- By Fidelis Oditah, KC SAN
In every democracy based upon the rule of law, the judiciary plays a central role as the third organ of the government, resolving a succession of issues between private persons and between individuals and the state.
In Nigeria, our courts are an important public resource and a pillar of the rule of law and our democracy, performing a difficult and very visible role with meagre resources. If the role is properly performed, our courts can strengthen our democracy and economic prospects by (i) enforcing contract and property rights, (ii) protecting human and social rights, (iii) ensuring that elected leaders have mandate and legitimacy, (iv) ensuring that the law is respected and enforced in accordance with and well-known procedures, and (v) ensuring political and institutional accountability. In this way, our courts can be a force for good by promoting economic development, good governance, a culture of accountability and respect for law and institutions, social cohesion and national stability. If they fail to perform the role effectively, the converse would be the case – illegitimacy of political leaders, poor governance, impunity and social upheaval.
The court has a central role to play in the economic development and prosperity of our country. Just as economies are underpinned by trade, so trade is underpinned by the fabric of law and the civil justice system. The law itself provides the basic structure within which commerce and industry operates. It safeguards the rights of individuals, regulates their dealings with others. An important aspect of the rule of law is the enforcement of contract and property rights in a timely and effective manner by impartial courts. A steady neglect or decline in the rule of law in many developing countries has been a major reason for the decline in the development prospects of such countries. If foreign and domestic investors lose faith in the ability of our law and the judicial system to protect their investments and property rights or to adjudicate disputes in a timely and fair manner without undue or improper influences, they would be reluctant to invest. The result would be a flight of capital out of our country to other countries where these values are given greater primacy. The extent to which we can attract business to our country depends in part upon investor perception of the quality of our civil and criminal justice system. If our system of civil and criminal justice is perceived to be inefficient and ineffective, we would lose out to more efficient systems. Nigeria needs a strong, independent and effective civil and criminal justice system to trade itself out of poverty and into prosperity.
In order to perform this role, a civil or criminal justice system must possess three qualities: it should be just, fair and effective in resolving disputes. How does our system measure against these three benchmarks?
We all know that our courts are gridlocked. Cases can stay in court for 20-30 years. Litigants would have died and everyone would have forgotten what the dispute is about, save possibly in land matters.
I would like to start with the well-known but unfortunate case of OKAFOR v NWEKE – to court room advocates, the case is a 2007 Supreme Court decision that only a legal practitioner may sign a court document such as a writ of summons, statement of claim, notice of appeal or motion. In that case, it was a motion issued in 2005 seeking “trinity relief” to cross appeal that was signed JHC Okolo SAN & Co. But the case is germane to our topic of judicial gridlock. The case started life at the Onitsha High Court in 1955. Judgment was delivered at first instance in 1998 after 39 years. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed in 2001 and it was concluded fittingly on 17 January 2025 after 70 years of various interlocutory skirmishes on the basis of two technicalities – one, that the notice of further or additional grounds of appeal in the Court of Appeal was signed by JHC Okolo SAN & Co; two, the original notice of appeal was abandoned because the Appellant’s Brief of Argument at the same Court of Appeal was signed by the same JHC Okolo SAN & Co. Both documents were invalid because neither was signed by a legal practitioner with the result that the appeal from the decision of the High Court of Onitsha in 1998 was dismissed.
The Okafor v Nweke case started in 1955 and 1959 at the Onitsha High Court seeking a declaration of title to land. The 1959 case was eventually tried on the basis of a Further Amended Statement of claim filed on 20 April 1993 – 34 years after the case was filed – and judgment was delivered 9 April 1998 in favour of the plaintiffs – 5 years later and 39 years after the case was filed at the High Court. Costs of N10k were awarded. A notice of appeal was filed on 22 June 1998 containing two grounds of appeal. Further/Additional Grounds of Appeal were filed in Jan 1999 and an appellant’s brief of argument in February 1999. Both were signed “JHC Okolo SAN & Co”. On 25 January 2001, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the ground that the existence of the 1955 proceedings made the 1959 proceedings an abuse of process. An appeal to the Supreme Court was filed on 2 April 2001 and amended on 7 September 2020. The Supreme Court held that the Additional grounds were incompetent because of the signature, leaving the original grounds which were deemed abandoned because of the incompetent brief of argument. The court stated that a brief of argument was jurisdictional and that an unsigned and incompetent brief was incapable of conferring jurisdiction on the Court of appeal.
There are numerous other examples.
Why did I say we should start from here? The case illustrates two fundamental problems with Nigerian civil justice system: first, inordinate delay; second, Nigerian courts’ excessive and self-destructive obsession with matters of form and procedure rather than of substance. Both problems feed off each other: because litigants and their lawyers know that the courts are obsessed with form and procedure, they take every possible formal or procedural objection, wrapping it up in the garb of “jurisdictional” objection, and run it to the Supreme Court. Interlocutory applications are a bane of Nigerian civil justice system and have become veritable instruments in the unending war of attrition as lawyers, both advocates and judges, indulge themselves in matters of form at the expense of justice. In Nigeria, the problem is not access to justice; it is exit from justice. How do you extricate and disentangle yourself from the Nigerian justice system once you have had the misfortune to get entangled?
Refer to AIHL v Meridien – enforcement of arbitral award since 2011. Challenge enforcement all the way to Supreme Court. As we got bailiff to execute judgment, judgment debtor brought fresh proceedings in 2023 to restrain enforcement. That proceeding has not been argued. Since June 2025 there have been 6 adjournments. I will read out the reasons for the adjournments.
No system can function like that or serve public interest if it is this ineffective.
There is a lot of lamentation by judges about spurious and abusive litigation which choke up the court. What have they done about it?
How did we get here?
In my view, there are many reasons for the judicial gridlock:
a. Lack of institutional capacity – understaffing, weak, incompetent, inexperienced and corrupt judicial officers caused by inappropriate recruitment and promotion practices, political influences over judicial appointment and promotion processes, and poor work ethic, outdated and decaying court infrastructure due to decades of neglect and underfunding, chaotic court registries.
b. Weak case management – judges are unable to manage cases before them and accede to almost every spurious request for adjournment. Often court rooms are over congested and judges accept requests for adjournments with gratitude.
c. Poor case listing practices – far too many cases are listed daily which do not get a hearing for a variety of reasons; sometimes cases are listed without regard to the availability of counsel due to poor communication between court registries and counsel.
d. Unclear definition and allocation of jurisdiction between the Federal High Court and the State High Courts based on section 251 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 especially the meaning of “simple contracts”. It is a disgrace that after 52 years of litigation, we still have no clarity regarding the respective jurisdictions of the Federal High Court and State High Court. Section 251(1)(e) allocates jurisdiction to the Federal High Court over disputes “arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under CAMA”. A dispute relating to the removal of a director from office is apparently within section 251(e) , but a claim by a director for wrongful termination of employment contract is said to be a “simple contract” and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In a similar vein, a dispute involving “an Armada of Technical Contracts” concerning oilfields and mining is apparently within section 251(1)(n) , but not dispute relating to the claim for a 1.5% profit interest in an oil block.
e.Poor and inefficient administrative practices including the transfer and promotion of judges in the middle of a trial – more problematic in the Federal High Court. All part-heard trials have to commence afresh once the trial judge is promoted, causing avoidable delay and wasted costs.
i. One solution to the problem is to allow a promoted judge to conclude all part heard cases especially trials: see section 396(7) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 which provides as follows: “Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, a Judge of the High Court who has been elevated to the Court of Appeal shall have dispensation to continue to sit as a High Court Judge only for the purpose of concluding any part-heard criminal matter pending before him at the time of elevation and shall conclude the same within a reasonable time.”
ii. The provision was intended to solve the problem created by the 1979 Supreme Court decision in Ogbunyiya v Okudo (1979) 6-9 SC 32 and the 2009 decision in Our Line Ltd v SCC Nigeria Ltd (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt 1170) 383. In Ogbunyiya v Okudo, Justice Nnaemeka-Agu delivered a judgment in a case that had been pending before him as a Judge of the High Court of Anambra State – notwithstanding that he had been elevated to the Court of Appeal two days earlier. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment on the basis that when he gave the judgment he had ceased to be a Judge of the Anambra State High Court and therefore lacked jurisdiction.
iii. Unfortunately, in the Orji Uzor Kalu case – Ude Jones Udeogu v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2022) 3 NWLR (Pt 1816) 41, the Nigerian Supreme Court declared section 396(7) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (‘ACJA’) to be inconsistent with provisions of sections 253 and 290 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 and that it is thus void to the extent of that inconsistency. Section 253 provides that “the Federal High Court shall be duly constituted if it consists of at least one Judge of that Court.” Section 290 provides that a person appointed to any judicial office shall not perform the functions of the office until he has taken the Oath of Allegiance and the Judicial Oath; the section also now includes requirements relating to declaration of assets. The court held that it had interpreted the previous equivalent of this provision (s. 254 of the 1979 Constitution) to mean that a person elevated to a higher court ceases to be a judge of the court from which he was elevated.
iv. The Supreme Court set aside a conviction on the basis that Justice Idris Mohammed had been promoted to the Court of Appeal even though he had not been sworn in when he concluded Orji Uzor Kalu’s trial. The Supreme Court said that it did not matter that Orji Uzor Kalu’s lawyer had requested for Justice Idris to conclude the trial. As a result, a trial that had commenced in 2007 was set aside without regard for the legislative intent or the public interest or the fact that some of the witnesses might have died and that a fresh trial would be all but impossible. In the UK, for example, promoted judges sit in their former courts to assist with a few cases. High Court Judges sit with Court of Appeal Judges where more hands are required. We are on our own in refusing to give effect to a clear and very desirable statutory provision designed to address the scourge of delay in the administration of civil and criminal justice.
f. Widespread misuse of interlocutory appeals and requests for stay of proceedings – partial solution in section 306 of the ACJA 2015.
g. Excessive and self-destructive obsession with form and procedure at the expense of justice. In Statoil & Texaco v NNPC at the US District Court SDNY in 2020, it was stated that Nigerian courts use “hyper-technicalities” to obscure and miscarry justice. That was a case arising from an arbitration where NNPC was alleged to have overlifted tax oil.
h. Adjudication in Nigeria is formulaic and involves excessive box-ticking which prevents analysis. Take two examples (a) once a statute prescribes a particular way of doing something, no other way is permissible (b) where a statute provides a condition precedent to the commencement of an action, failure to fulfil the condition will deny the court jurisdiction to hear the matter. We take refuge in box-ticking, formulas and catchphrases instead of analysis. The biggest impetus for this misadventure is the celebrated case of Madukolu v Nkemdilim which set out a three-pronged test for evaluating the competence of a court. It is universal solvent of all competence and procedural issues. Once you tick the boxes nullification follows as surely as night follows day. No analysis of the duty of the court, the purpose of the statute or legal rule in question, considerations of prejudice or lack of it.
i. Perhaps the biggest challenge is the so called “jurisdictional” objection. To be clear, the problem is not the existence of useful procedural tools such as the preliminary objection or the trial of a preliminary issue. The problem is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a truly jurisdictional objection. In Nigerian courts, there is a fundamental and unfortunate conflation of “jurisdiction” and “admissibility”, with tragic consequences.
j. I’m concerned that Nigerian law is going down a blind alley from which it needs to extricate itself; I cannot see any light at the end of the tunnel. Unless the rampaging misunderstanding of “jurisdiction” is brought under control, the problem of gridlock will get worse:
i. A court’s jurisdiction is almost always statutory, ie the authority of a court to decide matters brought before it – does the subject matter fall within the statutory power of the court, eg section 251 of the Constitution, in relation to the Federal High Court, and section 254C in relation to the National Industrial Court? That is substantive or subject matter jurisdiction. There is also personal jurisdiction in the sense that a court could exercise its authority over persons who are present within its territory or have otherwise submitted to its jurisdiction. We are not concerned with that.
ii. The procedure for bringing a case before the court and invoking the statutory jurisdiction of the court is another matter. The question of “jurisdiction” concerns the constitutional and statutory powers of the court to hear and determine disputes brought before it. The question of “admissibility”, on the other hand, relates to the claim before the court rather than to the power of the court, and asks whether this is a claim which can be properly brought. Have all the correct pieces of paper been filed? Are the papers correctly signed by a legal practitioner? Has the Claimant paid the court fee? Has the Claimant complied with any pre-condition, contractual or statutory –amicable dispute resolution, eg a meeting of the parties’ representatives; it could be statutory pre-action notice. The important thing is that they are all matters of procedure or admissibility, rather than of jurisdiction.
iii. The significance of the distinction for present purposes is that “jurisdiction”, being substantive, cannot be waived , but “admissibility”, which is merely procedural, can be waived.
iv. This distinction was explained by Justice Ayoola in the Supreme Court in 2002 in Mobil Producing (Nig) Ltd v LASEPA as follows:
“…an irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction should not be confused with a lack of jurisdiction which takes cognisance of the general meaning of the word “jurisdiction” as the “the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision”. (See Halsbury’s (op cit) para. 715). Procedure for invoking the jurisdiction of the court should not be confused with the authority of the court to decide matters which on the face of the proceedings have been properly presented in the formal way for its decision and which are within its jurisdiction.
v. Sometimes admissibility is referred to confusingly as “procedural” jurisdiction.
vi. Many of the issues incorrectly described as “jurisdictional” in Nigeria are analytically matters of “admissibility” as they affect the claim rather than the statutory power of the court. For example, the question whether an originating process can be signed by a law firm rather than a legal practitioner is a question of “admissibility” as it affects the claim sought to be asserted, rather than jurisdictional – the power of the court. If this simple distinction is observed, it would clarify a lot of confusion in Nigerian law and practice.
vii. In Solumade v Kuti , in which a writ of summons was signed by M A Bashua & Co, the late Oseji JSC (giving the lead judgment) expressed sadness at the fact that the proceedings which commenced in 1998 to resolve a land dispute, and in which there had been a trial and an appeal to the Court of Appeal should be set aside after 23 years because of “what the law sees as an incompetent originating process” . Take note of the powerful dissent of Agim JSC.
k. Perhaps the source of the error which has burdened civil and criminal practice in Nigeria is the often-cited statement by Bairamian FJ in Madukolu v Nkemdilim that
“Put briefly, a Court is competent when-
(1) it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and
(2) the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction, and
(3) the case before the Court is initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Any defect in competence is fatal. For the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decided. The defect is extrinsic to the adjudication. But is it?
i. The first requirement is truly jurisdiction. So also the first part of the second requirement. But the third requirement is not in any sense jurisdictional. So also the second part of the second requirement. Both confuse “jurisdiction” or competence of a court properly so called, with “admissibility” of a claim. Issues of jurisdiction go to the existence or otherwise of a court’s statutory power to judge the merits of a dispute; issues of admissibility go to whether the court will exercise that power in relation to the claims submitted to it. For example, “there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction”, concerns “admissibility” of a claim rather than the power of the court. Similarly, the claim being “initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction” is about admissibility of the claim rather than the power of the court. The fulfilment of conditions precedent has also been confirmed in the field of arbitration as a matter going to the “admissibility” of a claim rather than the jurisdiction or power of the tribunal.
ii. This catchphrase and box-ticking have done untold damage to the administration of civil and criminal justice in Nigeria.
l. In many jurisdictions, the distinction between rules that are mandatory and those that are directory has largely fallen into disuse. Compare, for example, the approach of the UK Supreme Court in R v Soneji involving section 72A(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 with the case of Zakari v Nigerian Army .
m. In Soneji, Kamlesh Soneji and David Bullen pleaded guilty and were convicted in April 2000 of conspiracy to convert property and move the proceeds abroad knowing the same to represent the proceeds of criminal conduct. Confiscation orders, which were required to be made within 6 months of conviction, were made in January and February 2002 – more than 18 months after. The convictions were upheld. Lord Steyn said it was not useful to ask whether the rule prescribing a 6-month time limit was mandatory or directory. Instead, the true question to ask was whether parliament intended that a failure to comply with the 6-month timetable should deprive the court of jurisdiction and invalidate all proceedings and orders made thereafter, ie to focus on the consequence of non-compliance with the prescribed time-limit. He held that the intention of parliament was not that non-compliance deprived the court of jurisdiction. He also pointed out that it was in the public interest not to allow a convicted offender to escape confiscation simply because of errors of the judicial process.
n. In Zakari v Nigerian Army, Zakari, who was the chairman of a task force sent to investigate the illegal use of Nitel lines for 419 business by yahoo boys, received a bribe of N40k from the suspect company and he released employees of the company that had been arrested. He was court marshalled and convicted. He challenged his conviction on the basis that the court-marshal had a panel of 4 members one of them was his junior. Sections 129(b) and 133 of the Armed Forces Act required a court martial panel to have three members all of whom should be senior to or at least the same rank as the accused officer. In this case, 3 of the 4 officers were senior or same rank as Zakari. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, saying that once a member of the panel was disqualified notwithstanding that the officers constituting the quorum were qualified, the entire proceedings would be a nullity. At page 106D, Justice Ngwuta said that the argument that the fourth member was superfluous as the quorum was 3 members was “curious” and self-defeating, because “If a court, properly constituted by way of membership brings in an additional member who is not qualified to sit, it loses its competence to adjudicate because its composition has changed resulting in a change of the number and qualification of membership”, citing the case of Madukolu v Nkemdilim.
o. The Zakari case illustrates one of the tragedies of adjudication in Nigeria – which is the recourse to formulas, catchphrases and clichés instead of analysis of legislative intent and public interest. The Supreme Court did not ask whether the legislator intended that the entire proceedings should be nullified if the quorum was present but an additional person sat. It did not matter that the Capt Zakari, the gatekeeper, joined the thieves. It did not matter what the public interest required. All that apparently mattered to the Supreme Court was that a fourth superfluous member of the panel sat. That is a very peculiar and narrow understanding of the judicial function and duty.
p. Zakari
q. You could add the Orji Uzo Kalu case.
r. In Okafor v Nweke No 2, the Supreme Court held that an unsigned brief of argument deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. How can that be correct? We are just wasting our time!
s. Hyper technicality!
t. In Makinde v Adekola (2022) 9 NWLR (Pt 1834) 13 there was an unsuccessful challenge to a brief of argument which was allegedly written in a wrong font said to contravene the Supreme Court Rules!
u. In Okafor v Nweke No 2, there was also an unsuccessful challenge to a court document which did not contain the address of the second respondent.
v. Fittingly, the Okafor v Nweke case ended after 70 years of fruitless litigation on the basis that the Notice of further/Additional grounds of appeal as well as brief of argument were signed by JHC Okolo SAN and Co!
w. In criminal litigation, section 396(2) ACJA 2015 provides that jurisdictional and other objections should be taken with the merits and rules upon when judgment is delivered. Partial solution in civil litigation in proceedings begun by originating summons, now reflected in civil procedure rules eg Order 29 of the Federal High Court Rules 2019 – must be raised within 21 days otherwise will be dealt with at the conclusion of the proceedings.
14. Costs in civil litigation
a. Role of costs in civil litigation.
b. Incentives?
c. Basis for assessment – standard or indemnity. In th
d. Are costs awards realistic? Unless and until the courts begin to exercise properly the power to award costs, the courts at all levels will remain congested.
e. In any rational system of civil procedure, adverse costs orders are the principal deterrent against abuse of litigation.
f. In addition, the successful party should recover his costs reasonable (or a substantial proportion thereof) from the unsuccessful party.
g. The threat of adverse costs can induce parties to settle their proceedings either without recourse to the courts or without a trial.
h. Unfortunately, although our courts have powers to award costs, surprisingly they have exercised the powers almost without exception in a manner which not only encourages wasteful and irresponsible conduct of litigation, but also appears to penalise the successful party by awarding what can fairly be described as nominal costs.
i. There are many consequences of the derisory cost regime: (a) encourages frivolous litigation; (b) gridlock; (c) discourages investment and thereby undermines positive policies aimed at improving the investment climate in Nigeria; (d) impoverishes our jurisprudence – no time to think calmly and produce quality judgments; (e) over burdens the judicial infrastructure; (f) damages the health of judicial officers especially judges.
j. See examples from costs in arbitral proceedings – (a) Econet shareholder dispute No 1 against Celtel – £5,701,442, plus US$1,170,738; (b) Econet No 2 against FBC Assets £2,106,404 plus US$711,779; (c) Total v NNPC (2013) – £4,456,424 plus US$1,945,732; (d) Total v NNPC (Nov 2025) – 3 Nigerian arbitrators awarded US$304,406 plus $38,785 ($343k), plus N100m, plus N12m (N112m) where purely local counsel was used. Why aren’t our courts awarding costs at this level?
k. Wasted costs orders.
l. Sanction erring lawyers especially senior lawyers including imposing wasted costs.
HOW DID THESE PROBLEMS AFFECT ELECTORAL LITIGATION?
15. In some cases, election litigation, both pre and post, went on for several 4 years, eg Dr Fayemi against Mr Oni (Ekiti State), Peter Obi against Andy Uba (Anambra State), Adams Oshiomole v Prof Okunbor (Edo State). Hence those states have off cycle governorship elections. In the case of State and National Assembly litigation, some cases remained in court until after life of the Assembly – assemblies have a fixed 4-year lifespan from the date of inauguration.
16. That’s why our selfish lawmakers decided to give themselves and their electoral litigation priority over all other litigation, both civil and criminal.
17. Against the backdrop of judicial gridlock – case backlogs, procedural delays and institutional inefficiencies that collectively obstruct the timely delivery of justice – Nigerian legislators decided to (a) create special tribunals to hear post election disputes, and (b) give priority to electoral litigation affecting politicians alone. They did so constitutionally in section 285 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 – timelines for filing pre and post election disputes (14 and 21 days respectively) and for disposing of such disputes (180 days for first instance: court or tribunal) and 60 days for appeals. To cut out interlocutory appeals, section 285(8) provides that ruling on any preliminary issue or interlocutory issue affecting the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal shall be made at the time of the final judgment.
18. Non-electoral political litigation also enjoy disproportionate priority even without a statutory provision. For example, the Rivers State political crisis pitting the Governor against the House of Assembly, the originating summons was filed on 15 July 2024 and the judgment of the Supreme Court was handed down on 28 February 2025 – a mere 7 months: a Federal High Court judgment was delivered in favour of the defected lawmakers on 30 October 2024, and the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on December 13, 2024. The Supreme Court, on the 28th of February delivered its judgment on the matter on February 28.
19. In contrast, in the case instituted at the Supreme Court by some governors elected on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) challenging the suspension of Rivers State’s democratically elected officials under an emergency rule. The matter could not be slated for hearing at the Supreme Court until the end of the 6-month emergency Rule. The matter was only recently heard at the Supreme Court on November 28, 2025 and judgment delivered on 15 December 2025 striking out the proceedings for want of locus by PDP Governors.
20. There may be perfectly good reasons for that, but in the court of public opinion and public perception, the reality is different.
21. Thus electoral and other political cases receive expedited hearing schedules, specialised tribunals, and heightened judicial scrutiny compared to ordinary civil and criminal socioeconomic cases. This preferential treatment creates a two-tier justice system where politically connected litigants can access swift resolution while ordinary citizens face interminable delay.
22. To meet the demand for prioritised justice, a huge amount of judicial resources is diverted to electoral and political cases at the expense of socio-economic litigation involving land and property rights, commercial disputes, human rights, etc, further exacerbating the gridlock problem. According to the research carried out by the Kimpact Development Initiative, there were 1,893 pre-election cases after the conclusion of party primaries in June 2022. With only 77 Federal High Court judges in Nigeria available to decide these 1,893 pre-election cases, as prescribed by the Electoral Act , of which 815 were appealed and more than 400 reached the Supreme Court. The sheer number made is created a logjam that forced the suspension of regular proceedings, leaving thousands of other litigants in limbo as they struggled to meet the 180-day deadline.
23. As regards post-election litigation, 1,209 petitions were filed, according to Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC)’s 9 April 2025 report , with 840 appeals filed. 21 governorship election appeals went to the Supreme Court. For example, in the 2023 general elections, 338 judges were deployed to 98 election petition tribunals across Nigeria. These judges were drawn from various courts, including State High Courts, Federal High Courts, and the National Industrial Court. When these judges are assigned to election tribunals, every case pending in their home courts is put on hold.
24. According to PLAC:
The Court of Appeal is responsible for constituting Election Petition Tribunals (EPT) and therefore holds the official records and statistics of the number of petitions filed by parties. According to the Court of Appeal, the official number of petitions filed following the general elections held in February and March 2023 is 1,209, out of which 206 were withdrawn, leaving 1,003. A total number of 840 appeals were filed at the Court of Appeal, 21 appeals were filed at the Supreme Court with respect to the governorship elections, and 2 appeals were filed at the Supreme Court with respect to the presidential election.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRIORITISATION OF ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL CASES
25. In IPCO, Tomlinson J (2007) described the delays in Nigeria’s civil justice as “catastrophic” and in the Court of Appeal (2008) the Nigerian proceedings were described as “sclerotic” – pretty strong condemnation. In the Total v NNPC (2020) SDNY, adjudication in Nigerian courts was described “hyper technical”.
26. The prioritisation of electoral and political litigation has further exacerbated the problem of gridlock which have catastrophic economic and social consequences.
27. Economically, the gridlock harms investment and impedes economic development. Law and dispute resolution are central to investment climate and our national prosperity. An important aspect of the rule of law is the enforcement of contracts and property rights. If disputes are unresolved for decades, it means that a key ingredient of the rule of law is missing. The consequence is flight of investment, loss of revenue, unemployment, etc. The Project Eagle aircraft dispute – has been in court for 10 years and aircraft is unusable. Same for wet lease disputes involving Jimoh Ibrahim’s Virgin Nigeria. For 14 years Meridien has been seeking to enforce ICC arbitral awards obtained in 2011 in respect of a dispute arising from the termination of a hotel management agreement in 2006 – nearly 20 years.
28. The gridlock also creates weak and unaccountable institutions which undermine our democracy. Every one of us is familiar with the mantra “Go to Court” – because there is no expectation that justice can be obtained from the courts.
29. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings consistently place Nigeria among the lowest-ranked countries, partly due to the difficulties in enforcing contracts and resolving commercial disputes through the judicial system.
30. The United States Department for Commerce highlighted Nigeria’s “slow and ineffective judicial system” and “lack of effective judicial due process” in its Country Guide for US exporters.
31. The commercial implications of judicial delay are particularly severe for small and medium size enterprises, which lack the financial resources to sustain prolonged litigation. For these businesses, legal disputes over contracts, debts, or property rights can become existential threats when resolution takes years rather than months. The resulting economic distortion privileges large corporations with greater litigation capacity while stifling the entrepreneurial activity that drives inclusive growth. The economic costs of judicial gridlock in socio-economic matters thus represent both an immediate business constraint and a long-term development challenge.
32. Gridlock also leads to unfair settlements because instead of facing the prospect of interminable litigation, investors opt to cut their losses and move on.
33. The gridlock also has harmful social consequences.
34. The law and the resolution of disputes are instruments for social engineering, integration and change. Gridlock undermines the social contract between the citizens and those who exercise power in their names. Justice delayed is justice denied and encourages self-help.
35. The prioritisation creates a significant disparity in access to justice which disproportionately impacts ordinary Nigerians, whose access to legal remedies for economic and social grievances becomes increasingly theoretical rather than practical.
36. The prioritisation of electoral justice at the expense of economic and social justice reinforces inequality and alienation. Law should foster rather than hinder the growth of social life and cohesion in our community, facilitate the recognition of the sanctity of human life, maintain and enhance human dignity. Unfortunately the priority accorded to electoral and political cases prevents the realisation of these ideals and prevents law from addressing fundamental issues of poverty, inequality, and economic rights. This systemic imbalance not only perpetuates institutional dysfunction but also exacerbates socioeconomic disparities, erodes public trust in democratic institutions, and ultimately compromises Nigeria’s developmental progress.
37. Thus, beyond its economic effects, the deprioritization of socio-economic justice exacerbates structural inequalities and undermines the protection of fundamental human rights. When cases involving land rights, labour disputes, consumer protection, and access to essential services face interminable delays, the justice system effectively denies redress to vulnerable and marginalised populations. This justice gap reinforces patterns of exclusion and disadvantage, particularly for those who lack the political connections to expedite their cases.
38. This erosion of public trust is particularly damaging in a democracy, where judicial institutions depend on public confidence to effectively fulfil their constitutional role. The institutional consequences of this trust deficit are multifaceted. As citizens lose faith in formal justice mechanisms, they may increasingly resort to other ways of settling scores including self-help, violence or mob justice.
39. This withdrawal from state institutions further weakens the social contract and undermines the rule of law.
WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS TO THE GRIDLOCK PROBLEM?
40. What’s the way forward from Nigeria’s slow and ineffective judicial system? I would suggest 10 solutions.
41. First solution – better funding and resources for the judiciary. Recruit more judges and other court officials, upgrade the court infrastructure and make greater use of information technology.
42. Second solution – reduce bribery and corruption in the judiciary because often it is unclear where incompetent ends and corruption begins – zero tolerance to judicial corruption. Stop giving corrupt judges a smack on the wrist or reinstating dismissed corrupt judges. One-year suspension without pay gives the appearance of tolerance of corruption, as does placing them on a watch list or not being eligible to apply for promotion. In most systems, it would be unthinkable that a judge with a past history of corruption could ever be considered for elevation.
43. Third solution – courts should exercise stronger case management powers free from appellate court interference. The aim of a managed system of dispute resolution is to ensure that cases are disposed of fairly and justly and above all that each case is allotted its appropriate share of the court’s resources. Case management orders will therefore balance the interests of the parties to proceedings and the public interest in ensuring that the parties do not use more than their fair share of a public resource – the courts. Case management powers underpin and seek to achieve this balance by ensuring that a judge makes procedural orders which are best for the active management of the case.
44. Fourth solution – limit interlocutory appeals and their effect on existing proceedings by combining jurisdiction objections with merits hearings, eg section 306 of the ACJA provides that applications for stay of proceedings shall no longer be heard until judgment. Further, such application can longer operate to stall continuation of trial. Section 306 has the potential to curb the misuse of interlocutory appeals to scuttle criminal trials.
45. Fifth solution – strengthening prosecution and investigation in criminal litigation– a lot of the cases that are brought to court have been very poorly investigated and the evidence in support is so deficient that one wonders why such cases should be brought to court at all.
• Proliferation of charges instead of investigation of 1 to 10 charges and selecting the best.
• There should be greater separation and independence between the investigators and the prosecutors.
• Better resourcing of investigation and prosecution.
46. Sixth solution – sort out the mess arising from the definition and allocation of jurisdiction between the Federal and the State High Courts, which is a major cause of delay in the administration and delivery of civil justice.
47. Seventh solution – reform the way cases are listed – by reducing the number of cases listed and the way they are listed so as to reduce multiple bookings for the same lawyer. And create better communication with counsel.
48. Eight solution – judicial attitude needs to change –
• Many Judges do not sit on time because of indiscipline.
• Many fail to sit in pursuit of personal business – parties, school runs, attendances at seminars and conferences.
• Resistance to use of modern technology.
• A lot of wasted time because of failure to inform counsel that Judge will be absent.
• Cynical attitude of the courts – if a party fails to take a procedural step on time, he is sanctioned, eg default fees, strike out or dismissal for want of diligent prosecution.
• But there is no sanction where a Judge misses time limits
• Inability to give Bench Rulings, which means that every point, however small or immaterial, will be adjourned for a Ruling.
• No evidence that the adjournment for Ruling gives rise to well considered Ruling. Instead, in the vast majority of cases, counsel is kept waiting in court while the Judge belatedly writes a Ruling on a matter that had been adjourned for a Ruling for several months.
49. Ninth solution –cure the defective system for the appointment and promotion of Judges and reduce political influence on the appointment and promotion of judges. Excessive lobbying for appointment to the Bench has meant that merit has been largely surrendered to patronage.
• The new trend of judges and politicians seeking to appoint their children, relatives and mistresses as judges.
• Serving Judges lobby politicians for promotion to the higher Bench, which is shocking.
• Judges nurture unnecessary social relationships because they believe they need such relationships to progress on the Bench.
• Senior Judges ask lower court Judges to throw cases as favour
• These make it all but impossible for the Judges to be independent or impartial.
• What is required is a merit based and rigorous selection process.
50. Tenth solution – impose proper costs and sanction erring lawyers especially senior lawyers including imposing wasted costs and professional discipline. As regards professional discipline, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) is shamefully non-functional. Professional misconduct complaints lodged in 2020 are yet to be investigated.
FINAL THOUGHTS
51. No system of civil or criminal justice administration is or can be perfect. Ours has been described as “catastrophic”, “sclerotic” (rigid, unresponsive, losing the ability to respond, hard and insular) and “hyper technical”. Is our judiciary incapable of adapting?
52. Credible civil and criminal justice systems do not fall from trees and are not delivered by angels such as the biblical Angel Gabriel. They are the result of deliberate choices made and implemented. Such credible justice systems, like other great things, do not occur by fiat or impulse, but are the products of deliberate choices made and achieved by bringing “small things” together. It is those “small things” that coalesce and guarantee fair hearing and inspire public confidence in our justice system.
53. For example, English law and adjudication are exported worldwide. London is the number centre of international commercial and investment arbitration. In more than 70% of cases in the English commercial court, neither party is English. English law and English courts have been chosen because of the confidence in English law and adjudication by the courts. This has enabled many small English law firms to become global firms. The value added by lawyers alone is more than US$50 billion annually. You can only imagine the direct and indirect consequences.
54. Our judiciary can play a very important role in making Nigeria a good destination by solving at least the judge-made problems which cause gridlock. A lot of the gridlock is due to judge made rules which are outdated and unfit for purpose. There are at least four reforms which are low hanging fruits that can be plucked quickly and effectively: (a) redefining truly jurisdictional questions and keeping them separate from admissibility questions – could invite amicus briefs, could involve a presentation to senior judges, or host civil justice summit; (b) make court rules combining jurisdictional objection with merits hearings as is done in originating summons proceedings and election litigation (section 285(8) of the Constitution); (c) reforming the award of costs – costs must be assessed, not just announced. Reasonable costs must be awarded. We do it in arbitrations in Nigeria. Why can’t the courts do the same? (d) improved work ethic and attitudinal change – CPR works in England but not in Nigeria. Case management conferences work in England but not in Nigeria. Fast track works in England but in Nigeria? Why? No civil or criminal procedure rule is self-executing. Human beings must implement.
55. Unless these issues are addressed, no amount of funding can ease the gridlock.
