Category: Comments

By Victor Okeke

Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do. Goethe’s words, written two centuries ago, capture Nigeria’s present problem with uncomfortable accuracy. The country knows what development requires, and everyone does. The literature is vast, the case studies are numerous, and the policy recommendations are endless. Yet knowing and doing remain worlds apart.

Nigeria stands where Japan stood facing Western powers in the 1860s, where Korea stood in the ruins of civil war, and where China stood after decades of isolation and turmoil. Each of these nations confronted the same fundamental challenge: transforming an economy built on primary resources and low-productivity activities into one capable of manufacturing, innovation, and rising living standards. None achieved this transformation through wishful thinking or waiting for ideal conditions.

The Industrial Revolution, the strategic state-led development of successful latecomers, the reorganisation of production into global value chains, and the emerging climate transition all point to an unavoidable conclusion that industrial development is not a natural process that unfolds on its own. It is made through deliberate policy choices, through building capabilities that markets alone will not create, through states that can both discipline and enable. The knowledge exists. What remains is the doing.

The Industrial Revolution teaches us that development begins not with abstract “good institutions” alone, but with concrete changes in production, energy, skills, and incentives. Britain industrialised first, not because it was morally superior or uniquely gifted, but because it combined high wages, cheap energy, scientific culture, expanding markets, and political constraints on absolute power. These conditions created incentives to adopt labour-saving technologies and continuously improve them. The key lesson for Nigeria is that industrialisation is not about copying technologies in isolation, but about creating the economic environment in which firms have strong reasons to learn, invest, and innovate.

Latecomer countries face even tougher challenges. History shows that there is no automatic “advantage of backwardness.” Countries that tried to rely solely on free markets or primary exports often remained trapped in low-productivity activities. The experience of Western latecomers such as the United States, Germany, and Japan demonstrates that manufacturing played a central role because it generated learning-by-doing, technological spill overs, and increasing returns. These countries protected and promoted strategic industries when they were weak, and only later championed free trade once they had become strong. This is the essence of the “kicking away the ladder” problem that developing countries like Nigeria must recognise when designing policy.

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Japan’s experience is particularly instructive. Facing the threat of colonisation in the 19th century, Japan pursued a national project of Rich Nation, Strong Army, combining central state capacity with selective adaptation of foreign technologies and institutions. Japan did not blindly transplant Western systems; it translated them into domestic realities, invested heavily in education and skills, built infrastructure, and used state-owned enterprises and private conglomerates to kick-start industrial sectors. More importantly, firms were expected to perform, learn, and eventually compete globally.

Nigeria has a great entrepreneurial spirit, evident in the creativity and resilience of its people who constantly create businesses out of necessity. This individual drive, however, operates within a fragmented environment. Nigeria’s core challenge is not a lack of effort but the absence of an integrated structure where education reliably provides industry-ready skills, government policies remain consistent enough for long-term investment, and essential infrastructure like reliable power and accessible finance are readily available. This systemic failure prevents successful small businesses from achieving industrial upgrading like the Zaibatsu in Japan and Chaebols in Korea. Without these interconnected support systems, individual Nigerian entrepreneurs often hit a ceiling, unable to scale up, compete effectively, or convert their hard work into sustainable national economic development. The survival mode becomes a vicious cycle.

The truth is that the world has left us behind, and this must inform the urgency of Nigeria’s response. The lessons of Japan and Korea are not endpoints; they are models of successful climbing. The world is defined by complexities that defy simple solutions, and industrial policy must be an iterative, adaptive process. Developed industrial nations have largely found ways to solve their everyday problems and make life more dignified for their citizens, even in the face of evolving global challenges. Nigeria must now commit to a policy regime that not only catches up but also prepares for the next series of global economic shifts.

Korea’s post-war transformation teaches the importance of an active state participation in industrial development alongside strict fiscal discipline. Starting poorer than Nigeria is today, Korea combined land reform, mass education, export orientation, and close but disciplined state–business coordination. The Korean state did not replace markets; it organised them. Monthly export performance reviews, targeted credit, and relentless emphasis on global competitiveness ensured that protection did not become a permanent shelter. Korea’s story shows that the real issue is not whether the state intervenes, but how it intervenes and whether policies are performance-based, time-bound, and focused on capability-building rather than rent distribution.

Also relevant to this discussion is China, whose long stagnation before the 19th century reminds us that large populations and ancient civilisations do not guarantee modern growth. Its post-1978 transformation shows the power of removing distortions, reallocating labour from low-productivity agriculture to industry, integrating into global markets, and using targeted industrial policy to climb technology ladders. China did not abandon the state; it redefined its role. Special economic zones, foreign direct investment, export discipline, and gradual reform allowed learning without systemic collapse.

Global value chains in which China is a leader now define the terrain on which Nigeria must compete. In today’s world, countries no longer need to master entire industries at once; they can specialise in tasks. But value chains are not neutral. Assembly and raw material supply generate little value, while design, engineering, branding, and advanced manufacturing capture most profits. Nigeria’s participation in global trade remains heavily concentrated in crude oil and low-value activities. Without deliberate upgrading through skills, infrastructure, and industrial clusters, Nigeria risks remaining stuck at the bottom of the smile curve, vulnerable to price shocks and external disruptions.

The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act of 2010 is a direct legal attempt to move Nigeria up the value chain. This Act mandates that a percentage of the work, goods, and services in the oil and gas sector must be executed, produced, and provided by Nigerian entities. While still facing implementation challenges, the law is a conscious state effort to force technological spill overs and local capability-building in a dominant sector, shifting from simple rent extraction to disciplined domestic participation. It aligns with the historical lesson that latecomers must strategically protect and promote domestic industries to achieve learning-by-doing and reduce capital flight.

The climate transition adds a new and unavoidable dimension to the industrialisation conversation. Achieving Net Zero is not simply an environmental aspiration; it is a new industrial revolution. History shows that major energy transitions reshape production, geopolitics, and development pathways. The shift away from fossil fuels toward clean electrification, hydrogen, and new materials will determine future winners and losers. Nigeria’s heavy dependence on oil exports is therefore not just a climate risk but a development risk.

At the same time, Nigeria possesses abundant renewable potential, a large domestic market, and growing demand for energy, transport, housing, and manufacturing, all of which can support green industrialisation if guided properly.

Climate economics teaches that energy efficiency alone is not enough; countries must also reduce carbon intensity by changing energy sources. Hydropower, solar, wind, and potentially nuclear can all play roles, but each has limits. The real lesson for Nigeria is not to chase a single silver bullet, but to design an integrated energy-industrial strategy that provides reliable, affordable power while gradually lowering emissions. Clean energy investment can become a driver of industrial learning, local manufacturing, and job creation if linked to domestic capability development rather than treated as an isolated environmental project.

Nigeria’s challenge is not that it lacks lessons to learn, but that it must choose which lessons to apply. Industrial development will require prioritisation, patience, and political commitment. It will demand investment in people, power, infrastructure, and institutions that reward performance rather than connections. It will require engaging global markets strategically, not passively, and embracing the climate transition as an opportunity for renewal rather than a threat to the past.

Industrial success is fundamentally a social project. The questions we must continue to ask ourselves are: what is the Nigerian state’s contribution to the advancement of citizens’ lives, and what is citizens’ contribution to the advancement of society? A strong state–market partnership cannot be one-sided; it requires that citizens be afforded dignity, security, and the necessary capabilities (education, health, and infrastructure) by the state, in return for their commitment to a productive, law-abiding, and innovative society. This renewed social contract is the bedrock upon which sustained industrial development must be built.

History is unforgiving to countries that wait for perfect conditions. Britain industrialised under political conflict, Japan under existential threat, Korea under poverty, and China under systemic crisis. Nigeria’s moment is now. The question is whether it will use the hard-won lessons of industrial revolutions past and present to shape its own path, or whether it will once again watch the next transformation unfold from the side-lines.

•Okeke is of the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, South Korea.