Category: Comments

  • Leadership, power, and the politics of calumny

    Leadership, power, and the politics of calumny

    By Habib Haruna

    In Nigeria’s recent political history, few public office holders have generated as much attention, debate, and controversy as the current Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Barrister Nyesom Ezenwo Wike. Whether as governor of Rivers State or as minister in the present administration, Wike has emerged as one of the most visibly active and consequential political figures of his generation, particularly in the areas of infrastructure development, administrative control, and internal security.

    These attributes, taken together, have positioned him as a formidable political force whose influence extends beyond his immediate constituency. Measured against the yardstick of performance—especially infrastructural renewal, urban transformation, and enforcement of governmental authority—Wike’s tenure in public office presents a record that is difficult to dismiss. His approach to leadership reflects a firm grip on the levers of power and a readiness to deploy state authority decisively. Such traits, while applauded by supporters as evidence of strong leadership, have equally made him a target of intense political hostility.

    In Nigeria’s political environment, performance rarely insulates a leader from opposition; rather, it often intensifies resistance, especially when such performance translates into growing political capital.

    It is therefore unsurprising that Minister Wike has, in recent times, been subjected to sustained campaigns of calumny. These attacks, largely orchestrated by political opponents and others unsettled by his rising influence, have sought to recast his leadership narrative from one of achievement to one of controversy. This phenomenon is not unique to Wike. Nigerian political history is replete with examples of high-performing public officials who, by virtue of their success, attracted relentless opposition. Successive Lagos State governors like Bola Tinubu and Raji Fashola, Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno State, Rabiu Kwankwaso, Abdullahi Ganduje, former Central Bank governors Charles Soludo and Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, former Kaduna State governor Nasir El-Rufai, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and Oby Ezekwesili all illustrate how competence and assertiveness often provoke resistance rather than consensus.

    Ironically, the current wave of hostility directed at Wike has found fertile ground within Nigeria’s social media space—a domain increasingly populated by politically uninformed but highly vocal participants. Social media, while democratizing access to information, has equally become a powerful tool of manipulation in the hands of political actors. Simplistic narratives, stripped of context and nuance, are easily amplified, shaping public opinion in ways that often distort reality. The controversy surrounding Wike’s relationship with the governor of Rivers State, Siminalayi Fubara exemplifies this dynamic.

    A sober examination of the Wike–Fubara political relationship is therefore imperative. What is beyond reasonable dispute is that Fubara’s emergence was largely facilitated by Wike. Against formidable odds and entrenched political interests within Rivers State, Wike singlehandedly championed Fubara’s candidacy and navigated the complex political terrain that ultimately produced his victory. At the time, Fubara was widely regarded as a technocrat with limited political visibility, minimal grassroots structure, and virtually no independent political following. His ascension to the governorship was neither inevitable nor self-propelled; it was the result of deliberate political engineering by Wike.

    This context raises profound questions about the prevailing narrative that casts Wike as the villain and Fubara as the victim. How did opposition figures succeed in reframing the story so effectively? More fundamentally, what does this episode reveal about political loyalty, gratitude, and power in Nigeria’s democratic experience? Is it reasonable to assume that a political benefactor suddenly becomes an antagonist within months of an ally assuming office—particularly when that alliance endured for nearly a decade?

    The more plausible interpretation is that power itself often alters political behaviour. History demonstrates that individuals elevated from relative obscurity to positions of immense authority may, upon acquiring power, seek autonomy at all costs—even if it means severing ties with those who facilitated their rise. This is not merely a personal failing; it is a structural feature of Nigerian politics, where loyalty is frequently transactional and short-lived.

    However, the Wike–Fubara saga is ultimately not an end in itself. Rather, it serves as a precursor to a broader and more troubling pattern within Nigeria’s political elite: the deliberate weaponization of misinformation and moral outrage as tools for political rehabilitation. Time and again, political actors who presided over periods of national decline reposition themselves as messiahs once they exit office. Figures who were integral to administrations between 2015 and 2023—an era marked by severe economic contraction, rising insecurity, institutional decay, and disregard for the rule of law—now seek to reinvent themselves as champions of national rescue.

    Read Also: NESG projects 5.5 per cent GDP growth for Nigeria

    The irony is profound. Individuals such as former ministers and senior party officials, who wielded immense power and resources for years without delivering commensurate progress, now appeal to Nigerians for renewed trust. This pattern reflects not only political cynicism but also an underestimation of public intelligence.

    While Nigerians remain vulnerable due to economic hardship and information asymmetry, the recycling of failed political actors under the banner of “rescue missions” is increasingly losing credibility.

    Every political narrative, like every drug, has an expiry date. The persistent reliance on recycled slogans, selective amnesia, and manufactured outrage has reached a point of diminishing returns. The Nigerian electorate must begin to interrogate not just the promises of political actors, but their historical records. Those who failed to rescue Nigeria for over two decades cannot plausibly present themselves as its saviours today.

    In conclusion, Nigeria’s democratic future depends on a decisive break from the politics of deception and personality assassination. The nation must resist the temptation to be swayed by emotionally charged but historically hollow narratives. More importantly, Nigerians must demand accountability, competence, and renewal—qualities unlikely to be found among the same political actors who have dominated the system for decades. If meaningful change is to occur, it must be driven by a new generation of leaders unburdened by the failures and contradictions of the past.

    •Haruna is an Abuja-based business development consultant.

  • Africa doesn’t lack capital. It lacks bankable projects

    Africa doesn’t lack capital. It lacks bankable projects

    By Oladele Dele Akinjo

    Nearly a decade ago, I worked on a gas infrastructure transaction that, on paper, had everything going for it. It was strategically important. Demand was identifiable. Long-term contracts were in place. Reputable lenders and development institutions were involved. By most conventional measures, it was considered bankable.

    And yet, the project spent years in debt restructuring.

    • Not because the asset failed.

    • Not because demand disappeared.

    • But because bankability had been assumed rather than deliberately built.

    That experience has stayed with me, because it reflects a broader pattern across Africa’s infrastructure and energy landscape, one that is often misdiagnosed.

    Africa’s infrastructure deficit is frequently framed as a financing problem. From experience, it is not.

    There is significant global and regional capital actively seeking African infrastructure exposure today. From development finance institutions and infrastructure funds to pension capital and local banks. What remains scarce are projects structured to meet the risk, governance, and enforcement thresholds required by long-term capital.

    When projects stall or struggle to reach financial close, the explanation is often attributed to investor appetite or global market conditions. More often, the cause is structural.

    Returning to that gas infrastructure transaction, the weakness only became visible under pressure. The project had signed contracts and identifiable demand. What it lacked was resilience. Cash flows were exposed to delayed payments, extended receivable cycles, and macroeconomic volatility. Risk had been identified, but it remained concentrated at the project level.

    This pattern repeats itself across African infrastructure. Contracts exist, but cash-collection mechanisms are weak. Currency risk is transferred wholesale to projects. Governance frameworks are referenced, but enforcement depends on discretion rather than process.

    Long-term capital does not avoid Africa because of risk. It avoids risk that cannot be modelled, priced, or enforced.

    That transaction also highlighted the limits of commonly used risk-mitigation instruments. Sovereign-linked guarantees and credit enhancements are frequently cited as solutions to bankability challenges. In theory, they are effective. In practice, they are often politically sensitive to enforce.

    When stress emerges, calling on such instruments is viewed less as a contractual remedy and more as a policy failure; one with reputational and systemic implications for the sovereign. As a result, protections that exist on paper are treated as last-resort options that few are willing to exercise.

    Structures that depend on remedies that cannot be realistically enforced are inherently fragile.

    If Africa is serious about scaling infrastructure delivery, the focus must shift from announcements to structure. In practice, bankability is built through a small number of deliberate technical choices.

    First, cash flows must be protected before guarantees are relied upon. Escrow arrangements, letters of credit, revenue trapping, and automatic payment waterfalls should absorb stress early, before sovereign or third-party support is triggered. Guarantees should act as backstops, not substitutes for payment discipline.

    Second, risk allocation must be explicit. Foreign exchange, demand, regulatory, and operational risks should sit with the parties best able to manage them, rather than being vaguely “shared.” Ambiguity may appear collaborative, but it increases uncertainty and raises the cost of capital.

    Third, base-case assumptions must be conservative by design. Debt sustainability should hold under downside scenarios. Upside volumes, future off-takers, or policy improvements should benefit equity, not be required for viability. If a project only works when everything goes right, it is not bankable.

    Fourth, governance must be automatic rather than discretionary. Step-in rights, cure periods, and enforcement triggers should operate by rule, not negotiation. Governance is not about formal structures; it is about execution certainty under stress.

    Fifth, project preparation must be treated as a capital discipline. Technical, legal, and commercial risks should be resolved before financing is pursued, not retrofitted during distress. Weak preparation cannot be corrected with better term sheets.

    Read Also: AfDB okays $3.9m to electrify homesin Nigeria, others

    Finally, local capital must be structurally integrated. Projects are more resilient when domestic institutional capital and blended-currency structures are embedded from the outset. This reduces foreign-exchange fragility and improves long-term durability.

    Africa does not lack infrastructure opportunities, and it does not lack demand. It also does not lack capital. What it lacks, consistently, are structures that align cash flows, risk allocation, governance, and enforcement in a way long-term capital can trust and defend.

    For project sponsors, this means investing more discipline upstream before financing is pursued, and resisting the temptation to push unmanageable risks down to the project level.

    For policymakers, it means recognising that guarantees without credible enforcement mechanisms weaken bankability rather than strengthen it.

    For development institutions, it means treating project preparation not as ancillary support, but as a core investment function.

    Bankability is not a label applied at financial close. It is the outcome of deliberate technical choices made much earlier. Until those choices improve, Africa’s infrastructure challenge will remain less about funding, and more about structure.

    •Akinjo, an expert in investment banking writes from Lagos.

  • Emerging world order and Africa’s lessons from the Trump era

    Emerging world order and Africa’s lessons from the Trump era

    By Oumarou Sanou

    The post–Cold War international order was never perfect, but it rested on an implicit bargain: economic integration, shared security frameworks, and a rules-based multilateral system that, however asymmetrical, offered predictability. Today, that fragile system is cracking. What we are witnessing is not merely a shift in global power centres; it is a contest for the very architecture that governs the relations between the powerful and the weak.

    In Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a speech that resonated far beyond Canadian audiences. He warned that the world is experiencing “a rupture, not a transition” in the international order—a rupture driven by great power rivalry, coercive economic instruments, and the abandonment of long-standing norms that underpinned international cooperation. Carney’s admonition was clear: “If we are not at the table, we are on the menu.”

    Carney’s words are particularly relevant in light of the behaviour of the United States under President Donald Trump. Whether it was threats of acquisition or control over Greenland, aggressive tariff wars, or overt economic coercion against traditional allies like Canada, Trump’s actions revealed a willingness to privilege raw national interests over collective stability and legal norms.

    Trump’s repeated threats to Greenland—suggesting the United States might pursue control of the territory and even floating military options—were not only alarming in themselves but illustrative of a broader willingness to subordinate sovereignty to strategic ambition. When such rhetoric comes from a self-described champion of “America First,” it sends a sobering message: might still make right in the world, even among countries that claim to champion democracy and the rule of law.

    Meanwhile, revelations that officials from Washington held private meetings with Alberta separatist activists in Canada stirred fears of foreign interference in a neighbour’s internal affairs. Critics in Ottawa denounced these contacts as a breach of Canadian sovereignty. Such actions, whether driven by geopolitical opportunism or domestic political theatre, further illustrate the weakening of mutual respect that once characterised Western alliances.

    Yet it is not only Western allies who have felt the tremors of this shifting order. Trump’s use of tariffs as negotiation tools—far beyond strategic trade leverage, extending toward punitive measures against Canada, Mexico, and other trading partners—underscored a willingness to weaponise economic integration itself. The result: fractured alliances, defensive economic posturing in Europe and Asia, and a deterioration of trust that had anchored global cooperation for decades.

    For Africa, these developments are not abstract. They serve as both a warning and a lesson.

    First, the era of assuming predictable behaviour from great powers—whether the United States, Europe, or others—is over. If a democracy like the US can threaten tariffs or territorial ambitions without significant institutional pushback, what then for African states facing far more powerful neighbours or external influences? Africa must understand that in a multipolar scramble, goodwill will not protect it. Sovereignty must be backed by strategy and diversified partnerships.

    Secondly, the Trump era illustrates the limits of aligning too closely with any one power. African nations have long faced pressure to choose between Western influence and alternative models—whether from Russia, China, or other actors. What Africa needs, as Carney suggested for middle powers, is “cooperation without subordination”: strategic alignment that preserves autonomy rather than replacing one patron with another.

    This is where many pseudo-pan-African narratives fall short. They paint Africa’s choices as binary—either anti-Western or pro-Russian/Chinese. Such framing is simplistic and dangerous. Africa’s challenge is not to replace one hegemon with another, but to craft an independent strategy rooted in its own developmental priorities, not the geopolitical interests of outsiders.

    Africa also faces internal vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit. Just as the alleged Trump administration’s interactions with Canadian separatists raised fears of meddling in domestic cohesion, many African states grapple with separatist movements, ethnic tensions, and governance deficits. These internal fractures could be manipulated by external powers seeking influence–be it the US, Russia, China, EU and the others. Nigeria’s own experience with separatist agitation, for example, could invite unwelcome foreign interest if not managed within a strong governance framework.

    Read Also: AfDB okays $3.9m to electrify homesin Nigeria, others

    The Trump era also underscores the importance of resilience in global institutions. Carney’s critique of the “rules-based order” highlighted how powerful states can weaken norms and leverage economic integration as coercion rather than cooperation. For Africa, which relies on international norms for trade, security, and diplomacy, this erosion is dangerous. It means engaging not only in bilateral relationships but also strengthening regional architecture—from the African Union to ECOWAS and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)—to buffer external shocks and present collective leverage.

    Moreover, Africa must invest in economic self-reliance and intra-continental cooperation. Reliance on distant powers for security, investment, or economic growth leaves African states vulnerable to external shocks and policy whims. Strengthening intra-African trade, harmonising regulations, and building joint capacities in critical sectors can provide a foundation from which African states negotiate rather than capitulate.

    Finally, the African diplomatic corps must be modernised. Africa needs representation that not only attends global summits but actively shapes narratives and defends African interests. Just as Western powers deploy elaborate strategic communication and lobbying capabilities, African states must professionalise their diplomatic engagements to protect sovereignty and influence outcomes.

    The emerging world order is marked by competition, not cooperation. This reality will not change simply by wishing it so. Africa’s response must be pragmatic, strategic, and rooted in its own interests—not in reaction to external pressures but in pursuit of its own vision of prosperity, stability, and sovereign self-determination.

    •Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and researcher focusing on governance, security, and political transitions in the Sahel. Contact: sanououmarou386@gmail.com

  • Nigeria’s economic test before 2027

    Nigeria’s economic test before 2027

    By Leonard Karshima Shilgba

    Against the pessimism that dominated late 2025, the Naira has emerged as an unexpected bright spot. Closing the week at approximately N1,391/$1 on the Nigerian Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (NAFEM), the currency has sustained a rally that leaves it more than 10% stronger than its opening level in 2025. This is not a speculative blip. It is the visible consequence of structural corrections long overdue.

    Two forces explain this recovery. First, improved FX inflows—especially from non-oil exports—have strengthened supply. Second, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s disciplined withdrawal of excess Naira liquidity has punctured speculative demand. Most importantly, the long-distorted gap between the official and parallel FX markets has effectively vanished, now trading within a 2% margin. For investors, this convergence signals credible price discovery and renewed confidence.

    Yet markets alone do not determine the political and social economy. Nigerians experience both the cost and the benefits of these reforms directly—and that is where perception becomes decisive.

    The Tinubu administration faces three interlinked challenges.

    The first is physical insecurity, which continues to disrupt agriculture, commerce, schooling, and family life across large parts of the country. No macro-economic gain will be felt where farmers cannot farm, traders cannot travel safely, or communities live in fear.

    The second is translation—the conversion of macroeconomic stabilization into tangible, everyday benefits. Nigerians hear that indicators are improving, yet high prices, tight credit, and fragile incomes persist.

    The third, and most politically consequential, is communication. Economic reform that is not clearly explained feels punitive; reform that is not empathetically communicated feels indifferent. In an election year, that perception can harden quickly.

    The opposition has filled this communication vacuum with a simple narrative: things are harder, money is scarce, prices are rising, Nigerians are unsafe—and the government is to blame. That message resonates because citizens are living through the pain of adjustment.

    What is missing is an honest alternative. Fuel subsidy restoration is fiscally unsustainable and legally constrained by the Petroleum Industry Act. A return to multi-tier exchange rates would revive arbitrage, scare away foreign capital, and undo the fragile FX stability now emerging. The opposition’s silence on alternative solutions does not make it unattractive to the electorate as a viable alternative nor does it neutralize hardship—and hardship shapes perception.

    A stronger naira, a tighter economy

    Nigeria’s $46.1 billion external reserve position, now at a multi-year high, gives the Central Bank genuine capacity to defend the Naira without reverting to trade bans or capital controls that previously strangled enterprise. Yet, this stability has a cost. In its determination to tame inflation, the financial system has swung toward extreme caution. Commercial banks parked over N33 trillion in the Standing Deposit Facility in January alone. Currency stability has improved—but credit circulation remains constrained.

    This creates a paradox: macro-stability without micro-access. Medium, Small, and Micro Enterprises (MSMEs)—responsible for roughly 40% of GDP—remain largely excluded from affordable financing. Stability that does not reach producers, traders, and employers risks becoming politically hollow.

    Markets are optimistic—voters are cautious

    Nigeria’s stock exchange market ended the last week of January with a N45 billion increase in market capitalization, led by industrial goods and Tier-1 banks. Consumer goods stocks remain subdued, weighed down by high borrowing costs and weak household demand.

    International observers are taking note. Nigeria is now projected to rank among the top contributors to global real GDP growth in 2026, alongside economies such as Indonesia and Brazil. These signals strengthen investor confidence—but they do not substitute for domestic legitimacy. Elections are not won on IMF projections.

    Read Also: ‘Clear regulations key to Nigeria-European investment’

    Beyond stability: The institutional imperative

    Recent economic analyses have rightly observed that Nigeria has moved from emergency crisis management into a phase of stabilization. While broadly accurate, this assessment understates the urgency of converting macro-economic stability into tangible relief and institutional trust.

    Stability is not a destination—it is a narrow corridor. Linger too long, and public patience erodes; move too fast, and inflation resurges. The real challenge is not merely affordability; it is perceived fairness and credible governance. Nigerians are asking harder questions than price indices reveal:

    • Is the burden shared fairly?

    • Are institutions reforming, or merely enforcing pain?

    • Will today’s sacrifice translate into dignity tomorrow?

    Affordability without fairness still feels unjust. Growth without credibility still feels exclusionary.

    The agenda before October 1

    First, security must be treated as economic infrastructure. Every secured farm, road, and school reduces costs and safeguards livelihoods. Security spending should be explicitly linked to household welfare outcomes.

    Second, fiscal policy must now lead. Interest rates cannot build roads, ports, or power plants. Infrastructure is Nigeria’s most potent anti-inflation and pro-employment lever.

    Third, idle capital must be deliberately mobilized. Targeted credit guarantees, risk-sharing mechanisms, and sector-specific financing can unlock MSME productivity without reigniting speculative pressure.

    Finally, communication must become an institutional function of governance. Nigerians need clear timelines, measurable benchmarks, and plain explanations—what was unavoidable, what has been achieved, and what relief is realistically ahead. Not slogans. Not silence.

    The political test ahead

    The Tinubu administration has corrected distortions that nearly broke Nigeria’s economy. The Naira’s recovery, FX convergence, reserve accumulation, and renewed investor confidence are real and consequential. But politics is not audited in reserve statements. It is lived in markets, classrooms, farms, and homes.

    Between now and October 1, the task is unmistakable: Convert stability into shared relief, reform into reassurance, and data into dignity.

    In politics, perception rivals truth.

    But truth that is felt still wins.

    •Prof Shilgba writes via <shilgba@gmail.com>

  • Supporting Nigeria’s future nation builders

    Supporting Nigeria’s future nation builders

    • By Nick Vaughan-Williams

    With one of the world’s youngest populations, Nigeria faces both a profound challenge and an extraordinary opportunity. Over 60% of Nigerians are under 30 and, with recent estimates suggesting that nearly 80 million young Nigerians are unemployed, this skills and employment gap threatens national productivity, social cohesion, and long-term economic resilience. 

    Yet it is precisely here that universities—both within Nigeria and internationally—can play a more ambitious, targeted role. As provost of the University of Birmingham, I have witnessed how strategic partnerships, innovative pedagogy, and industry-aligned learning can transform prospects for young people and societies at-large. 

    Universities are not simply places of knowledge generation; they are engines of economic renewal. My own institution contributes £4.4 billion every year to the UK economy. For Nigeria, this means building ecosystems that bridge the gap between education and employment at scale.

    Since the 1980s, access to education has grown the global economy by 50%, led to increased income for 70% of the world’s poorest 20% of people, and reduced extreme poverty by 40%. Higher education equips young people with the technical, critical thinking, and interpersonal skills that economies need, whilst driving innovation to forge our global future.

    The UK Government’s recently published International Education Strategy aims to make the UK the global partner of choice at every stage of learning. A blueprint for continued change, the strategy looks to grow the UK’s leadership in transnational education (TNE) — expanding access to high‑quality UK study programmes overseas. The strategy also maintains focus on Nigeria as one of several key partner countries for ongoing TNE development. 

    Read Also: Police urge NLC to shelve Tuesday’s planned protest

    Aligning curricula with labour market demands

    A key driver of unemployment in Nigeria is the mismatch between the skills that employers need and those that students acquire. Many graduates leave university without the practical or digital capabilities required for today’s job market, particularly in rapidly evolving fields such as technology, renewable energy, logistics, and health sciences. We also know that, for many employers, graduates need more support to be work-place ready. This can be addressed by integrating experiential learning—internships, placements, apprenticeships, simulations, and problem-based learning—into core degree pathways. Expanding digital skills training, from basic data literacy to advanced AI, cybersecurity, and software development will also provide vital support.

    With global technological shifts displacing some job categories while creating millions more, Nigeria’s young people will need to equip themselves for roles in the emergent digital economy. The World Economic Forum projects that 97 million new roles may emerge globally due to AI and automation—and Nigeria cannot afford to be left behind. 

    Expanding university–industry partnerships

    Employability thrives when universities and employers work together. In the UK, universities like Birmingham have pioneered co-created programmes with industries that not only shape curriculum but provide direct employment pipelines.

    For Nigeria, scalable impact requires sector specific advisory boards made up of employers co-guiding university teaching and research priorities. Companies hosting students for paid placements will help to grow the country’s skills and experience base. Industry sponsored innovation hubs — especially in agriculture, fintech, health technology, manufacturing, and the creative industries – will help to future-proof the nation’s skills. 

    Supporting entrepreneurship and job creation

    A sizeable proportion of youth unemployment in Nigeria is driven by the economy’s ability to integrate new people or capital into its workforce or market without causing instability, such as increased unemployment, poverty, or reduced wages. There are 1.7 million graduates entering the Nigerian labour market annually, but too few jobs to match. Universities thus have a responsibility not only to prepare students for existing jobs but also to empower them to create new pathways to decent work and lead inclusive growth. 

    Strengthening research capacity to drive national development

    Universities are uniquely positioned to generate the research and innovation that fuels long-term economic transformation. Nigeria’s strategic priorities—from food security to healthcare improvements, from digital transformation to climate resilience—require evidence-based solutions and skilled researchers. By investing in research talent, Nigeria can grow high value labour markets while reducing reliance on foreign expertise.

    Broadening access to Higher Education and skills training

    Despite progress, many young people in Nigeria—particularly women, rural populations, and those in marginalised regions—face barriers to accessing high-quality higher education. Studies highlight continuing regional and gender disparities in youth unemployment. 

    Universities can expand inclusivity through flexible and hybrid learning models, allowing students to study while working or managing family responsibilities. Micro credentials and short professional programmes can help to ensure fast and affordable pathways into employment. Targeted scholarships— especially in STEM, digital skills, and sectors experiencing talent shortages—can help to create a more inclusive education system leads to stronger national outcomes and social stability.

    Global institutions have a responsibility to collaboratively support Nigeria’s strategic development goals. At the University of Birmingham, we have strengthened our existing strategic partnership with the University of Lagos — signing a new agreement to explore the expansion of high-quality transnational education and research collaboration in Nigeria. We will now work closely with Nigeria’s Ministry of Education to develop fully scoped proposals for a Transnational Education Unit, based in Lagos, with the ambition to begin programme delivery from 2027.

    Nigeria’s youth are the nation’s greatest asset—and universities are critical to unlocking their potential. By aligning curricula with market needs, expanding industry partnerships, supporting entrepreneurship, strengthening research, widening access, and deepening international collaboration, universities including Lagos and Birmingham will play an indispensable role in advancing Nigeria’s economic and social aspirations.

    •Prof Vaughan-Williams is provost and vice-principal, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.

  • There is a governor in Lagos

    There is a governor in Lagos

    • By Tunji Bamishigbin

    There has been one man, one governor in Lagos State, who has done greater things with immeasurable boldness, despite his simple nature and calm demeanour. That man is Babajide Sanwo-Olu, the current governor of Lagos State. When it comes to embarking on daring projects, he stands taller.

    Let me break it down.

    Recently, as I drove by Alausa, Ikeja, I saw the state government’s Secretariat extension building opposite the Lands Bureau, and the Ministry of the Environment. That building was meant to house some of the state MDAs’ offices that are spread across the state in rented buildings.

    The project has passed through God knows the number of administrations in the state, and I always wonder who was responsible for the delay in completing that single project. It is hoped that the building will be put into use and afford the state huge savings from the annual rents it has been expending yearly.

    There is also the Oko Baba Log Market by the Ebute-Meta Waterfront. This is a community that has existed for over a century. The Log Market has been a stain on the beauty of the waterfront from the Third Mainland Bridge. No administration in the past was bold enough to tackle the menace, military or civilian.

    When I first heard about the governor’s intention to evacuate the market to Ejirin in his speech at the inauguration of the Epe film village, where I sat in the hall near my friend and colleague, Tade Ogidan, I remember whispering to him that the governor’s proclamation was a mere political statement and doubted how he could achieve that.

    Read Also: Police urge NLC to shelve Tuesday’s planned protest

    Behold, the day I saw the location from the Third Mainland Bridge, sometime mid last year or thereabout, and saw that the park was already evacuated, I had to park for a proper view of the site. No doubt, it takes some guts to achieve that, especially when it is realised that the previous administrations (military and civilian) could not work it out. For me, perhaps, what makes the feat rather amazing was how it was done without noise.

    Pelewura Market

    If I could recollect quite well, the Pelewura Market was built on a site that used to be a dumpsite by the Lagoon on Adeniji Adele, long before the 3rd Mainland Bridge was constructed. It used to be another version of Owode Onirin, where scraps were traded, particularly by Ijebu traders, who were the original motor spare parts traders before the advent of the eastern traders after the civil war.

    I cannot remember the administration that later acquired the site and constructed lock-up shops on it, which were sold to individuals. However, rather than the shops being used for trading, many were converted to accommodation that was let to many undocumented characters who fled the state within and outside the country. This made it gradually to become unkempt, thereby making it attractive to criminals. Many administrations had watched this site unattended before now.

    It was on the same day I saw the Oko Baba evacuation that I witnessed the demolition of Pelewura Market by the Sanwo-Olu administration. It is the same daring approach being witnessed at Makoko now that the government deployed to tackle the market issue.

    It should be stressed that the previous administrations saw the need to remove the illegal residents and traders along the corridor, but they never had the political will to deal with it.

    These people built their homes on makeshift stuff, with the attendant danger and serious environmental degradation, thereby endangering their lives as well as those of others. This is also in addition to destroying the aesthetics of the waterway. It is to the credit of the current administration that it decided to do the right thing despite the predictable backlash and threat from NGO groups, who had turned the undue activism into a money-spinning venture.

    Governor Sanwo-Olu stands taller for taking bold steps to achieve difficult results that will ultimately benefit the state. The icing is the fact that the governor deploys his quiet and simple demeanour to achieve his goals without unnecessarily being loud and noisy.

    However, I need to stress that his administration needs to improve on the maintenance of public infrastructure across the state, as well as the strict enforcement of law and order. This is one weakness that I have observed with the administration.

    Oshodi was cleaned up by the Fashola administration, and discipline was introduced in the running of the place by the NURTW. The Ambode administration also gave the corridor a facelift, with the construction of the high-tech terminal, but today Oshodi appears to be going back to the previous times. The terminal is underutilized and not in a good state.

    Another example is the activities of the iterant street boys, called bolar boys. My last check on the Lateef Jakande Road, Agidingbi, Ikeja, revealed how these boys have gradually removed the strong iron protection railings at the bus stop from the one by LTV, opposite Coca-Cola, Agidingbi, and the one at Agidingbi Primary School Bus Stop.

    The same goes for the one at Agidigbi Grammar School and the one by Mega Chicken, Agidingbi. To think that this is a location close to the government office, and some guys are employed as Business District Police, but choose to engage in vehicular assignment, needs to be looked into.

    Lastly, the governor, as part of his unique endeavours in breaking the ice that others were not able to dare, should add Oba Akran Road, Ikeja, and its adjacent roads that hold industries. The road needs reconstruction as done in Apapa, Eric Moore, and another industrial location in the state.

    I am aware of the two major impediments on that road: the overhead mini high tension electric cables and the underground gas pipe. These, I believe, are surmountable, going by the daring nature of the governor in infrastructural development.

    The unique achievement this will be is the first transformation of the first main road that held the very first industrial estate in Nigeria by the colonial administration and developed by the late sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, administration in the First Republic. Surely, Baba Awo will be glad in heaven.

     • Bamishigbin is a veteran movie director, actor, and producer.

  • Sadio Mane – Man who made the difference

    Sadio Mane – Man who made the difference

    • By Ray Ekpu

    The 2025 African Cup of Nations seemed to be running well. All the trains of the competition seemed to be moving in time until we got to the final. The stadium was filled to the rafters because the host country, Morocco was playing. The Morocco Atlas Lions were facing the Senegalese national team known as the Teranga Lions. Two lions in one den, struggling for success, struggling for soccer suzerainty, struggling for stardom.

    That setting was explosive. You could cut the tension with a knife. The two teams had played a technically cautious game and for 90 minutes there was no score. Three minutes into extra time, a Senegalese player Pape Gueye fired a superb left footer that shook the back of the Moroccan net. The Senegalese players kicked the air, some punched it in merriment. But the referee Jean-Jacques Ndala from the Democratic Republic of Congo, disallowed the goal without verifying from the Video Assistant Referee (VAR). A few minutes later the referee awarded a penalty against Senegal and the Senegalese thought that was a piece of injustice that could do them in. Their coach, Pape Thiaw angrily asked his players to leave the pitch. For them Senegal’s misfortune was likely to become Morocco’s good fortune. This was a tense situation that could mar Africa’s football. But there were mixed feelings, some people were enthralled while some others were appalled.

    Football, also known as the beautiful game, has moved from being a game to being a game changer, a game changer for footballers and for countries. People who play football in the big leagues are millionaires today, countries that win continental and global football tournaments are widely respected globally. So the stakes are higher for players, clubs and countries than hitherto.

    In the middle of the game is the referee, the man or woman who decides how the game is to be played for the benefit of the game. Managing a football match fairly is the referee’s major challenge. But there are four reasons why some decisions made by referees are sometimes disputed. One, a referee is a human being and so he or she can make mistakes, major or minor in the course of the game. Two, referee’s decisions are made within seconds and that leaves him or her with no room for much thinking before his or her whistle goes. Three, some coaches engage in a lot of drama, throwing their hands up in despair, shouting at referees for unfair decisions or talking to the linesman on his side of the field. All of these theatrical displays are aimed at ensuring that the referee’s decisions are favourable to his team. Four, most football players deserve to be actors in Hollywood. Virtually all of them pretend to be innocent by lifting their hands in the sky when they commit a foul; some wag their fingers at the referee, some look sternly and viciously at the referee; some claim to be wounded through a tackle by an opponent by rolling and rolling on the field. If someone is wounded how can he keep rolling so easily like a gymnast? Some hold any part of their body and pretend that they can’t even walk and if the referee calls for a stretcher you may see them get up, limp a little and continue with the game. The trick may have been to waste a few minutes if that will help his team.

    Read Also: Police urge NLC to shelve Tuesday’s planned protest

    So entertainment on the football pitch today has three components namely: dribbling, goal scoring and theatricals. All of these are happening today because football has become a mega bucks business that brings to people both fame and fortune. So these three components especially the third are threatening to change the nature of the game. It means that Kali, the Indian mother goddess in whom the creative principle and the destructive principle are joined is at work in today’s football.

     There have always been mistakes in football. To reduce these mistakes the football authorities decided to introduce the use of the Video Assistant Referee device to assist the referee to make the right decision when controversy inserts itself in the game. It was a mistake for the referee to refuse to verify through VAR if the goal scored by Senegal was a valid goal or not. It was also a mistake for the Senegalese coach Pape Thiaw to order his players to discontinue with the game. Decisions on the pitch are made, not by the coaches or the players of the two teams but by the referee. All coaches and players are bound by the decisions of the referee in the spirit of sportsmanship whether they agree with those decisions or not. By telling his players to move to the locker room thus bringing the match and the tournament to an abrupt end, the Senegalese coach was driving a nail into the coffin of African football. People who continue to see Africa as a dark continent where there is little or no positive development would have been given more lethal weapons to use against the continent.

    At present Africa is perceived by some people in the developed world as a continent of hunger and poverty, illegal immigrants, coup plotters, asylum seekers, debtors and dictators who run a feeding bottle economy and who are sit-tight leaders. Football anarchy would have worsened the picture.

     One man saved the day. He ran to the locker room and told his colleagues to return to the field of play. The full details of what happened there are not known but what is known is that a player called Sadio Mane made the difference. Mane was not the coach or captain or vice-captain. He was just one of the players, a famous one wearing number 10 jersey. He didn’t need to wear the coach’s jersey or the captain’s arm band to do what was right for Senegal, Africa and football. In football, today good manners and proper etiquette are in the intensive care unit. With steam-rising frustration, those who manage football are wondering how we got to this point. They are punishing offenders but the offences are still piling up. Even though it is the person who throws off ashes that the ashes follow, the game of football can be better served by more heroes like Mane.

    Some people might think as Will Rogers said that “being a hero is the shortest-lived profession on earth.” However, being a hero is virtuous. Mane’s name will remain permanently on the minds of Africans and football lovers worldwide because he performed magic when mayhem was going to happen and football was going to get a kick in the face.

    Mane began his professional football career with Ligue 2 Club Metz at age 19. He also played for Southampton where he set a new Premier League record for the fastest hat trick record in 176 seconds in a 6-1 win over Aston Villa in 2015. But it was at Liverpool which he joined in 2016 that he achieved global recognition. He finished as the UEFA Champions League joint top scorer in 2018-2019 season winning the Premier League Golden Boot. In October 2021, he scored his 100th Premier League goal becoming the third African to reach that landmark. The two footballers that got there before him were Didier Drogba and Mohammed Salah. At the 2021 African Cup of Nations, Mane starred for his country which won the tournament for the first time. He clinched the player of the tournament award. He made his 100th appearance for Senegal on November 18, 2023. When Senegal won the AFCON on January 18, by defeating Morocco 1-0, he earned the Best Player of the Tournament Award. Mane plays as a left winger who scores with both feet and head winning astonishing aerial battles even though he is only 5’9” in height. He has considerable speed, agility, ball control and fantastic dribbling skills which have made him a terror to his opponents.

    Now with what he did in Morocco on January 18, he has added more dignity to his persona than hitherto. He has delivered, by his action at AFCON 2025, a bunch of flowers to African football and that fragrance will stay with him forever. Humble and amiable, Mane remains a man with a fighting spirit, a fighter for good causes for club and country; he remains a role model for youths and a leader that other less talented leaders ought to emulate globally.

    Mane has also made massive investment in philanthropic activities that benefit schools, hospitals and football in his country and he is not making any noise about them. He is a quiet giver who does not blow his trumpet. He prefers that his deeds speak eloquently for him.

    When the AFCON trophy was handed over to the Senegal captain, he removed the captain’s arm band and fixed it on Mane’s arm and handed over the trophy to Mane. That action spoke louder than a million words: Mane was the man of the moment.

  • Tax reform is policy not politics

    Tax reform is policy not politics

    • By Arabinrin Aderonke 

    Every administration is ultimately judged by its willingness to confront difficult structural problems. For President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s government, tax reform represents one such necessary but challenging intervention, designed not for political convenience, but for long-term national stability and economic renewal.

    The recent controversy surrounding the newly enacted tax laws, particularly claims of falsification and lack of transparency, deserves to be addressed with calm, facts, and institutional respect. 

    The leadership of the National Assembly has spoken clearly. Senate President Godswill Akpabio has affirmed that the laws signed by the President reflect what was duly passed by the legislature, while the House of Representatives has taken additional steps to reassure the public through the release of Certified True Copies and the activation of internal review mechanisms. These actions demonstrate a functioning democracy, not a failing one.

    It is important to separate legitimate oversight from unhelpful alarmism. Nigeria’s constitutional system already provides structured avenues for resolving legislative concerns, and those avenues are currently being utilised. To continue to project suspicion while these processes are ongoing risks weakening public confidence in institutions at a time when unity and clarity are required.

    Beyond the political exchanges lies the more important issue: the substance of the reforms. Nigeria’s economy has for decades suffered from weak revenue mobilisation, a narrow tax base, and inefficient administration. 

    The new tax laws are intended to modernise the system, improve coordination among revenue agencies, and reduce leakages, steps that are essential if the country is to fund infrastructure, social services, and economic diversification without unsustainable borrowing.

    President Tinubu has been consistent in his reform agenda, from fiscal policy to broader economic restructuring. These reforms are not without short term discomfort, but history shows that nations that shy away from reform in the face of resistance ultimately pay a higher price.

    Read Also: New federal tax reform to protect low-income earners, says Ebonyi commissioner

    International economic assessments continue to emphasise that fiscal discipline and domestic revenue generation are key to Nigeria’s growth prospects and macroeconomic stability.

    Public debate is healthy, but it must be informed. Much of the current uproar appears driven by speculation rather than careful engagement with the actual provisions of the tax laws. Constructive criticism should be anchored in evidence and proposed improvements, not in narratives that suggest institutional bad faith without proof.

    The tax laws are now operational. The administration has acted within the law, the legislature has exercised its oversight responsibilities and there are no discrepancies. At this point, the national interest is best served by shifting focus from controversy to implementation, ensuring clarity, compliance, and public understanding.

    Governance is not advanced by endless dispute, but by steady, responsible action. The Tinubu administration has made its intentions clear, to place Nigeria on a firmer economic footing through necessary reforms. 

    The task before citizens and leaders alike is to engage constructively, allow institutions to do their work, and support policies that are aimed at securing a more resilient and prosperous Nigeria. The task before us now is to make them work transparently, fairly, and for the benefit of all.

    * Arabinrin Aderonke Atoyebi is the Technical Assistant on Broadcast Media to the Executive Chairman of the Nigeria Revenue Service

  • Leveraging trust to deliver fiscal sustainability

    Leveraging trust to deliver fiscal sustainability

    By Gbenga Oyebode Falana

    Fiscal sustainability connotes the ability of governments to manage public finances over the medium and long term without excessive borrowing, debilitating debt, or fiscal crises – has emerged as a central pillar for economic resilience in today’s interconnected global economy. Yet, while the technical dimensions of fiscal sustainability (such as debt-to-GDP ratios, budget deficits, and revenue mobilisation) dominate policy discourse, an equally critical but less discussed driver is trust – trust between citizens and the state, investors and institutions, and among public stakeholders themselves. In emerging economies, where structural challenges abound, elevating trust from a peripheral consideration to a core strategic asset can transform fiscal outcomes and accelerate sustainable development.

    At its core, trust is the belief that institutions will act predictably, fairly, and in the public interest. When citizens trust their government, they are more willing to comply with fiscal obligations such as taxation; when investors trust the policy environment, they commit capital for the long term; and when civil society trusts public institutions, collaborative solutions to complex socioeconomic problems become possible.

    This trust – social, political, and economic is not measured solely by sentiment surveys, but by observable behaviours that influence fiscal performance:

    • Tax compliance: Trust in the integrity and fairness of tax systems increases voluntary compliance, reducing reliance on costly enforcement mechanisms.

    • Public spending efficiency: When citizens believe that public funds are managed transparently and responsibly, there is greater acceptance of necessary fiscal adjustments.

    •Domestic resource mobilisation: A trusted government is more likely to unlock domestic savings and channel them into productive investments.

    •Policy certainty: Investors both domestic and foreign are more inclined to commit to long-term projects when policy frameworks are credible and stable.

    In emerging economies, where tax bases are often narrow and public debt vulnerable to external shocks, trust becomes an indispensable asset in achieving fiscal sustainability.

    Fiscal trust in emerging economies: The current reality

    Emerging economies face multiple hurdles that erode trust:

    1. Perceptions of corruption and rent-seeking: Where public funds are perceived as being diverted for private gain, citizens become reluctant taxpayers.

    2. Weak institutional capacity: Inadequate administrative infrastructure undermines service delivery and weakens confidence in fiscal policy.

    3. Opaque budget processes: Lack of transparency breeds suspicion and fuels the belief that budgets serve special interests rather than the common good.

    4. Volatile policy regimes: Frequent, unpredictable changes in tax and regulatory frameworks discourage long-term investment.

    These challenges are not mere theoretical constructs they manifest in persistent fiscal deficits, high debt service burdens, limited public investment in infrastructure and human capital, and episodic financial crises. While emerging economies vary widely, a common denominator remains without trust, even the most technically sound fiscal strategy risks failure at implementation.

    Lessons from developed climes

    Developed economies, though not immune to trust deficits, offer instructive contrasts. Consider, for example, the Nordic countries of Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark where high levels of tax compliance coexist with generous welfare states. What explains this paradox to outsiders is a deep-rooted trust that taxes are fair, public services are effective, and officials are accountable.

    In Germany, for instance, the Federal Constitutional Court’s “debt brake” (Schuldenbremse) is more than a fiscal rule; it reflects broad societal consensus about intergenerational equity and sustainable public finances. The rule’s legitimacy is anchored in processes that involve public debate, legal clarity, and predictable enforcement.

    In Canada, the Parliamentary Budget Officer – an independent fiscal authority provides non-partisan analysis on fiscal and economic trends, enhancing credibility and informing public debate. These mechanisms foster trust, which in turn reinforces fiscal discipline and resilience.

    Pathways for emerging economies: A trust-first agenda

    Read Also: How a new youth reform agenda is rewriting the Nigerian story

    Emerging economies can harness similar principles, adapted to their specific contexts, to strengthen fiscal sustainability. The pursuit of trust must be deliberate, coordinated, and embedded in both policy design and implementation.

    1. Strengthen revenue institutions and tax justice. Tax compliance is the lifeblood of sustainable public finances. However, simply increasing tax rates is neither equitable nor effective if taxpayers do not believe in the fairness of the system. Introduce progressive tax policies that align burden with ability to pay. Modernise tax administration through digitalization, reducing points of discretion that invite corruption. Publicise tax expenditures and rationalise exemptions to ensure fiscal fairness and accountability.

    Empirical evidence from across Africa and Latin America suggests that reforms improving procedural fairness such as dispute resolution mechanisms and taxpayer service charters yield significant gains in voluntary compliance.

    2. Enhance transparency and open budgets. Trust thrives where information is reliable and accessible. Publish timely, comprehensive budget documents, including medium-term fiscal frameworks. Use open-data platforms to allow citizens, journalists, and researchers to track public spending. Institutionalise participatory budgeting at local and national levels so stakeholders can influence priorities.

    Countries like South Africa have made strides through “Open Budget” initiatives, which invite public engagement and strengthen fiscal legitimacy.

    3. Institutionalise independent fiscal oversight. Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) serve as trusted arbiters in complex economic environments. Establish non-partisan budget offices, fiscal councils, and supreme audit institutions with statutory authority. Protect these bodies from political meddling through legislative safeguards. Require regular reporting to legislatures and the public.

    In Brazil, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) has been pivotal in audit enforcement, exposing fiscal irregularities and promoting evidence-based governance.

    4. Foster policy consistency and predictability. Emerging economies often experience abrupt policy swings in response to political cycles or economic shocks. While flexibility is necessary, unpredictability undermines credibility. Anchor fiscal rules in law with clear triggers and escape clauses for emergencies. Engage stakeholders in policy formulation to build broad consensus. Communicate policy changes proactively, with impact assessments.

    Malaysia’s medium-term fiscal framework and India’s Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act are examples of efforts to bring discipline and predictability to public finances.

    5. Invest in civic education and trust building. Ultimately, trust is social and cultural as much as institutional. Promote civic education to deepen public understanding of fiscal policy and its implications. Support community forums where citizens can voice concerns and co-create solutions. Recognise and address historical grievances that contribute to scepticism and disengagement.

    In Thailand, civic education campaigns around the national budget have helped ordinary citizens demystify public finance and engage more confidently in fiscal discourse.

    Comparative reflections: emerging vs. developed

    It is tempting to assume that developed countries enjoy trust by default. Yet, events such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crises, Brexit, and rising populism across Europe and North America reveal that trust is neither static nor guaranteed. These episodes underscore the fragility of trust even in mature democracies and the dangers of complacency.

    However, developed economies generally possess stronger institutional scaffolding robust judiciaries, independent media, entrenched civil society organisations, sophisticated data systems, and diversified economies that help sustain trust even under strain. Emerging economies, while less endowed in these respects, are not without agency. By strategically investing in trust as a fiscal asset, they can unlock significant developmental dividends.

    Fiscal sustainability cannot be divorced from the social contract that underpins it. Technical solutions like expenditure rationalisation, debt restructuring, and revenue optimisation are necessary but insufficient in the absence of trust. Emerging economies that embed trust in their fiscal architecture will not only stabilise their public finances but will also strengthen democratic legitimacy, catalyse investment, and enhance resilience in an uncertain global environment.

    In a world where economic shocks are frequent and citizen expectations are rising; trust is not a luxury it is a strategic imperative. Emerging economies that recognise and act on this insight will be better positioned to deliver prosperity for their citizens and contribute to a more equitable global economic order.

    •Falana, PhD, FCA, is Commissioner, Tax Appeal Tribunal, Abuja.

  • Deploying military veterans into ungoverned spaces

    Deploying military veterans into ungoverned spaces

    By Lekan Olayiwola

    Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces deceptively look like geographical gaps begging for occupation. Forests, borderlands, creeks, and rural corridors are treated as a single problem, awaiting a singular solution. The government’s new plan to deploy retired military personnel into these areas is bold and politically visible. To work, veteran deployment must do more than fill gaps.

    Ungoverned spaces are not monolithic. Each is shaped by unique governance gaps, local economies of violence, and historical state-society relationships. This proposed approach must navigate local realities, integrate with civilian institutions, and complement broader governance efforts.

    Ungoverned spaces are not just geographically remote

    The first analytical mistake in Nigeria’s security discourse is the assumption that ungoverned spaces are simply places where the state is absent. In reality, many of these spaces are just governed differently by non-state actors, informal authorities, armed groups, or hybrid arrangements that emerged because formal governance failed to adapt. A disaggregated mapping reveals at least four broad categories.

    Northwest forest corridors such as Zamfara, Katsina and parts of Kaduna are shaped by rural banditry linked to cattle rustling, artisanal mining, arms proliferation and collapsed local policing. Here, violence is economically motivated, decentralised, and deeply embedded in forest ecologies that favour mobility over territorial control.

    Northeast borderlands, particularly in Borno and Yobe, reflect insurgent fragmentation rather than pure absence of authority. State presence exists, but legitimacy is contested after years of militarisation, displacement and humanitarian dependency. Ungovernance here is less about vacuum and more about trust erosion.

    North-central agrarian belts experience governance breakdown driven by land tenure disputes, demographic pressure and politicised identity claims. Violence is episodic, communal and often escalated by weak conflict resolution institutions rather than criminal enterprise alone.

    Southern coastal and riverine zones, including the Niger Delta creeks, operate under a hybrid order where the state is present through security forces and oil infrastructure but absent in welfare, environmental protection and local accountability. Militancy, piracy and oil theft thrive not because there is no state, but because the state is selective. A single deployment model deploying retired soldiers positioned as security stabilisers cannot plausibly respond to such divergent logics of violence.

    The governance deficits behind ungoverned spaces

    What unites these regions is not terrain but institutional weakness. Local governments with little fiscal autonomy, police forces overstretched and mistrusted, judicial processes inaccessible or slow, and development interventions that arrive late or not at all. Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces are thus not accidental; they are produced by decades of centralisation, elite capture and uneven state investment.

    Security initiatives that focus on physical presence without addressing these deficits often displace violence rather than resolve it. When armed actors are pushed out of one forest, they migrate to another jurisdiction where governance remains weak. Without parallel investment in dispute resolution, livelihoods, and local administration, the cycle persists.

    Veterans as security actors: Lessons from elsewhere

    Globally, the use of retired military personnel in stabilisation or post-conflict settings is not unprecedented but outcomes vary sharply. In Colombia, former combatants were integrated into rural security and development roles after the FARC peace process. Where this was tied to land reform, civilian oversight and economic reintegration, violence declined. Where oversight was weak, criminal splinter groups emerged.

    In Sierra Leone and Liberia, post-war veteran engagement succeeded only when framed within comprehensive DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) programmes, with clear civilian command, psychosocial support and income pathways. Veterans deployed as security auxiliaries without these safeguards were vulnerable to remobilisation.

    In Mexico, the reliance on militarised actors including former soldiers to fill policing gaps contributed to blurred lines between state and non-state violence, worsening human rights outcomes. The lesson is that veteran deployment works only when it is demilitarised in purpose, embedded in civilian governance, and tightly regulated. Experience alone does not substitute for institutional design.

    Civil–military relations and the risk of institutional drift

    Nigeria already operates one of the most crowded security landscapes in Africa. Military, police, civil defence, intelligence agencies, regional outfits, vigilantes, informal militias, and civic veteran organisations coexist with limited coordination. Introducing another security actor, even one drawn from the retired ranks, risks deepening fragmentation unless roles are clearly defined.

    While veterans bring institutional knowledge and, in many cases, experience in civic engagement through bodies such as the Nigerian Legion, operational instincts shaped by combat or paramilitary training may still dominate. Without targeted retraining in community protection, mediation, and human rights, their presence could reinforce perceptions of occupation rather than protection, especially in communities already traumatised by security excesses.

    Moreover, unclear command structures invite accountability gaps. Who supervises a retired officer operating in a civilian space? Under what legal framework? These questions are central because they determine whether the initiative enhances or erodes state legitimacy.

    Comparison with community policing and structural reform

    Community policing, when properly resourced, addresses many deficits veteran deployment does not. It embeds security within local accountability structures and emphasises intelligence, trust and early warning. Nigeria’s challenge has never been conceptual rejection of community policing, but half-hearted implementation.

    Read Also: Nigeria on ‘healing journey’ to $1trn economy by 2030 – Presidency

    Similarly, state police debates remain stalled by elite fear of decentralisation rather than evidence of failure. Yet countries with complex internal security challenges from India to Brazil demonstrate that layered policing systems, not central monopolies, are more adaptable.

    Economic strategies matter as well. In bandit-prone regions, livelihoods linked to mining regulation, grazing reform and rural credit address incentives that guns alone cannot. Veterans may contribute as mentors or administrators here, but only if security is not their sole function.

    Blind spots and how to mend them

    Three blind spots stand out. First, regional specificity. Any deployment must be tailored to local conflict economies. Veterans stabilising farming corridors require different mandates from those operating in insurgent-affected borderlands.

    Second, institutional integration. Veterans should operate under civilian agencies, not parallel command. Global best practice places such actors within ministries of interior or local government, not defence.

    Third, exit strategy. Ungoverned spaces are not reclaimed permanently by force. Without clear timelines and handover plans to civilian institutions, temporary security gains evaporate.

    Reclaiming authority, not just territory

    The real challenge Nigeria faces is not reclaiming space, but rebuilding authority. Ungoverned spaces persist because governance retreated long before soldiers did. Deploying retired military personnel may buy time, but time is only useful if it is used to repair institutions, not bypass them.

    A policy worthy response begins by abandoning the myth of uniformity. Nigeria’s ungoverned spaces are plural, political and deeply historical. Treating them as such is not academic indulgence; it is the difference between another cycle of security improvisation and a genuinely transformative strategy.

    •Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher/policy analyst. He can be reached at lekanolayiwola@gmail.com