Tag: Abdulaziz Yari

In June 15, 2018, the Governor of Zamfara State, Abdul’aziz Yari shocked Nigerians when he said he no longer considered himself the Chief Security Officer (CSO) of the state. The governor’s lamentation was contained in a message to the people of the state as they celebrated Eid el Fitri. Zamfara has been the epicentre of banditry and horrific killings in the northwest for some time now. Apart from Benue, Plateau, Taraba and possibly Adamawa, Zamfara has witnessed its “fair share” of unwarranted and senseless loss of lives and property. Only three local government areas in the state are said to be free from horrors of the bandits.

As a result of the killings in some parts of the country, security has understandably become one of the most discussed topics today, pushing “restructuring” to the second position. Last week, I wrote about the plateau killings which have now prompted the President to moot the idea of tinkering with the security architecture in the country.

As the president maybe planning to rejig Nigeria’s security architecture in the ongoing search for workable solutions on how best to secure the country, I would like to refer him to the excellent paper presented on June 27 in Abuja by Dr. Dan Mou, a national security expert at an international conference organised by the Gusau Institute (GI) and Center for Nigerian Studies, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University (ZINU) China.

“National Security Architecture, Good Governance and Nation Building: Preventing Nigeria from Becoming a “Failed State” is a paper, not only the president, but policy makers need to read because of its depth and insight. My interest in the paper stem from the way it explained the various national security architectures, their drawbacks and how they can lead to professional inefficiencies if the wrong model is adopted.

A classic case played out when the now released 110 Dapchi school girls – less Leah Sharibu – were abducted from the Government Science and Technical Girls College in Dapchi, Yobe State by Boko Haram militants. Recall that Governor Ibrahim Gaidam insisted that the military and the defence headquarters should be held responsible because they ordered the withdrawal of troops from Dapchi town shortly before the attack and abduction of the schoolgirls. According to him, Dapchi town has been peaceful and never witnessed such an incident until barely a week after the military withdrew the troops from the town.

“If the soldiers had been on the ground, the attack on the town and subsequent abduction of the schoolgirls would not have happened…” he was quoted as saying. Days later, the military through Col. Onyema Nwachukwu, the Deputy Director, Army Public Relations and Operation Lafiya Dole spokesperson, agreed that it redeployed troops from the town “to reinforce troops in Kanama area following attacks on troops’ location at the Nigerian-Niger Republic border.” But “Dapchi town was formally handed over to the police division located in the town.”

The Yobe State Commissioner of Police, Sumonu Abdulmaliki, in a swift reaction said there was no time the military handed over Dapchi town to the police. The critical question to ask here is what went wrong in Dapchi and why is the Dapchi scenario being played out like a movie in other parts of the country? Don’t lose a night’s sleep as Dr. Dan Mou’s paper effectively gives us a very clear perspective.

According to him, there are varieties of national security systems or architectures. First is the captured national security system (CNSS) or architecture: under this scenario, it is argued that the dominant interests of a given social cleavage or a set of them in that society have taken control of the state security apparatuses, so that the national security policy and objectives are influenced by the elite group. This group uses the nation’s security apparatuses as the oppressive tool for their economic and political exploitation of others. The interests of the public, defined as whatever is in the society that is for the common good of all, will not be a priority under this system or architecture of national security.

Furthermore, the information for public consumption will also be distorted to suit the interests of those particular social cleavage elite. Opposition media houses tend to be oppressed with government machinery. A classic example he gave is apartheid period in South Africa, where the government security apparatuses were used for the interest of the minority white people.  It was also practiced in Germany during the rule of the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler. In fact, it is a common security architecture or system that operates in most nations, in different degrees, including in Nigeria,

Next is the autonomous national security system (ANSS) or architecture: this is said to exist where the state security apparatuses are operating independently of the dominant elites or classes in that society. National security policy and its apparatuses are more rational and objective in carrying out state policy, implementation and security policies that concern/cater for all its citizens.

The relatively autonomous national security system (RANSS) or architecture is a position that presupposes that the national security apparatus is neither captured nor autonomous. In most democracies, national security is relatively autonomous because they cater to some extent, for the common good of all citizens.

There is yet a second broad approach; the organizational determinant categorization of national security systems or architectures: segmentary national security System (SNSS) or architecture; Coordinated national security system (CNSS) or architecture; and Integrated national security system (INSS) or architecture.  The three key distinguishing words are Segmentary, Coordinated and Integrated.

The eminent national security scholar pointed out that with the exception of South Africa and Libya (during Gaddafi); all other African countries (including Nigeria) have adopted the segmentary security system or architecture even though the degree of application varies from one country to the other.

“In Nigeria, for instance, under the administration of former Presidents Shehu Shagari and Jonathan administration, the Military and other security Agencies all operated separately with little coordination and integration between them and other Security Agencies.  The same appears to be the case now even with the present President Muhammadu Buhari Administration.  This became more visible in their different strategies and operations regarding the control of the Herdsmen and Farmers conflicts and clashes all over the Nation, but especially in the North Central Zone of Nigeria.  In the event of any security threat, as was the case with the Herdsmen and Farmers clashes, therefore, these Services reacted differently, with little coordination and integration of their efforts.”

This same SNSS, he pointed out, is what was applied under former President Jonathan that is apparently being utilised under President Buhari in the war against Boko Haram. “…despite President Buhari’s personal commitment, political will and allocation of a lot of resources, Boko Haram is still to be completely wiped out.  The limit of the segmentary national security system or architecture, the SNSS, in my view, is also partly what is hindering the successful conclusions of the military/national security operations throughout the country, including the failure to address decisively the Herdsmen and Farmers conflicts, all over the nation.

“For instance, instead of the Armed Forces Coordinating efforts, with the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies, they always order the Nigerian Police Force, even the Police Special Terrorist Units, to withdraw before they start  their own operations, as was the case with the “Cat Race” operation “Ayem a Kpatuma” in the North Central, particularly Benue State.”

With this, we can begin to gradually comprehend what went wrong in Dapchi and other theatre of clashes. From the analysis, it may not have been the commanders involved who erred through buck passing per se, but the model of national security structure in operation in the country.

Equally too, the model does not promote the full utilisation of the national security defence resources of the country.  Instead, they tend to be “hoarded” by particular services or heads of individual security agencies.  In event of threats or attacks, full mobilisation of the national security defence resources for a coordinated and integrated attack against the offenders becomes impossible. Again, this clearly brings the Dapchi abduction and others into full glare.