urgency, focus, and responsibility. Electoral credibility is a shared obligation, and history will judge harshly any institution that fails to act when the stakes are this high.

    •Tochukwu Jimo Obi,

    Obosi, Anambra State.

  • Nigeria’s security partnership with the U.S

    Nigeria’s security partnership with the U.S

    Sir: On January 22, Nigeria and the United States held the inaugural session of the U.S.–Nigeria Joint Working Group in Abuja — a diplomatic and strategic engagement born from mounting international concern over insecurity, religious freedom, and civilian protection in Africa’s most populous nation. Led on the Nigerian side by National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu and on the U.S. side by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker, the meeting underscored the complex interplay between national sovereignty, international scrutiny, and the imperatives of cooperation in confronting what both governments described as endemic threats to human security.

    The working group emerged in the aftermath of the United States’ re-designation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act in October 2025 — a move triggered by allegations of systemic violations of religious freedom, particularly against Christian communities. The designation, and the diplomatic tensions that followed, signalled a shift in U.S. policy toward Nigeria’s chronic insecurity, compelling a bilateral conversation that now seeks to translate contention into coordinated action.

    At face value, the establishment of a joint working group reflects shared interests: both governments publicly profess a commitment to reducing violence, safeguarding religious freedom, and ensuring that all Nigerians can practise their faith without fear. Hooker emphasised the need to deter violence against vulnerable groups, investigate attacks, and hold perpetrators accountable; a statement intended to resonate with universal human rights norms.

    Yet beneath the diplomatic language lie deeper questions about narrative framing, national agency, and the practical realities of security governance. Nigeria has long grappled with multifaceted threats — Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, banditry and kidnappings in the North-central states, and communal conflicts that defy simple categorisation. In many of these theatres, violence affects Christians and Muslims alike, raising important questions about the extent to which religious identity accurately explains the patterns of insecurity.

    Read Also: FULL LIST: Top 10 countries requiring $10,000+ proof of funds for student visas

    This contextual complexity means that the bilateral dialogue, while necessary, must be grounded in a nuanced understanding of Nigeria’s security architecture and socio-political dynamics. For instance, recent abductions in Kaduna State, one of the catalysts for the high-level engagement underscore how criminal violence and terrorist opportunism often intersect with governance failures that transcend sectarian boundaries. Any credible partnership must therefore avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and instead address root causes such as poverty, state capacity deficits, and fractures in community trust.

    Moreover, the working group’s emphasis on religious freedom ought not to be detached from the broader rule of law and human security framework. Nigeria’s plural society, as NSA Ribadu rightly emphasised, does not allow for selective protection. Violence framed along religious lines must be treated as an attack on the state itself, a declaration that underlines the government’s constitutional commitment to citizens of all faiths. Yet turning such principles into durable policy action demands more than diplomatic proclamations; it requires tangible reforms in policing, intelligence sharing, judicial accountability, and community engagement.

    The U.S. role in this partnership also raises questions about equilibrium and influence. While increased cooperation including intelligence sharing, technology support, and potentially defence assistance can enhance Nigeria’s capacity to confront violent extremism, it must not overshadow the imperative of preserving Nigerian sovereignty or create perceptions of external imposition. Legitimate security cooperation should empower Nigeria to build its own institutional resilience rather than foster dependency or undermine local ownership of solutions.

    Furthermore, the current environment of heightened scrutiny, both domestically and internationally; highlights the importance of data integrity and transparent reporting on incidents of violence. Civil society organisations, government statisticians, and security agencies must collaboratively generate credible evidence that informs policy decisions and counters the proliferation of exaggerated or de-contextualised narratives that risk inflaming tensions or eroding public trust.

    Ultimately, the Joint Working Group is a diplomatic instrument that can yield strategic dividends only if it is matched by political will, accountability, and operational coherence. Its success should be measured not by the frequency of meetings or the rhetoric of communiqués, but by measurable improvements in civilian protection, verifiable decreases in targeted violence, and strengthened institutional mechanisms that uphold religious freedom and human dignity.

    Nigeria’s security challenges are vast and entrenched, but they are not beyond solution. A partnership with the United States offers resources, expertise, and a platform for joint action. Yet for this cooperation to be transformative, it must embrace holistic strategies that integrate security, development, justice, and human rights, and it must be anchored in the lived realities of everyday Nigerians who yearn for peace, stability, and freedom.

    •Felix Oladeji,

    Lagos.

  • Abba Yusuf, Kwankwaso and politics of mandate

    Abba Yusuf, Kwankwaso and politics of mandate

    • By Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu

    Sir: In Kano today, politics is no longer whispered in corridors; it is argued loudly in markets, mosques and on social media timelines. Since Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf’s reported decision to part ways with the NNPP, the city has become a theatre of competing loyalties, sharp sarcasm and deeper constitutional questions. Supporters have reduced complex political choices into street labels. Beneath the banter, however, lies a serious national issue: who truly owns a political mandate?

    Governor Abba Yusuf did not emerge from a vacuum. His ascent to the Kano Government House was inseparable from the Kwankwasiyya political machinery, a movement painstakingly built by Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso over two decades. From red caps to ideological messaging, the movement transcended party platforms and became a political identity. In the 2023 elections, many voters did not merely vote for a party; they voted for Kwankwasiyya as a symbol of continuity, defiance and populist appeal.

    Yet, Abba Yusuf is no ceremonial beneficiary. He contested, won, survived legal battles and now governs with all the constitutional powers vested in an elected governor. His mandate, in law, is personal. Once sworn in, no political godfather—however influential—can legally issue directives from outside the Government House. This is where the tension lies: the clash between moral ownership of political capital and constitutional authority of office.

    Kwankwaso’s influence in Kano politics is undeniable. Beyond elections, he represents a moral compass for millions who see him as a symbol of resistance against elite dominance. His supporters’ anger is therefore not merely partisan; it is emotional and ideological. To them, Abba Yusuf’s political identity was inseparable from Kwankwaso’s shadow.

    However, governance demands autonomy. A governor who appears perpetually tethered to an external authority risks administrative paralysis and legitimacy questions. Abba Yusuf’s defenders argue that Kano cannot be governed from outside its constitutional structures. They insist that the electorate voted not just for Kwankwaso’s endorsement but for Abba Yusuf’s promise to lead.

    Read Also: Shell Global CEO hails Tinubu, says leadership driving planned $20bn investment

    The real casualty in this contest, unfortunately, risks being governance itself. When political energy is consumed by loyalty tests and factional supremacy, policy focus suffers. Kano’s challenges—urban congestion, youth unemployment, education deficits and security concerns—require a governor fully immersed in administration, not constant political firefighting.

    There is also the electoral implication. While Kwankwasiyya remains a formidable grassroots force, incumbency is a powerful weapon. State resources, visibility and administrative control can reshape political narratives quickly. The assumption that loyalty automatically translates into electoral dominance may underestimate the pragmatism of Nigerian voters, especially when power dynamics shift.

    Yet, Abba Yusuf’s path is equally fraught. Detaching from a movement that delivered his victory carries political costs. Kano’s electorate is emotionally invested, and symbols matter. If his administration fails to convincingly outperform expectations, the narrative of ingratitude could harden into electoral punishment.

    Ultimately, this is not just a Kano story; it is a Nigerian one. It forces a national reflection on whether mandates belong to parties, movements, godfathers or the individuals elected by the people. The Constitution is clear, but politics rarely is.

    Perhaps the wisest outcome lies not in triumph or humiliation but in recalibration. Political movements must learn to institutionalise beyond personalities, while elected officials must acknowledge the moral debts that brought them to power. Neither absolute loyalty nor total independence offers a sustainable path.

    In Nigeria’s democracy, mandate is both a legal instrument and a moral contract. Kano’s unfolding drama reminds us that ignoring either side of that equation comes at a cost—sometimes heavier than any political suffering.

    •Abdulhamid Abdullahi Aliyu,

    Abuja.