Col. Ben Gbulie is widely known for his role in the January 1966 coup in which he and other majors and captains upturned the political and military status quo in the country. Having been detained in Enugu alongside Victor Banjo and others who participated actively in the coup by the Federal Government, he was subsequently released by Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu at the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. He rose to the rank of a Colonel in the Biafran Army where he held important positions which included the de facto commander of the 7th battalion, Nsukka, Supply and Transport and later as the Military Administrator of Aba Province. In this interview with Edozie Udeze and Chris Orji in Enugu, he reiterates how he and Gen.Alabi-Isama and others joined the Nigerian Army in March 1960, why Obansanjo’s My Command is full of half-truths and how Nzeogwu was killed, among other salient war related issues.
Gen Alabi Isama was emphatic in his book that the invasion of the West by the Biafran forces through Ore was a serious blunder. He said instead invading Lagos from Ilorin, or any other alternative route would have been a better military option. What do you think?
Now, with regards to the war itself, I fought on the side of Biafra, what you call the rebel side. In other words, the Biafran side, because there was a country if you can refer to Chinua Achebe. And he (Isama) fought on the Nigerian side.
Now, with regards to the Ore issue…First of all, Alexander Madiebo has actually resolved this matter; that the Biafrans going into the Mid-West was Ojukwu’s way of pleasing Banjo. And that alone raises a number of other questions, because I was detained prior to all that due to the coup of January 1966. And Banjo was also with us in prison. I don’t know if you have read my book titled The Fall of Biafra.
If you have read it, you’ll see where I talked about Banjo speaking to us in Enugu prison before we were released by Ojukwu before the war started. And Banjo made it quite clear that he didn’t support any question of secession. That instead he wanted the creation of more states. Initially, the North didn’t want the creation of states. But they let superior argument prevailed and so they let the British guide them. And so they supported the creation of states. As at that time, Ojukwu in Enugu, well, in the Eastern Region, said it was not right to create states. That it was to emasculate the East. Ojukwu and the East were against the creation of states. So, when Banjo came out of prison with us, released by Ojukwu himself, he asked the Ojukwu the same question what about the creation of states.
It is all covered in my book. Now, as to the question of we going into the Mid West in August 1967, it was a matter for Biafrans to decide. So, you don’t decide for us. Not even Alabi Isama himself, because Alabi-Isama is a strategist. He did courses in strategy and so there is no question of him asking why should we do this or why should we do that. No, he shouldn’t do that; it is all in the past. The thing had taken place.
Banjo, by the way, a Yoruba man, took former Easterners to the Midwest, that alone in my book, I said, is a monstrous gamble. It is like paying your own assassin. So, there are many questions that came out of that. Do you understand? So, Banjo alone was bad news, because he didn’t support Biafra. But Ojukwu too, he was bad news, because he was pig-headed. He wanted to use Banjo to go to Lagos. But Banjo also wanted to use Biafran troops to get to his people, to overthrow Gowon and become head of state of Nigeria. This was very clear to everybody. So, whether we should have gone into the Midwest or not, it was the choice of Ojukwu and Banjo. So the critique is well-taken. But those two people are dead already. So, what am I going to say?
The larger issue was that the Biafran high command didn’t collectively take that decision.
Now, you are talking about Biafran high command. What was the Biafran high command? What was it? Ojukwu was everything. Okay, if you read Madiebo, he wrote an addendum by way of foreword in Alabi’s book. I have a copy of it. He did say that even the commander of the Biafran army did not know about Biafran crossing to the Midwest. We were not told. Ojukwu was not telling people about a lot of things. Even where our arms and ammunitions were kept, he didn’t tell anybody. He was always dealing with civilians, sending them abroad to even buy ammunitions of war for us. And if we want to face facts I must say that anybody on sideline outside Biafra could feel free to criticise our own way of handling things. But Isama did also give us credit for having some flashes of genius in the war. He did. And so I cannot fault him entirely.
What other blunders were also caused by the Biafran high command?
Good Lord! Again you are talking about Biafran commanders. Be very careful. You got to study Biafra and the way Biafrans were organised in the war before you start asking such questions. For instance, Ojukwu was the commander of the Biafran troops and at the time when Biafran troops entered the Midwest it was Njoku who was the commander. But Njoku was arrested and detained by Ojukwu. He was detained throughout the war. Don’t you know that? So, what is all these about? Biafran hierarchy or whatever, did we have any?
Ojukwu was everything and that was one of the problems we faced. And eventually what happened? A number of people- Victor Banjo, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Alali and Agbam, they were shot by firing squad. Don’t you remember all that? Don’t you know? We equally had our own inherent problems. Even Nzeogwu was not involved in the war. He decided, because he was an Igbo man to go and give us support at the Nsukka sector. And he paid with his life. But Ojukwu never involved him in the war, because of petty jealousy. You ought to understand these things. Anyway, this is not to tell us that I hate my people, my dear Igbo people. No. It is to me that I am looking inwards and discussing with you what actually went wrong. Many things went wrong. For instance, the declaration of Biafra took effect at the wrong time. It was wrongly timed. Whereas other military leaders in the West, in the Midwest were cooperating with Gowon, even if you didn’t like Gowon.
Don’t you remember that Adebayo was the governor of the West and both Awolowo and the western officers were saying that northern troops should leave the West. But eventually they supported Gowon and that didn’t mean they liked Gowon. You play up to someone until your time is ready. But Ojukwu had not much patience. That was not the way to handle it and he did not do it well, anyway. So, you can now deduce from what I am saying whether Alabi was right or wrong in some respects. I have told you that by hindsight, anyone can say anything. In other words, referring to what had happened based on what had happened and the result and that is what happened today.
In other words, why did we go into the Midwest in the first place? After all, Midwest was actually a buffer area. Midwest was not enemy of Biafra. We had plenty Midwest officers who were Igbo or Ika. Why did we go there in the first place? By that we upset the apple cart as it were. So, it is only Ojukwu who can say that. Ojukwu promised us before he died (may his soul rest in peace) that he would produce the The Book. But he never produced it and died. And so I am not going to write it for him.
I have written my book, The Fall of Biafra in which I criticised a lot of things. And there are many things I criticised and you know what, Ojukwu held a press conference saying – I am not going to rejoice with Gbulie on the fall of Biafra. He held that press conference in Lagos and until a long time we never saw eye-to-eye. Not because he was not my senior or commander. Oh, he was. For instance, the problem with our people is that we don’t look inwards, we don’t consider issues thoroughly.
Do you know that Ojukwu was one of the people that aborted the coup of 1966 in which I participated? And he said so in his book Because I am Involved. That was on page 120 or something like that. I was just reading it this morning. Read the book yourself. He aborted the coup. And now get me right. When he was appointed the governor of the East and the Northerners started acting on the killings of January 1966, he started defending Igbo people.
This was a man who created the impression ipso facto that the coup was an Igbo affair and then he later became a messiah for Ndigbo. That was where the problem lay. Because the people he was defending were being killed in large numbers in the North as a result of the impression that the coup was on Igbo affair.
What situation gave rise to the issue of saboteurs in the Biafran army then?
(Laughs) You know why I am laughing? Why I am laughing is that there is what you call the human element. Ojukwu was indeed entitled to his own human element. Ojukwu would say something and he wouldn’t want anybody to argue with him.
By the way, that does not mean that some Igbo senior officers were not against him. They were. For instance, in the case of the sabotage levelled against Ifeajuna, Agbam and Alali, my thinking was that it must be true. Yes, it must be true.
Ifeajuna, in my book, supported Banjo. He supported Banjo and the plan was that Banjo would get to Lagos with our own troops, the Biafran troops, overthrow Gowon, take over Nigeria. Then they would send Ifeajuna to the East, to his own Biafra, flush out Ojukwu and then he Ifeajuna would become the governor of the East. That was their plan. And a man called Wale Ademoyega would be made the governor of the West. So it was clear-cut and it was clear Ojukwu knew about this. Do you know that when we were released in March 1967, Ojukwu did so, because we were being held in his domain? He released us, that was after Gowon had taken power. After we were released, Ojukwu was clear-cut that he understood what was happening. He gave us instructions, those of Igbo, that we should go home, spend one week or so, then get ready to come back to join our various units. Thereafter, we were deployed. I was deployed to Nsukka. Now what happened to Ifeajuna and Banjo, who were living with him at the government house here in Enugu?
That was why when Ifeajuna was told he’d been deployed to Nsukka, he turned him down. It is in my book. Ifeajuna was in government house together with Victor Banjo because before the Nigerian crisis, Ojukwu was the quarter-master-general of the Nigerian army. And Ifeajuna who joined the army later, by then I was an officer-cadet, but Ifeajuna had a university degree. He joined and their total aim was to rule the country. There was no doubting that. Now, if you read Professor Eleagwu’s book titled Gowon, even then Ojukwu was reported to have been planning a coup. That was in 1964. But ours was in 1966.
Do you know why? As at that time, there was this federal election in which the NCNC refused to take part. And Zik decided not to recognise Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It is there. Eleagwu is talking sense and you have to read that book. It was Gowon who reported Ojukwu who was able to wriggle out of it.
If the Biafrans had put their acts together, is it true that they would have won the war instead?
Just a minute, wait a minute! The same Alabi also said if they had put their acts together in the Nigerian side, they would have won the war in three months. Do you know that Gowon gave us only twenty-four hours within which to win the war? Do you know it was called a police action – that is using only the police to overrun Biafra? That presupposed that the war would not last for more than one month? But what happened? Never you think that some people are weak. You think that some people are weak until the time comes for them to act, to prove themselves.
But then, you don’t remember the tenacity of people, about the resilience of people, about the indomitable will of the people. You don’t easily conquer people like that. No, you don’t. So, Alabi is entitled to his views but I wish he can come and argue with me.
Let’s go back to Nzeogwu. You mentioned professional jealousy…
Oh, no, no. You are talking about jealousy. No, no. you see, he and Ojukwu had only clash of personalities. It wasn’t a question of professional jealousy between the two. That Nzeogwu did the January 1966 coup, he became very popular. He was a revolutionary. Yes, he was indeed. Ojukwu didn’t quite like this. It is in my book titled Nigeria’s Five Majors. We sent captain Udeh to Kano and he was arrested in the Officers’ Mess. Ojukwu was there with him while the coup was going on.
There’s this belief that Nzeogwu was not actually killed by the federal troops…
Look, Look! Wait, wait! I want to stop you there because if you ask me I was not there on the spot. But I do know that Nzeogwu would have died earlier. I do know, because I fought at Nsukka sector. He would have died earlier the way he was carrying on. He was having what I would call a maniacal or suicidal bravery. He would put his head and everything into what he was doing. He came to Nsukka on the second day of the war without anybody inviting him. Then, he took over command. Col. Eze was our commander and then Nzeogwu burst into our Zik’s hostels at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Eze was his senior by the way. But Nzeogwu would not know whether you are his senior or not. He would just take over command. He was very dynamic and so he started dishing out orders, including giving orders to the then Major Emma Udeaja, to me and to Eze himself.
And that was the first issue of sabotage, because before you knew it, that was about 7pm of that day, there was an explosion downstairs. Somebody had exploded a grenade and Nzeogwu quickly dashed downstairs and threw another grenade. Remember in January coup, he threw grenade. He loved throwing grenades but he was a very great man. He was hurt in that grenade. He was a dare-devil, no doubt about it. So he could have died then. As at the time he died, nobody called him. Our headquarters, in fact, was at Opi Junction at the time. He just arrived and decided to go for an operation by himself.
He went on patrol in the night and he used this armoured car, a monstrosity that had nothing but was called armoured vehicle. So, he paid with his life. They were ambushed by the federal troops. It was the same federal government that announced his death. So, anybody who tells you that Ojukwu killed him or something else is talking rubbish, complete rubbish. Nigeria announced his death and his body was taken to Kaduna, was buried in a cemetery in Kaduna with all military honours. This is indeed the complexity of the Nigerian situation. This was a man who did a coup and you termed it Igbo affair and the same man who organised it, you killed him and then gave him military burial. And you said he was misguided. Who was not misguided?
The Abagana war sector was said to be the largest gathering of the army…?
Hah! Which army? Whoever was there to say it was the largest army? Who had the statistics to say so? Where did they get the fact from? What was the strength of the army? It was the second division – second div., under Murtala Muhammed. They tried to cross through the Niger three times but failed. If you read Alabi-Isama, when they tried to cross the Niger, a lot of people died. A lot of people perished. Nigerians perished in the water. A lot of people, over 2000 people, died. So, he sent the troops, those carrying arms, ammunitions, petrol and other things through the main land. And they came in and there was an ambush at Abagana. I don’t want to go into that because I was not there myself. I went to see it but I was not there.
Many people have claimed credit; that they were the people who did it. That is absolute rubbish because we know those who claimed credit when something good happened to Biafra. But anytime anything went wrong you won’t see them.
Was it true also that the federal troops kept prisoners of war whereas the Biafran side kept killing their own during the war?
Who said so? Can you please listen to me? The matter is that most people go with the winner. They never go with the loser. If we lost the war so anybody can concoct stories against us. That is rubbish. This one is not true and could never be. I can name many people killed even after the war by Nigerian troops. One of them was Tim Onwuatuegwu, another was Major Ukpai. Kalu Ezera was also killed. I don’t want to start naming them here now. So what are they saying? They died, they were killed. So, let’s let sleeping dog lie.
Another issue was the Owerri sector. It became tough that the Federal troops would capture a part and the Biafran troops would regain it. Why was it so for a long time?
Please, please, you should know that Owerri was strategic in its location. It was very near our airport and the centre of gravity for Biafra. The centre of gravity was the Uli airport. So, the airport was actually a beehive of activities in Biafra. Things were coming into the nation from there.
We were surrounded by the federal troops, by land and by air. So, the only place that was available was Owerri. Don’t forget Alabi gave us credit for building two airports within the time of the crisis. Is it easy? Yes, there were things that happened as it were and you see the ingenuity of the Igbo man. So it was actually this tenacity of purpose and this indomitable spirit of the Igbo that made them to last so long in the war. Otherwise the war would have been a matter of days and it was over for us.
Owerri was strategic. Initially it was captured by the 3rd Marine Commando under Col. Benjamin Adekunle. By the way, Adekunle and I met at Sandhurst. He was my senior there. But he was ruthless with his artillery, with his weaponry. He was always known to deploy artillery pieces and fire them all at the same time. He called them his own personal thunder. So, he captured the place, I mean Owerri, but Biafrans took it back because of the strategic nature of the place. It was like Nigeria going to capture Oguta. It was so strategic to us too. It couldn’t happen and we were prepared not to let it happen no matter how long. But eventually what must be must be. It happened when it had to happen. By then our leader had left for Ivory Coast.
What is your comment on the book, There Was a Country by Chinua Achebe
All I can tell you is that Chinua was a writer of high standards. He was a raconteur, a prolific story teller of immerse proportion. He was telling a lot of stories. I saw a lot of inaccuracies in some of what he said. I saw a lot of them. Anybody could see them. Alabi pointed them out. For instance, one of the causalities of our war was truth. So, Alabi said it was actually Biafrans who committed a lot of atrocities in Ikot Ekpene and other places in the area. And he was right. We didn’t impose the war on Nigeria, Nigeria imposed the war on Biafra. And we resisted because we wanted to protect lives and property. There were errors in that book but that does not make the book bad. Achebe is not alive today to defend himself.
You have read My Command by Obasanjo and Isama’s book…
Yes I have read all…
Can you compare the two books?
Listen. Let me answer it straight away. Obasanjo was captain when I was captain in the Nigerian Army. We served together but he was my senior just like he was Alabi’s senior too. We were in the same army engineer. He said he was my commander in his book. No, he was my OC that is Officer-Commander and OC and CO are two different things. But it doesn’t matter. I saw many lies in Obasanjo’s book.
I saw them with my eyes because I happened to be with Obasanjo in the army. I also happened to be with Alabi in the Nigerian Army. I happened to know what was happening. I was in fact in the vortex of the crisis, for which I was detained by Ironsi from 1966 when the coup took place till 1967 when Ojukwu released us here in Enugu.
Gowon said Ojukwu had no right to release us. So, he detained us again. So, from 1970 to 1974, I was in prison, languishing behind prison bars. We were eight of us. Alabi is writing on facts. This man called Obasanjo is writing on half-truths. I tell you something that book is full of half-truths and that is it. In the launching of Alabi’s book, Gowon wrote a foreword which though belated is what I believe in. That the government of the day, that is Gowon, appointed Obasanjo the commander of the 3rd Marine Commando.
There is no disputing the fact. So, at the end of the war, whether Obasanjo was quarrelling with Isama or Akinrinade or with other people, it was not really what mattered. Obasanjo was the one who stood in for the federal government and received the instrument of surrender. That fact has to be made clear at all times. And Gowon put it quite clear for everybody. He had every right to do so because he was the commander, even though he was not there on the spot. Even though Akinrinade had come down before him, he was the commander. The commander was appointed by the head of state.
And therefore if you want the buck, the buck stops on the table of the commander. Akinrinade came first and then Effiong came into it. Later Obasanjo came and we were called. If you read My Command, he addressed me there as a captain which was the rank I was before the war started. He said that Captain Ben Gbulie was Effiong’s secretary, while Lt. Col. Akinrinade was his, which is ridiculous. Then he pointed out that Akin and Gbulie were course-mates at Sandhurst which is the truth. So, you see there are complexities here and there.
