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  • State police and questions Nigeria can no longer avoid

    State police and questions Nigeria can no longer avoid

    • By Tosin Osasona

    Nigeria’s post-1999 democratic era has coincided with one of the gravest crises of state authority in the country’s history, with the state appearing weak and incapable of defending its authority. Fundamentalist Islamist groups, ethnic militants, gangs, secessionist movements, cult groups, organized criminal groups, and political thugs, among others, have relentlessly challenged the state to a duel of superiority, forcing the state into either spasms of retroactive violence or face-saving settlements. While this crisis of governance has interconnecting structural and operational drivers, political actors, particularly at the subnational level, have increasingly framed the decentralization of the Nigeria Police Force as one of the key solutions to this complex problem.

    Undoubtedly, the centrally controlled Nigeria Police Force and the uniform conceptualization of policing in Nigeria are problematic for the country’s diversity and complexity. In acknowledgement of this fact, every president since 1999 has initiated police reform of some sort. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration appears poised to advance the most far-reaching reform yet: the constitutional amendment required to permit state-controlled police services. While the political momentum behind this proposal is significant, the critical policy question remains unresolved: will the creation of state police meaningfully address Nigeria’s security crisis, or merely reproduce existing failures at a subnational scale?

    There is no empirical, contextual, or policy-based evidence that suggests constitutional authorization alone can deliver Nigeria’s much-needed security outcomes. Public policy effectiveness is largely determined by the political and institutional environment in which it operates. For a political system characterized by low levels of accountability, deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions, permanently simmering secessionist agitations, and politicization of policy processes, will the establishment of state police not create worse problems in the long term?

    What will stop these new policing outfits from being appropriated as personal enforcement gangs for state governors?

    While policing is less about institutional form and more about institutional character, Nigeria is oddly one of the few countries globally among multi-ethnic and multi-religious federal states that expressly prohibit subnational governments from exercising any policing authority. Therefore, the case for state police is compelling; however, the challenges lie less in principle than in the operational and institutional details. Given Nigeria’s political history, how then should the proposed police decentralization be structured to safeguard critical constitutional guarantees, enhance the capacity of subnational units to respond to local security concerns, and reduce the potential for abuse?

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    Across the world, all effective and efficient policing systems are built on three crosscutting pillars: legitimacy, accountability, and professional competence. Assessments based on multiple performance indicators suggest that the Nigeria Police Force performs poorly across all three dimensions. Creating state police will at best address the question of legitimacy, leaving unresolved the crisis of accountability and professional competence. The Nigeria Police Force is the ideological successor entity to the colonial Consular Guard of 1861, which was built on the mantra of using ‘strangers to police strangers’—an extractive policing system conceived to protect ruling power rather than local communities. State-created policing outfits will at least be resourced from local communities, would be enmeshed in local contexts, and would have cultural affinity with the communities they serve. This will to some extent address legitimacy concerns that bedevil the Police Force in Nigeria. Unless there is deliberate institutional design, state creation and control of policing authorities will not automatically translate to fairer and more respectful policing procedures, a more equitable distribution of policing outcomes, or strict adherence to law and human rights.

    Policing is an expensive enterprise, demanding sustained investment in personnel, training, infrastructure, intelligence systems, and operational logistics. Without these critical financial inputs, a decentralized system risks merely replicating the current inefficiencies at a subnational level. Currently, only nine out of the 36 states can meet their salary obligations without total dependence on federal funds, and only about 20 states are paying the current minimum wage. Where, therefore, will the funds to finance the proposed state policing outfits come from?

    The stark disparity in fiscal capacity of states creates a dangerous possibility, where poorly funded state police units could become bands of armed men, nominally in uniform but functionally abandoned to fend for themselves. This would incentivize extortion, predation on the very citizens they are meant to protect, and could see these units auctioning their coercive power to the highest bidder, deepening insecurity and corruption. Therefore, the transition to state police demands not just a constitutional amendment, but a fundamental revaluation of fiscal federalism to prevent the birth of 36 potentially uneven and, in some cases, dangerously unmoored police services.

    Beyond the hurdle of fiscal viability lies the more contentious question of operational and organizational independence. If state police services are to be more than just ‘State House Enforcers’ with broader jurisdictions, their leadership must be insulated from local politics. Lessons from abuses by the First Republic’s regional policing force teach that without clear institutional safeguards, state police risk becoming instruments of political patronage rather than instruments of public safety. Independence, among other things, will require legal frameworks that define the chain of accountability, establish professional standards, and create oversight mechanisms—possibly through independent policing commissions—ensuring that state police serve the people, not the political ambitions of individual governors. Knowing what we know, how many governors will commit to this in practice?

    Ultimately, Nigeria’s current policing system is in urgent need of reform. A realistic reform pathway lies in restructuring the existing centralized system to allow for hybrid control and a multi-tiered policing arrangement that accommodates both national and subnational policing platforms. Whatever choice is settled upon, any serious policy on police reform in Nigeria must be accompanied by a clear framework for sustainable funding, an oversight system, and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the creation of state police strengthens, rather than destabilizes, local security governance.

    State police may indeed be inevitable. Whether they become a solution or a new source of insecurity will depend less on constitutional amendments than on the political will to confront Nigeria’s deeper governance failures.

    •Osasona, a criminal justice professional is of Centre for Public Policy Alternatives, Lagos.

  • Beyond rituals: Inside China’s Africa-First diplomacy

    Beyond rituals: Inside China’s Africa-First diplomacy

    •  By Charles Onunaiju

    The tradition of choosing Africa first in China’s diplomatic work in which the foreign minister visits the region at the start of every year, in the past 36 years is neither a hollow ritual nor a safari. Facts have proven over the years that the consistent pattern of the diplomatic outreach which is rooted in the history of China-Africa cooperation has enabled one of the world’s most pragmatic and productive partnerships, in contemporary international relations.

    The tradition did not jump out of the magic box but is rooted in the shared history of anti-colonial struggles and the solidarity built from it. From December 14, 1964 to February 4, 1964, China’s affable Premier Zhou Enlai made the famous visit to 10 African countries –Egypt, then (United Arab Republic), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, spending a total of 55 days in Africa, the longest of any visiting foreign leader to the region in all her post-colonial history.

    Significantly, before his scheduled arrival to Accra, Ghana, an assassination attempt on the then Ghanaian leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, nearly marred the visit but the legendary premier insisted on the visit to demonstrate the unbreakable bond of friendship between China and Africa, for which even an unforeseen circumstance could not vitiate.

    Premier Zhou Enlai, went on, in Ghana to announce the historic Eight Principles of Assistance to Arab and African countries which among them is the iconic “self-reliance”, in which it was explicitly stated that “the purpose is to help recipient countries embark on the road to self-reliance and independent development, not to make them dependent on China”. The spirit of the Eight Principles has traversed the historic trajectories of China –Africa cooperation up to now with adaptations and modifications to the changing times. Beijing’s Africa first diplomatic outreach at the start of every year in the past 36 years is a bold affirmation and testament that no matter how China grows in influence, wealth and power or even however, the world changes, China  would remain trustworthy and reliable friend of Africa and true to her essential historic features.

    This important bit of history is necessary to disclaim any notion that contemporary China-Africa cooperation is transactional or opportunistic. While the course of the partnership as evident in the tradition of Chinese foreign minister first visit to Africa at the start of the year drew from history, it is not a mere tribute to historical memory. It is practical and aligns with strategic contributions to the core concerns of Africa including, support to narrow or even close the historical deficit in infrastructure connectivity, that for long hobbled the vision of the region’s integration and Pan-Africa unity.

    The Belt and Road Initiative, a framework for international cooperation has delivered and still delivering on the critical requirements of Africa that not only enables connectivity within Africa but with the rest of the world.

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    The significance of the BRI is best illustrated that Africa is the region of the world with the largest number of partner countries. From Nigeria’s first ever deep seaport; Lekki Deep sea port to Mombasa –Nairobi to standard gauge railway, Ethiopia- Djibouti’s first electrified railway and many others, the state of infrastructure connectivity is nearing the bold vision for African industrial and infrastructure integration outlined in the historic Lagos Plan of Action, decided in 1980 by African leaders meeting under auspicious special session of the organization of Africa Unity (OAU) held in Lagos, with prior consultations with organized labour movement and other popular non-governmental groups, including the intelligentsia and women. The pragmatism and tangible outcomes embedded in the follow-up process of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which are further reinforced in the Africa first tradition of Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit to the region has helped established a predictable frame work of long term engagement.

    On the 70th anniversary of China’s diplomatic relations with Africa starting with Egypt’s Abdel Nasser’s outreach to the then young People’s Republic of China in 1956; Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania and Lesotho is significant, not only because it conforms to the continuity of a tradition already well known to the world but more importantly for the year under review. In the spirit of the traditional format of consultations and consensus, the Chinese and African leaders declared the 2026 as “China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges”, a deliberate calibration to people-centric engagement because a historic partnership of China-Africa proportion is not only more secure in the intimate bosom of the people, but should better flourish at the people’s conscious ownership of its process.

    At Ethiopia during the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other high officials including the African Union chairperson, Mr. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, co-chair of FOCAC, Jean-Claude Gakosso who is also the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Congo, Ethiopian President, Taye Atske Salassie, the “China-Africa Year of People-to People Exchange” was launched with clarion calls for the two civilizations to deepen dialogue and play pivotal roles in the global dialogue among civilizations.

    President Xi Jinping in his congratulatory letter on the occasion expounded on the significance of mutual learning among civilizations in adding momentum to China-Africa modernization. He further outlined the direction and principles of people-to-people and cultural cooperation, which demonstrated deep reflections on human history and civilization and provided important guidance for building an all-weather China-Africa community with a sacred future for the era. He added that facts have buttressed that people-to-people exchanges form the most solid foundation of China-Africa friendship; even as mutual learnings stand as solid platform on which the cooperation would continue its upward trend.

    The “iron clad” nature of China-Africa cooperation is not built on a shared historical memory of solidarity in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles alone but in the vision of building resilient economies and political stability with the social dividends of peace and improved living conditions for their respective peoples. In their respective national construction, China and African countries have outlined critical sphere of engagement; mutual learnings and experience sharing in governance, thereby expanding the value-chain of engagement, in addition to a solid and credible track record of cooperation in critical areas as trade and investment, industrial and production capacity cooperation, infrastructure cooperation which have already endeared a revolutionary landmark with impacts in across Africa.

    Furthermore, the international consensus on “One-China Principle”, an irreducible minimum of China’s international outlook underlining her sovereignty and territorial integrity, has enjoyed its most high profile affirmations in Africa, where the occasional tantrums of the “Taiwan independence” troublemakers and its few foreign collaborators are staunchly rebuked and reprimanded. At Addis Ababa, the AU headquarters, during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Visit, the regional body reaffirmed the “One-China Principle”; stressing unequivocally that there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory and that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and that the AU firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national unification.

    The Belt and Road Initiative despite been the world’s biggest public goods, represent for Africa a major turning point because it objectively aligns with the region’s historic requirement to open the path to sustainable and inclusive development. Throughout its nearly 13-year history, Africa has not only closely associated with it, but many countries in Africa have deliberately tailored their respective policy to engage with the Belt and Road Initiative. And in the current stage of high quality development, its reputation for sustainability and quality delivery on schedule continues align the urgency of closing the infrastructure connectivity gaps in Africa.

     In the world in which the U.S President Donald Trump has boasted that he is not restrained or constrained by international law or rules but by what he called his private morality, China and Africa should step up in more strategic engagement, accumulating more strategic aggregates for both resilience and credible deterrence, while playing constructive roles in building an international governance architecture that is both broad and inclusive, an effective antidote to any bully.

    The visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi in honour of a 36-year-old tradition, where Africa is the first destination for any Chinese Foreign Minister, is not much a renewal but a vital new historic starting point, when Africa-China cooperation is no longer at a luxury that both sides can conveniently afford, but an imperative and clarion call to duty, because an increasingly desperate world surely need the certainty and sure-footedness in cooperation model that both sides exemplifies.

    •Onunaiju, Director, Centre for China Studies, (CCS) Abuja.

  • Tinubu, reforms and the long arc of history

    Tinubu, reforms and the long arc of history

    • By Bamidele Ademola-Olateju

    Serious nations are not built by applause lines, they are built by leaders willing to confront hard truths, absorb political pressure, and make choices whose benefits may only become clear with time. History is unequivocal on this point. Throughout the world, administrations that are most celebrated in hindsight, were often the most criticised in their early years. From Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, to India’s 1991 economic reforms, from post-war Europe, to modern Asian economies, structural change has always come dressed in discomfort. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration belongs to this tradition of difficult but necessary governance.

    When President Tinubu assumed office, Nigeria was not merely facing cyclical challenges; it was grappling with deeply embedded structural distortions. For decades, successive governments postponed reform, choosing political ease over economic logic. Subsidies, exchange rate manipulation, fiscal opacity and consumption-driven growth became the norm. The bill for that avoidance eventually came due. President Tinubu’s removal of fuel subsidy was the most visible and controversial decision of the administration’s early days.

    Yet history offers clarity here; no country has ever sustainably developed by subsidising inefficiency and smuggling at the expense of education, healthcare and infrastructure. Nigeria’s fuel subsidy regime had long ceased to serve the poor. It enriched a narrow network of importers and middlemen while bleeding public finances dry. Ending it was not cruelty; it was correction. Every reforming economy has faced a similar reckoning, and none escaped it by pretending the problem did not exist.

    The foreign exchange reform followed the same historical logic. Multiple exchange rates created a system where access, not productivity, determined success. Arbitrage thrived, investment hesitated, and confidence eroded. By moving toward a unified and more transparent exchange rate regime, the Tinubu administration chose realism over illusion. History again provides perspective: economies that grow do not fix prices by decree; they create systems that reward value creation and discipline rent-seeking. These decisions were not made in isolation, they were made within a difficult global context marked by inflationary pressures, geopolitical tensions, and tightening financial conditions. Nigeria did not invent these headwinds, but it had to respond to them.

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    Leadership is never exercised in ideal conditions, it is tested precisely when conditions are harsh. Beyond macroeconomic reform, the administration has demonstrated a clear understanding of how nations actually grow. Infrastructure remains central to its development strategy, not as political ornamentation but as economic necessity. Roads, rail lines, ports and power systems are the unglamorous foundations upon which industrialisation rests. No serious student of history disputes this. From Britain’s rail expansion to China’s logistics revolution, infrastructure has always preceded prosperity, not followed it.

    Equally important is the recalibration of social policy. Rather than broad, untargeted spending that often collapses into waste, the government has begun shifting toward more focused interventions. The student loan scheme, targeted social assistance and renewed engagement with subnational governments reflect lessons learned globally; effective social policy supports mobility and productivity, not dependency and spectacle. Critics often frame reform periods as evidence of failure. History suggests the opposite. Reform is disruptive by nature. It exposes inefficiencies, resets expectations, and forces adjustment. The early years of reform are rarely comfortable because they dismantle old arrangements before new benefits fully materialise. Countries that abandoned reform midway often found themselves worse off, trapped between broken systems, and unrealised alternatives.

    As Nigeria looks ahead to the 2027 presidential elections, the question before voters should not be whether reform was painless. That question has never had an affirmative answer anywhere in the world. The real question is whether the direction is right. Early signs suggest an economy being repositioned for competitiveness rather than consumption, for productivity rather than patronage. Fiscal discipline is improving. Revenue conversations are becoming more honest. Investment signals, while cautious, are responding to policy clarity. These are not overnight achievements. They are the early markers of structural repair.

    President Tinubu’s political history also matters in this context. He is not an accidental reformer. His record in Lagos State demonstrated an understanding of institution-building, revenue reform and long-term planning. Lagos did not become Nigeria’s economic nerve centre and the fifth largest economy in Africa by chance; it became so through sustained, sometimes unpopular, policy choices. That same philosophy now informs governance at the national level.

    Elections are snapshots in time. Nations, however, are long projects. The Tinubu administration has chosen to govern with an eye on history rather than headlines. That choice carries risk, but it also carries promise. If the reform momentum is sustained, 2027 will not merely be an electoral contest; it will be a referendum on whether Nigeria is finally prepared to endure short-term pain for long-term gain. History is clear: countries that succeed do not avoid hard choices. They make them, defend them, and stay the course. Nigeria now stands at that familiar crossroads.

    The Tinubu administration has chosen a path history tends to reward. When President Franklin Roosevelt chose a similar path of reform, Americans felt the pain at the outset. By the end of his first term, they began to experience changes in economic outlook, but the economy had hardly rebounded. Nevertheless, Americans decided to give him a second term to complete the reforms. He was even given a third term to consolidate on the gains, especially as the World War II loomed in the horizon. That is why, today, Roosevelt is still the only American President to serve more than two terms.

    •Ademola-Olateju, a former Ondo Commissioner for Information, is Director of New Media and Corporate Services for All Progressives Congress (APC).

  • Football does not create unity

    Football does not create unity

    By Akpandem James

    The DeeJay at Farm City was livid with rage. Not the performative rage that sometimes accompanies hype music and crowd control, but a visceral indignation provoked by what had become the talking point of the day: the temerity of Algerian players joking that the Super Eagles of Nigeria would be sent back to Sambisa Forest after their quarter-final encounter at the ongoing Africa Cup of Nations in Morocco. It was a jab at his national pride, an insult to his national identity.

    Long before kick-off, a large crowd had gathered at the expansive leisure spot along Kashim Ibrahim Way, Wuse Zone 2, Abuja, on Saturday night. The size of the crowd was not unusual for a major match night; what was striking was its composition and disposition. People of all shades, ages and backgrounds converged in different spaces. The early birds secured a spot in the section with the giant LED screen. That section also has a performance stage. They were not there for the usual revelry. They were there to watch Nigeria battle Algeria in faraway Marrakesh.

    Naturally, Eagles and Foxes are never best of friends. In the wild, both are predators, locked in a rivalry of survival. Eagles prey on young foxes; foxes raid eagle nests for eggs and chicks. So, the threat to return Nigerian Eagles to Sambisa Forest, Nigeria’s infamous den of terrorists, was not entirely out of place within the metaphor of animal rivalry, though it touched a raw national nerve. The crowd at Farm City was therefore apprehensive but expectant. MTN and Guinness spiced up the night with promotions: buy two bottles of Guinness, get one free; SIM cards and routers registered at no cost. It was a full night of fun and expectation, but the match was the real issue. It was the reason for the eclectic crowd.

    A viral video had earlier shown a member of the Algerian national team jokingly warning: “Nigeria, I hope you are ready, because we have no option than to send you back to Sambisa Forest tomorrow.” That video was the fuel. It was the kicker of the frenzy. Yet beyond the banter, the conviviality at Farm City was palpable. Mixed emotions paraded the corridors between tables laden with steaming chop, cold drinks and cups of hot tea. Green was the dominant colour: jerseys, caps, scarves, bracelets. Religion, tribe and political affiliations were conspicuously absent. Only apprehension and patriotic frenzy held sway.

    As the referee’s whistle pierced the Marrakesh night and echoed through the Abuja screen, Farm City fell into an initial anxious silence punctuated by nervous commentary and spontaneous chants. Fans watched the first half with trepidation. Every Nigerian touch was cheered. The Super Eagles responded with authority. Deft touches, tailor-made passes and telegraphic shots into the 18-yard box pinned the Desert Foxes deep in their own half. For long stretches of the first 45+ minutes, Algeria barely crossed the halfway line.

    In that moment, the small patch of Abuja felt larger than life. The Godswill Akpabio Stadium in Uyo, the Moshood Abiola Stadium in Abuja and the National Stadium in Lagos could not have boasted a more pan-Nigerian and enthusiastic crowd than this one small space in Wuse. It was perhaps in hundreds of people, but its pluralistic composition and single-purpose commitment made it profoundly eclectic. The various ethnicities in Nigeria and accents from beyond its boundaries blended seamlessly. Strangers shared tables, drinks and opinions with an ease rarely seen outside moments of national catharsis.

    On my left sat Tomi Ojetunde, a man I had never met before that evening. Yet in the spirit that enveloped the arena, familiarity came easily. My colleague, Iyobosa Uwugiaren, was on my right beaming with ecstasy. Intermittently he will remind me that Osimhen is his brother. Leaning towards me amid a wave of pressure from the Algerians that quickly fizzled out, Ojetunde said with quiet certainty, “Nigeria will win.” There was no bravado in his voice, just conviction born of faith in the green-white-green.

    Still, there was a goal drought. The first 45 minutes, plus added time, ended goalless. This was despite Nigeria’s dominance, over 70 percent possession, relentless pressing and territorial control. Some fans groaned. Others shifted uneasily in their seats. Ojetunde did not waver. “Goals will come,” he insisted. Not “a goal,” but “goals.” Plural! He then added: Two goals! He repeated it like a prophecy waiting for fulfilment. He was not just optimistic, he was emphatic. But he did it with the calmness of a medical doctor that he is. It came to pass!

    The second half began, and almost immediately, destiny arrived. Nigeria advanced to the Africa Cup of Nations semi-finals after a convincing 2 – 0 quarter-final victory over Algeria in Marrakech. Victor Osimhen opened the scoring early in the second half, rising highest to head home Bruno Onyemaechi’s cross on his 50th cap for the Super Eagles, his fourth goal of AFCON 2025. Farm City exploded.

    Barely had the echoes of celebration died down when Akor Adams doubled the lead, finishing into an empty net after Osimhen’s deliberate square pass, which he connected from a sublime outside-of-the-boot assist from Alex Iwobi. Nigeria dominated proceedings, no doubt, but could not increase the score line. Adams later hit the post, but the message was already clear. A semi-final clash with hosts Morocco was in view.

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    When the first goal came through Osimhen’s boot about the second minute of the second half, Farm City erupted into a frenzy, buoyed by thunderous jams from the DeeJay’s turntable. The same Deejay who had earlier fumed at Algerian bravado suddenly seemed transported. He thundered, “Anyone who prays that the Algerians see the Nigerian net…” he received a Pentecostal “Holy Ghost Fire!” response from the crowd before he could conclude. Then he started speaking in tongues, shouting half-coherent praise into the microphone. He joked that Akor missed some goal chances because he does not drink Guinness Stout. Strangers embraced without realising they were doing so. Tables rattled. Drinks spilled. The music became a universal elixir, pushing revellers off their seats, possessed by the spirit of football and the madness of victory. Bodies moved in seductive synchrony, a spontaneous choreography that spoke eloquently of national unity. In those minutes, football blurred primordial lines. It dissolved differences and suspended worries.

    One thing was obvious in that shared space: football doesn’t create unity; it reveals its latent possibility. For Nigeria, the implications run deep: what stirs us emotionally can fuel social and political cohesion, if deliberately harnessed. This unforced harmony offers real hope, not just illusion. It proves Nigerians are not inherently divided; they are ready for unity. The challenge for leaders, media and social institutions lies in transforming these explosions of collective joy into a lasting national identity.

    Perhaps the Algerians are unaware that Nigerian forces recently stormed Sambisa Forest and shattered the myth that once clung to it. The place no longer carries the dreaded weight it once did. And so, in a twist of poetic justice, instead of the Eagles being sent back to Sambisa, it was the Foxes that were sent scampering back to the Sahara Desert, where, for the duration of the tournament, they rightly belong.

    • James is an Abuja-based communication consultant.

  • Nigeria’s strategic exposure in a fragmenting US order

    Nigeria’s strategic exposure in a fragmenting US order

    Lekan Olayiwola

     The global order is hardening in ways that matter for how power is exercised and how external influences intersect with domestic risk. Many of the assumptions that guided middle and regional powers for much of the past two decades are quietly being revised. This shift reveals itself through patterns that appear discrete, even idiosyncratic, but together signal a deeper recalibration in how influence is asserted and defended.

    Recent developments involving the United States’ posture towards Venezuela, renewed assertions around Greenland’s strategic value, diplomatic strain with South Africa, intensified pressure on China and Russia, and a more focused attention on strategically positioned states across Africa are often treated as isolated episodes or personalised to individual leaders. That framing misses the larger point.

    Nigeria at the nexus of strategic recalibration

    What is emerging is a fragmenting US led geopolitical order in which rules remain invoked, but selectively applied; in which multilateralism persists, but increasingly as cover rather than constraint; and in which leverage is exercised more openly across energy, finance, security, and narrative space.

    For Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, a regional anchor, and a state approaching another pivotal electoral cycle, this moment introduces strategic risks that are subtle, cumulative, and easily misunderstood. This is not a story of imminent confrontation or external orchestration. It is a reassessment of exposure.

    From cooperative leadership to transactional power

    For much of the post–Cold War period, US leadership operated through cooperative frameworks, institutional mediation, and a degree of predictability that allowed regional powers to plan around relatively stable assumptions. That posture is giving way to something more transactional. Across recent US foreign-policy decisions, an emerging pattern is a willingness to privilege direct strategic advantage over cooperative leadership, flexibility over restraint, and bilateral leverage over consensus-driven process.

    Moves around Venezuelan oil once heavily sanctioned, now selectively re-engaged demonstrate how quickly principle yields to strategic need. Renewed rhetoric around Greenland reflects a blunt recognition of geography, resources, and Arctic positioning. Diplomatic distancing from South Africa signals lower tolerance for ambiguity among partners perceived as drifting.

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    None of this is anomalous. It reflects a broader recalibration driven by domestic pressures, energy insecurity, industrial competition, and intensifying rivalry with China and Russia. The significance lies less in any single decision than in the normalisation of a precedent that exceptional measures are justified by strategic urgency, and that international restraint is conditional, not assumed.

    Nigeria in a fragmented multipolar order

    Multipolarity, once an approaching condition, is now an operational reality; but in a form far less orderly than the term suggests. What is emerging is not a balanced concert of powers, but a fragmented landscape in which influence is unevenly distributed, rules are enforced asymmetrically, and alignment is increasingly issue-specific.

    China’s economic reach in Nigeria is deep and visible, spanning infrastructure, trade, technology, and finance. Yet domestic unease over debt exposure, labour practices, local value capture, and industrial dependency has grown steadily.

    Russia’s economic footprint remains modest by comparison, but its interest in defence cooperation, security diplomacy, and symbolic alignment persists, particularly as it seeks partners outside Western pressure regimes. Western engagement continues to emphasise stability, counter-terrorism, and reform, but increasingly through narrower channels, reduced aid budgets, and more explicit conditionalities. Nigeria is not being courted because it is weak, but because it is strategically consequential.

    Strategic importance as exposure

    Nigeria’s scale gives it leverage, but it also magnifies scrutiny. Its demography shapes migration calculations. Its energy profile intersects awkwardly with global transition politics. Its geographic position and military weight matter in a region destabilised by Sahelian coups, jihadist expansion, and declining European influence.

    This strategic importance creates expectations. Regional stabilisation roles are assumed. Security cooperation intensifies. Diplomatic silence is interpreted. Policy choices once treated as domestic reforms are read through geopolitical lenses. The result is not pressure applied openly, but exposure that accumulates quietly.

    Security cooperation and the risk of dependency

    Counter-terrorism partnerships, intelligence sharing, and military assistance have delivered tactical benefits. Yet without sustained investment in indigenous surveillance, logistics, command structures, and defence production, such cooperation risks sliding from partnership into dependency.

    When threat perception, intelligence priorities, and operational tempo are shaped externally, strategic autonomy narrows even as immediate risks are managed. Security becomes stabilising in the short term but constraining over time.

    Economic vulnerability in a transactional era

    Economic exposure compounds this vulnerability. Nigeria’s reliance on oil exports, foreign exchange inflows, and external financing leaves it sensitive to shifts in global energy politics, sanctions regimes, and financial signalling.

    As development finance becomes more transactional and debt restructuring increasingly intersects with geopolitical alignment, economic policy space tightens. Choices presented as technocratic including subsidy reform, currency management, and fiscal consolidation now carry strategic meaning beyond Nigeria’s borders.

    Sovereignty today is rarely tested through overt interference. It is tested through incentives. Infrastructure finance, security assistance, trade concessions, and investment pledges respond to real needs, yet they also shape policy horizons. When available options are structured externally, autonomy erodes quietly. Sovereignty is not lost by imposition, but by constrained choice.

    Elections as a strategic pressure point

    As Nigeria approaches the 2027 elections, these dynamics intensify. In a context of economic strain and social pressure, external actors offering capital inflows, security guarantees, or reputational endorsement can shape political narratives without appearing to intervene. Elections in a hardening global climate become pressure points rather than flashpoints. Structural influence works without orchestration. 

    Nigeria does not need dramatic realignment or rhetorical defiance. It needs intentional strategy. Security partnerships must deepen domestic capability rather than substitute for it. Economic diplomacy must prioritise value capture, not just aggregate inflows. Non-alignment must be active, negotiated, and strategic, not passive.

    Nigeria must also recognise that influence will increasingly flow through softer channels like information ecosystems, consultancy networks, diaspora capital, regulatory standards, and digital platforms.

    Strategic clarity in a fragmenting order

    The current geopolitical moment is not uniquely hostile, but it is less forgiving of ambiguity. Great powers are acting more openly in pursuit of interest. Middle powers are being drawn into these dynamics whether they choose to be or not. Nigeria’s challenge is not choosing sides in a renewed great-power struggle. It is avoiding being compressed by struggles defined elsewhere.

    In a fragmenting US-led geopolitical order, sovereignty is preserved not by declarations, but by capacity, foresight, and disciplined choice. That work is quiet, incremental, and often invisible, but it is precisely what determines whether Nigeria remains a rule-taker or secures its place as a consequential actor on its own terms.

    •Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher/policy analyst. He can be reached at lekanolayiwola@gmail.com

  • Journalism and the diary of disaster

    Journalism and the diary of disaster

    By Ray Ekpu

    At the end of every year there is always a graceless burst of bad news for journalists. That is when media-related organisations release the year’s diary of disaster, bringing to the public the number of journalists killed or imprisoned in the outgoing year.

    In its recent report, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) has informed us that 128 journalists were killed in 2025, 10 of them women. The Middle East and the Arab World recorded the highest figure of 74 which is 58% of the total killings. The most notable of the killings was the targeted attack on Anas Al-Sharif, an Al Jazeera reporter killed along with five other journalists and media workers in a tent housing journalists on the outskirts of Al Shita Hospital in Gaza City on August 10, 2025. Another trouble spot, Yemen, came second with 13 deaths while Ukraine, Sudan and India recorded eight, six and four respectively.

    Other countries such as Mexico, Peru and Pakistan also lost some journalists during the past year. Of particular interest to observers is the brutal murder of an Indian journalist Mukesh Chandrakar on January 1, 2025. He was beaten to death with an iron bar and his body dumped in a septic tank.

    In Africa, Sudan took the lead with six deaths while Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe followed closely. Even though Nigeria recorded the death of seven media workers in a car accident on December 29, 2025, this is not considered work-related. The IFJ says that since 1990, it has recorded 3,173 deaths of journalists worldwide. This is an average of 91 deaths per year. In 2024, it also recorded 122 deaths while 516 were imprisoned.

     In 2025, 533 journalists were in prison globally. China took the first position on this while Eritrea also came first in Africa, putting behind bars seven journalists out of a total of 27 imprisoned in Africa. In Nigeria, a number of well-known journalists have been assassinated over the years. Dele Giwa, the founding Editor in Chief of Newswatch leads the pack. He was assassinated through the instrument of a parcel bomb on October 19, 1986. Bagauda Kaltho of The News magazine, Godwin Agbroko of ThisDay newspaper and Bayo Ohu of the Guardian newspaper were also victims of targeted attacks. They were all killed without their murderers being brought to justice.

    For several decades, journalists in Nigeria have been in distress. Apart from the killings, hundreds of journalists have been thrown into detention for frivolous reasons by power hungry, corrupt and irresponsible leaders who cannot look truth straight in the face. Many newspapers and magazines were proscribed especially during the Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha iron-fisted administrations in the 80s and 90s. So it can be said without any fear of contradiction that the media in Nigeria have not been in fine fettle in terms of available freedom of expression.

    Our leaders, both military and civilian, have had the tendency of exploding from time to time in a towering rage of intolerance because they have something to hide. They think that the media are digging for dirt that they have accumulated during their stay in office. But the truth is that truth is like a pregnancy, you cannot hide it for too long. That is what makes the job of any committed journalist extra difficult. Ordinarily, journalism practice is not a cakewalk. It is a tough assignment because journalism enjoys the scent of scandal and any journalist who is committed to bringing the scandal to the full glare of the public is considered by the victim as an enemy. Everyone in the public space wants to have good ink in the media. No one wants to be thrown into the abyss of grief through the report of uncomplimentary conduct. This is what leads to the targeting of some journalists, their unfair detentions and death.

    However, as the statistics given by the IFJ shows, most of the journalists were killed at theatres of global conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, Yemen etc. There isn’t much that can be done about that because journalists must cover conflicts. And most of the combatants at the scene of conflicts do not obey the rules of international engagements. They even target journalists and other civilians because they believe, falsely or fairly, that they are probably spying for the other side. Secondly, there are misjudgements in the use of their equipment by some combatants. So journalists and other civilians get to pay for these mistakes with their lives. That makes journalism quite a hazardous enterprise.

    The IFJ General Secretary, Anthony Bellanger says “that 128 journalists killed in a single year is not just a statistic; it is a global crisis. Those deaths are a brutal reminder that journalists are being targeted with impunity, simply for doing their job.” There is an element of truth in this because warriors who do unconventional, unorthodox and illegal things at the war front may target journalists so as to prevent them from reporting the inconvenient truth at the war front. Even though there are continental and global laws that cover such engagements, the truth is that when a war breaks out, laws are easily broken and hell’s gate stays open.

    In Africa, there is the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. At the global level, there is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. There is also Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which guarantees protection for journalists on duty. The problem is not the absence of laws. There are laws but they are not respected particularly in war situations. That is why journalists get killed in such situations. And as the war zones increase around the world, journalists are assigned to do their duty in those places. The more wars there are, the more journalists that are likely to be assigned to cover them and the more journalists that eventually get killed. So it can be said that global conflicts are journalism’s worst enemies. If global conflicts are reduced, the number of journalists killed at such settings will also be reduced. But since many politicians are power hungry, global conflicts cannot be eliminated.

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    So what can be done? One, media organisations must provide insurance cover for their journalists who are assigned to cover conflicts. If they get killed on duty, their loved ones can get the benefits of the insurance cover. Two, many media organisations may not have the huge financial muscle that can get for their journalist the kind of insurance cover that can be very beneficial. That is why it is important for such media bodies as the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN), Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria (BON), Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and other media-related bodies to launch a fund-raising event for the purpose of helping journalists in distress. Three, the federal government must show interest in the cases of journalists killed in Nigeria and bring their killers to justice. That is government’s duty to journalism in Nigeria.

     Right now, self-pity is sitting on the chests of journalists around the world like a pile of bricks for the deaths, avoidable deaths that have occurred to journalists in various parts of the world. Self-pity is not enough. Journalists all over the world must unite to save their profession. There is an Ethiopian proverb that says that “when cobwebs unite they can tie up a lion.” It is not enough for us to look at these statistics and sigh and shrug our shoulders and go away. These deaths obviously affect our practice. It is George Bernard Shaw who said that “the ultimate in censorship is assassination.” Whether we know it or not these killings invariably affect our profession and may even discourage young people from coming into it for fear of being killed. 

  • Venezuela: It’s the oil, stupid!

    Venezuela: It’s the oil, stupid!

    United States President Donald Trump has for long fantasised about annexing northern neighbour, Canada, as his country’s 51st state. Now, he’s struck a better deal in the larger hemisphere with Venezuela. The Latino nation with vast oil reserves, estimated to be the world’s largest, is a conquered colony and its natural wealth is pledged to America’s pleasure. It is effectively the rule of might in a world presumed to run on international law espousing respect for mutual sovereignty.

    President Trump tore up the global rulebook with his country’s attack recently on Venezuela and the capture of its strongman, Nicolás Maduro, along with his wife, Cilia Flores, and their extradition to the US for trial. Maduro is accused by Trump of running “state sponsored gangs” and facilitating drug trafficking from his country into the US. The 63-year-old was early last week arraigned before a Manhattan judge on charges including “narco-terrorism” conspiracy, cocaine importation and weapons trafficking – allegations that he has long denied. But neither did Trump disguise his interest in taking control of Venezuela’s oil, and he has since the bombing of Caracas leveraged every occasion to claim that country’s oil resource. And he offers no apology for the brazen appropriation.

    It was not the first time the US was taking out another country’s leader for differences – genuine or orchestrated. But it was a first in flaunting might to take over other people’s natural wealth. Maduro’s capture came nearly four decades after US forces seized another indicted Latin American leader and one-time ally, Manuel Noriega of Panama. Noriega rose to power in 1983 on the heels of a plane crash that killed then junta leader, Omar Torrijos, and he was propped up by Washington with hundreds of thousands of dollars avowedly to fight drug trafficking. He was even said to be on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll as an informant and he promoted US interest in Latin America – at some point acting as Washington’s liaison with Fidel Castro of Cuba.

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    Noriega fell out of favor with Washington when he asserted his independence, and following allegations he was accepting bribes to allow drugs into the US in the late 1980s. Former President George H.W. Bush ordered US troops to invade Panama in late 1989, sending 24,000 troops to topple Noriega’s government. That operation resulted in the death of 23 American soldiers and left hundreds more injured. Noriega hid out in the Vatican embassy before surrendering to US authorities on 3rd January, 1990, upon which he was taken to the US to face drug trafficking charges. His fall marked the end of military dictatorship in Panama. He was convicted on drug trafficking charges and spent 20 years in American jail before being extradited to France in 2010 to serve a seven-year sentence for money laundering. Noriega was returned to Panama in 2011 to complete a 60-year sentence for offences imputed to the military’s three-decade rule in that country. He died of complications from a surgery to remove a benign brain tumor in 2017 at 83 years.

    Trump must have a sardonic sense of history, in that he ordered the capture of Maduro on 3rd January, 2026 – exactly 36 years from when Noriega surrendered to US forces. The Venezuela operation was reportedly delayed for many days owing to inclement weather conditions, though. Unlike the casualty-incurring Panama invasion, the Venezuela mission was clinical. In the two-hour-and-twenty-minute mission by air, land and sea that maximised the element of surprise, Maduro was seized from his safehouse and squirrelled off with his wife before Venezuelan authorities could make sense of decoy explosions and multiple US strikes that targeted the country’s air defence systems and other military targets.

    The American leader praised the operation as one of the “most stunning, effective and powerful displays of American military might and competence in American history.” According to him, only “a couple of guys” got injured on the US side with no service member killed. Meanwhile, Venezuela cited a heavy toll on its part. Venezuelan Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino said many in Maduro’s security team as well as “soldiers and innocent civilians” were killed in the US operation. Washington had previously offered a $50million reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest. But by 04:20 local time on 3rd January, helicopters were leaving Venezuelan territory with Maduro and his wife in custody of the US Department of Justice en route to New York to face criminal charges. About an hour later, Trump broke the news to the world: “Maduro and his wife will soon face the full might of American justice,” he said.

    Only it’s not all about Maduro’s misdeeds, but rather about taking control of Venezuela’s oil reserves. And Trump didn’t even mask the intention. At one of his early press parleys following the invasion, he said the US would “run the country” until a leadership transition could take place, and that US oil firms would go into Venezuela. On the same day that Maduro was seized, Venezuelan supreme court ordered Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez to assume office as interim president during Maduro’s “temporary absence.” But Trump insisted the US will decide the country’s fate. He later said Rodríguez had offered her support to Washington, adding cryptically: “She really doesn’t have a choice.”

    In subsequent statements, the American leader said Venezuela would soon be turning over some 50million barrels of oil to the US. In a social media post, he stated that the oil being expected from Venezuela would be sold and the proceeds used for the benefit the people of Venezuela and the US. “I am pleased to announce that the interim authorities in Venezuela will be turning over between 30 and 50million barrels of high quality, sanctioned oil to the United States of America,” he said. “This oil will be sold at its market price and that money will be controlled by me, as President of the United States of America, to ensure it is used to benefit the people of Venezuela and the United States,” he added. On the heels of Rodríguez taking the oath as Venezuela’s interim president, he had warned: “If she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.”

    Venezuela has millions of barrels of oil loaded on tankers and in storage tanks that it’s been unable to ship owing to a US blockade on exports imposed late last year. Now, Washington and Caracas have reached a deal to export up to $2billion worth of Venezuelan crude to the US – an indication that the Venezuelan government was responding to Trump’s demand that authorities there open up to US oil companies or risk expanded military action. The Trump administration, mid-last week, laid out bare-bones plan to take control of selling Venezuelan oil. “We are in the midst right now and in fact about to execute a deal to take all the oil,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday in Washington. Earlier in the day, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said the US intended to maintain significant control over Venezuela’s oil industry, including overseeing the sale of the country’s production “indefinitely.” Venezuela’s state oil firm issued a statement same day confirming that negotiations were underway with the US, but stopped short of saying a deal was in place.

    Maduro wasn’t by any stretch a good leader of his country. But Trump was the quintessential aggressor in a world system handicapped from holding him in check. And so, it sucks to moralise the US military action the way United Kingdom Conservative Party leader with Nigerian roots, Kemi Badenoch, sought to do. Speaking on BBC Radio 4 Today programme last week, Badenoch described the American raid as morally justified and equated Maduro’s misrule to her own experience of military dictatorship while growing up in Nigeria.

    “Morally, yes,” the Tory leader responded when asked whether sending special forces to seize Maduro was right. “While the legal certainty is not yet clear, morally I do think it was the right thing to do,” she said. “Venezuela was a brutal regime. We didn’t even recognise it as a legitimate government. I think that what’s happened is quite extraordinary. But I understand why America has done it,” Badenoch explained. She linked her stance to her background, saying her views were shaped by lived experience. “I grew up under a military dictatorship [in Nigeria], so I know what it’s like to have someone like Maduro in charge. I know what it’s like to have people celebrating in the street. So I’m not condemning the US,” she said.

    Badenoch never tires of belittling the country of her ancestry, but she was wrong as ever. The attack on Venezuela had nothing to do with morality. It’s the oil, stupid!

    •Please join me on kayodeidowu.blogspot.be for conversation. 

  • Impact of the new CBN cash policy

    Impact of the new CBN cash policy

    • By Kelvin Gilberts

    In a major policy shift, the nation’s apex bank, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), introduced a new set of cash management rules. The policy took effect on January 1. 

    By the provisions of the policy, the old deposit limits and the frustrating deposit fees have been abolished in a move that makes it possible for bank customers to now deposit any amount of cash at no charge. This is actually a positive change that makes banking more convenient.

    In the same direction, the new policy sets a new cumulative weekly cash withdrawal limit of N500,000 for individuals and N5 million for businesses. Similarly, it demands that withdrawals above those limits would require the payment of excess withdrawal fees (three per cent for individuals, five per cent for businesses)

    The policy also places automated teller machine (ATM) withdrawals at N100,000 per day and N500,000 per week. In the same vein, third-party cheques above N100,000 can no longer be cashed over the counter though they can still be deposited into accounts. The CBN, in this new policy, requires banks to report all large withdrawals to it monthly

    Other provisions of the policy permit banks to keep 60 per cent of excess withdrawal fees, while CBN takes 40 per cent. The implication is that banks garner profit when customers exceed withdrawal limits.

    Also, only government accounts and microfinance institutions are exempt as previous exemptions for embassies, diplomatic missions, and aid donor agencies have been removed

    What this entails is that cash withdrawals are now more restricted, and withdrawing above the limits will cost more. However, deposits are now completely free.

    It must be understood that this is not the CBN’s first attempt to manage cash usage. The process has been on since 2011 as the apex bank continues to push for a cashless economy through various policies. This new circular, however, supersedes other previous policies and represents its most comprehensive effort yet.

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    The intention of the policy according to experts, are to reduce the cost of cash management (printing, transporting, and securing physical currency; address security concerns around large cash movements; reduce opportunities for money laundering and encourage adoption of digital payment systems.

    It is pertinent to stress that the CBN is not trying to eliminate cash, but it is deliberately making large cash transactions more expensive so as to shift behaviour toward digital alternatives.

    For those thinking of playing smart, the limit is cumulative. It doesn’t matter if one withdraws from multiple banks or multiple accounts. The CBN tracks withdrawals per individual across the banking system. The same goes for businesses (corporate accounts).

    By the provisions of the policy, ATM withdrawals have their own daily limit (N100,000 per day), but these withdrawals count toward one’s weekly N500,000 total.

    What this means is that if one withdraws N100,000 from an ATM every day for five days, one may have used one’s entire weekly limit. Any additional cash withdrawal that week, whether from an ATM, POS, or over the counter, will trigger the three per cent excess fee.

    The impact of this policy on bank service consumers is dependent on how much one relies on cash.

    What is obvious, however, going by the provisions of this policy, is that more people will depend on transfers and digital payments; ATM availability may feel tighter; charges can add up quickly if one relied on frequent cash withdrawals; small businesses that operate mostly in cash will need to adjust; planning becomes more important and large one-time expenses require planning.

    So far, the focus has been on restrictions even as a lot remains the same or actually may have improved: Among them include the reality that deposits are now completely free (previously there were deposit limits and fees); bank transfers remain free and unlimited – no restrictions on digital transfers; POS payments remain unaffected – paying merchants via POS doesn’t count toward withdrawal limits; online/mobile banking remains the same – bill payments, subscriptions, and digital transactions are unchanged and cash is still legal tender – you can use it for any transaction; you just face limits on withdrawing large amounts.

    Experts are positive that excess withdrawal fees of 3–5 per cent are avoidable if bank customers reduce reliance on physical cash while using bank transfers, POS, or online payments wherever possible; spread their cash withdrawals across weeks; use digital wallets or bank transfers for recurring expenses such as school fees, rent, subscriptions, utility bills, pay these digitally instead of withdrawing cash to pay them. Most schools, landlords, and service providers now accept transfers and keep emergency fund digital. Emergencies often force large, sudden withdrawals, which now attract fees. If your emergency fund is in a savings account or investment that allows quick transfers, you can move money digitally without hitting withdrawal limits.

    They also advise that suppliers and vendors be paid via transfer; consider splitting payment method. If one needs N1 million for a transaction, you might withdraw N500,000 (avoiding fees) and arrange a bank transfer for the remaining N500,000 just as they must understand that splitting across accounts doesn’t help. The CBN tracks withdrawals per individual across all banks. Withdrawing N300,000 from Bank A and N300,000 from Bank B in the same week still totals N600,000, triggering fees on the N100,000 excess.

    In the prevailing circumstance, it is advisable to deploy digital financial tools. It helps if one organised spending money digitally: Hold daily funds in digital wallets or savings accounts; plan big expenses; automate cash flow: schedule regular savings to avoid last-minute withdrawals; rely less on ATMs: Keep money accessible digitally without hitting withdrawal caps; build better habits: Nigeria is shifting toward digital finance; adapting early helps avoid inconveniencing charges.

    With this new policy, Nigerians have a lot to expect and hope for. For certain, CBN is not trying to ban cash. Cash remains legal tender and will continue to be available. However, the CBN is deliberately making large cash transactions more expensive to encourage digital payments, which are cheaper to manage, more transparent, and harder to use for money laundering. This is part of a global trend toward cashless economies

    Furthermore, cash will continue to be available, but controlled: Digital payments will keep growing: They’re the cheaper, easier alternative for most transactions; businesses and individuals who adjust early will avoid unnecessary fees: Those who resist change will pay thousands or even millions in excess withdrawal fees; financial planning will matter more than ever: Tools that help you manage money digitally will become essential: Whether it’s your bank’s mobile app, a digital wallet, or investment platforms, comfort with digital money management is no longer optional.

    Nigeria isn’t eliminating cash, but the direction is clear: using large amounts of cash will now come with limits and, often, extra costs.

    •Gilberts is a management consultant.

  • Still on Nigeria’s re-designation as ‘country of particular concern’

    Still on Nigeria’s re-designation as ‘country of particular concern’

    • By Hafiz Bakare

    In October 2025, the re-designation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) by the Trump administration sparked significant debate regarding its tone and intent.

    Nigeria and the United States subsequently found common ground to collaborate on the airstrike which took place on Christmas Day 2025. This collaboration was a direct result of diplomatic engagement that followed significant Nigerian and international reservations about President Donald Trump’s initial communication, which many saw as threatening and misinformed.

    The primary reservations regarding President Trump’s communication re-designating Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) on October 31, 2025, focused on its *inappropriate tone, selective framing of the security crisis as purely religious persecution, and a perceived threat to Nigerian sovereignty.

    The Nigerian government, led by President Bola Tinubu, strongly refuted the U.S. characterization that Christianity faced an “existential threat,” stating it did not reflect the country’s reality or values. Officials stressed that violence affected citizens of all faiths, including Muslims, and was tied to broader issues like terrorism, resource conflicts, and governance challenges.

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    Many Nigerians, including ethnic organizations and diplomats, viewed Trump’s subsequent threat of potential U.S. military intervention (“guns-a-blazing”) as an insult to national sovereignty and a dangerous oversimplification that could exacerbate sectarian tensions.

    Nigeria’s initial, more assertive diplomatic response was soon replaced with a toned-down version to de-escalate tensions, highlighting internal government deliberation on how to manage the diplomatic friction.

    Analysts and some U.S. lawmakers argued that framing Nigeria’s complex security landscape in narrow religious terms was counterproductive and detracted from the wider problem of tackling jihadist violence and widespread insecurity affecting everyone.

    Trump’s rhetoric, including threats to enter the country “guns-a-blazing” and instructions to the “Department of War” to prepare for action, was seen as inflammatory and a violation of diplomatic decorum.

    Some observers viewed the move as an attempt to appeal to Trump’s domestic religious base in the U.S. rather than a nuanced foreign policy effort.

    A visiting bipartisan delegation of U.S. Congress members later clarified that the CPC designation was intended to foster reforms through dialogue and partnership, not military force, dismissing any plans for U.S. troops on the ground.

    Experts urged the U.S. to use its leverage to pursue a broader, more nuanced approach to religious freedom that acknowledged Nigeria’s complex, multi-layered crises rather than a single-issue focus.

    The two countries did find common ground, leading to a collaborative operation. The U.S. airstrikes on December 25, 2025, targeting ISIS in Sokoto State, were conducted in coordination with and with the approval of Nigerian authorities.

    Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar confirmed that President Tinubu gave the “go ahead” for the operation after discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Nigerian government officially described it as a “collaborative effort” and “precision strike operation”. Nigeria provided intelligence and strategic coordination, while U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) carried out the kinetic action at the request of the Nigerian government.

    While collaboration was confirmed, a slight divergence remained in the public framing. President Trump’s statements emphasized targeting those “persecuting Christians”, while Nigerian officials stressed the operation was about general counterterrorism and ensuring the safety of all innocent civilians, irrespective of religion.

    Yes, the initial reservations have been addressed to a reasonable extent through ongoing dialogue and practical security cooperation. The shift from Trump’s initial threats of unilateral military action to a coordinated operation with Nigerian consent indicates successful diplomatic de-escalation.

    Following a high-level meeting in Washington, D.C., in November 2025, both nations agreed to a non-binding cooperation framework and the creation of a Joint Working Group to unify their approach to counter-terrorism and civilian protection.

    Since late November 2025, the U.S. has conducted daily intelligence-gathering flights over Nigeria using contractor-operated aircraft to monitor militant movements and support Nigerian tactical operations.

    High-level engagement and bipartisan congressional visits have helped clarify the U.S. intent as partnership and capacity-building rather than “punishment” or “invasion”.

    The incident has spurred more concrete actions from the Nigerian government, including a declaration of a nationwide security emergency and planned recruitment of more police officers, demonstrating a commitment to addressing security concerns internally.

    In November 2025, Nigeria unveiled its National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Strategic Plan 2025–2030, which prioritizes bilateral cooperation with the U.S. to enhance intelligence analysis and modernize Nigeria’s security architecture.

    However, a few Nigerians still have sovereignty concerns despite the collaboration while the fundamental disagreement over whether the violence constitutes “religious persecution” or “regional insecurity” persists, with the U.S. administration and Nigerian government continuing to use different language to describe the same conflict.

    Overall, both nations ultimately chose pragmatism, leveraging the moment of diplomatic tension to reinforce their shared interest in counterterrorism, ensuring the bilateral relationship remains a strong, albeit complicated, partnership.

    •Bakare is a consultant and a former bank chief executive.

  • Was Section 233 (3) deleted from the amended 1999 Constitution?

    Was Section 233 (3) deleted from the amended 1999 Constitution?

    • By Sylva Ogwemoh

    It is no longer news, and neither is there any controversy that the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has altered the Constitution of the  Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (the Constitution) at least five times, starting with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act 2010 (First Alteration Act 2010).

    What is, however, news or has become controversial in the legal community in Nigeria is the supposed deletion of subsection 3 of section 233 of the Constitution in the first and second alterations of the Constitution.

    If the Constitution has indeed been altered by the deletion of subsection 3 of section 233 of the Constitution, the argument could be made as it is presently the case that the Supreme Court no longer possess the jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the Court of Appeal on grounds of mixed law and fact.

    This article, therefore, seeks to establish by evidence supported by the authentic versions of the Constitution that there was no alteration to section 233 of the Constitution that deleted subsection 3 of the Constitution.

    Introduction

    In the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration) Act 2010, Section 233 of the Principal Act (the Constitution) was only altered in paragraph (e) under Section 24 of the First Alteration Act 2010, by – (a) Substituting for the word “or” after the word “President” in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii), a comma, and (b) inserting immediately after the word “Vice-President” in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii), the words “Governor or Deputy Governor”.

    By the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Second Alteration) Act 2010 (Second Alteration Act 2010), Section 233 of the Constitution was further amended by Section 6 which only altered Section 24 of the First Alteration Act 2010 by amending subsection 2 of Section 233 of the Constitution by the addition to the subsection, subsection 2 (iv), (v) and (vi) which deals with election to the office of the governor of a state or the deputy governor of a state, the term of office of the governor of a state or the deputy governor of a state and whether the office of the governor of a state or the deputy governor of a state has become vacant.

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    From the evidence available to the writer, there was no amendment by the deletion of subsection 3 of Section 233 of the Constitution by the Second Alteration Act 2010.

    Genesis of the controversy

    In Shittu v. P. A. N. Ltd. (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 195 at 209-210, Honourable Justice Rhodes-Vivour J.S.C., in delivering the lead Judgment, struck out the appeal of the appellant upon a determination of the provisions of sections 233(2) and (3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the appeal lacked merit for failure of the appellant to seek and obtain leave of either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court before commencing the appeal; the grounds of appeal being grounds of mixed law and fact.

    Honourable Justice Rhodes-Vivour J.S.C., who delivered the lead judgment, however, proceeded at pages 209-210, paras. H-B of his judgment to make the following remarks: “I must observe that there is now in existence the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered by the First, Second and Third Alterations Acts, 2010. By the alterations, there is no longer section 233(3) of the Constitution.

    That is to say, the Supreme Court can only hear appeals where the ground of appeal involves questions of law. See section 233(1) of the Constitution.

    The Supreme Court no longer has jurisdiction to hear appeals where the ground of appeal involves questions of mixed law and facts. Appeals on grounds of mixed law and facts end at the Court of Appeal.”

    In Amadi v. Wopara (2022) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1811) 359 at pages 370-372, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to clarify the Court’s position in Shittu v. P.A.N. (supra), when the Court held that the observation made by Honourable Justice Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C., in Shittu v. P.A.N. Ltd. (supra) is, no doubt, an obiter dictum as the comment was made in passing, and therefore not binding on the Supreme Court.

    Given the decision of the Supreme Court in Amadi v. Wopara (supra), the controversy generated by the remarks of Honourable Justice Rhodes-Vivour J.S.C., in Shittu v. P.A.N. Ltd (supra) appeared to have been laid to rest until the case of Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (2025) 14 NWLR (Pt. 2006) 531 at 586-587, where my Lord, Honourable Justice Saulawa J.S.C., in his concurring judgment, again stirred up a hornets’ nest of legal controversy on the amendment of section 233 of the Constitution in the following words: “I аm not unmindful of the view point ехрrеssed by Augie J.S.C, in the recent case of Amadi v. Wopara (2021) LPELR-58286(SC); (2022) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1811) 359:… With utmost deference, the fact that by viгtue of the provision of section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Second Alteration) Act, 2010 (supra), the Supreme Court’s power regarding leave to argue ground of mixed law and facts has been removed from the Constitution, is no longer in doubt.

    In mу paramount view, it is tantamount to an impunity, thus, would not auger well for the courts may (sic) counsel to continue to act upon the provisions of subsection of section 233 of the 1999 Constitution that has since 2010, over onе and half decades ago, been deleted by, or substituted with an entirely new section 233 pursuant to section 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Second Alteration) Аct, 2010.”

    From the above statement of my Lord, Honourable Justice Saulawa J.S.C., it is apparent that the basis for my Lord’s comment on the powers of the Supreme Court to continue to hear appeals on grounds of mixed law and fact is that section 6 of the Second Alteration Act 2010 substituted a new section 233 of the Constitution. However, it does appear, with the greatest respect, that there is now clear evidence that the Second Alteration Act 2010 did not alter section 233 by deleting subsection 3 from the section.

    Was Section 233(3) deleted?

    The answer to the question whether section 233(3) was deleted from the Constitution by section 6 of the Second Alteration Act 2010, ought to have come from the National Assembly, being the organ of government with the powers to make laws for the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but I am yet to come across an official statement from the National Assembly on the matter.

    Majority of opinions on the subject however seems to suggests that section 233(3) has been deleted from the Constitution while some other legal commentators have argued that the deletion is the result of an erratum (an error in printing or writing) in the course of printing the Constitution, thus suggesting on the other hand that there was no deletion of section 233(3) from the Constitution.

    The question, however, to be answered is whether an erratum can be said to occur in a document that did not emanate from the appropriate authority or which appears to be a product of unintelligent piracy or fakery. In the writer’s respectful view, this lingering controversy is needless, because a diligent search or enquiry from the appropriate authority would have revealed the clear provisions of the authentic version of the Constitution.

    Thus, the Forward by the former Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Mohammed Bello Adoke, SAN, CFR, to the authentic version of the Constitution is helpful in the circumstances. The former Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Mohammed Bello Adoke, SAN, CFR, who appears to have been aware of this needless controversy and in a bid to lay it to rest, prior to leaving office in 2015, circulated what he called “the authentic version of the 1999 Constitution with its 1st , 2nd and 3rd Alterations as passed by the National Assembly in 2010 and gazetted by the Federal Government Printer in 2011”.

    That version of the Constitution was printed by the Federal Government Printer, Lagos (the appropriate authority), and circulated by the Federal Ministry of Justice.

    In the Forward to the authentic version of the Constitution, the then Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation, Mohammed Bello Adoke, SAN, CFR, stated as follows and I quote: “In keeping with the constitutional responsibility of my Office as the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and mandate of the Federal Ministry of Justice to ensure that legislation in the public domain are comprehensive, certain and predictable, the imperativeness of producing for circulation the authentic version of the 1999 Constitution with its 1st, 2nd and 3rd Alterations as passed by the National Assembly in 2010 and gazetted by the Federal Government Printer in 2011 is of utmost importance and priority.

    “By virtue of section 22(1) of the Interpretation Act, CAP 123, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, where an enactment is amended by the insertion or omission of words or by the substitution of words for other words, then on printing the enactment at any time after the amendment takes effect, the person authorized to print the enactment shall, if so directed by the Attorney General of the Federation, print the enactment as so amended. I have therefore directed the Federal Government Printer to print the Constitution with the First, Second and Third Alterations.

    “In line with the provisions of section 22 (2) of the Interpretation Act (supra), the Federal Government Printer has included special side notes as indicators of the amendment and the enactment of which was made.

    “I therefore recommend this publication of the 1999 Constitution with its Alterations as passed by the National Assembly to date to all institutions, persons seeking to know the current constitutional provisions applicable in Nigeria and to the general public for use and appropriate guidance.”

    In the same vein, Abubakar Malami, SAN, who was the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation from 2015-2023, following the footsteps of his predecessor in office, and in an apparent move to settle the controversy surrounding the amendment of the Constitution, circulated an updated version of the Constitution with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Alterations and in his Forward to the authentic version of the Constitution, stated as follows: “In line with the constitutional responsibility of my Office as the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and the mandate of the Federal Ministry of Justice towards ensuring that legislations in the public domain are complete, certain, genuine and predictable.

    “Equally, the need to circulate to the members of the public the authentic version of the 1999 Constitution with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Alterations as passed by the National Assembly and duly Gazetted by the Federal Government Printing Press in 2011 and 2019 remains pivotal to my responsibility. I therefore consider the production of the 1999 Constitution with its Alterations as my utmost priority and responsibility as the Chief Law Officer of the Federation by making available the officially Gazetted 1999 Constitution with 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Alterations for the members of the public…

    “The rational for the production and circulation of the 1999 Constitution (with its Alterations) is borne out of the unpleasant development of the circulation of different fake versions of the 1999 Constitution (with Alterations) by some vendors without my seal of authority and approval leading to instances, whereby erroneous and misleading provisions are contained in some of the copies of the Constitution in circulation. In view of the above, I hereby recommend the publication of the 1999 Constitution (with its 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Alterations) as passed by the National Assembly by the Federal Ministry of Justice for the benefit of all institutions and persons seeking to know the current constitutional provisions applicable in Nigeria and to the general public for usage and appropriate guidance.”

    A reading of the authentic versions of the Constitution printed by the Federal Government Printer and circulated by the Federal Ministry of Justice under the guidance of both Attorneys-General would show that section 233(3) of the Constitution is intact and has not been deleted. The footnote in the section is with reference to subsection (2) of section 233, which was altered by section 6, Act No. 2, 2010. Section 6, Act No. 2, 2010, only altered section 24 of the First Alteration Act, which had only amended section 233(2) of the Principal Act in paragraph (e).

    In the amendments in the First and Second Alterations, subsection (3) of Section 233 of the Constitution remained untouched and intact because it was never amended or removed from the section, and this is why the subsection is till date part of the authentic versions of the Constitution circulated by the Federal Ministry of Justice on the authority of the Attorneys-General of the Federation, Mohammed Bello Adoke, SAN, CFR, and Abubakar Malami, SAN.

    Also, the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Volume 3 updated to the 31st day of December 2010, and prepared under the authority of The Revised Edition (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) Act 2004, by the Law Revision Committee under the Chairmanship of Honourable Mr. Justice E.A. Ayoola and published by LexisNexis (Pty) Ltd in 2011, has section 233 of the Constitution intact without any deletions of subsection 3 of section 233 of the Constitution or any subsections thereof.

    Conclusion

    If there is any document being referred to as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which does not carry subsection 3 of section 233, that document is not the authentic version of the Constitution printed by ‘The Federal Government Printer, Lagos’, and or such copy of the Constitution that has been printed on the authority of the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation in such a manner as may be specified by his direction pursuant to his powers under section 22(1) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 123, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.

    · Ogwemoh, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, is the Founder and Senior Partner of the Law Firm of KMO Legal and can be reached at info@kmo.legal